Transcript of Question and Answer Session
Bijan Khajehpour
April 4, 2003
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
QUESTION: I’m Robert Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Thank you very much for your excellent presentation, which is very timely in terms of events in the region. I would like to pick up on your final two points where you talked about the possibility of national interests -- a concept of national interests entering the discourse -- as well as the cartoon that you had. Earlier you talked about ‘determinance’ affecting the different key interest groups, I was struck that the term national interests was nowhere there. It was perceptions in the Islamic world, perceptions in the international community, but the concept of national interests was never there. And I was wondering where you talked about relationships between domestic and foreign policies, were there two elements under the national interests rubric, how they might surface in the public debate in the new era? The first issue would be the question of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which is sort of an external dimension of Iranian policy that is one of the key irritants in the US relationship. Is that questioned at all in Iran, people saying, “Why is Iran investing so much in this external group that costs us so much internationally?” And, second dimension is on the nuclear side. You have this debate on nuclear issues in Iran where it’s framed in terms of prestige and what should we do under the NPT under Article 4 in terms of nuclear technology. And that the denial strategy of the United States saying we deny you the technology even though Iran signed the NPT, sort of shifts the debate on nuclear from security to the question of prestige and what Iran is due under the NPT. That leading to the final element of my question, which is the opportunity for US-Iran dialogue under what auspices in the wake of Iran, that one would think, if the disarmament of Iraq is successful, that the basis for some type of dialogue with Iran is there to say “we’ve just dealt with a major motivator of the Iranian nuclear program. How can we take that into account in terms of Iran’s calculus of whether it needs these capabilities or not.” My fear is that because of Axis of Evil rhetoric and the preemption doctrine, that instead of creating an opportunity for dialogue, the perception in Tehran will be, “lets hit the accelerator on the nuclear program because the only way we will be able to deter the United States is if we have a bomb.”
KHAJEHPOUR: First of all, the term national interests was not there on those three levels but the third one, if you remember, was domestic public opinion. And I think domestic public opinion in Iran, from a societal point of view, is very much involved with national interests. So it is there and the reformists are very much interested in that, in the issue of national interests. I just didn’t use the term there. In terms of debates on, for example, the phenomena like Hezbollah, or even the support for the Palestinian cause, there is a lot of debate in Iran. And this argument comes out very openly. The argument that basically it’s not worth it and that Iran should dedicate her resources to Iranian issues and challenges instead of foreign issues. In fact in a number of recent demonstrations in Iran, especially the demonstrations by the teachers about six months ago when they asked for better pays and better conditions, one of the slogans they were shouting was “leave Palestine and dedicate the government resources to our problems.” So it’s even at that level, apart from intellectual reviews and intellectual criticism. It’s very much there and I think eventually it will find greater space in the decision-making apparatus. The reason that those elements are still important for Iran is reflected on a different level and that’s why I described the level of Islamic public opinion, because it’s a very very strong determinant for the conservatives. And as long as the conservatives have the levers of power they will keep that there. But if the balance of power changes, or there are new arguments or if the Islamic world public opinion shifts, Iran’s foreign policy priorities could also shift. In any case, there is always an opening.
On the nuclear issue, there is not as much debate, because I think it’s not as much an issue because I really believe no matter who you put in charge in Iran, the tendency to develop nuclear energy will be there both from a security point of view but also from a prestige point of view. And unfortunately, the US behavior over the past few years doesn’t help. I mean, don’t forget your own behavior towards Pakistan and how suddenly Pakistan became the darling of the West post-11 September, does encourage Iranians to believe that superpowers treat you differently, if you have reached a certain level of nuclear technology. And I’m sure with the current development with North Korea and depending on how the U.S. reacts eventually to the North Korean threat, the constituents in Iran saying “we need nuclear technology to deter the Americans” will become very very strong. But I think from the point of view of a potential dialogue or potential negotiation in the future between Iran and the US, the opening will definitely be there to discuss the issue of nuclear technology. But the key issue for Iran both in the nuclear issue, but also in the overall political and regional issues is that regime constituents don’t trust the Americans. And I think they have a very good reason not to trust the Americans. And unless there is a degree of mutual trust, nothing will move forward. That’s why I mentioned the UK as a facilitator, that will be important because I think a direct dialogue is going to be undermined by a distrust issue. But a potentially mediated dialogue through the UK or alternatively through the European Union, where certain guarantees can be given by other countries, not necessarily by the United States, could actually work. In my view, Iranians are pragmatic enough – even the conservatives at the end of the day are pragmatic enough, to see the different challenges, but as I said they just can’t be sure because there have been a number of broken promises.
QUESTION: Rich Kauzlarich at US Institute of Peace. I’d like you to comment in a little more detail about the impact of development on regionalism in Iran --particularly the Azerbaijan region -- where at least a recent visitor from there suggested that their was a generational gap with younger people becoming much more radicalized in terms of their demands. The second issue is, in terms of foreign policy, you did not mention Russia in any sense and how you see that relationship shaping up particularly as you try to counter the perception of the US putting a ring around Iran.
