Xi Credibility Disadvantage (Aff Answers)SLUDL/NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17

Xi Credibility Disadvantage (Aff Answers)SLUDL/NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17

MS-I, JV, & Varsity Only

Xi Credibility Disadvantage Answers

Summary

Glossary

Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now

Non-Uniq-- Xi Not Committed to Market Reform

No Link- Opposition to Reform Blocks Reform

No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China

No Impact- Chinese Growth Not Sustainable

No Impact- China won’t start a war

Impact Turn- Reform Harms Chinese Economy

Impact Turn- Reform Causes Authoritarian Rule

Summary

The thesis of this disadvantage is that cooperation with the United States will undermine President Xi Jinping’s domestic economic reform efforts. Currently, President Xi Jinping (pronounced “she jean-ping”) of China is embarked on domestic efforts to reform China’s economy, most of which consist of opening China to market forces and reducing state owned enterprises. However, such reforms are politically contentious, and require Xi to maintain domestic political strength. Hardliners in China distrust cooperation with the United States, thus such cooperative efforts will undermine Xi domestically, derailing his reform efforts, which are the key to China’s economy.

Debaters should note that Xi is actually the surname, as in many Asian countries the first name is the equivalent of the last name in English (even though the name Xi comes first it is the equivalent of Obama in Barack Obama’s name).

Thanks to Selene Figueroa, Samford Debate Institute, Northwestern University Debate Institute, Michigan National Debate Institute and Gonzaga Debate Institute for their contributions to this project.

Glossary

Accrue- accumulate or receive (such payments or benefits).

Xi Jinping- is the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the Chairman of China's Central Military Commission.

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or Communist Party of China (CPC)- political party of China. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the CCP has been in sole control of that country’s government.

Clout- influence or power, especially in politics or business.

Hardliners- a member of a group, typically a political group, who adheres uncompromisingly to a set of ideas or policies.

Market based reforms- proposed reforms of the Chinese economy to reduce the influence of the state in production and business to a more open and market based economy.

Political Capital- the trust, goodwill, and influence a politician has with the public and otherpoliticalfigures. This goodwill is a type of invisible currency that politicians can use to mobilize the voting public or spend on policy reform.

People’s Liberation Army –the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China

People’s Republic of China – official name for the government of China

Vested interests- a personal stake or involvement in an undertaking or state of affairs, especially one with an expectation of financial gain.

Xi Credibility Disadvantage (Aff Answers)SLUDL/NAUDL CORE FILES 2016-17

MS-I, JV, & Varsity Only

Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now

[___] Financial sector reforms spur more investment in China.

EswarPrasad, 2016 (Tolani Senior Professor of Trade Policy at Cornell University), China’s economy and financial markets: Reforms and risks, Apr. 27, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

There could be significant effects on the patterns of global capital flows if this decision does lead to further financial sector reforms, capital account liberalization, and exchange rate flexibility in China. These changes would open the doors for more capital inflows into China and also further tilt the composition of China’s outflows away from foreign exchange reserve accumulation by the central bank, as it will spur more foreign investments by China’s households, corporations, and institutional investors.

Non-Unique-- Xi Credibility Low Now- Extensions

[___]

[___] Slowing economy threatening Xi’s credibility.

Andrew Nathan, 2016 (Columbia University) Signs of growing discontent for Xi Jinping in China, Mar. 31, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

There are many people unhappy because the economy is slowing down and because people are losing jobs. Xi Jinping is attacking the state-owned enterprises to try to force them to be more efficient. He wants to reorganize the military. He has this big anti-corruption campaign.

[___] Slower growth is sapping the legitimacy of Xi now:

ECONOMIST, 2012The man who must change China, Oct. 27, 2012. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

MrXi portrays himself as a man of the people and the party still says it represents the masses, but it is not the meritocracy that some Western observers claim (see article). Those without connections, are often stuck at the bottom of the pile. Having long since lost ideological legitimacy, and with slower growth sapping its economic legitimacy, the party needs a new claim on the loyalty of China’s citizens.

Non-Uniq-- Xi Not Committed to Market Reform

[___]Xi is not committed to market reforms.

THE ECONOMIST, 2016In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

MrXi has been even more hesitant in his handling of the economy. Months after taking power, he proclaimed that under his leadership markets would play a “decisive” role. Since last year he has begun to talk of a need for “supply-side” reforms, implying that inefficient, debt-laden and overstaffed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—ie, most of them—need shaking up. But his approach has been marked by uncertainty, U-turns and, occasionally, incompetence.

[___]Xi is not fully committed to market reforms.

THE ECONOMIST, 2016In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

It is true that some prices have been liberalised. In the second half of 2015, more market-friendly systems were introduced for setting exchange and interest rates. But the reform of SOEs has barely begun, stymied by the vested interests of SOE managers and their political friends, by fear of increasing unemployment, and perhaps by Mr Xi’s own oft-stated belief that the party should keep its hold on the main economic levers. There are few signs yet that loss-making SOEs will be shut down or that any will be subjected to real competition.

