Abstract
This paper analysis seeks to explain why politicians engage in the counterintuitive behavior of supporting public policy which is failing. By branching out beyond standard reinforcement and exchange theories, to more social psychological explanations, a possible explanation surfaces. An analysis is presented which predicts that the greater the levels of cognitive dissonance and value salience, within the politician, the greater the possibility of supporting failed public policy. The interacting effect of the political party, as a social group, is also explored. Next, considerations are offered about group think, the possibility of sufficient justification accounting for the same counterintuitive behavior and methodological suggestions for this proposition. Finally, concluding thoughts are presented which attempt to make inferences about how this proposition might play out in the American political system, namely what factors might make for a successful politician.
Statement of the Problem
Common sense and standard theories of exchange and reinforcement would predict that politicians would be less likely to embrace public policy which has been deemed to fail. Supporting policy which has failed to be enacted, implemented yet not worked, or has poor public support would seem counterintuitive to the standard goals of a politician, namely to represent the people who elected him; and more selfishly, to ensure his own chances of reelection.
However, this behavior has been common and prevalent through out the history of America’s political system. Three more recent examples were Lyndon Johnson’s continued support of the Vietnam War, long after public approval for the war and himself had declined substantially (Meuller, 1970); Newt Gingrich’s continued support of archconservative policies after the reelection of Bill Clinton in 1996 and his own personal drop in public support (Sinclair; 1999); and finally George W. Bush’s current policy in Iraq has witnessed his levels of public support decline from 71% to 39% over the last two years (FoxNews, 2005), yet he continues to pursue this policy.
By examining the sociological and psychological contexts of groups, value salience and cognitive dissonance, the counterintuitive nature of these actions appears to diminish. It is by acknowledging that human behavior may not always be based on a rational calculation that one can begin to examine why politicians support failed public policy.
Proposition
Politicians are more likely to support failed public policy when they possess high levels of value salience and engage in cognitive dissonance. A corollary to this is that politicians’ existence within social groups (the political party) fosters value salience and cognitive dissonance even further.
Concepts
Value Salience
Value salience is a synthesis between Homans’ concept of a generalized value and Kuhn’s concept of role salience. It starts with Homan’s concept of value. A value is something which a person finds rewarding. In addition, a value can be either primordial (innate) or social (learned).Social values are linked to primordial values through the process of social learning; one which, although Homans does not argue this, is uniquely symbolic in nature. (Homans, 1974) When a value, or a set of values, becomes integral to the actions of enough of a society’s members, it will become routinized and reified as a structural element. Once, it possesses this structural capacity it is termed a generalized value. Generalized values may range from the amount of money one is expected to pay for a particular item, to the types of public policy which should be implemented by a government.
Kuhn saw the primary structural element in society as being the role. Roles represented routinized and reified interactions between actors, which in turn, generated social expectations. His conception of the self was one where actors were role takers. People identified themselves by which roles they took on. However, he observed, through his Twenty Statements Test, that people often did not identify with the roles which they took on the most often. Thus, there had to be an element of self development which went beyond the simple conception of role prominence. He identified role salience as a term to denote how deeply a role went into determining a person’s self. Although Kuhn did not use the term identity, it appears to be the logical conclusion of his observations. People choose to describe themselves in terms of roles they do not take on as often, precisely because they identify with them more deeply. These roles are more salient. (Stryker, 1980)
In considering a synthesis between these two concepts, and essentially substituting the concept of value for role in creating value salience, one must acknowledge value as being a structural entity. Both Exchange Theory and Symbolic Interactionism present incomplete structural explanations. Blau explores the use of value as a structural phenomenon, but only the particular value of reciprocity; whereas in Symbolic Interactionism, only the role is considered. If value is conceived of as a form of symbolic mediation which can be routinized and reified as a structural entity, then it allows for Symbolic Interactionism to provide a richer theoretical outlook. Generalized values and roles can then both be seen as structural determinates for the creation of the self.
Given this background, the definition of value salience is, the intensity with which someone identifies with a particular value, or set of values, and the subsequent effect that has in shaping the self.
Cognitive Dissonance
This theory demonstrates the strong drive present in people to eliminate inconsistencies between cognitions. These dissonance reduction techniques will often result in behavior which is completely counterintuitive to standard reinforcement theories, or for that matter common sense.
