You've probably heard people say…
#1 The humanitarian initiative or a treaty banning nuclear weapons can undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
But in reality…
· By highlighting the unacceptable consequences of nuclear weapon detonations, the humanitarian initiative has strengthened both the non-proliferation pillar and the disarmament pillar of the NPT.
· The purpose of the NPT is, as stated in the first preambular paragraph of the Treaty, to prevent “the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind [sic] by a nuclear war”.
· The NPT stipulates that it is the responsibility of all states to make progress towards negotiations on nuclear disarmament.
· China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US are the only nuclear-armed parties to the NPT. We should not be surprised that these states argue against anything that could undermine this perceived “special status”, including the development of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.
· There is nothing in the NPT that would be incompatible with a comprehensive international instrument codifying the unacceptability of nuclear weapons for all states at all times.
· Article VI of the NPT requires all states to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament and anticipates additional instruments.
· A nuclear ban treaty would not supersede the NPT, but would complement it, in a similar way as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. By joining a nuclear weapons ban, states would not be renouncing their NPT obligations.
· Prohibiting nuclear weapons would help close some of the gaps in the NPT related to nuclear weapons activities, thus strengthening the non-proliferation regime.
· A comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons would end the two-tiered, discriminatory relationship between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states reflected in the current implementation of the NPT. .
You've probably heard people say…
#2 Some states will never give up nuclear weapons
But in reality…
· A nuclear weapons ban would help put normative, legal, economic, and practical pressure on all nuclear-armed states to renounce their nuclear weapons.
· A ban on nuclear weapons would set the possibility for nuclear-armed states to join the prohibition should their domestic political situation change.
· The claim that so-called rogue states will seek to acquire nuclear weapons is a self-serving argument made by states that already have nuclear weapons and refuse to renounce them.
You've probably heard people say…
#3 Nuclear weapons will never be used
But in reality….
· According to evidence presented in Vienna and Nayarit, and the analysis conducted by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the risk of nuclear weapons use is growing again, and is higher than previously known.
· Despite the end of the Cold War, the nuclear-armed states are modernising their nuclear arsenals. Modernisation, especially if new capabilities are created, reinforces the perceived utility and credibility of nuclear weapon use that the doctrine of “nuclear deterrence” promotes.
· Nuclear weapons have already been used twice in war, and explosively tested over 2000 times. On numerous occasions, various combinations of technical and human error have brought us within minutes of nuclear war being unleashed, and on many of these occasions the security of the world has depended on just one person making the right decision, under great pressure and without full information.
· “Nuclear deterrence” entails the preparation for—and thus risks—the use of nuclear weapons. Thousands of those weapons remain on high alert and could be launched within minutes
· Escalation of international tensions between nuclear-armed states could lead to the use of nuclear weapons intentionally, accidentally, or by miscalculation.
You've probably heard people say…
#4 An international instrument without the nuclear-armed states would be meaningless
But in reality…
· The current legal regime regulating nuclear weapons is plagued by a lack of clarity which allows states to engage in nuclear weapons activities. A treaty banning nuclear weapons would close any loopholes and highlight the hypocrisy of claiming benefit from possessing nuclear weapons, while arguing in favour of their elimination.
· An international legal instrument that prohibits the development, production, testing, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, deployment, threat of use, or use of nuclear weapons, as well as assistance, financing, encouragement, or inducement of these prohibited acts, will put nuclear weapons on the same footing as the other weapons of mass destruction, which are subject to prohibition through specific treaties.
· Agreement by non-nuclear-armed states on a legal instrument codifying the illegality and unacceptability of nuclear weapons will strengthen efforts to stigmatise nuclear weapons within nuclear-armed states.
· A treaty banning nuclear weapons would provide campaigners and state signatories with a legal instrument that strengthens incentives for nuclear disarmament. The treaty would also encourage nuclear-armed states to comply to the obligations as a means to end isolation and stigmatisation associated with continued possession of nuclear weapons.
· Should the treaty include prohibitions on financing or assistance, it could lead to systematic divestment from nuclear weapon production and modernisation, increasing incentives to end modernisation programmes and eliminate nuclear weapons.
· Many international agreements have been initiated in this way by a group of like-minded states. The Mine Ban Treaty was considered impossible when first proposed but has won the support of the majority of nations, including the United States, which has recently announced compliance with the obligations of the treaty.
· A treaty banning nuclear weapons would further build on existing international humanitarian law and international human rights law, adding to the body of international humanitarian disarmament treaties and commitments promoting the protection of civilians from armed violence.
· A treaty banning nuclear weapons could help compel states that do not possess but depend on nuclear weapons to develop a new security model that no longer relies on the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.
· Nuclear-armed states are no longer able to ignore the growing support that the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons is leveraging. The normative power and practical effects of such instrument will be an important milestone in the process of stigmatising the only weapon of mass destruction not yet prohibited.
You've probably heard people say…
#5 Nuclear weapons are different from other inhumane weapons that we have banned
But in reality…
· The effects of the use of nuclear weapons are devastating, but this must not accord them a special status under the law. On the contrary, it provides the rationale for prohibiting and eliminating these weapons.
