Literature
to “Introduction to Cognitive Science”
Kampis György
ELTE History and Philosophy of Science
1117 Budapest, Pázmány Péter s. 1.
General
Kampis György ed. (1996):
A Reader in Cognitive Science,
I/1. From behaviorism to cognitive science
W. Sellars (1963): Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
G. Ryle (1949): The Concept of Mind. London.
R. Descartes (1641): Meditations on First Philosophy.
R.Descartes (1637): Discourse on Method.
J. Watson (1913): Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It.
K. Lashley (1923): The Behaviorist Interpretation of Consciousness.
N. Wiener (1948): Cybernetics, MIT Press, Boston.
See:
C.L. Morgan (1894): Introduction to Comparative Psychology.
E. Mach (1905): Die Analyse der Empfindungen, Fischer, Jena.
B. Skinner: The Behavior of Organisms, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs.
E.C. Tolman (1932): Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men, Century, New York.
J. Locke (1690): An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
D. Hume (1737): A Treatise on Human Nature.
A. Comte (1844): Discourse on thePositive Spirit, Paris.
Stadler, F. (2000): The Vienna Circle, Springer, Berlin.
H. Gardner (1984): The Mind's New Science, Basic Books, New York.
K.Lashley (1950): The Problem of Serial Order in Behavior, in: Jeffres, L.A ed.: Cerebral
Mechanisms in Behavior, Wiley, New York.
W.S McCulloch és V. Pitts (1943): A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous
activity, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophyics 5, 115-133.
D.C. Dennett (1995): Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Simon and Schuster, New York.
I/2. Intentionality, folk psychology, animal intelligence
Klima Gy. (1990): Approaching Natural Language Via Mediaeval Logic, in: J. Bernard-
J. Kelemen: Zeichen, Denken, Praxis, Institut fur Sozio-Semiotische Studien, Wien.
J. Austin (1962): How to do things with words, Harvard University Pres, Cambridge, Mass.
J.R. Searle (1969): Speech Acts, CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge.
J.R. Searle (1983): Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind, CambridgeUniversity
Press, Cambridge.
F. Brentano (1874): Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint,
ChapterI.:
E. Husserl (1917): Pure Phenomenology, Its Method and Its Field of Investigation,
D.C. Dennett (1991): Intentionality,
B. Hoff (1982): The Tao of Pooh, Penguin.
Fodor, J. (1985): Fodor's guide to mental representation: The intelligent auntie's
vade-mecum. Mind, 94, 1985, 76-100.
Reprinted in Fodor: A theory of content and other essays. MIT Press, 1990, 3-29 pp.
R. D'Andrade (1987): A folk model of the mind, in: D. Holland és N. Quinn ed.:
Cultural models in language and thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
A.I. Goldman (1993): The Psychology of Folk Psychology,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16, 15-28.
S.Stich (1983): From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
A. Clark (1989): MicroCognition, MIT Press, Boston.
D. Chalmers (1996): The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Th. Nagel (1974): What is it Like to be a Bat?, Philosophical Review 4, 435-50.
C. M. Heyes (1998): Theory of mind in nonhuman primates, Behavioral and Brain Sciences
21, 101-134.
D. Premack és G.Woodruff, (1978): Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1, 515-525.
G. G. Gallup (1970): Chimpanzees: Self-recognition, Science 167, 86- 87.
J.Barresi és C. Moore, (1996): Intentional relations and social understanding, Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 19, 107-154.
D. J. Povinelli, K. E. Nelson és S. T. Boysen (1990): Inferences about guessing and knowing
by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology 104, 203-210.
D. L. Cheney és R. M. Seyfarth (1990): How monkeys see the world, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
I/3. The mind/body problem. Functionalism
R. Descartes (1641): Meditations on First Philosophy.
R.Descartes (1637): Discourse on Method.
D.C. Dennett (1991): Consciousness Explained, Little Brown, Boston.
L. Wittgenstein (1953): Philosopphical Investigations,
(on private language see $243. and around)
See also:
D. Hume (1737): A Treatise on Human Nature.
H. Putnam (1960): Minds and machines, in: Hook, S. ed.: Dimensions of Mind, New York
University Press, New York.
H. Putnam (1967): The nature of mental states, in: Capitan, W.H. és Merrill, D.D. ed.:
Art, Mind, and Religion, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh.
