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All England Law Reports/1963/Volume 2 /Jordan v Burgoyne - [1963] 2 All ER 225

[1963] 2 All ER 225

Jordan v Burgoyne

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

LORD PARKER CJ, ASHWORTH AND WINN JJ

19 MARCH 1963

Public Order - Public meeting - Threatening, abusive or insulting words - Breach of peace - Group of persons in audience intent on obstructing speaker - Words in fact insulting to them - Speaker must take his audience as he finds them - Whether contravention of Public Order Act, 1936 (1 Edw 3 & 1 Geo 6 c 6), s 5.

The respondent was addressing a crowd of about five thousand people at a public meeting, amongst whom were two hundred or three hundred young persons, positioned together immediately in front of the speakers' platform, who intended to prevent any meeting being held at all if they could. That group contained Jews, supporters of the campaign for nuclear disarmament and communists. The respondent used words insulting to that group. The appellant, a superintendent of the Metropolitan Police, stopped the meeting and the police had the greatest difficulty in restoring order, twenty people being arrested for offences involving breaches of the Queen's peace. The respondent's appeal to quarter sessions against his conviction under s 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936a, of using insulting words at a public meeting whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned was allowed on the ground that, though the words used were highly insulting, they were not likely to lead ordinary, reasonable persons attending the meeting to commit breaches of the peace. On appeal by the prosecution,

a Section 5 is set out at p 227, letter b, post

Held - For the purposes of s 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, a person had to take his audience as he found them and, if the words that he used to a particular audience, or part of it, were in fact likely to provoke a breach of the peace, then he would be guilty of an offence under s 5 (see p 227, letter d, post); in the present case the words used by the respondent were intended to be and were deliberately insulting to the body of persons who were being restrained by the police and there had been a clear contravention of s 5 of the Act of 1936.

Appeal allowed.

Notes

As to offensive conduct in a public place conducive to a breach of the peace, see 10 Halsbury's Laws (3rd Edn) 582, para 1081; and for a case on the subject, see 15 Digest (Repl) 785, 7359.

For the Public Order Act, 1936, s 5 see 5 Halsbury's Laws (2nd Edn) 1091.

Case Stated

This was a Case Stated by the chairman of the County of London Quarter Sessions to whom John Colin Campbell Jordan ("Mr Jordan"), appealed against a conviction and sentence of two months' imprisonment imposed at Bow Street Magistrates' Court on 20 August 1962, on an information laid by George Burgoyne a superintendent of the Metropolitan Police, that, on 1 July 1962, Mr Jordan

[1963] 2 All ER 225 at 226

at Trafalgar Square at a public meeting used insulting words whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned, contrary to s 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936. The following facts were found. On 1 July 1962, there was a public meeting in Trafalgar Square. At about 3.0 pm, there was a crowd of about two thousand people, of which two hundred or three hundred young people were positioned together immediately in front of the speakers' platform. This group contained many Jews, supporters of the campaign for nuclear disarmament and communists. That group intended to prevent any meeting being held at all. Between the crowd and the speakers' platform was a line of police. The present appellant, George Burgoyne, was responsible for maintaining the Queen's peace, particularly in the vicinity of the speakers' platform which was on the plinth at the base of Nelson's column. There was disorder throughout the whole of the meeting mainly, but not exclusively, among the group of two hundred or three hundred young people, who repeatedly attempted to attack the platform and the speakers and their supporters. In other parts of the crowd the disorder was mainly confined to heckling. The meeting was addressed by one John Hutchyns Tyndall. During the course of Mr Tyndall's address, the present appellant stopped the meeting on four occasions to restore order. After Mr Tyndall had addressed the meeting, it was addressed by Mr Jordan who read a speech to the crowd. At about 5.15 pm, the crowd had grown to about five thousand people. There was considerable opposition from other parts of the crowd during the speeches, but the main disorder was concentrated in the group at the front. At about 5.15 pm, Mr Jordan used words which included the following: "... more and more people every day ... are opening their eyes and coming to say with us: Hitler was right. They are coming to say that our real enemies, the people we should have fought, were not Hitler and the national socialists of Germany but world Jewry and its associates in this country". There was complete disorder, an outcry and a general surge forward by the crowd towards the speakers' platform. When this happened, the present appellant stopped the meeting. The police had the greatest difficulty in restoring order. Twenty persons present at the meeting were arrested for offences involving breaches of the Queen's peace. The majority of these arrests were made in the dispersal of the crowd after 5.15 pm Quarter Sessions allowed Mr Jordan's appeal against conviction, and the present appellant now appealed.

