Why Pragmatic Diplomacy Is a Sine Qua Non

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Chapter One

Why Pragmatic Diplomacy Is A Sine Qua Non

This thesis investigates Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy. It seeks to address five broad questions: First, what was Taiwan's "old" diplomacy and why is this important? Secondly, why has Taiwan been isolated in the international arena? Thirdly, what is pragmatic diplomacy and why is it adopted? Fourthly, how does Taiwan manage to adopt pragmatic diplomacy to break its isolation in the international arena? The dynamics and problems of Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy can be assessed under this ground line of inquiry. Finally, what framework should Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy be analysed?

The history of Taiwan's diplomacy ever since the Republic of China (ROC, or then Nationalist China) retreated to the island has been clinging to its official "three nos" policy of no contact, no compromise, and no negotiations vis-à-vis the Chinese Communist regime and its diplomatic allies. Up until 1971 the Nationalist government on Taiwan still asserted its United Nations (UN) seat, 63 out of the then 144 world states (accounts for 43%) maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan under the pretext that Taiwan’s Nationalist government was the sole legal government representing the whole of China, while 49 states (accounts for 34%) supported Communist China. The Nationalist government had the support not just of the USA but also Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. Even the major countries who had recognised the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, such as Britain and France continued to support the Nationalist regime in the international arena (Maguire 1998: 166).

One year later, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist China on Taiwan was expelled from the UN on the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, which passed by a large majority to seat representatives of the People’s Republic of China and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations.[1] The U.S. proposal of dual representatives for the PRC and ROC in the UN was rejected by both, and the ROC's three nos policy has meant that Nationalist China's international role eroded over time. More and more states withdrew their recognition of the ROC and switched their diplomatic ties to the PRC. The number of countries having diplomatic ties with Nationalist China has fallen, from 52 in 1971 down to the historical low 21 in 1979 when the ROC's principal ally and previously staunch supporter, the U.S., withdrew recognition of ROC. Compared with Israel’s 162, Singapore’s 149 and Mongolia's 134 diplomatic allies, today less than 30 countries maintain diplomatic ties with the ROC.

Peter Vale (1997: 101) terms Israel, Chile, South African and Taiwan as international pariahs. They are all ruled by immigrants, they surpassed their neighbours in economic and political development and they had all become targets of communist onslaught. Yet, they all found themselves at odds with the international community as a whole.[2] Efraim Inbar (1985: 3-4) argues that Taiwan was one of the four states which had been isolated by other states in international politics. He starts with the definition of isolation, which refers to a state which has little or no interaction with the rest of the actors. His focus is on isolation imposed upon a state by other international actors. He points out that opponents of outcast countries try to eliminate them as international actors by refusing to grant legitimacy to these states or by attempting to mobilise the international community to isolate them.

Several ways to measure isolation are obvious, Inbar argues. The first is the number of states that have diplomatic relations with the outcast countries. The second criteria for measuring isolation is the membership of a state in Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). The third measure is the outcome of issues raised at the United Nations, its affiliated organisations and other international organisations, that relate to the outcasts (Inbar 1985: 4-5).

Despite a handful of diplomatic allies, Taiwan is not a Member State of the UN nor of its affiliated agencies. It suffers hostility from both the global and regional IGO and proves its isolation in the international arena. Taiwan’s opponent, China, makes every effort to diminish Taiwan’s international roles by preventing states and IGO from recognising Taiwan (Cliff 1998: 300-301). Since Taiwan lacks diplomatic recognition by most UN member-states and no issue related to Taiwan has been successfully raised in the UN since 1971, the question is not how isolated Taiwan is but how does Taiwan manage to break its opponent-imposed isolation?

To broaden its international profile, Taipei has sought and accepted recognition, membership, and other indicia of international status wherever they have been available or on a variety of terms, and whenever Communist China has been involved. In contrast to the earlier stage of three nos policy, this approach is termed “pragmatic diplomacy.” Thus, we see “the Republic of China” (the official term in Taipei, used by some states that have full diplomatic relations with the ROC), the “Republic of China on Taiwan” (or ROCOT, in many ROC officials’ statements and draft resolutions for its "return" to the United Nations), “China, Taiwan” (the International Cotton Advisory Committee and Interpol), “Chinese Taipei” (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Olympics), “Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu” (applications to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Trade Organisation), “Taipei, China” (Asian Development Bank) and “Taipei Economic and Cultural Offices” (the surrogate embassy and quasi consulates in most countries) have been used in different occasions to represent the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan (Lisle 2000: 35). Before detailing the research questions, the application of some terms needs to be clarified.

