IMO Certificates of Competency (Coc)

IMO Certificates of Competency (CoC)

CoC for Masters and Chief Mates on ships of 3000 gross tonnage or more

Maritime English Exam

WRITTEN EXAM – PART ONE

(sample)

1. Read the attached text from MAIB Reports:

(a)  Reading phase: read the text for gist (2 minutes skimming the text to get the main idea) and then read it for the second time (10 minutes) for more specific information. Then read it slowly and carefully for the third time (10 minutes) and write down an outline of the text consisting of the headings (natuknice) and sub-headings (podnatuknice) of your choice. (You will be allowed to use your ‘outline’ as a memo for the first part in the oral exam, i.e. oral presentation of the text in the MAIB Report); if appropriate, make a drawing showing the situation described in the MAIB report (altogether 22 minutes)

(b)  Using your own outline of the text (but without using the original text) summarize the text, in writing, on not more than one page; (20 minutes) – Please note that you will be expected to use your outline notes when presenting this accident in the oral exam

(c)  Before completing your summary make written comments based on your experience and knowledge, evaluating also the lessons to be learnt from the case described in the MARS Report. (5 minutes)

(d)  If appropriate, write down the text of one VHF exchange message (following the rules of IMO SMCP based on ITU/IMO radio-communications) between the TSS and the OOW – add any data as you think appropriate in the message

NOTE: Do not rewrite the text (!!!) because such work will not be accepted as your written exam.

201517 Coast assisted collision

Edited from MAIB official report 25/2014

A general cargo vessel was making way in a busy traffic separationscheme (TSS). A bulk carrier was abaft the vessel’s starboard beam at adistance of 1.7nm and slowly overtaking.
The OOW of the general cargo saw another vessel forward, 20 degrees off hisstarboard bow at 3.9nm and with a CPA of 0.1nm. He did not acquire thevessel on the ARPA or use the AIS data to determine the vessel’s name orstatus. However, he assessed that the vessel was crossing their bow fromstarboard to port so he judged his vessel was the give way vessel.

As it turned out, this was a fishing vessel engaged in fishing, not acrossing vessel. The fishing vessel began to manoeuvre to port to stayaway from the commercial traffic but the OOW on the general cargovessel did not immediately notice this. When he did notice the changeof course, he was confused as this did not match his mental picture ofa vessel crossing the traffic lane. His response was to continue to alterto starboard, putting the fishing vessel about 30 degrees off his port bow. Bynow he was becoming unsure of what to do – and in the followingtwo minutes he made several alterations of course to both port andstarboard. He was still unaware that this vessel was a fishing vessel thatwas manoeuvring out of his way.

The coast guard TSS services, seeing the movements on radar,became aware that an ambiguous situation was developing and calledthe OOW of the general cargo vessel. A short conversation ensuedandthe TSS services inquired if the general cargo vessel was executinga 360 degree turn. Although this was not the OOW’s plan, he replied in theaffirmative to TSS services; immediately after this conversation, theOOW selected hand steering and applied 35 degree starboard helm. Since thevessel was equipped with a high lift rudder the rate of turn increasedrapidly. He did not realise that the bulk carrier was now about 500m offhis starboard beam.
Meanwhile, the bulk carrier’s OOW had also been contacted by theTSS services and after a short conversation this OOW ordered hard porthelm. Although he had been monitoring and was now aware that thegeneral cargo was to do a 360degree turn, he did not think this manoeuvrewas already underway. He assumed that the general cargo would passahead before starting the 360 degree turn. But within seconds he noticed thatthe cargo vessel was turning quickly towards him so he immediatelyordered hard starboard helm. Nonetheless, soon afterwards the two vessels collided.

Lessons learned
* Although the fishing vessel had started to alter course in order toclear the traffic lane and avoid impeding the safe passage of thetwo larger vessels, this alteration was not seen by the general cargovessel’s OOW for over five minutes. This implies that the generalcargo vessel’s OOW was neither keeping a proper visual lookout, noreffectively using the electronic aids available.
* The intervention on VHF radio by the coast watch officer was timely,appropriate and well-intended. However, because of the languageused, it unintentionally influenced the decision-making of the general cargo vessel’s OOW and prompted him to improvise a 360 degree turn,unwittingly turning towards the bulk carrier.
* The general cargo vessel’s OOW suffered a complete loss ofsituational awareness. He was unaware of the proximity of the bulkcarrier until the vessels collided.
* The general cargo vessel’s OOW was very inexperienced, as shownby his inability to make sense of the fishing vessel’s actions and histotal loss (or lack) of situational awareness. He had not yet developedsufficient competency to keep a bridge watch in a busy TSS at nightby himself.
* As it turned out, the general cargo vessel’s OOW had been in chargeof only 10 bridge watches before the accident and the Master hadonly known him for about two weeks. It is not known why the Master was sufficiently confident of the OOW’s abilities to entrust him withthe bridge watch in such a congested area at night.