Dissonance (inconsistency) and consonance (consistency) are the two types of relations which two cognitions (opinions, beliefs or actions) can possess. When dissonance occurs, it creates a tremendous discomfort in the individual, causing him to try and eliminate it. Cognitive dissonance is the method used by people to eliminate the dissonance between two inconsistent cognitions. This can be accomplished in one or more of three fashions. The person may try to change the beliefs, actions or opinions involved in one of the cognitions, to match the other; a person may attempt to develop or acquire new cognitions to increase the amount of consonance between the two initial cognitions; or a person may attempt to minimize the importance of the two cognitions in the dissonant relationship. If a person lacks sufficient justification (more consonance than dissonance) to justify the relationship between the two dissonant cognitions, he will engage in one of these three dissonance reduction techniques to eliminate the inconsistency. (Festinger, 1959)
In his classic experiment, Festinger provided subjects with a boring task to complete. Following this task, the subjects were told to tell, who they thought would be another subject, that the task had been exciting; hence, creating dissonance. Varying dollar amounts were given to the subjects, representing different levels of (in)sufficient justification, to tell the future subject how exciting the task had been. Those given the greater dollar amount possessed sufficient justification to account for the dissonance and told the future subject that the task had not been exciting; they simply figured they were being paid to lie. Those given the lesser amount did not possess this added consonance and did tell the future subject that the experiment had been exciting. Moreover, this latter group, when interviewed later, actually believed that the task had been exciting. They developed a contrary cognition of this boring task, to create a consistency with their behavior. This experiment, and general theory, demonstrates people’s strong desire to maintain cognitive consistency and to eliminate dissonance. (Festinger, 1959)
Social Groups
A social group is defined as the emergence of three or more individuals into a pattern of goal orientation, characterized by an interrelationship of statuses and awareness of membership. (Schutte, 2005) First, social groups are emergent, based on the interpersonal interactions of people. As a structural entity, it is the consequence of interaction, not the cause of it. Second, there must be some purpose or goal to the group’s behavior, as well as, a sense of membership, belonging and cohesiveness. As will be discussed later, these tend to vary in proportion to one another. Finally, there must be an interrelationship of statuses which help to legitimate the group’s structure and power relationships.
The first type of social group is the primary group. This group is marked by its extraordinary closeness among its members. This type of group might include a family, a church group, or even a gang.There is a common spirit which Cooley refers to as the we. (Cooley, 1909) This we or common spirit can best be described as the feeling of cohesiveness and awareness of membership which is felt among the members of the primary group. There are goals to the group’s activities; however, the attainment of these goals is secondary to cohesiveness and emotional bond which these activities facilitate.For instance, a family getting together for Thanksgiving dinner is technically meeting to consume a meal. But the normative meaning of the interaction is to reinforce the bonds of membership. If anyone at that get together were to only eat and then promptly leave, there would be a feeling among the group that he had violated a norm, even though he had fulfilled the technical goal of the group’s meeting.
The second type of group is the secondary group. Like the primary group, it possesses all the traits of a social group except the emphasis is on goal attainment. Although cohesiveness and a sense of group membership are present, they are there to facilitate the group’s goal. Weber’s discussion on bureaucracy summarized many of the aspects of a secondary group. The statuses possessed by the members are officially assigned by the group and contain the members’ specific duties. Tasks, boundaries and appropriate forms of behavior are governed by laws and administrative regulations which are specialized to each individual member. The relationships within this type of group are more instrumental, whereas the primary groups are more interpersonal. The normative emphasis is on adherence to the rules, which aid in the facilitating of the group’s goal. (Weber, 1946) An example of this type of group would be a modern day corporation. The goal of the corporation is to be as profitable as possible. The normative regulations for each member are officially stated and are expected to be adhered to. As in any other social group, there is an awareness of membership; however, it is expressed instrumentally by obeying the rules, hence aiding the group in attaining its goal.
It would be a mistake to think the distinction between the two groups is a function of size. The distinction lies with their respective primary focuses. For a primary group, it is cohesiveness, and the goals of the group are there to simply reinforce it. For the secondary group, it is goal attainment, and the cohesiveness of the group is regimented, to best facilitate that. An example of a small secondary group would be an individual unit within a corporation or a jury. It exists to accomplish a specified task, with little extraneous interpersonal bonding. An example of a large primary group might be a reference group of individuals which are geographically dispersed, yet are bonded together by some set of values (ideology) or ascribed characteristics (race). If an organization surfaces which bring these geographically disperse peoples together for the manifest purpose providing a sense of membership to them, it would still be considered a primary group. This distinction of group type being a function of goal attainment or cohesiveness and not size, is vital to the upcoming critical analysis.