I. Diplomacy and Pragmatic Diplomacy

Diplomacy

The word "diplomacy" is used in more than one sense. Silva (1972: 4) suggests that diplomacy may be used as a synonym for foreign policy, i.e. the international procedure of a particular state, either in a generic sense (e.g. Brazilian diplomacy), or with regard to a particular geographical area (e.g. Middle Eastern diplomacy), or to a particular era (traditional diplomacy or modern diplomacy). The other context Silva raises is the functions performed by a diplomat. These include duties to represent his or her state, promote friendly relations between the sending country and the receiving country and ascertain conditions in the host state.[3] Finally, Silva argues that there is the popular sense of the word with the idea of tact, care, courtesy or politeness, as well as the unfavourable connotations of duplicity, astuteness and guile.

Silva (1972: 4-5) also illustrates other scholars such as Pradier Fodere who defines diplomacy as the idea of international negotiation, the maintenance of external relations, the administration of the national interest of peoples and their governments in their material contact, be it peaceful or hostile. Often quoted is the definition of River, for whom diplomacy is the science and art of representing States and negotiating, which has been evolved by Paul Fauchille by saying that as a science, its aim is to become acquainted with the legal and political relations between the various States, their respective interests, their historical traditions, and the conditions laid down in treaties. As an art, its aim is to carry on international negotiations. This involves the ability to co-ordinate and direct political negotiations and accompany them with full understanding. All of these define "negotiation" as the essence of diplomacy. As Berridge (1995: 1) indicates, diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation.[4]

If diplomacy is only served for negotiation, then diplomacy becomes a policy instrument in its own right for persuasion. Baylis and Smith (1998: 257-260) term persuasion as "pure diplomacy" which constitutes part of the foreign policy process. They argue that states learn that persuasion is often more successful if sticks and/or carrots are attached. Consequently, three other types of policy instrument have been established, namely military force, economic measures, and subversion (eg. giving assistance to rebel groups). In other words, the relationship between diplomacy and the foreign policies of states is that diplomacy serves as one of the four policy instruments for negotiation and persuasion. If this instrument is not sufficient, "sticks" will be used to achieve a state's objectives.

Not all scholars agree with these definitions. Nicolson (1969: 3-5), for example, particularly points out that diplomacy has been carelessly denoted in several interpretations. He denies “diplomacy” has been employed as a synonym for “foreign policy,” nor does he agree denoting diplomacy as “negotiation” or “the processes and machinery by which such negotiation is carried out.” He also rejects the definition of skill in the conduct of international negotiation or in its worst sense, the more guileful aspect of tact. His definition of diplomacy focuses on “who” in which he argues diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.

All of these definitions on diplomacy will be useful in this research. Negotiation, foreign policy and the actors respectively play different roles in Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy. However, Nicolson limits “who” to ambassadors, envoys and diplomatists, which can only partly cover the concepts and the players of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy, because the major players for this approach include that polity's Head of State. Specifically, Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy confronts tremendous opposition from China. Thus, Taiwan's concept of diplomacy has been generated into the particular idea of “pragmatism", which allows Taiwan to find its own way while dealing with the majority of states that have no official ties to it.

Pragmatic Diplomacy

Surely all diplomacy should be pragmatic and practical in affairs, however, "pragmatic diplomacy" has a significant meaning for Taiwan, whose diplomatic efforts must contend with intransigent opposition from China. For purposes of this study, pragmatic diplomacy means cultivating diplomatic channels and establishing closer bilateral relations with other states to compensate for Taiwan's lack of widespread sovereign recognition and to reinforce a separate sovereign identity for Taiwan by all possible means. During the Cold War there was a global ideological struggle between capitalist democracy and communism (Goldstein 1996: 208). In this context, an anti-Communist Nationalist China on Taiwan was an important ally in the United States-led struggle against world communism, although it was far away from democracy (Klintworth 1995: 56). Adopting ideological struggle did earn Nationalist China collective recognition under the name “ROC” until 1971 when Taipei lost its seat to Beijing in the UN. Beijing worked patiently for twenty-two years before ousting the ROC. Indeed, in 1971 its spokesperson insisted that, if the U.S. dual representation resolution were to pass, the PRC would still remain outside the organisation and would be satisfied with nothing less than ROC expulsion. Beijing’s strategy was first to isolate Nationalist China on Taiwan by insisting that the ROC be denied membership in intergovernmental organisations before the PRC could join. As for the condition of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, other governments must break official relations with the ROC before establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing (Simon and Feraru 1995: 273). Consequently, the number of countries maintaining diplomatic ties with Taiwan dropped from 63 in 1970 to 22 in the late 1980s, while China increased its diplomatic allies from 49 in 1970 to 140 in the late 1980s.

