African Communist , 3Rd Quarter, 1980

African Communist , 3rd Quarter, 1980

The Immediate Task of our Movement

ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by “Comrade Mzala”

In this period of struggle the urgent task of the movement is to inject into the masses of our people a feeling of confidence in their own potential to overthrow the racists, by means of vigorous revolutionary action, the main content of which must be effective and sustained guerrilla operations including a nation-wide sabotage campaign reminiscent of the early sixties, and thus continue from where Rivonia left off.

This does not mean that we must go and grab guns and start fighting tomorrow, anywhere. The Marxist theory of revolution differs from all other theories in the remarkable way it combines complete scientific sobriety in the analysis of the objective state of affairs and the objective course of revolution with the most emphatic recognition of the importance of revolutionary energy, revolutionary creative genius and revolutionary initiative of the masses1

Certainly, we must severely criticise the adventuristic theories of the Narodnik type which completely separate the subjective factor from the real objective conditions that prevail. My stress, however, on the role of armed struggle at this critical stage of our revolution is a deliberate approach that reflects the new requirements of the movement at a time when conditions have become ripe for vigorous armed revolution. It would therefore be wrong for the reader to draw a conclusion from the article that armed activity alone can accomplish a revolution in South Africa irrespective of the objective political situation and in disregard of other forms of political struggle. These propositions are advanced not on mere theoretical consideration but on practical considerations – and as always, practice is the test of theory.

Lenin taught that while soberly taking into account objective conditions, one should not forget that in revolutionary times the limits of what is possible expand a thousand fold2 under the powerful impact of the mass historical action. It should be said in all fairness and truth that each year, indeed each month, that the liberation of South Africa is speeded up will mean the lives of millions of undernourished children saved from starvation; hundreds saved from detention, torture and the hangman’s noose; an infinite quantity of pain spared the people. In the words of the founders of Umkhonto We Sizwe: “The time for small thinking is over because history leaves us no choice.”3

Formation of Umkhonto We Sizwe

Slovo, summing up the conditions that dedicated the historic decision to form Umkhonto We Sizwe in December 1961, states:

“By then the strategy of mass struggle along non-violent lines had exhausted its potential for mobilising the people. The

regime had turned to the use of undisguised terror against all

militant opposition to race rule; the liberation organisations had been outlawed. The facts had put paid to any lingering illusions that radical change could be won by action which did not include armed activity”4

The Manifesto of MK declared:

“We are striking out along a new road for the liberation of the

people of this country. The Government policy of force,

repression and violence will no longer be met with non-violent

resistance only! The choice is not ours: it has been made by

the Nationalist Government which has rejected every peaceable

demand by the people for rights and freedom and answered

every such demand with force and yet more force.”

That therefore the time had come in 1961 to answer racist violence with revolutionary people’s violence can no longer be a debated question. Te above-quoted passage of the MK Manifesto clearly reflects that the decision to embark on armed struggle was arrived at after great consideration and deliberations. Further than that, it is a proof in itself that Umkhonto We Sizwe at such an infant stage, having hardly any serious material resources to talk about, operating in a highly industrialised capitalist totalitarian state that was surrounded by hostile states, could manage to conduct more that 150 acts of sabotage during a period of only18 months. These dramatic acts of revolutionary assault, which grew in intensity and scope with each passing month, are proof enough that the majority of the people 1) were already disillusioned with the prospect of achieving liberation by non-violent means, and 2) were ready to respond to the call for armed struggle.

In the light of these conditions the prosecution of military struggle depends for its success on two factors viz., the existence of clear leadership with material resources at its disposal to spark off and sustain military operations, and the strength of the enemy.

Those who criticise the so-called failure of the sabotage campaign of the early sixties by citing as a proof the final arrest of the leadership at Rivonia and thus try to prove that the time had not yet come, should be aware that they would have, in the similar fashion and probably for the reasons, criticised Fidel Castro in Cuba if his guerrilla band had failed to sustain themselves in the Sierra Maestra. After all, the technical security mistake which resulted in the arrest of the leadership in Rivonia was about to be solved with the initial implementation of the draft document “Operation Mayibuye” one passage of which reads thus:

“Before the operations take place, political authority will have

been set up in secrecy in a friendly territory with a view to

supervise the struggle both in its internal and external aspects.”

It should be noted that the Rivonia arrest took place before the implementation of “Operation Mayibuye.”

Although we know that victory in South Africa is certain, our founding fathers could not afford in 1961 to sit in the doorways of their houses waiting for the corpse of apartheid to pass by. They understand, in the same as Marx put it in a letter to Dr Kugelman, that “world history would indeed by very easy to make if the struggle were taken up on condition of infallible favourable chances.”

Then there are those who argue that a revolutionary situation is always a prerequisite of the armed struggle, and that the contrary is left-wing childishness and adventurism. In so doing they make use of quotations from Lenin who once wrote: “To Marxists it is indisputable that a revolution is impossible without a revolutionary situation: furthermore, it is not every revolutionary situation that leads to revolution.”5 On another occasion Lenin said: “Oppression alone, no matter how great, does not always give rise to a revolutionary situation in a country.”6

These texts have been misunderstood greatly, and at times applied dogmatically out of context. Many a vanguard movement has historically doomed itself to political death – continued to exist but ceased to live – by waiting passively for the moment when the revolutionary situation appears and a nation-wide crisis break out. What is a revolutionary situation? Should guerrilla struggle wait for the revolutionary situation?