N. Block (1995): The Mind as the Software of the Brain, in: D. Osherson, L. Gleitman,
S. Kosslyn, E. Smith és S. Sternberg ed.: An Invitation to Cognitive Science,
MIT Press, Boston.
N. Block (1978): Troubles with Functionalism, in: Block, N. ed.: Readings in Philosophy
of Psychology, HarvardUniversity Press, Boston, Mass.
(Megtalálható Kampis 1996-ban).
D.Armstrong, 1968: A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge, London.
D. Armstrong, 1984: Consciousness and causality, in: D. Armstrong és N. Malcolm,
Consciousness and Causality, Blackwell, Oxford.
D. Lewis (1966): An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63,17-25.
H. Putnam (1988): Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Boston.
II/1. Mind and Language. The Representational View
R.G. Millikan (1984): Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass.
C. S. Peirce (1940): Logic As Semiotic: The Theory Of Signs, in: J. Buchler (ed.). The
Philosophical Writings of Peirce, Dover, New York, 98-119.
D. Chandler (1999): Semiotics for Beginners,
N. Goodman (1976): Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, Indianapolis.
T.J. van Gelder (1992): Connectionism and the Mind-Body Problem: Exposing the
Distinction Between Mind and Cognition, in: L. Niklasson és M. Boden (ed.):
Selected Readings of the Swedish Conference on Connectionism, Ellis Horwood.
J. Huarte(1575): Examen de los ingenios para las scienzias…
M. Cervantes (1605): El ingenioso hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha
T.Hobbes (1651/1962): Leviathan, Collier Books, New York.
N. Chomsky (1957): Syntactic Structures, Mouton, The Hague.
N. Chomsky (1963): Language and mind, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
B.F. Skinner (1957): Verbal Behavior, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York.
N. Chomsky (1959): Review of Verbal Behavior, Language, 35, 26-58.
N. Chomsky (1971): The Case Against B. F. Skinner, New York Review of Books, 30, 18-24.
J.A. Fodor (1968): Psychological Explanation, Random House, New York.
J.A. Fodor (1975): The Language of Thought, Crowell, New York.
J.A. Fodor (1980): Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in
Cognitive Psychology, Behaviorial and Brain Sciences 3, 1.
J.A. Fodor (1981): Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive
Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
J.A. Fodor (1985): Fodor's Guide to Mental Representation: the Intelligent Auntie's
Vademecum, Mind96, 76-100.
J.A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind,
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
J.A. Fodor és Z.W. Pylyshyn (1988): Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical
Analysis, in: S. Pinker and J. Mehler ed.: Connections and Symbols,
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
M. Aydede (2000): The Language of Thought Hypothesis, in: E. Zalta ed.: Stanford
Enyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2000 Edition,
N. Block (1995): The Mind as the Software of the Brain, in: D. Osherson, L. Gleitman,
S. Kosslyn, E. Smith and S. Sternberg (ed.): An Invitation to Cognitive Science,
MIT Press, Boston.
K. Marable (2000): Fodor and Pylyshyn Refuted: Compositionality, Systematicty, and
the Power of Distributed Representation,
II/2. The computational metaphor of mind
L. Floridi (2000): Philosophy and Computing: A Webliography,
J.A.N. Lee (2000): History of Computing,
IEEE Computer Society: The History of Computing,
The Virtual Museum of Computing,
Lullus, R. (1275): Ars Magna, e.g.:
U. Eco (1997): The Search for the Perfect Language, Fontana Press, New York.
J. Hintikka (1996): Lingua universalis vs. Calculus ratiocinator, Kluwer, Dordrecht.
R.K. Harrison (1997): Bibliography of Planned Languages (excluding Esperanto),
M. Roinila (2000): Leibnizian Resources,
M. Schroeder (1997): A Brief History of the Notation of Boole's Algebra, sec 7:
Boole's Work, Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 41--62.,
Charles Babbage's First Difference Engine
The Babbage Pages
The Babbage Difference Engine #2,
R.R. Rathbone (1952): Charles Babbage, Scientist And Philosopher, Paper R-206,
MIT Digital Computer Laboratory,
J. Walker (1998): The Analytical Engine,
T.P. Pridmore (2000): Who's Who in the History of Computing,
#1: Charles Babbage (1791-1871) and
#2: Ada Augusta Lovelace (1815 - 1852),
B. Toole (1995): Ada Byron, Lady Lovelace,
A. Hodges (2000a): Alan Turing: the Enigma,
Walker and Company, New York.
