TPP Updates-JV, Varsity, High School

Table of Contents

Introduction

Key words

*** Inherency Updates ***

*** New Plan ***

*** Trade Advantage (1/2) ***

*** Trade Advantage (2/2) ***

*** Economic Collapse impact scenario ***

*** They say “too late to reverse trade differences ***

*** They say “trade blocs don’t compete” ***

Neg answers

*** 1NC vs Trade Advantage (1/2) ***

*** 1NC vs Trade Advantage (2/2) ***

*** Extensions to: Trade blocs don’t compete ***

Introduction

What is a trade war?

A trade War is a conflict between two or more nations regarding trade tariffs on each other. This type of conflict usually arises because the nations involved are trying to improve imports or exports for its own country. Trade wars have the potential of increasing the costs of certain imports if the nations involved refuse to make a compromise.

A negative side effect of protectionism that occurs when Country A raises tariffs on Country B's imports is retaliation for Country B raising tariffs on Country A's imports. Trade wars may be instigated when one country perceives another country's trading practices to be unfair or when domestic trade unions pressure politicians to make imported goods less attractive to consumers. Trade wars are also a result of a misunderstanding of the widespread benefits of free trade.

A trade war that begins in one sector can grow to affect other sectors. Likewise, a trade war that begins between two countries can affect other countries not initially involved in the trade war. A trade war can be distinguished from other actions that have a detrimental effect on the trading relationship between two countries in that its goals are related specifically to trade (whereas sanctions, for example, also negatively affect free trade, but may have humanitarian or war-related goals).

Key words

Ratify— Sign or give formal consent to (a treaty, contract, or agreement), making it officially valid.

Economic Interdependence— A relationship between two or more people, regions, nations or other entities in which each is dependent on the other for necessary goods or services. Economic interdependence often occurs when all parties are specialized in the fulfillment of some requirements, and must trade with others for unmet requirements.

State Consolidation- Multiple governing entities coming together; unifying.

Hegemonic- the social, cultural, ideological, or economic influence exerted by a dominant group.

Duties-a tax on certain items purchased abroad.

* Inherency Updates *

Trump’s presidency means no TPP. Japan will not ratify it without the U.S. ratifying TPP

The Hill Times 11/30/16,

“No Pacific trade deal without the U.S., says Japanese envoy

Chinese-led negotiations may be Canada’s last chance at a regional agreement.”,

Japan’s ambassador has nixed the possibility of a trans-Pacific trade deal without the United States, scuttling the hopes of members of Canada’s official opposition and others who have called for the remaining members of the TPP to push for a new deal if U.S. president-elect Donald Trump makes good on his promise to pull out of the agreement.

“If the United States is out, I think it is very difficult to strike a deal again. Because the whole background conditions are totally different, so what we have negotiated may not apply to areas,” Ambassador KenjiroMonji told The Hill Times last week.

The Trans-Pacific Partnership’s ratificationformula effectively requires both Japan and the United States to implement the deal for it to come into effect. Mr. Trump has signaled that won’t happen, and Mr. Monjisignaled that Japan has no interest in renegotiating the deal with the remaining 11 members.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also said last week the TPP would be “meaningless” without the U.S.

* New Plan *

Plan: The United States federal government should increase diplomatic and economic engagement with The People’s Republic of China, by ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal AND invite The People's Republic of China to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership making clear to the Chinese government that they are not excluded, can meet standards, and are encouraged to apply for membership

* Trade Advantage (1/2) *

First, Failure of TPP causes China to pursue aggressive regionalization.

Mitchell 15

Tom Mitchell, staffwriter @ the Financial Times, 2015 (“China lays out ‘countermeasures’ to offset exclusion from TPP,” Financial Times, October 19th, Available Online at

China has “countermeasures” that it can take to offset the negative economic impact of the country’s exclusion from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, its National Bureau of Statistics said on Monday. Sheng Laiyun, NBS spokesman, waded into a growing debate in Beijing about the costs of being left out of the TPP, the US-led pact also referred to by some as the “anyone but China” deal. The debate began just days after the US reached a TPP agreement with 11 trading partners, when a People’s Bank of China economist estimated that lost trading opportunities could initially knock 0.5 percentage points off the country’s annual economic growth.Mr Sheng said that potential “countermeasures” include bilateral free trade agreements and President Xi Jinping’s effort to construct a “New Silk Road”, officially known as the “One Belt One Road” plan, linking China and Europe. “TPP will have some impact but it won’t be significant in the short-term,” he said. “Bilateral trade agreements, ‘One Belt One Road’ and new free trade zones [in China] could cushion the impact.” However, MrSheng said that “we must attach great importance to TPP,” especially as the pact’s 12 potential founding members account for almost 40 per cent of global economic output. “If the TPP agreement is finally implemented, zero tariffs will be imposed on close to 20,000 kinds of products,” he said. “That will create some pressure on our foreign trade.”