During the 1980s the ROC foreign ministry came under increasing public criticism by people of Taiwan for its lack of success in defending the ROC’s international status. It lost its seats in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund in 1980, and in 1986 when the PRC joined the Asian Development Bank, the ROC was informed that it could remain a member of that organisation only if it accepted the designation of “Taipei, China” in place of its official name. People found it difficult to understand why a country that had become a power in the world economy could be so isolated diplomatically. Since the old diplomacy of three nos policy has come to a deadlock, new diplomacy has emerged.

As Adam Watson (1982: 14) argues, states are committed to diplomacy by the nature of the world in which they exist. Not long after Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as President in January 1988, signs of pragmatic diplomacy in Taiwan’s foreign policy appeared. Lee announced new guidelines for Taiwan’s foreign policy, including a more flexible approach to upgrade bilateral relations, distribution of foreign aids to developing countries and active engagement in the international organisation, under whatever names. The essence of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy is to give up the outdated three nos policy and try every effort to engage with other states and participate in the international community, whether the Communist China has been related or not, either using the name of Republic of China, or using other names.

The main purpose of diplomacy is to achieve security for the nation to ensure the survival of its particular values. Similarly, the purpose of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy, as promoted and defined by Lee, is to break through Taiwan’s isolation and to secure Taiwan’s sovereignty in the international community. Practically, this means reinforcing a separate de facto sovereign identity for Taiwan. A number of researchers (Chai 1995; Clough 1993: 104; Kuo 1995; Tien 1995) argue that Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy had four principal tactics: (1) to press vigorously for admission to international organisations, (2) to accelerate the strengthening of substantive relations with countries with which Taiwan lacked diplomatic relations, (3) to develop relations with communist countries for the first time, and (4) to challenge the PRC in countries with which Beijing had diplomatic relations. In the last sense, pragmatic diplomacy is to recognise that China and Taiwan are ruled by two governments and to promote the existence of one China, one Taiwan.

II. Outline of Thesis

The central purpose of this research is to study Taiwan’s approach to pragmatic diplomacy relative to the five questions stipulated at the outset of this chapter. Accordingly, the major issues relating to diplomacy will be the main concern of this thesis. The most important theme in traditional diplomacy, of course, is sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty will not be found in societies in which there is no state. Sovereignty is first, and perhaps foremost, a noteworthy legal and political expression of character. It is because in the past 300 years, the state system has been loosely organised according to the legal doctrine of sovereignty. Furthermore, a sovereign state is the traditional actor for diplomacy (Ziegler 1993: 149-150).

Up until 1949 when Nationalist China fled to Taiwan, Taiwan had never been a self-ruled political entity. It used to be a colony of Dutch (1624-1662), Spanish (1626-1642) and Japanese (1895-1945). After 1949, Taiwan was ruled under the Chiang Kai-shek regime as a stepping-stone to fulfil Chiang’s intention – to recover mainland China. For Taiwan itself, sovereignty is a new idea, because Chiang’s Taiwan was regarded by the majority of states as a sole legal government representing not only Taiwan itself, but also mainland China until 1971, when it was expelled from the United Nations. Although expelled from the UN, Taiwan officially asserted its sovereignty extending to mainland China for another two decades. This assertion was dismissed in May 1991 when Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui announced the termination of the 43-year-old Period of National Mobilisation for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (Lawrence 1992: 47). It is the ending of the myth that Taiwan tried to recover mainland China in the past four decades. It is also a beginning of the fact that Taiwan seriously considers itself a sovereign state.

Two years after Lee’s announcement, Taiwan unofficially recognised two-China policy. On November 21, 1993, Taiwan’s Economic Minister P.K. Chiang voiced Taiwan’s first governmental recognition of its de facto independence from China. Speaking in a comparatively unobserved corner of the Asia-Pacific Summit in Seattle, Dr. Chiang argued that there are now two sovereign states across the Taiwan Straits (The Economist November 27, 1993). It was the first time that Taiwan’s high-level official had asserted Taiwan itself as a sovereign state. In the following year, President, Vice-President and Premier of Taiwan asserted Taiwan itself a sovereign state on different occasions. The assertion of Taiwan as a sovereign state is not immune from criticism. China, particularly, tries every effort to deny Taiwan’s existence as a state. Hence, the second chapter will examine the legal argument concerning Taiwan's claim to sovereignty in the eyes of international legal experts. This discussion will base on the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, the conclusions of Cairo and Potsdam Conferences in 1943 and 1945 respectively, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, and the ROC's Constitutional Amendments in 1991.