A. Hodges (2000b): Alan Turing: the Enigma,
F. Weierud (2000): Turing's Treatise on Enigma,
R. Herken (ed.) (1995): The Universal Turing Machine: A Half-Century
Survey, Springer, Berlin.
M.L. Irons (1998): A Universal Turing Machine,
H. Hesse (1943): The Glass Bead Game.
D. Matuszek: (1996): The Halting Problem,
C.S. Kaplan: The Halting Problem,
J. Copeland (1997): The Church-Turing Thesis, in: E. Zalta in.: Stanford
Enyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2000 Edition,
D.R. Hofstadter (1979): Gödel, Escher, Bach, Basic Books, New York.
Douglas R. Hofstadter (1995): On seeing A's and seeing As,
Stanford Humanities Review 4/2: Constructions of the Mind,
II/3. Can machines think?
Alan M. Turing (1950): Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind LIX(236) 433-460.
J. Weizenbaum (1965): ELIZA-A Computer Program For The Study Of Natural Language
Communication Between Man And Machine, Communications of the Association
for Computing Machinery9(1), 36-45.
ELIZA:
Loebner-díj:
D. Chalmers (2000): Zombies on the Web,
T. Nagel (1974): What is it like to be a bat?, Philosophical Review 83, 435-50.
F. Jackson (1982): Epiphenomenal Qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 27-36.
F. Jackson (1986): What Mary Didn't Know, The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII, 291-95.
The Knowledge Argument (review and bibliography):
T. Crane and D.H. Mellor (1990): There is no question of physicalism, Mind 99, 186.
D.C. Dennett (1988): Quining Qualia,in: A. Marcel és E. Bisiach (ed.):
Consciousness in Modern Science, OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford.
reprinted in: A. Goldman (ed.) 1993: Readings in Philosophy and
Cognitive Science, MIT Press, Boston, MA.
J. von Uexküll (1920): Theoretische Biologie, Verlag von Gebrüder Paetel, Berlin.
Chalmers, D.J. (1995). Absent qualia, fading qualia, dancing qualia, in: T. Metzinger
(ed.): Conscious Experience, Imprint Academic, New York.
J.R. Searle (1980): Minds, Brains, and Programs,Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, 417-457.
Searle debate and refs:
S. Harnad (1989): Minds, Machines and Searle,
Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 1, 5-25.
S. Harnad (1992): The Turing Test Is Not A Trick: Turing Indistinguishability Is A
Scientific Criterion, SIGART Bulletin 3(4), 9 - 10.
S. Harnad 1990: The Symbol Grounding Problem, Physica D 42, 335-346.
G. Ryle (1949): The Concept of Mind. London.
III/1. Symbolic and subsymbolic processing
A. Newell (1980): Physical Symbol Systems, Cognitive Science 4, 135-183.
A. Newell and H.Simon (1976): Computer Science as Empirical Enquiry:
Symbols and Search, Communications of ACM 19, 113 -126.
W.S. McCulloch and W.S. Pitts (1943): A Logical Calculus of The Ideas Immanent in
Nervous Activity, Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 7,115 - 133.
W.S. McCulloch (1965): Emodiments of Mind, MIT Press, Boston, Mass.
F. Rosenblatt (1958): The Perceptron: a Probabilistic Model for Information Storage
and Organization in the Brain, Psychological Review 65, 386-408.
A. Jagota (1998): Early Computer Models of Connectionism,
M. Minsky and S. Papert (1969): Perceptrons, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
S.C. Kremer (1999): Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
D.W. Clark (1997): An Introduction to Neural Networks,
D. E. Rumelhart and J. McClelland (1986): Parallel Distributed Processing.
Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition; Volume 1: Foundations.
MIT Press, Boston, Mass.
S. Pinker and A. Prince (1988): On Language and Connectionism: An Analysis of a
Parallel Distributed Processing Model of Language Acquisition,
Cognition 28, 73 - 193.
A. Clark (1989): MicroCognition, MIT Press, Boston.
J.W. Garson (2000): Connectionism, in: E. Zalta ed.: Stanford Enyclopedia of
Philosophy, Fall 2000 Edition,
P. Smolensky (1988): On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11, 1-23.
D. Chalmers (2000): Contemporary Philosophy of Mind: An Annotated Bibliography.
Part 4: Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 4.3. Philosophy of Connectionism,
D.O. Hebb (1949): Organization of Behaviour, Wiley, New York.