Second, exclusion causes deals that hurts the economy & undermines global trade.

Economist 15

Global news magazine, 2015 (“Into the home stretch,” Financial Times, July 25th, Available Online at

Ultimately, for TPP to really make a mark, it has to be bigger. Leaving out China is an expedient to get the deal done but, if kept that way, it would be a huge gap. China is the world’s biggest manufacturer. Any Asian trade zone without it faces one of two sorry fates. Either, because of China’s centrality to Asian supply chains, the deal is so riddled with exemptions that it becomes worthless. Or, if the zone gains traction, the effect is to divert trade away from the most efficient Chinese companies and hurt the global economy. The TPP is likely to face both problems. In textiles, for instance, Vietnamese and Malaysian mills expect to be allowed to continue to source fabric from countries such as China or India that those inside the trade zone cannot produce. This exemption may be vast. Meanwhile, Vietnamese and Malaysian garment makers admit the exclusion of Chinese finished goods will help shelter them from their toughest competition—hardly the ideal of free trade. In other areas, though, TPP could make waves of a good kind. Rules to protect labour rights, strengthen environmental safeguards and limit subsidies to state-owned companies should go further than any previous trade deal.Officials in China, who previously viewed TPP as a gambit to isolate it, now drop hints about wanting to join the club. “It won’t be the gold-standard deal they’ve been talking about, and they will be lucky to get a silver. Perhaps it will be a bronze,” says Jayant Menon of the Asian Development Bank. With other ambitious trade talks gathering dust, however, even a bronze would glitter.

* Trade Advantage (2/2) *

Third, TPP without China causes a trade war. Chinese inclusion solves — they’ll accept the invite.

Subramanian 14

Dr. Arvind Subramanian, Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development, 2014 (“Trade and Flag: The Changing Balance of Power in the Multilateral Trading System,” IISS Conference, April 6th-8th, Available Online at

Now, China can respond in a number of ways. It can offset its own disadvantage relative to American competition in Asia-Pacific markets by negotiating free trade agreements of its own with these countries. Indeed, that is what it is doing. China has negotiated agreements with four countries already and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN and six other countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea, India and China) is aimed at widening this circle of free trade agreements to parry similar American efforts. But such agreements negotiated by China also impose a cost on American and European firms because in Chinese markets they are now disadvantaged relative to Asian firms. De facto, TPP and TTIP combined with Chinese responses to them amount really to an elaborate trade war by proxy. How will this war end? A lot will depend on China. If it chafes under this strategy of containment, it could prolong the war by targeting the US, for example, by negotiating trade agreements with Korea and Japan that would create even more discrimination against American business. On the other hand, Chinese pragmatism might prevail. Seeking to avoid the impact of TPP and TTIP on its own exports and economic trajectory, China could come to the negotiating table. The early evidence relates to the fact that Japanese entry to the TPP negotiations may have altered China’s approach to the TPP. China quickly recognized the economic losses it would suffer as a result and hence became much more forthcoming about its own market opening. This changed approach is manifest in China’s willingness to negotiate a BIT agreement with the US, seeking to join the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) negotiations in Geneva, adopting a more nuanced approach (and less obstructionist) to the ITA-2 agreement in Geneva, willing to join negotiations onenvironmental trade, and even desire/willingness to join the TPP itself. Especially if China wants to liberalize for domestic reasons (and there are increasing signs pointing in that direction), China might want to do what Premier Zhu Rongji did in getting China to join the WTO more than a decade ago. By negotiating with its larger trading partners, China could seek to extract concessions for its own liberalization actions that it might want to undertake in any case.

Finally, trade wars escalate to military conflict

Brownstein 16

Barry Brownstein, Pf. Emeritus of Econ @ Baltimore U., 2016 (“Why Do the Candidates Want War with China?,” Foundation for Economic Education, March 30th, Available Online at

Financial analyst Robert Prechter points out that a common cause underlying wars and bear markets is a negative collective social mood. A negative social mood is based on fear. As fear increases, politicians seek to harness that fear for their personal advantage. They blame other countries for domestic problems. They threaten and then institute trade barriers. As trade barriers increase, the economic situation further deteriorates, both in their own country and around the world, further increasing fear. Eventually, demagogic politicians provoke wars. Writing in the Wall Street Journal, columnist Andrew Browne explained the economic rift growing between the old industrial part of China and its booming coast. China’s economic slow lane is choked with state-owned industrial firms in sectors linked to real estate — steel, cement, coal and construction equipment.… They are zombies in a phantom economy. Zipping along in the economic fast lane are private companies producing goods and services for a burgeoning consumer market that has taken over from manufacturing as the engine of China’s growth. The result of increasing tariffs on Chinese goods will be a declining Chinese economy. Chinese leaders will feel the pressure when “fast-lane” companies can’t absorb displaced workers from the state-owned firms. Increasing fear among Americans has already produced the Trump phenomenon. Imagine what countries with authoritarian traditions will produce if the global economy deteriorates due to trade wars. If trade wars begin, economic tensions will mount. To divert attention from the economy, Chinese politicians could escalate tensions over Taiwan or North Korea. Or, perhaps, they could direct their efforts farther abroad. Will American fears of a cyberattack on our electrical grid prove prophetic? A prosperous world dramatically reduces the odds of such catastrophic events. Economically illiterate politicians who promote trade wars threaten human cooperation, international harmony, and general prosperity. They threaten peace. Good intentions are meaningless if your trade policies lead to war.

