Between the pool of spoils and shallow PROFESSIONALISm

- the role and cadres of the political cabinets of ministers

and prime ministers of Poland in the period 1997-2006

Tatiana Majcherkiewicz[1]

Abstract

The analysis of political cabinets raises the question of whether any permanent trends have appeared in relation to their selection, personnel policy and functioning. This article investigates the cabinets of five successive prime ministers and their ministers from 1996, to May 2006, which signalled the end of Prime Minister Marcinkiewicz’ minority government and ministerial stability as a result of the formation of a government coalition. The developments of political cabinets are analysed in the context of the post-communist administrative transition, with particular attention paid to the central administrative reform of 1996, which separated administrative and political positions and established institutions of political cabinets. It is also argued that the efficient functioning of political cabinets requires a strong and apolitical civil service corps built from scratch after the collapse of communism. The presentation of prime ministers’ political cabinets will focus on specific features of each of the five successive governments and the same time the gradual evolution towards rather shallow professionalism. In the political cabinets of ministers, attention will be paid to problems of size: sometimes fluctuating between a complete absence of cabinets to extremely large number of personnel. Moreover, among the selection criteria, political credentials predominate. Finally, two characteristics of Polish political cabinets have been the strong informal power of advisers participating in decision making and corruption charges raised against ministerial advisers.

Introduction - political cabinets and administrative background

The proposed article on the dimension of governance in Poland where roles intermingle not only at the level of actors, but also at the level of governing institutions, will cover the composition and functioning of political cabinets of successive prime ministers and ministers.[2]

Political cabinets are a relatively new phenomenon, being part of the central administrative reform of 1996.[3] The formation of professional units of political advisers within the ministerial structure and that of prime minister, can only be understood if analysed in the context of two issues:

1. the dismantling of the dysfunctional structure of central administration established under communism and

2. the creation of an apolitical civil service corps from scratch.

The analysis of the role and cadres of political cabinets in Poland requires a presentation of the main issues of administrative transition. However, evaluation of these reforms should be cautious for although the legal basis of formation of more efficient government (1996-1999) has been made, as Izdebski Kulesza (2002: 152) comments it can lead but not have to lead to the expected changes. Those aspects deeply enrooted under the socialist style of governing are very difficult to eliminate.[4]

The central administrative reform adopted by parliament in 1996 (and introduced on 1 January 1997) created a more coherent structure of government overcoming legacy of communism, dividing the government into several tiny ministries, fighting with each other over limited resources (Polska branżowa). This reform also aimed at changing the functions performed by government – the transition of ministerial and government functions from detailed decision making in each particular case by ministers and approval of ministerial branch projects during government meetings towards a concentration of ministers in strategic planning and policy-making and coordination of these projects by government. This change of ministerial functions meant as Kulesza and Barbasiewicz (2002: 38-39) emphasize, to the necessity of reorganising central administration - the redefining and re-division of tasks performed by ministries (strategic) and central offices (only administrative). In 2001, however, a retrospective step was taken when twenty central administration units were again included in ministerial structures (Izdebski and Kulesza, 2004: 128).

The next stage of this reform, aimed at creating a more flexible and coherent government structure, was taken in 1997 when the Act on Type of Central Administration Units was accepted by parliament. After strong resistance met from ministers (and lawyers – constitutionalists) it finally came into force in Autumn 1999. The government structure became more flexible, with decisions on the number and type of ministries falling under the remit of the prime minister.[5] According to Izdebski and Kulesza (2004: 169-170) in creating a more coherent political agenda, probably the weakest link has been the political cabinet of the prime minister, which should cooperate with the other cabinets of ministers. However, it has mostly been performing an advisory function only.

It has to be stressed that changing the role of ministers by breaking traditions deeply rooted under socialism has been a very serious challenge. It may be argued that the ministerial role is still in flux, and this naturally has an impact on defining what roles should be played by political cabinets. In addition, it has to be mentioned that a step towards more coherence of central administration was also achieved by devolution of power to lower levels (1990 local and 1997 district and regional administration).