· Nuclear weapons have had an ambiguous legal status for too long. A ban treaty would subject nuclear weapons to the same legal prohibitions that already apply to other weapons of mass destruction.
· A ban on nuclear weapons would correct a legal anomaly and fill an unacceptable legal gap.
You've probably heard people say…
#6 A ban on nuclear weapons does not ensure their elimination
But in reality…
· A ban on nuclear weapons would explicitly declare nuclear weapons illegal and unacceptable for all states, prohibit all nuclear weapon-related activities, and establish practical and normative tools for affecting the political, economic, and legal landscape related to nuclear weapons. All of this will help create the conditions for nuclear disarmament.
· A ban treaty process would create a new forum of discussion where there is a common understanding of the illegality of nuclear weapons for all states.
· Past processes suggest that a ban treaty would affect the behavior even of those states outside the treaty. The existence of the treaty would require states to decide if they support nuclear weapons or not. This pressure would influence other international fora, as well as debates at national level.
· There is no way to “guarantee” the effects of any process. It is clear that the so-called step-by-step or building blocks approaches, which were developed in the 1950s, have not “guaranteed” the elimination of nuclear weapons. By generating change in some of the political, legal, and economic institutions and arrangements related to nuclear weapons the ban treaty, has an unprecedented opportunity to initiate greater change than staying the current course.
You've probably heard people say…
#7 The Ukrainian situation proves that possessing nuclear weapons makes a country safer
But in reality…
· There was never an option for Ukraine to gain command and control over the weapons stationed on its territory.
· Even if Ukraine had somehow kept its 1,500 nuclear weapons, it is not likely Ukraine would have been willing to make a nuclear threat against the Russian Federation over a territorial dispute and risk nuclear retaliation.
· “Nuclear deterrence” is not effective, even in theory, against non-state actors such as the secessionists.
· The potential for the conflict in Ukraine to embroil nuclear-armed NATO and Russia in direct confrontation, with risks of escalation to use of nuclear weapons, is real and alarming.
You've probably heard people say…
#8 The humanitarian initiative is a diversion; the only “realistic” approach that has proven to be effective is the step-by-step approach
But in reality
· A step-by-step approach that is not informed by norms of prohibition creates blockages to real progress and holds the entire process hostage to the success or failure of individual steps. Some of these steps have been stalled for decades, and could take more decades to achieve if pursued in isolation. Neither of the two steps most often referred to – the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or the negotiation of a treaty ending the production of fissile materials intended for weapons - would progress nuclear disarmament in any direct way.
· A ban on nuclear weapons would not preclude working on other aspects of the disarmament agenda; on the contrary it would make them more effective by giving them a context and a direction.
· A ban on nuclear weapons is a much-needed legal tool that would strengthen all other work on disarmament.
· The step-by-step approach, which has been on the table since the 1950s, is defined primarily by the NPT recognized nuclear-armed states and contributes to the misperception that only they can move the disarmament agenda forward.
· Article VI of the NPT does not require a step-by-step approach; rather, it requires good faith negotiations for nuclear disarmament—a process in which a ban treaty would be a real first step.
You've probably heard people say…
#9 The humanitarian disarmament model cannot be applied to nuclear disarmament as there is no alternative to the deterrent effect that nuclear weapons are able to provide
But in reality…
· The world today is dramatically different from the one that existed during the Cold War, and it will change even more profoundly in the decades ahead. Some argue that a strategy based on nuclear deterrence worked to prevent armed conflict among the so-called superpowers during the Cold War, though the history of violent conflict and proxy wars during that period suggest otherwise. Regardless, retaining that strategy today in an increasingly multipolar world increases the danger that nuclear weapons will be used.
· As several studies and books have elaborated, nuclear deterrence “works until it doesn’t”. And on the day it fails, the humanitarian impact will be catastrophic.
· Nuclear deterrence is not a rational, objective, or exact science. It is not an effect automatically generated by the possession of nuclear weapons. For the theory of nuclear deterrence to be plausible the perceived probability of the use of nuclear weapons has to be high and credible. This requires preparation for their use, which in turn increases the probability of accidental detonation.
· Deterrence is not effective against accidents, technical and human failures, or non-state terrorist organisations.
You've probably heard people say…
#10 The most pressing issue is to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
But in reality
· For the past ten years, Iran’s nuclear programme has been the main media focus on nuclear weapons instead of addressing the weapons that already exist. Iran should not have nuclear weapons; neither should China, the DPRK, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, the UK, or the US.
· The failure to progress nuclear disarmament is a potent driver for nuclear proliferation.
· Without a stronger norm stigmatising the use and possession of nuclear weapons it is unlikely that Iran will be the last country that is hesitant to take the nuclear option off the table.
· The concerns about Iran underscore the limitations of the NPT. The non-proliferation regime must be reinforced by a legally-binding instrument that is non-discriminatory.
· While we focus on the Iran negotiations, we overlook the fact that nuclear possessors are modernising their weapons at an alarming pace. This breach of the NPT is a pressing issue that a new legal instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons will address.
4