Non-Uniqueness Extensions – Xi not committed to market reform

[___] Economic liberalization has stalled under Xi.

THE ECONOMIST, 2016In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

Another implication is that it is no longer reasonable to argue that China is a model of an authoritarian country opening up economically without doing so politically. Mr Xi has increased control over the political system, but economic liberalisation has stalled. At the moment, the two are moving in lockstep in the wrong direction, to China’s detriment. The third is that Deng’s policy of putting “economic construction at the centre” is no longer the country’s most hallowed guiding principle. ForMrXi, politics comes first every time.

[___] China’s commitment to reforms wavering now:

CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 2016 Soros says China's debt-fueled growth echoes U.S. in 2007-08, Apr. 21, 2016, Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

"Whether we call it stabilization or not, I am not sure," Colquhoun said in an interview in New York. "From a credit perspective, we'd be more comfortable with China slowing more than it is. We are getting less confident in the government's commitment to structural reforms."

No Link- Opposition to Reform Blocks Reform

Opposition to reform prevents Xi’s reform efforts.

THE ECONOMIST 2016,In his exercise of power at home, Xi Jinping is often ruthless. But there are limits to his daring, Apr. 2, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

Some optimists still argue that Mr Xi believes the time is not yet ripe for bold economic change but that, once he has cleaned up the party, he will be able to turn his attention to economic reform. In this view, a critical period will come after a party congress due late next year. At that meeting, Mr Xi will put many more of his loyalists in positions of authority. But it is just as likely that he will continue to dawdle on reform, because opposition to it will have become entrenched. It is rarely possible to change course sharply after several years in power.

Xi retreating on reforms now.

Goh Sui Noi, 2016(East Asia Editor), Why is Xi Jinping the reformer resorting to rule by fear? Mar. 28, 2016. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

After what seemed like an initial reformist turn, Chinese President Xi Jinping appears to be changing course. Soon after taking power in late 2012, he dropped references to Marxism and Mao Zedong thought and came up with an impressive reform blueprint. More recently, though, he seems to be moving in the opposite direction. He has detained human rights lawyers, reined in the media and allowed a personality cult around him.

No Link Extensions – Opposition blocks reform

Xi needs to replenish his political capital.

Minxin Pei,2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College), FORTUNE, China-Taiwan Summit: Why Now? And What to Expect, Nov. 4, 2015. Retrieved May 10, 2016 from

Xi also has a compelling political reason to showcase his leadership and meet with Taiwan. With a struggling economy and an anti-corruption campaign that has made him unpopular with the bureaucracy, Xi needs to replenish his political capital. A landmark summit with Taiwan could offer that benefit. It demonstrates Xi’s bold leadership, particularly since such a meeting would have been inconceivable under his less decisive and powerful predecessors. Xi is also concerned that, should the DPP recapture the presidency in Taiwan next January, he would risk criticism of doing nothing to prevent such an outcome.

No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China

[___] Real pro-market reforms are impossible in China:

MinxinPei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12, 2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

To be sure, the economic policies of the CPC have changed beyond recognition since the end of the Mao era. However, the Chinese party-state has yet to shed its predatory instincts and institutions. Despite rhetoric professing respect for the market and property rights, the actual conduct and policies of the Chinese ruling elites show that they neither respect private property rights nor wish to protect them. The most telling evidence of the absence of their willingness to constrain the predatory appetite and capacity of a one-party state is the top leadership’s undisguised hostility to the idea of constitutionalism, the essence of which is enforceable limits on the power of the state and its rulers. The CPC’s rejection of any meaningful limits on its power, in practical terms, implies that China cannot have truly independent judicial institutions or regulatory agencies capable of enforcing laws and rules. Since genuine market economies cannot function without such institutions or agencies, it is clear that, as long as the party places itself above the law, real pro-market economic reforms are impossible.

No Internal Link- Reforms Impossible In China- Extensions

[___]

[___] China will never commit to the type of reforms necessary to save its economy:

Thus, the continuation of China’s predatory and extractive institutions precludes successful, radical, and complete market reforms. The impossibility of the task of constructing a genuine market economy supported by the rule law can be summarized in a wise Chinese proverb, yuhumoupi, or bargaining with a tiger for its skin. The long-term prospects for China’s economic growth, key to the CPC’s survival, are not optimistic. As the era of rapid growth produced by partial reforms and one-off favorable factors or events ends, sustaining China’s growth requires a radical overhaul of its economic and political institutions in order to achieve greater efficiency. But since this fateful step will destroy the economic foundations of CPC rule, it is hard to imagine that the party will actually commit economic, and hence political, suicide. Those unconvinced by such reasoning should count the number of dictatorships in history that willingly gave up their privileges and control over the economy in order to ensure long-term national prosperity.

No Impact- Chinese Growth Not Sustainable

Chinese growth is not sustainable:

However, investment-driven growth in the Chinese context has had three negative consequences. One is the diminishing returns on investments, because each incremental increase in output requires more investment, as measured by capital output ratio (the amount of investment needed to produce an additional yuan of GDP). In the 1990s, Chinas capital output ratio was 3.79. In the 2000s, it rose to 4.38. This trend—growth requiring ever-rising investment—is simply not sustainable. China is already investing nearly half of its GDP, an extraordinary number made possible by state control of infrastructure development. The extent of overcapacity and misallocation of capital are equally extraordinary.