Critical Analysis
To begin this analysis, one must first address the social context within which politicians operate. Politicians work within political parties, which can be seen as large groups that attempt to convert ideologies (sets of generalized values) into public policy. A political party may morph between being either a large primary group or a large secondary group, depending on its focus. As a secondary group, a political party’s main focus will be on the goal of enacting specific public policy. As a primary group, the main focus will be on generating an ideological fervor, hence solidifying the bonds between its members. Goal attainment and ideological cohesion exist in both forms; however, one will be secondary to the other, depending on the type of group the party is manifested as.
When a political party fails to enact its value-based public policy, or does, to only see it fail or meet with public disapproval, dissonance is created. An inconsistency is generated between its members’ values and the success or public response of the policy. In Festinger’s classic experiment, mentioned earlier, subjects faced with this dilemma changed their value judgment of the experiment being boring, to gain consistency with the cognition that they had engaged in behavior stating that it had been exciting.(Festinger, 1959) The changing of the one cognition to match the other, was the dissonance reduction technique used to restore cognitive consistency to the situation.
This can not happen for the dilemma faced by the politician, because the both cognitions can not be changed. The success of enacting policy, the success of the policy itself and the policy’s approval, are all empirical phenomena, which as facts, can rarely be disputed.
On the other hand, the values are as equally hard to change for two reasons. First, the politicians possess very high levels of value salience. Their mere choice of occupation lends credence to this fact. It is intuitively obvious that an elected member of public office, working to enact policy sought by his party, would have a deep sense of value salience in those beliefs he is trying to enact as policy. Furthermore, unlike Festinger’s subjects, these politicians are acting within a group which possesses the same values. This group fosters a strengthening of an already strong value salience, deepening the dissonance with the other cognition.Had Festinger’s subjects been allowed to form as a group (presumably one primary in nature) and discuss their beliefs that the task had been boring, it is likely that the cohesive nature of this group would have strengthened the belief that the task was boring. This would have deepened the dissonance and would have eliminated changing the belief, as a plausible option. The subjects would have sought other dissonance reduction techniques.
This idea of a group fostering a strengthening of beliefs, and hence adding to the dissonance of inconsistent cognitions, has been explored several times in the literature. This analysis will briefly describe two, Festinger’s When Prophecies Fail and Grupp’s analysis of satisfaction within the John Birch Society.
In When Prophecies Fail, Festinger analyzed an end of the world cult and what happened after the apocalyptic predictions failed. He observed that the group fostered an incredible strength of values among its members. (Festinger, 1956) In addition, although Festinger did not mention it, it might be added that the spiritual nature of this group’s values (much like the ideological values mentioned in this analysis) by themselves were lent to strong levels of belief and value salience. Spiritual values are ones often held deeply by people, that even without group pressure, are seldom subject to change. However in this case, the group helped to even further deepen the belief.
When the predicted prophecies failed to pass, the members were in a state of dissonance. Due to group pressure and the inherent strength of spiritual beliefs, changing the beliefs to eliminate the dissonance was not an option. In addition, the members could not deny the cognition of the prediction failing to pass; it was so empirically obvious and indisputable, to have denied it would have been to admit not being a part of reality. The solution of reducing the dissonance was to retreat back to the cohesive nature of the group and to reaffirm their beliefs through proselytizing. The result was the introduction of a new consonant cognition that there was a strengthened amount of belief among the members and that, furthermore, even more members were being added to cult. If this was happening, then from the point of view of the members, the beliefs had to obviously be correct. This allowed the cult to not only continue existing, but to withstand even further failed predictions. (Festinger, 1956)
The objection might surface that it is unfair to compare political parties to cults, so a second study looks at the levels of satisfaction among members of the John Birch Society, a uniquely political activist group. Grupp sought to measure the attitudes of members upon joining, about why they joined. Then after the 89th Congress failed to enact the policies sought by the John Birch Society, how these members derived satisfaction from their membership. He found that 61% of the members joined for reasons of ideology, or more specifically, to enact political change. At the same time, only 36% sought to join for reasons relating to group cohesiveness and involvement (these were specifically worded as “need for political commitment,” “associate with like minded people,” and “becoming informed”). After the 89th Congress failed to enact their policies, the levels of satisfaction relating to enacting political change fell to 19%, a drop of 42%. At the same time the levels of satisfaction relating to group cohesiveness and involvement rose to 72%, an increase of 36% or a doubling. (Grupp, 1971)