*** Economic Collapse Impact Scenario ***

Second, the only scenario for great power war is Asian economic conflict.

Zakaria 14

Fareed Zakaria, Peabody award winning journalist, Council on Foreign Relations, (“Time to Put Trade Above Politics,” Time Magazine, March 3rd,

We live in a world without war or even significant conflict among the major powers. We also live in an age of economic growth. All of this seems normal, but in fact, it isn't. The current global system of commerce and collaboration instead of war and competition is historically rare. Will it last? The answer depends largely on Asia, which within 10 years will be home to three of the world's four largest economies. There are two possible scenarios. The first is that Asian countries will embrace the open, rule-based free-trade system in place today and deepen it. The second is that as these countries grow rich, they will become more nationalist, focus on narrow interests, pursue mercantilism and thus erode if not destroy what some in those countries describe as the "Western international order." This is not a theoretical debate; a great game is afoot in Asia. The U.S. wants to strengthen the forces of openness, rules and free tradeby concluding an ambitious trade agreement with many Asian countries, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). China, on the other hand, is proposing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a more mercantilist deal for Asian countries. It asks very little of these countries in terms of commitment to real market-based reforms or to environmental and labor standards. It offers them greater access to China as a gift from Beijing. This might advance China's narrow interests, but it does little for an open, rule-based regional order. Most Asian countries will naturally sign up to expand into the Chinese market. But they are willing to make painful concessions to sign up for America's vision of the region. Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, told me recently that he was willing to take on some of his country's most protected sectors as part of the TPP. But it's in the U.S. that the American vision has become more cloudy. Congressional Democrats have virtually abandoned free trade, and Republicans balk at supporting President Obama. The economic reason for Washington to support both the TPP and another ambitious trade agreement with European countries, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, is obvious. The U.S. market is already wide open. Last year, 68% of the value of goods entered duty-free. The rest came in at an average tariff of 4.4%. Any agreement will require other countries to make many more concessions than the U.S. simply because their markets remain much more closed. And both trade deals open up markets in other tough areas, like intellectual property, state-owned companies and what are called nontariff barriers (regulations that have the effect of protecting inefficient local industries).

*** They Say: “too late to reverse trade differences ***

1. Explain why the plan can reverse trade differences (hint Subramanian evidence).

2. It’s not too late to reverse perceptions of containment and increase trade.

Lai 15— David Lai, Ph.D., Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2015 (“China’s Strategic Moves and Counter-Moves,” Strategic Studies Institute, Winter, Available Online at ChinasStrategicMovesCounter-Moves.pdf)

China has long held that since it has shown signs of rising, the United States has sought to contain China. Many of the US moves around China, especially the strategic rebalance, have been perceived by the Chinese as attempts to encircle China (by the way, encirclement is a signature feature of Go). Since that is the case, the United States might as well play Go for real and make some well-intended Go moves on China. Moreover, US national leaders have arguably learned much from Sun Tzu’s Art of War and should be able to apply Sun Tzu’s tactics to deal with his Chinese descendants. The US strategic rebalance is likely to continue regardless which party is in charge in Washington. To do it right in what may be called the “US Strategic Rebalance 2.0,” the United States should set the strategic rebalance priority straight—engaging the emerging great powers, especially China (not “including China”), should be at the top of the agenda.39 In addition, the United States should follow the Go strategy to put stones inside China as new efforts to engage China. These future moves will take Black’s moves 11 and 13 in Figure 1 as stepping stones. In Go terms, those future (United States) moves will reduce the size of White's (China’s) posturing. In geostrategic terms, those moves will be enhanced by US efforts to shape China’s rise. At this time, China is still open to US engagement and persuasion. Washington should seize the opportunity to engage Beijing before that window of opportunity slips away. Whether China and the United States play chess or Go in the Asia-Pacific is not a trivial matter. Chess is a force-on-force game that relies heavily on maneuver of pieces with different values and capabilities. Moreover, chess is a zero-sum game in that there is usually only one winner (as shown in Figure 3), though it sometimes ends in a draw. The implication of this aspect is very problematic in the context of US-China relations. If guided by the mindset of chess, China and the United States would seek a clear victory over the other. The price would be unattainable and unbearable.