Furthermore, during the period of transition, the position of the prime minister within the government was strengthened (as defined by the Constitution of 1997 and the Act on the Council of Ministers and Ministerial Terms of Reference).

However, our analysis of administrative transition should return to the description of the 1996 central administration reform to mention two more issues: the separation of political functions within administration, and civil service reform. The first aim was achieved, among other means, by dissolving the Office of the Council of Ministers (URM), a “super-ministry”, that was powerful but inefficient due to being burdened with numerous and varied tasks. In addition, the dysfunctional organisation of the URM was also related to the fact that it could be defined as the administrative tier located between ministers and prime minister. Most of its administrative functions were taken over by the newly established ministry of internal affairs and public administration. Other, competencies aimed at the service of the prime minister were transferred to the newly established Chancellery.[6] Thus, the structure of government formally became more transparent (although one has to remember the real administrative practice – personnel adopting to these regulations, radically changing the status quo is crucial). Within the Chancellery, the division between political and administrative spheres was officially drawn and political advisors were moved to the newly-established “political cabinets”. The dividing line between the political and administrative spheres was likewise drawn at individual ministries, where similarly political cabinet units were established.[7]

Second, it should be stressed that the formation of effective political cabinets demands an apolitical and professional civil service, which is particularly challenging for post-communist countries where, for more then forty years, public administration was under complete political patronage. Thus, the fact that civil service reform was introduced in Poland only in the late nineties had a fundamental impact on the efficient formation and functioning of political cabinets.

The issue of the formation of an apolitical civil service has been difficult for politicians to accept, as they are used to a spoils system and being assisted by political colleagues and acquaintances. Sometimes its, role was completely distorted – the vision of political cabinets was modelled on the communist vision of “cooperation” (supervision, patronage) between politicians and administration.[8]

Furthermore, there was instability over the vision of civil service reform, successive governments hindering, or even destroying previous actions. In two years, two Acts were passed by parliament: in 1996 and 1998 (plus in December 2001, amendment 144a was adopted to create a loophole for politicizations in senior positions). It is also uncertain how long the current act will be in force.[9] The replacement of the first Civil Service Act of 1996, which no doubt favoured post-communist cadres, with the much more ambitious Act of 1998 was positive. Evaluating the 1998 Act, it should be stressed that establishing competition procedures for senior positions in administration was crucial for promoting professional standards. Nevertheless, the fact that Buzek government decided to introduce its own Act meant prolonging the status quo. As a result, the civil service corps is still tiny, in the early stage of its formation and thus vulnerable to repeated political attacks (In 2006, there were 4, 000 civil service officials, [who passed professional exams] among 120, 000 administrative personnel). Finally, it has been crucial for the development of the civil service that the positions of director generals, the most senior administrative posts in ministries (and in regional administration) should act as effective barriers, quarantining their apolitical functioning.

However, the opposite argument has also been raised; that the formation of political cabinets should enhance civil service professionalism. The creation of political cabinets has been crucial for drawing clear divisions between political and administrative functions within ministries and thus it should limit its politicization and promote stability of employment in administrative positions (Rydlewski 2002: 156). However, the author of this article is convinced that the strengthening of the civil service is of primary importance, as a means of averting the politicization of administration. It is also probable that in contrast to administrative positions, those of advisers are seen as an attractive pool of spoils for political colleagues in that they require neither high level professional qualifications nor administrative experience, in addition to which they are seen as being comfortable and demanding no responsibility (Potkaj 2002).

1. The vision of political cabinets and the 1996 reform of central administration

In this theoretical part, the vision of political cabinets held by Michał Kulesza, a professor of public administration, and the founding father of this reform, is presented (Kulesza and Barbasiewicz 1999, Kulesza and Barbasiewicz, 2002). The political cabinets model introduced in Poland in 1996 was inspired by the French tradition of ministerial cabinets (Izdebski and Kulesza 2004: 181).

