What the Kyoto Protocol means for the Russians

by Alexey Kokorin

The only impediment to the Kyoto protocol entering into force now is the Russians. The only global agreement to save climate, which has been ratified by 110 countries, is still in limbo. Why? Who? How? This is article presents an up-to-the-minute analysis of the reasons. The history of progress up to and back from ratification is summarised, including the latest facts from early June 2003. The views of all relevant ministries, business, Parliament and the general public briefly presented, as are the intentions and/or plans. It is clear that there is progress toward ratification, but serious opposition still exists. The selfish interests of agencies, clumsy bureaucracy and misunderstandings should and can be overcome.

Context

At the end of 1997 in Kyoto nobody could predict that only Russian ratification would block its entry in to force, nor that the fate of the protocol would still be uncertain, even in mid-2003, even after it had been ratified by 110 countries. It was so obvious that the Kyoto protocol is profitable for Russia that the UNFCCC negotiation community was not ready to face such a problem. Without Russia the Kyoto protocol can’t enter in to force (as long as the US does not ratify). Global efforts to combat climate change will be undermined for at least 5–10 years, business confidence in low-carbon incentive markets will be eroded.

People see controversial and incomprehensible statements by different Russian officials. It seems that the Russian position is and “unpredictable and subject to sudden change”, that the jungles of Russian policy will never be ruled by reasonable arguments and human logic. What does it all mean? What does the Protocol mean now for different Russian agencies, for business, for Parliament, for the officials of the Russian Academy of Science, the media, and the general public? We reveal their views below.

Views and plans of the main stakeholders

To do so, it is reasonable first of all to summarize the importance of the Protocol for Russian national interests, and then to identify the main specific features and motives of Russian officials. The fact is that all views and plans are a combination of the first and second points, as applied to the specific situation of a given agency or person.

Why is it so important for Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol?

  • The Russian ratification will demonstrate its global political role – the country that makes the Kyoto protocol a reality.
  • Russia will attract investments for energy efficiency and cleaner energy sources, using Joint Implementation and other mechanisms to seek funding and to reduce the risk of investments.
  • The Russian ratification will fix an agreed set of general principles of GHG emission reduction (in particular, accounting of obligations from a base year level and fixing 1990 as the base year), which is profitable for Russia, as is as the principle of “cap and trade” as a whole.

What are the specific features that have to be understood to understand the Russian position?

  • A Russian official usually express only his/her own opinion, rather than the established, officially adopted position of the country. This sort of “democracy” reflects the rather low level of bureaucratic discipline within the Government. A statement from an official cannot therefore be considered as a Russian position, and even a very positive promise of the Prime Minister cannot be interpreted as a direct order to the clerks.
  • The income of middle and low-level Russian officials is not based on salary, but on additional jobs, e.g. consultancy on projects, preparation of analytical reports, lecturing, etc. (please note that this is not corruption). What it means, though, is that they have to “produce” new projects and activities. If nothing can be produced, an issue doesn’t interest them.
  • Given this context, officials do not want to be overloaded by a routine bureaucratic job. If the Kyoto Protocol is just one more load of paperwork, the officials will prefer to suspend or even reject ratification.

So let’s now consider the positions of the relevant ministries, from most positive to the worst.

The only ministry that always supported the Kyoto Protocol was the Ministry of Energy. It really follows Russian national interests and seeks compromise between the interests of the ministry and others. The staff are sure that the Kyoto Protocol is very profitable for energy projects and it is a good deal from every point of view. The ministry is going to insist on ratification, incorporation of Kyoto mechanisms in the national Energy Strategy, creation of solid JI system, and support of other energy projects, e.g. under the ERUPT programme. On the other hand, they are dead against any other agency (in particular, Roshydromet) having any form of control over energy JI projects.

The Ministry of Energy insists on ratification, incorporation of Kyoto mechanisms in Energy Strategy, creation of solid JI system

Ministry of Foreign Affairs is always emphasising its function as a servant to the Government. Therefore, for many months it stayed in a neutral position, limiting itself to very general, “careful” words. The Ministry had been asked to provide a clear Russian position on ratification, but in vain. However, the ministry made a crucial contribution during discussion in the President’s Office in mid-May by its strong support of the political reasons for ratification.

Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet) is the UNFCCC Focal Point and therefore chief negotiator from the Russian side. Everybody knows that in this has been no easy matter in recent years. However, in the last few months the Head of Roshydromet, Alexander Bedritsky, many times declared clearly for ratification, even during a joint Russia–USA press conference in Moscow in mid-January, 2003. This is clearly a fine U-turn, but his staff …: oh, possibly they just did not read the text of the Protocol. It is evident that the capacities of this small agency are very limited, therefore they highlight the up-front funding of the GHG inventory – before ratification. Roshydromet would also like to keep control of the entire process of JI project approval – as a source of additional jobs (and income) for its people: and it wants these institutional provisions before ratification. So, while formally speaking they are in favour of ratification, the staff is doing all it can for suspension.

The Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) is the Russian ministry of environment; its concern is more to exploit nature than protection it. The staff here see a danger in any international agreement because it can be a barrier for the unrestricted exploitation of nature, or at least there will be more transparency – and that’s something they are very afraid of. Another point is the forest inventory. The ministry should keep such an inventory, but currently it is in a very poor state. Therefore they would like to avoid any solid standards for a CO2 sink inventory as may be incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol. Many times MNR officials have expressed strictly negative opinions on the protocol. But … we can see a U-turn now. The new Deputy Minister, Irina Osokina, has been nominated to be responsible for the deal, and she is close to the President’s team. We can now see another tone, reasonable arguments and support of ratification. Welcome on board and good luck!

The most dramatic and controversial position is that of MEDT – Ministry of Economic Development and Trade – the ministry officially nominated to lead the ratification process. In 2001 and early 2002 it was a supporter of the protocol. It developed economic schemes for implementation and calculated a quite high economic value of the Kyoto Protocol for Russia. Suddenly, however, the bureaucrats came to understand that the largest projects would be under the Ministry of Energy, a special new body may control trade, and they would have only more paperwork and unpaid bills. Stop! Stop the protocol! The MEDT position became increasingly more negative, right up to a direct proposal to reject ratification. Currently, after direct pressure from the President’s Office, they are demonstrating their loyalty – “ratification of course” but only “after full adoption of Russian GHG legislation, which will need about two years”. So, we still see an effort to suspend ratification, until the MEDP staff can find a scheme with selfish profit, e.g. organisation of tenders for GHG emission reduction projects under their control.

Many in (energy) industry support ratification. They see profit in energy efficiency projects, investments, good partnership with Europe, good company image.

However Russia is not only bloody-minded bureaucrats and ministries, but business, regional leaders, academy of science, State Duma (parliament), NGOs and, last but not least, the general public.

Business is business. Its goals and language are commerce. First, business considered the Kyoto Protocol as a sort of potential carbon burden and opinion was adverse. Many organisations, in particular WWF Russia, spent a lot of time on preparing materials, organising events and forcing big business to read, discuss and analyse realities, and nothing more. It was enough. RAO UES, GAZPROM, RUSAL, SUAL,… Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists (RSPP), Union of Oil and Gas Producers, supported ratification. They see profit in energy efficiency projects and investments, they see good partnership with Europe, they see good company images. Actually the same could be said about regional leaders, up to 80% of whom currently support ratification. This is the best proof that the protocol is economically beneficial to Russia and MEDT’s position is a bluff. Speaking about plans, key words are projects and investments. The regional leaders have been assured that the free trade in quotas is the prerogative of Federal Government, so JI and quotas “generated” by projects could be their main climate business. People want to win in Dutch ERUPT and any other tenders and programmes there may be available, initiate JI projects, but they are afraid of concentration of control functions in a federal body, which can restrict regional and local initiatives.

The most exotic Russian position is the negative one adopted by some officials of the Russian Academy of Science (RAS) led by Yuri Izrael (who, incidentally, is still vice-chairman of the IPCC). They point out that the climate system has not yet been investigated thoroughly enough to warrant spending money on the Kyoto protocol, and it would be proper to spend it all on science. However, in May–June 2003 other top scientists represented RAS in key meetings, and RAS supported ratification. Russian NGOs, led by Greenpeace, were instrumental in collecting 250 signatures of Russian professors in support of the Kyoto Protocol and it is one more proof that Mr. Izrael’s activity is just a mixture of self-aggrandisement, coupled with a misunderstanding of modern financial realities of international relations. In the given context it is a pity that the Moscow World Climate Change Conference planned for late September, 2003 is under the technical organisation of so specific a person as Mr. Izrael. It certainly spoils the prestige of the conference and wastes the good wishes of all, including President Putin, who authored the idea of the conference.

