West Coast 2010 Pub Forum

January PF 22

West Coast Publishing

PubForum File

January 2010

Afghanistan Topic

January 2010 1

Afghanistan Topic 1

Topic Analysis 1/2 2

Topic Analysis 2/2 3

Topic Definitions 4

Pro 5

Obama’s Plan Is On-Balance Best 5

Obama’s Plan Will Be Successful 6

Obama’s Plan Encourages Afghani Responsibility 7

Setting An Exit Date Is A Good Strategy 8

The US Can Still Succeed In Afghanistan 9

History Does Not Prove US Will Fail In Afghanistan 10

Withdrawal Is A Worse Option 11

Obama’s Plan Is Not Withdrawal 12

Iraq Proves Obama’s Plan Can Work 13

Con 14

Obama’s Plan Will Not Be Successful 14

Afghanistan Is Not Key To Solve Terrorism 15

Obama’s Plan Can’t Solve Government Weakness 16

Obama’s Plan Overstretches The Military 17

Obama’s Timetable Ensures Failure 18

Obama’s Timetable Encourages Aggression 19

More Troops Encourages Insurgency 20

Other Alternatives Would Solve Better Than Obama’s Plan 21

Obama’s Plan Will Make Afghanistan Worse 22

Topic Analysis 1/2

The Public Forum topic for January 2010 is “Resolved: President Obama's plan for increasing troops in Afghanistan is in the United States' best interest.” The Pro side of this resolution will argue that Obama’s recently announced “troop surge” in Afghanistan will be successful and improve the security of the U.S. The Con side will argue that the plan will be unable to stabilize Afghanistan, and will leave the United States stuck even deeper in an intractable conflict. This months Public Forum Briefs are intended to give you a set of evidence to prepare and debate these questions.

TOPIC OVERVIEW

The Obama administration has been engaged in a comprehensive review of the United States’ military and diplomatic strategy in Afghanistan for most of the last year. The security situation in Afghanistan is widely considered to have deteriorated significantly in the waning years of the Bush presidency, with mounting US casualties and little progress in fighting the ongoing insurgency. Obama also pledged during his campaign that he would make Afghanistan the central focus of the war on terror, calling it a “necessary war.” In light of this, Obama has spent months weighing options and developing a plan to reconcile the advice from two competing factions: those that want to escalate the war and commit more US resources, including more troops, and those that want the US to withdraw as rapidly as possible. The former viewpoint is most vociferously represented by General Stanley McChrystal, the top military commander in Afghanistan, who publicly requested an additional 40,000 troops from the president. The latter viewpoint is represented by a host of other political advisors, the left-leaning wing of the Democratic party, and a large portion of the American public.

After months of deliberation, Obama delivered a speech on Dec 1st at West Point, in which he laid out his new plan. Most notably, Obama has decided to commit another 30,000 troops to the effort in Afghanistan, to be deployed as rapidly as possible starting this winter. He also set a deadline of July 2011 to start a drawdown on US troop levels. Administration officials, however, including Defense Secretary Robert Gates, have been quick to emphasize that this is not a hard deadline for US withdrawal, but will only represent the beginning of a long process that remains responsive to “conditions on the ground.”

This strategy has engendered controversy from both sides of the aisle. Many conservative commentators

criticize it for not devoting enough resources to Afghanistan, and vehemently oppose the notion of any sort of timeline for US withdrawal, worrying that this sends a signal that the US lacks commitment to the region. On the other side, liberals have been quick to condemn Obama for continuing a “failed war” and following in the footsteps of the Bush administration (who utilized a similar “surge” strategy in Iraq). Few on either side see much prospect for “victory” as conventionally defined.

Whether experience in Iraq can be generalized to the situation in Afghanistan is a source of particular controversy. Supporters see the enhanced military strategy employed in Iraq as critical to the security gains made there in the past several years. They emphasize that political and diplomatic strategies alone have failed in the region for decades, and that only getting control of basic public safety can create the conditions which allow other efforts to start making inroads. Detractors are quick to emphasize the differences between the two countries and the specifics of the respective plans – Iraq had a higher level of US military involvement prior to the surge, and Bush’s plan didn’t include as specific of a timeline for beginning withdrawal.

Other historical parallels make frequent appearances in the literature on Obama’s new strategy. Parallels to Vietnam and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are frequently employed by both sides to make predictions over the surge’s likely effect. Afghanistan is frequently called the “Graveyard of Empires” as successive attempts to rule the area with military force have failed for hundreds, if not thousands of years. Other commentators emphasize that part of the reason why the US “failed” in Vietnam was an unwillingness to commit a sufficient number of troops and resources to the military effort. The salience of these examples will need to be debated out by both sides.

One important thing to keep in mind is that the Pro doesn’t necessarily need to defend that Obama’s plan will be a panacea for Afghanistan. Rather, they are asked to defend that it’s in the best interests of the United States to send more troops as opposed to other available options. Both sides of the debate are quick to agree that where Afghanistan is concerned, there are no “silver bullets.” This months topic focuses instead on whether Obama’s policy might just be the least bad option.

Topic Analysis 2/2

DEBATING THE PRO SIDE

One of the most important things for the Pro side to defend is the importance of remaining as committed as possible in Afghanistan. The strategic centrality of the region, the necessity to not be perceived as a “failure” in nation building efforts, and most importantly the potential for a chaotic Afghanistan to operate as a base for insurgency and terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are all themes the Pro should emphasize. A vital part of winning will be arguing that the conflict in Afghanistan is not just “their problem” but is central to the United States best interests.