The Problem of Revolutionary Situation

Lenin developed the concept ‘revolutionary situation’ mostly during the First World War, when there appeared signs that a revolutionary situation was maturing in a number of European countries. He was describing the state of society preceding the politically mature revolution. His conclusions were the result of a thorough study of the specific experience of the Russian revolution of 1905-07. Initially he did not use the term ‘revolutionary situation’ but use the term ‘political crisis on a nationwide scale’ and others. At no stage did he say that armed struggle cannot begin until there is a revolutionary situation. For instance he wrote:

“What, generally speaking, are the symptoms of a revolutionary

situation? We shall certainly not be mistaken if we indicate the

following three major symptoms: (1) When it is impossible for

the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change:

when there is a crisis in one form or another, among the

‘upper classes’, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading

to a future through which the discontent and indignation of the

oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place,

it is usually insufficient for the ‘lower classes not to want’ to

live in the old way: (2) when the suffering and want of the

oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3)when,

as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable

increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly

allow themselves to be robbed in ‘peacetime’ but, in turbulent

times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and

by the ‘upper classes’ themselves into independent historical

action . . . the totality of all these objective changes is called

revolutionary situation.”7

The vulgarisation of Lenin’s theses on the revolutionary situation has practically means that all the vanguard movement should do is to accumulate weapons and manpower in the country while waiting for the D-day when we will be strong enough to meet the revolutionary situation. Experience of other countries like Algeria, Cuba, Angola, on the contrary shows that guerrilla struggle can bring about a revolutionary situation.

Nowadays, this is more so because the liberation forces have at their disposal an advantage (which the Russian revolutionaries never had), that is, the existence of a socialist community which is committed to the principles of proletarian internationalism. In fascist countries like South Africa, therefore, an open struggle of the guerrillas supported by the people will certainly speed up the development of a revolutionary situation to its highest phase – the nation-wide crisis.

After the above analysis, the question that assumes tremendous importance is one of political mobilisation of the masses.

Political Mobilisation

Armed struggle is the highest form of political struggle, demanding as it does greater sacrifice from the people. It is important to emphasise this because any manifestation of militarism which separates armed people’s struggle from its political context can result in untold tragedy and disaster and can, in our specific situation, set our movement decades back, if not cause its total collapse.

The policy of the African National Congress is very clear on this question:

“. . . the people’s armed challenge against a foe with formidable material strength does not achieve dramatic and swift success. The path is filled with obstacles and we harbour no illusions on this score in the case of South Africa. In the long run it can only succeed if it attracts the active support of the mass of the people. Without this lifeblood it is doomed.”

No matter how skilled or courageous our guerrilla units can be, the lack of mass support could mean their doom. An example of this is the struggle of the people of the Philippines. William Pomeroy, a contemporary Marxist and expert on revolutionary armed struggle, who has himself participated in the guerrilla struggle of the people of the Philippines, sounds this warning note:

“Broad and universal generalisations about the efficacy of armed struggle or guerrilla tactics cannot safely be made.”9

But how do you practically mobilise the people now in South Africa? Do you go from man to man inviting him to join the ANC? Or do you remind him that he is oppressed by law A, B and C? Surely, as the struggle sharpens and intensifies, political mobilisation will take the form of all-round educational and agitational work – for it can only be when the enemy is harassed and his forces dispersed and therefore weakened that effective propaganda by our underground units as well as armed combatants can mobilise the masses to a higher stage of organisation. Let us not forget armed propaganda, particularly at this initial stage, is in itself a politically mobilising factor.

Slovo is correct when he observes that;

“Experience of South Africa and other highly organised police states has shown that, until the new type of action is started, it is doubtful whether political mobilisation and organisation can be developed beyond a certain point. Given the disillusionment of the people with the old forms of struggle, a demonstration of the liberation movement’s capacity to meet and sustain the struggle in a new way is in itself a vital way of attracting organised allegiance and support. Therefore postponing all armed activity until political mobilisation and organisational reconstruction have reached a high enough level to sustain its more advanced forms would undermine the prospects of full political mobilisation itself.”10

The above-quoted passage is in the same tone as the preamble of “Operation Mayibuye” which emphasised in revolutionary optimism that in the initial stage “the plan envisages a massive onslaught on pre-selected targets which will create maximum havoc and confusion in the enemy camp” and which will inject into masses of the people a feeling of confidence that “here at least is an army of liberation equipped and capable of leading them to victory.” This then will create the proper atmosphere for a gradual mass participation in their armed revolution.

The question of political mobilisation cannot be treated in the abstract. As in Algeria, Cuba and other places, the general uprising will be sparked off by organised and well equipped guerrilla operations during the course of which the masses of the people will be drawn in and armed. The fascist ghost is still haunting our people. The ghost is clothed in the myth of invincibility. A serious challenge to this myth by a demonstration of people’s armed victories, however small, will shatter the myth – and such slogans as “The Law Has A Long Hand”, “Walls Have Ears” will become meaningless and proved to be a mere threat. In terms of political mobilisation of the masses, such MK operations as the Soweto Police Station Assaults are ideal operations, not necessarily because of their offensive nature but because of their victorious nature. The presence of a deliberate one: the operating law at this stage is: “shamelessly attack the weak and shamelessly flee from the strong.”11