Graham Swanwick QC and W M Howard for the appellant.

The respondent, Mr Jordan, appeared in person.

19 March 1963. The following judgments were delivered.

LORD PARKER CJ

stated the facts, and continued. Quarter sessions, in giving their opinion, said--

"4. We found as a fact that a great many of the words used by [Mr. Jordan] were highly insulting but were not likely to lead ordinary reasonable persons attending the meeting in Trafalgar Square to commit breaches of the peace by committing assaults and accordingly allowed [Mr. Jordan's] appeal against conviction. 5. The question for the opinion of the High Court is as follows: Whether the words in s. 5 of the Public Order Act, 1936, 'Where-by a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned' can properly be construed to mean 'likely to lead to a breach of the peace by the ordinary citizen in the circumstances of the case'".

Speaking for myself, I have great difficulty in understanding what quarter sessions were intending to convey. It seems to me, however, that what they had in mind was a hypothetical audience of ordinary reasonable citizens, whatever their creed, faith, race or political views might be. In other words, they were eliminating from the audience anybody who was, for instance, intent on breaking up the meeting whatever words the speaker used. It may be that that is what

[1963] 2 All ER 225 at 227

quarter sessions had in mind, but, even if that be so, I cannot myself, having read the speech, imagine any reasonable citizen, certainly one who was a Jew, not being provoked beyond endurance, and not only a Jew but also a coloured man and quite a number of people of this country who were told that they were merely tools of the Jews and that they had fought in the war on the wrong side, and matters of that sort.

Be that, however, as it may, there is no room here, in my judgment, for any test whether any member of the audience is a reasonable man or an ordinary citizen, or whatever epithet one might like to apply. This is a public order Act, something to keep public order in public places, and it provides, by s 5, that:

"Any person who in any public place or at any public meeting uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence."

This is, as I have said, a public order Act, and if in fact it is apparent that a body of persons are present (let me assume in Mr Jordan's favour that the persons present are a body of hooligans), yet if words are used which threaten, abuse or insult--all very strong words--then the speaker must take his audience as he finds them, and, if those words to that audience, or that part of that audience, are likely to provoke a breach of the peace, then the speaker is guilty of an offence. I will assume in Mr Jordan's favour that this body of young persons was a body of hooligans (though I am not saying that they were), and I assume that they came with the preconceived idea of preventing him from speaking, yet the police prevented them from obstructing the speaker, the police enabled Mr Jordan to speak, and then in his opening words directed to those two hundred or three hundred people he said:

"As for the red rabble here present with us in Trafalgar Square it is not a very good afternoon at all. Some of them are looking far from wholesome, more than usual I mean. We shall of course excuse them if they have to resort to smelling-salts or first-aid. Meanwhile, let them howl, these multiracial warriors of the Left. It is a sound that comes natural to them, it saves them from the strain of thinking for themselves."

Those were words which were intended to be and were deliberately insulting to the body of persons who were being restrained by the police, and on that and that alone it seems to me that there was a clear contravention of s 5 of the Act of 1936.

Mr Jordan, who has conducted his own case with great skill and industry, has been inclined to elevate this case into a cause cיlטbre in the sense that, if he is convicted here, there is some inroad into the doctrine of free speech. It is, in my judgment, nothing of the sort. A man is entitled to express his own views as strongly as he likes, to criticise his opponents, to say disagreeable things about his opponents and about their policies, to do anything of that sort, but what he must not do--and these are the words of the Act--he must not threaten, he must not be abusive and he must not insult them, "insult" in the sense of hit by words. It seems to me this is a perfectly clear case, that Mr Jordan was guilty of the offence charged, and that this appeal must be allowed and the Case must go back to quarter sessions with a direction to dismiss the appeal.

ASHWORTH J.

I agree.

WINN J.

I agree.

Appeal allowed. Case remitted.

Solicitors: Solicitor, Metropolitan Police.

N P Metcalfe Esq Barrister.