If the Kyoto Protocol is just one more load of paperwork, officials would prefer to suspend or even reject ratification.

The State Duma is the key body for ratification, of course. That is why various activities to involve the Duma in decision making, to increase people’s awareness shape a positive opinion on the Kyoto Protocol started more than a year ago. The starting point was very pessimistic. Only a few parliamentarians knew about the matter, people mixed up CO2 and CO, people believed the idea that CO2 emission leads to a deficit of oxygen in the atmosphere and it should be main point of an international agreement. However, gradually, events, publications, informal meetings, visits to Europe, efforts of the Duma Committee on Ecology achieved quite good results. Currently a majority of parliamentarians have a more or less sound knowledge and about 40–50% support the Kyoto Protocol. Why only 40–50%? About 1/3 are communists and some are agrarians, who are against the President on principal, and they are going to vote against. The other 20–30% are very unstable, the main reason being Duma elections in December 2003. They want to use any opportunity for self-advertising e.g. by exotic statements against the protocol, they see that people in election districts may be sceptical of Kyoto Protocol. So the situation is positive, but slippery. The State Duma will never vote “Yes” without a consolidation of pro-Kyoto forces and additional efforts. It is good that there are strong supporters in the Duma, in particular the fraction of the Union of Right Forces, we hope, pro-presidential United Russia is a solid supporter, and the “Yabloko” fraction (which recently promised come up with a ratification bill in September 2003 independently of the Government, which is allowed by the Constitution)..

It is possible to see a clear positive trend in the awareness and concern of the general public and NGOs. Gradually, people became sure that: (1) climate change exists – everybody knows, (2) it is adverse, even in a northern country like Russia – up to 80% believe, (3) the reason is anthropogenic emission – about a half think so, while only 10–20% thought so a few years ago. However, the typical view of Russians on any agreement like the Kyoto protocol is that it is one more bureaucratic tool to sell Russia’s natural resources, in particular, “clean air”. Just clean air is associated with limitation of atmospheric emissions. So views are very controversial. The progressive part of the population understands the Kyoto Protocol, but many others think along the lines of “More such agreements – more Russian Nature and Environment sold by bloody business and corrupt officials”. Education and awareness – carefully and gradually – this is the only way to improve these views, and NGOs, including WWF Russia should do the job.

What do we have to do?

At the moment the situation looks good. But … on June 5th last, the economic advisor to the President, Andrew Illarionov, stated to the press that he saw no reason for the Kyoto Protocol. Is this a sort of self-advertising, or a signal of yet another U-turn? Can the Government “forget” the recommendation of the President’s Office to pass ratification bill to the Parliament by 1st September? Russian history shows that it can.

We cannot sit and wait for the miracle of ratification. WWF see its role to increase awareness and education, to facilitate an adequate view of the Kyoto Protocol, and ratification. It would be nice to recommend all to progressive people in all countries that they contribute to the task. You could ask the leaders of your own countries to take care. You could ask your business companies to insist that Russian partners are more active in the battle for ratification. You could ask your scientists to explain the threat better and involve their Russian colleagues in the support of the protocol. You could help Russian NGOs and progressive leaders to do more.

And if so, the Government should pass the ratification bill to the Parliament by September, Parliament can adopt the bill as a priority issue in a couple of weeks and the President Putin can make the final sign in October 2003. In joint efforts the Kyoto protocol can enter into force and global community makes a first but principal step to prevent catastrophic climate changes.

* Alexey KOKORIN Ph.D. graduated from Moscow State University, has about ten years experience in the UNFCCC process and the Kyoto Protocol. For several years he worked for the Russian Government with direct involvement in the problems described here. Since 1999 he has been co-ordinator of the Russian Climate Programme of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF).

This article was specially prepared in June 2003 for the Netherlands Research Programme on Global Climate Change (NRP GC) to address latest facts and events in Russia.

For more information please contact:

WWF-Russia

Alexey KOKORIN,

Nikoloyamskaya St. 19 build. 3,

109240, Moscow, Russian Federation.

Tel.: 7(095) 727-0939 (switchboard) 727-0937 ext. 53 (direct line)

Fax: 7(095) 727-0938.

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