In particular, the Pro will need to defend the efficacy of troop increases as a mechanism to improve stability in Afghanistan. The Pro should draw on the aforementioned analogy to the Iraq surge, which is widely considered to have been successful despite the political firestorm it engendered at the time. Increased troop presence is also the strategy being supported by the constituency who is arguably most equipped to evaluate strategies for improved security: the military. There is also a significant constituency in the administration in favor of so called “counterinsurgency” as the most important military tactic in conflicts such as Afghanistan.

The Pro will need to be prepared to defend against criticisms of Obama’s plan from both the left and the right. First, it is necessary to defend that troop increases are preferable to withdrawal or gradual drawdown in Afghanistan. There is a very vocal political coalition in favor of reducing the US footprint in the Middle East, and they are up in arms over what they perceive as an abandonment of Obama’s progressive ideals. Against this line of attack, the Pro should emphasize the temporary nature of the surge, and the inclusion of a deadline for beginning a transition to Afghan security forces taking a more significant portion of responsibility. The Pro will also need to answer arguments that the more troops the US has in Afghanistan, the more it will be viewed as an occupying power, rather than a force for democracy and stability.

Secondly, the Pro needs to defend against criticisms from the right that Obama’s plan is a signal of weakness that will only encourage the Taliban and Al Qaeda to “wait it out” until after the US leaves. These critics argue that any sort of timetable or date for lessening the US commitment will only embolden more aggression on the part of the insurgency. To answer this, the Pro should make the same argument Obama made in his speech in response to this line of reasoning – that without a deadline, there won’t be a sense of urgency in Afghanistan that they need to get their own house in order. Both sides of the spectrum agree that in the long run, the only hope for a viable government in Afghanistan will need to develop indigenously.

DEBATING THE CON SIDE

As should be clear from the above, the Con has their choice of two broad angles to argue that Obama’s plan isn’t in the US best interest. They can choose to emphasize that his plan doesn’t go far enough in reiterating our commitment to “victory” in Afghanistan, or criticize further troop deployments as miring the US further in an intractable and possibly unwinnable war. In either scenario, the Con should develop a clear picture of how the US “best interest” should be evaluated. Should it take into account risks to foreign populations, or only our own? Is the risk from international extremist terrorism greater than the ongoing risks presented to the military forces engaged in the conflict? Is the conflict worth the ongoing cost, especially economic, in a time of financial crisis and national debates over domestic problems such as health care? These are the type of questions the Con should explore in developing a defense of not sending more troops.

When arguing that Obama’s strategy will fail, the Con should emphasize other factors which might be more important to overall success in Afghanistan than the level of US troop deployment. Many commentators emphasize that no amount of US presence can overcome the difficulties inherent in a hostile geography, widespread support for insurgency, mounting ethnic tensions, and especially widespread corruption in the weak central government headed by Hamid Karzai. Others point out that Afghanistan is only a symptom of a larger problem – and that terrorism and extremism will find havens in other countries, such as Pakistan or failed states in Africa, just as easily.

The Con should be able to defend an alternate strategy for how to deal with Afghanistan. If the Pro can successfully characterize Obama’s plan as the “least bad” option, they will likely win even if the Con points out many possible flaws or failings of the troop surge. If instead, the Con can point out that Obama’s plan comes at the expense of pursuing many other possibilities, such as increased diplomatic support, or even a full withdrawal, they will be in much better position.

Topic Definitions

1. President Obama is who you think it is

White House, 2009, “President Barack Obama,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-obama

Barack H. Obama is the 44th President of the United States.

2. Obama’s plan is 30,000 troops and exit by 2011

Pamela Constable and Joshua Partlow, December 3, 2009, “Pakistanis voice concerns,” Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/02/AR2009120201747.html?hpid=topnews

Analysts and residents on both sides of the 1,600-mile border expressed concerns about Obama's plan to send 30,000 more troops into Afghanistan in an effort to quickly train local security forces and allow U.S. troops to begin leaving by July 2011.

3. Obama’s plan will boost forces and start withdrawal in 2011

Brad Rhen, December 2, 2009, “Reactions vary to Obama’s Afghanistan plan,” Lebanon Daily News, http://www.ldnews.com/news/ci_13912565

Reaction locally, like that across the nation, was varied to President Barack Obama's new plan for Afghanistan, which he announced during a speech Tuesday night from the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, N.Y. Obama's plan calls for deploying 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in the next six months, boosting total U.S. forces there to about 100,000. The first waves of Marines are expected to arrive by Christmas, with the rest coming by summer. The president also said troops would begin pulling out of Afghanistan in July 2011, but he did not set a timetable for a complete withdrawal.

4. Troops are soldiers in the military

American Heritage, 2008, “troop,” http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/troops

# A group of soldiers. # troops Military units; soldiers.

5. Afghanistan is the country

WordNet, 2009, “Afghanistan,” Princeton, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=afghanistan

# S: (n) Afghanistan, Islamic State of Afghanistan (a mountainous landlocked country in central Asia; bordered by Iran to the west and Russia to the north and Pakistan to the east and south) "Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979"

6. Best interest means regard for the US’s benefit

American Heritage, 2009, “interest,” http://www.thefreedictionary.com/interest

Regard for one's own benefit or advantage; self-interest. Often used in the plural: It is in your best interest to cooperate. She kept her own interests in mind.

Pro

Obama’s Plan Is On-Balance Best

1. Obama’s strategy is the best option, even if it’s not perfect – key to protect us from terrorism

Douglas Drenkow, writer, December 2, 2009, “The Least Bad Option,” Op Ed News, http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Least-Bad-Option-in-Af-by-Douglas-Drenkow-091202-184.html