Sustainable Chinese growth is impossible:

Another harm inflicted on the economy is that investment squeezes out household consumption (36 percent of GDP in 2013, compared with 60 percent in India), causing a massive structural imbalance and making sustainable growth impossible. That sustainable growth must come from moving away from export-led modalities to domestic market growth, but it cannot set roots with household consumption so artificially low.

No Impact- Growth Not Key to Stability

Growth cannot sustain Chinese autocratic rule.

Minxin Pei, 2015 (director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College), AMERICAN INTEREST, Asia's Game of Thrones, Nov. 12, 2015. Retrieved May 9, 2016 from

However, trends since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012 suggest that repression and nationalism are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the CPC’s survival strategy. An obvious explanation is that China’s faltering economic growth is creating social tensions and eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing the regime to deter potential societal challenge with force and divert public attention with nationalism. There is, however, an equally valid explanation that many observers have overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on delivering economic growth to maintain legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only because economic growth cannot be guaranteed and ever-rising popular expectations will be impossible to meet, but also because sustained economic growth produces structural socioeconomic changes that, as demonstrated by social science research and histories of democratic transitions, fatally threaten the durability of autocratic rule.

No Impact- China won’t start a war

[___] Economic and political instability will cause domestic crackdowns not international lashouts.

Feng 2010 [5/10, Zhu, PhD, Professor of School of International Studies and Director of the Center for International & Strategic Studies @ Peking University, has served as research fellow @ Washington based CSIS & Fairbank Center for East Asian Studies @ Harvard University, visiting scholar @ Durham University in UK, “An Emerging Trend in East Asia: Military Budget Increases and Their Impact”, May 10, 2010,

Many China watchers in the West contend that the weak legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has spurred its military buildup. But this is mostly an attribution error. Despite a great number of challenges from home and abroad, the CCP’s ruling legitimacy has not suffered from any shock. The Chinese people do not believe that a change of ruling party or the party’s relinquishing of power will resolve their complaints. Even if domestic unrest flares up, China would likely turn inward rather than outward, even at the cost of effectively muting an assertive foreign policy.

[___] China has no national intereste in proving the United States into a war.

Rudd, 2015– Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Former Prime Minister of Australia (Kevin, Belfer Center, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under Xi Jinping”, April 2015, //11)

Xi Jinping is a nationalist. And China, both the U.S. and China’s neighbors have concluded, is displaying newfound assertiveness in pursuing its hard security interests in the region. But there is, nonetheless, a very low risk of any form of direct conflict involving the armed forces of China and the U.S. over the next decade. It is not in the national interests of either country for any such conflict to occur; and it would be disastrous for both, not to mention for the rest of the world. Despite the deep difficulties in the relationship, no Cold War standoff between them yet exists, only a strategic chill. In fact, there is a high level of economic inter-dependency in the relationship, which some international relations scholars think puts a fundamental brake on the possibility of any open hostilities. Although it should be noted the U.S. is no longer as important to the Chinese economy as it once was.

Impact Turn- Reform Harms Chinese Economy

Reforms will cause economic decline not save the Chinese economy.

Naughton 15 (Barry, China Leadership Monitor, “Is There a “Xi Model” of Economic Reform? Acceleration of Economic Reform since Fall 2014”, China Leadership Monitor, No. 46)

This is a remarkably bold and thorough proposal. Indeed, there are substantial implementation risks because the proposal may be too demanding in terms of compliance, and somewhat disruptive in its economic impact. Local governments were told in October to inventory their debts as of year-end and report them by January 5. Compliance with this schedule is not really realistic, and only one province, Hainan, was approved to announce it debt figures by the end of February. In the event, commentators suggested that the Hainan numbers were approved for disclosure not because they were accurate, but because they didn’t display any big shortcomings: total debt was not large relative to provincial GDP, and the growth rate of debt was acceptable.9 Hainan reported that its local debt grew 22 percent between mid-2013 and end-2014, and that 84 percent of the debt was local government responsibility, with government possessing various degrees of contingent liability for the other 16 percent. None of this debt could be converted into enterprise debt in the short term. The release of this one province’s debt figures is thus quite revealing. The delays show that local governments are under great time pressure, and indeed may be intentionally dragging their feet on a measure that certainly does not work in their interests. Moreover, the fact that the rapid 22 percent growth of Hainan’s government debt was considered acceptably moderate shows that local governments have incentives to come up with as large a number as possible for the debt they acknowledge. If they have to accept a new debt ceiling, it should be as large as possible, and local governments can probably assume that the central Ministry will be cooperative in helping them to get this debt restructured and listed on the local government capital budget.10 The Ministry of Finance is thus struggling to impose limits on new local government debt without acknowledging—and de facto accepting— excessively high levels of existing debt.