The necessity of drawing a formal division between politics and administration evolved only gradually during the democratic transition. Under communism, administration was subordinated to the communist party. At the beginning of the nineties there was no clear division between political and administrative spheres and post-Solidarity politicians believed in the formation of only a small self-limited political sphere. As a result, until 1996, advisers were employed in positions defined formally as administrative (Rydlewski 2002: 153).

In 1993, the vision of the political sphere changed, and Prime Minister Pawlak, introduced the expanded spoils system. The central administration reforms prepared by the post-communist government of Cimoszewicz in 1996 (and the Constitution of 2 April 1997), formally divided the political and administrative spheres:

The political sphere – flexible: members’ dismissal accompanies each change of government. This sphere covers two groups:

1. Political (senior) officials – deputy-ministers: being secretaries and under secretaries in ministries (as well as in the Chancellery) and regional governors (wojewodzi) and their deputies.

The most important regulation on this issue was in: the Act on the organisation and procedures governing the activities of the Council of Ministers and the scope of activities undertaken by ministers, adopted on 8 August 1996, which formally divided political and administrative sections in ministries (and in the Chancellery). This solution meant the adaptation of the extensive political sphere (around 200 officials). Article 38 of this Act determined that these political (senior) officials would be dismissed on a change of government.[10] In addition, Article 103.1 of the Constitution of 2 April 1997 prohibited the functions of an MP to be combined with work in administration, except for the political functions of prime minister, ministers and secretaries of state.

2. Political advisors of prime minister and ministers - since the 1996 central administration reform, they have been grouped in political cabinets.

The regulation of the employment of members of political cabinets was defined by the Civil Service Act of 1996, Article 88 (modification of the law of 1982). According to that regulation they are employed for the same time period as the person whom they advise. As a result, political cabinets began their existence by employing advisers in these new temporary contracts.

The administrative sphere – according to the Civil Service Act of 1996, and same regulations in the next Act of 1998, the most senior officials in the civil service, whose positions should be permanent and hence unrelated to changes of government, have been in positions of director generals. These directors are responsible for the running of ministries (the Chancellery, other central institutions, and regional offices). They perform policies defined by the minister and are responsible for the personnel policy of the administrative sections of ministries. Although it has been challenging for post-communist states, it is crucial to preserve the stability of the ministries by guaranteeing the permanency of staff employed in administrative sections, especially director generals who guarantee “the organisational memory of an institution and the state”.

Kulesza and Barbasiewicz (2002: 39) comment that: “At the same time, politicians taking up positions in ministries should respect the permanent staff and its judgment and work. This is to begin in Poland with the creation of the Polish civil service corps, although the creation process itself is slow. Even slower is the filling of the posts of general directors by professional managers of public administration; this process also suffers from the executive influence of political groups.”

According to the Civil Service Act of 1998 appointments to these positions should take place in accordance with competition procedures. Nevertheless, there has been strong resistance to this since the politicization of positions is still a feature, evidenced by the replacement of post-holders in the aftermath of each change of government. The peak of this process took place in the period between December 2001 and January 2003 when the amendment to the Civil Service Act of 1998, this is Article 144a was in force. This Act enabled the employment in senior administrative positions politicians as acting managers. For example, during this period only one-third of director generals (six out of 15 ministries) were employed by two previous governments (Pardowska Polityka, 19 Oct. 2002).

The impact on the low efficiency of political cabinets, which has fluctuation in positions of director generals is underlined by Kulesza and Barbasiewicz (2002: 58), who in referring to the early stage of the introduction of the reform state: “In Polish ministries, unfortunately, weak political cabinets often coexist with general directors whose position is by no means stable (nor justified for that matter by his/her past professional career). Consequently, the position of the general directors is often similar to that of political under-secretaries of state. Moreover, in some ministries a clear division of roles and responsibilities is lacking between general directors and vice-ministers. This gloomy picture does not, obviously, apply to the entire government administration; many ministers have competent cabinets and some ministries have good, professional and efficient general directors.”