KHAJEHPOUR: As for regionalism, first I,myself, am from Azerbaijan. So I can authoritatively talk about the situation in Azerbaijan. I do go to the Iranian cities of Tabriz, and Khoi, and Salmas, almost every year. So I am also very familiar with the issue. Regionalism or regional tendencies and demands, what I call it, are already on the rise, and will continue to rise, and that’s a clear byproduct of political opening, no matter how fast the pace has been over the past few years but the political opening has led to a number of demands. And partly, to be fair to the regime, they are trying to respond through decentralization of power, through local councils, etc, etc. But the nature of the demands is very different depending on where you are. I mean the Baluchis have historically been more deprived, if you want, from the wealth of the nation of Iran; the Kurds have been in a completely different situation. One characteristic for both of them has been that both of them are Sunni communities and in a Shiite dominated country they haven’t had enough access to power and to opportunities and so on. The other main ethnic minority, i.e. the Azeris, are Shiites. And to be honest, as an Azeri, and as someone who knows the situation, the majority of the Azeri elite wouldn’t like to give up Iran for whatever may come afterwards, whether it’s a separate state or whether it’s a joint entity with some other state. The Azeris are in a very good position in Iran, both in terms of participation in elite, in economic activities, acceptance etc. Yes there are demands…and right now there are demands, for example, people are saying, “let us teach the Azeri children in Azeri at least up to a certain level in school so that when a seven year old comes to school and has limited knowledge of Farsi that we can teach that child.” And that’s possible today. It wasn’t possible ten years ago, but today it’s possible. There is Azeri press; there are Azeri books, more and more Azeri culture, Azeri interaction with other countries. There will be more demands, as I said the list of demands will be endless over the next few years because there has been a long history of oppression of these demands. But I personally don’t think, from what I know both from Azerbaijan but also from the Sunni communities, I don’t think any of them will call for separation from Iran, but they will demand more and more provincial rights to deal and liberties to be able to deal with their specific issues.
Russia was not part of my talk because genuinely most of the Iranian constituents are afraid of Russia as well. In the Iranian psyche, Russia is this historically aggressive superpower, which was, we should not forget, in our vicinity. We were neighbors with Russia. So Russia only comes into the picture when there is absolutely no other choice. This is important, this is very important. And if there is a situation like in the nuclear technology when there is no other choice, Russia will certainly appear. And I have to say that the new private sector of Russia is also making a difference in Russia in terms of business relations. But political relations are still very much determined by Iran’s fear of this “white bear in the north” and it will remain like that for a few years in my view.
QUESTION: Shaul Bakhash, George Mason University. I wonder whether I could ask you to talk a little more about your projections for where the domestic political debate will come out in the future, but from a particular angle. Can you share with us your thoughts as to why the reformist movement, failed to a large extent, despite the huge popularity, the elections, the apparent sources of strength, and what this might tell us about the future of the domestic participation in Iran?
KHAJEHPOUR: I personally believe, and it’s not just a belief, I think some of it can be documented through the events of the past few years and statements. The reformist movement of Iran failed because it overestimated its actual capacity. I deliberately don’t say power, because power is something that we understand within the political power structure. But I am talking about capacity. And there were a number of failures that, as I said, thinkers in Iran had actually foreseen. For example, one of the first articles the magazine Goftogu published after the victory of Khatami, referred to the people that emerged from the 97 victory as the “Islamic Left.” The article dealt with the choices of the Islamic Left in its effort to regain and maintain power. It argued that the Islamic Left had only one choice to survive in power, and that was if it opened up to include other forces. It can’t just rely on its own forces because it can be once again overridden by the conservatives. But they didn’t listen. They overestimated their power. The Berlin Conference was the catastrophe of overestimation of capacity, overestimation of how much they could actually do within a certain period of time. They thought within a few months after the Majles elections in 2000, they thought they can go to Berlin and establish a link with the Iranian opposition outside of Iran. The dismissal of Rafsanjani in the 2000 Majles elections was another result of overestimation of capacity. Today if you talk to the main leaders of the reformist camp they admit that it was a mistake. If they would have accepted the Rafsanjani initiative to say “okay I want to be part of you, just give me some respectable position,” it would have been a different route of development in Iran. So I think they overestimated their power. This is one factor. The other factor I think is a general development in Iran. And that’s what I call the misplacement of constituents. I mean the Iranian revolution generally misplaced a number of people: Ideologues became technocrats, technocrats became taxi-drivers, and politicians became journalists and journalists went into arts and publishing. It’s true and this misplacement of social and political constituents led to disasters. You suddenly had popular newspapers, which should have been run by journalists, run by politicians with political ambitions. And they became organs of political entities that didn’t exist. Such phenomena discredited journalism and they sort of misplaced political activity. I think there was a learning process for everybody here to say, “no we have to find our own space, we have to find our own discourse, and we have to be very very realistic into how much power and capacity we have.” That’s why I refer to these social organizations and professional organizations that are emerging in Iran. They are important because, if you genuinely want to create political parties, you have to go through these experiences. And Iran is currently going through these experiences. I think if you have a reformist party down the line emerging from some of these social and professional organizations, they will be more realistic about how much they can move in society, what kind of promises they should give, what kind of organizations they should have a relationship with, etc, etc. It was generally an overestimation of capacity.
QUESTION: Barbara Slavin of USA Today. Given Iran’s political history. The fact that democracy has taken root in some basic way, I think, in the country, how are they going to regard the political experiment next door? It appears that the US government is about to install a transitional regime in Iraq. There is still perhaps some arguments over who the personalities will be, but it is quite possible that Ahmad Chalabi will be the leader of this provisional government. He has tried to mend fences with Iran, he has spent time in Tehran. Will he be accepted? Will this installation of an interim government be accepted in Iran? Will it have any impact on Iran’s own political choices?