G. Widrow and M.E. Hoff (1960): Adaptive switching circuits,
Institute of radio engineers, Western Electronic show & convention,
Convention record, Part 4, pp96-104. (you can’t get hold of this..).
S.C. Kremer és D.A. Stacey (1999): Artificial Neural Networks.
From McCulloch-Pitts Neurons to Back-propagation,
D. Marr (1982): Vision, Freeman, San Francisco.
R. McClamrock (1990): Marr's Three Levels: A Re-Evaluation,
Minds and Machines 1,185-196.
N. Goodman (1978): Ways of Worldmaking, Hackett, Indianapolis.
IV/2. Dinamic models of mind
N. Chomsky (1965): Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
J. A. Fodor (1981): Representations, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
J. A., Fodor és Z. Pylyshyn (1988): Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture:
A Critical Analysis, Cognition 28, 3-71.
D. Haraway (1991): Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature,
Free Association, London.
R. A. Brooks (1990): Elephants Don't Play Chess, in: P. Maes (ed.):
Designing Autonomous Agents, MIT Press Cambridge, Mass, 3-15.
R. A. Brooks (1991): Intelligence Without Representation,
Artificial Intelligence 47, 139-159.
A. Clark and J. Toribio (1994): Doing Without Representing, Synthese 101, 401-31.
L. Steels (1990): Cooperation Between Distributed Agents Through Self Organization, in:
Demazeau, Y. és Müller, J.-P. (ed.): Decentralized AI - Proceedings of the First
European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in Multi-Agent Worlds
(MAAMAW-89), Elsevier, Amsterdam, 175-196.
D.M. Rosenthal (ed) 1991: The Nature of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.
J.A. Fodor (1980a): Searle on What Only Brains Can Do, in Rosenthal (1991), 520-521.
J.A. Fodor (1980b): Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room, in Rosenthal (1991), 524-525.
J.R. Searle (1980a): Minds, Brains, and Programs, in Rosenthal (1991), 509-519.
J.R. Searle (1980b): Author's Response, in Rosenthal (1991), 521-526.
J.R. Searle (1980c): Yin and Yang Strike Out, in Rosenthal (1991), 525-526.
F. Dretske (1985): Machines and the Mental, Proceedings and Addresses of the
American Philosophical Association 59, 23-33.
M. Johnson (1987): The Body in the Mind, Chicago UP, Chicago, IL.
G. Lakoff and M. Johnson (1980): Metaphors We Live By, Chicago UP, Chicago, IL.
G. Lakoff (1987): Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, Chicago UP, Chicago, IL.
E. Thelen (1995): Time-Scale Dynamics and the Development of an Embodied Cognition,
in: R. Port and T. van Gelder ed.: Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics
of Cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 69-100.
E. Thelen, G. Schöner, C. Scheier and L.B. Smith (2000): The Dynamics of Embodiment:
A Field Theory of Infant Perseverative Reaching, Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
M.Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962): The Phenomenology of Perception,
Humantities Press, New York.
F. J. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch (1991):The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science
and Human Experience, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
J. Petitot, J.M.Roy, B.Pachoud and F.J. Varela (ed.) (1996): Naturalizing Phenomenology:
Contemporary Issues on Phenomenology and Cognitivie Science,
StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford.
F.J. Varela (1996): The Specious Present: Can There be Neural Accounts of the Experience
of Now?, in: Naturalizing Phenomenology, Petitot et al. (ed), op.cit.
F.J. Varela (1996): Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem,
J.Consc.Studies 3, 330-350.
T. J. van Gelder (1995): The Distinction Between Mind and Cognition, in: Y.-H. Houng és
J.-C. Ho (ed.): Mind and Cognition, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 57-82.
T.J. van Gelder,(1996): Wooden Iron? Husserlian Phenomenology Meets Cognitive Science,
T. J. van Gelder (1998): The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science,
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21, 1-14.
T.J. van Gelder (1999): Beyond the Mind-Body Problem, in: D. Johnson és C. Erneling
(ed.): Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture,
OxfordUniversity Press, New York.
T. J. van Gelder and R. Port (1995): It's About Time: An Overview of the Dynamical
Approach to Cognition, in: R. Port és T. van Gelder (ed.): Mind as Motion:
Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1-43.