THE SIX DAY WAR SOURCE BASED QUESTION

  1. (a) According to Source A, the consequences of the closure of the Straits of Tiran was a ‘gross violation of international law’, ‘q blow at the sovereign rights’ of nations, as well as ‘an act of aggression against Israel’. It also led to the government of Israel contacting a number of Governments who have exercised ‘the principle of free passage in these waters since 1957’ many of whom apparently support Israel’s claim about the importance of the necessity of protecting ‘these rights’.

1. (b) From Source B one can infer that the situation facing Israel from her Arab neighbours in May 1967 was one of overwhelming solidarity of the Arab nations against Israel in readiness for an attack on Israel. Israel is portrayed as standing alone on the edge of a precipice, in a swimming costume, with their back to the sea, beside a diving board (or perhaps a plank which in the past they have been asked to walk), teetering on the edge and in sever danger of falling off into the sea. Israel is presented as trembling with fear in the face of a united barrage of superior and unified military firepower. Each of the guns has an Arab message written along its barrel thus suggesting the solidarity of 8 of the Arab nations which surround Israel and their readiness to attack Israel.

This portrayal is accurate in the sense that Israel, on May 31st 1967 was surrounded by Arab nations, all of whom were more or less hostile to her. However, it overestimates the unity of the Arab nations, the degree of their military might and military superiority (in fact the sides were relatively equal in terms of military firepower), as well as the surprise of the Israelis, and the absence of international support for Israel.

  1. Source C supports the claim that Israel was about to attack her neighbours in the following ways. First of all it was written on 24th May 1967, some two weeks before the war began. It claims that “Israel extremists apparently hoped to take Syria by surprise’. It suggests that the ‘presence of UN troops in the Gaza area and Sinai peninsula’ gave ‘Israel advantages for staging a military provocation against Arab countries’. Having said that, these are claims more than actual evidence. Moreover, given that it is written by an Arab ally in the form of the Soviet ambassador, it is more likely to include more claims than actual evidence which lay the blame at Israel’s feet.

Source D does not contain any evidence that Israel was about to attack her neighbours., other than the claim that the Israeli’s ‘told lies’ about having opened the Gulf of Aqaba.

Source B supports source C in as far as it suggests ‘solidarity’ between the Arab states of ‘The United Arab Republic, Iraq, Algeria, Yemen, Lebanon, Kuwait, Sudan and Jordan’ as well as talking of ‘the united strength of Arab countries’. Source B does not support source D in any way, for there is no reference to international powers US or UK nor even the Soviet Union.

  1. The origin of Source D is a statement made by President Nasser on 26th of May 1967 to the organisation of the Arab trade Unions. Its purpose is threefold. First it aims to foster a sense of Arab solidarity in the face of a common enemy (‘we must develop and build our countries to face the challenge of our enemies’), in particular an Israel that might ‘embark on an aggression against Syria or Egypt’. Second, it aims to enlighten its audience as the the international support which Israel has in the United States and ‘America’s lackey’, Great Britain, whilst at the same time highlighting the alignment of the other main Cold War power, the Soviet Union, on the side of the Arab nations. Thirdly it aims explain who is to blame for the situation for the closure of the Straits of Tiran. Its value is that it is a primary source, a statement which originates directly from the mouth and pen of Nasser. It helps us understand Nasser’s aim of cultivating a pan-Arabism; it also provides an insight into how the Arab-Israeli conflict was seen by those involved as being a part of the Cold War and an insight into how the various powers in Cold War powers were seen by a prominent player in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover , it provides an Egyptian perspective on the international geo-political context that led to the closure of the Straits of Tiran. Its limitations lie in the fact that given that it is a statement by Nasser based more on rhetoric than any real evidence. Moreover, its vision of Israel’s position as well as that of the US and Great Britain is bound to be affected by its relationship to the USSR and its long-term anti-Israeli stance.

The origin of Source E is a telephone conversation between Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan which was apparently recorded by the Israelis at ‘4.50am on June 6th 1967’. Its purpose depends much upon the context in which it is being used and the audience for whom it was originally intended. If it is a secret recording by the Israelis, then its purpose is to reveal to either an Israeli or an international audience, some of the secret thinking and dealings behind the public words of two prominent Arab leaders in order to expose their lack of public honesty. Its value is that, if it is a genuine recording of a genuine conversation, it provides an insight into the international context of and involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the private thinking, comments and discussions that goes on between world leaders behind the façade of their public statements. Its limitations lie in the fact that one cannot be entirely sure it is a genuine recording of the conversation as it actually took place. Moreover, even if it genuine, this particular section does not reveal anything very surprising.

4.

At first glance, one might describe this war as a very local war. Source B does not give any sense of the cause of the war. Even to the extent that any such cause can be read into it, it makes no mention whatsoever of the international influence on the Middle East as a reason for the outbreak of the war. The 8 guns lined up suggest that the war is certainly more than just the Palestinians or the Egyptians against the Israelis. They suggest the involvement of a number of Arab nations. Having said that, all of those nations are a part of the Middle East and thus cannot be put down as ‘foreign influence’. Moreover, in terms of my own knowledge of the causes of the Six Day War, the actual war itself, it very much appears to be a local war. Its trigger, be it Nasser’s closing down of the Straits of Tiran, or the Israelis shooting down of Syrian MIG jets, can be said to have been local Middle Eastern causes. Moreover, its participants, particularly in terms of those who died, the 15,000 Egyptians and the 1000 Israeli soliders, all appear to be local.

Having said that, there is a great deal of evidence in these sources which suggests that foreign influence in the Middle East was a major reason for the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967. To begin with Source A, which lays out the reasoning of the Israeli government in terms of its reaction to the closure of the Straits of Tiran by Egypt couches all of its reasoning in terms of the international perspective and context of the situation. In other words, Israel is trying to make it appear as more than just an act of aggression by Egypt against Israel. For example, it suggests that ‘international law’ has been violated. Moreover, it emphasises that the Straits of Tiran are an ‘international waterway’, and that its closure it a ‘blow at the sovereign rights’ of various ‘nations’, that Israel had been in touch with some of these governments and that therefore Israel had gained international support’ for its case. Similarly in Source D, beyond the fact that Nasser suggests any conflict would not be ‘confined to one spot on the Syrian or Egyptian borders (without explicitly suggesting the role of international powers), Nasser does explicitly points out the importance of the US and British support for Israel, as well as the importance of the Soviet Union’s “attitude” as far as the Arabs were concerned, for “together with the Arabs…it would resist any further aggression”. Indeed, the case for foreign influence as a major cause of the war in Source C is even more blatant. For not only is it a statement by the Soviet ambassador, it is one which suggests the aggression of the Israelis (“hoped to take Syria by surprise’, and “Israel is once again to blame for a dangerous aggravation of tension”), and seems to celebrate to the point of exaggeration the “solidarity” of the “Arab States”. It even goes so far as to explicitly state that ‘anyone’ trying to unleash aggression in the Middle East (itself a suggestion that the agressors may be of international origin, in other words the American and British supporters of Israel) would encounter ‘strong opposition’ from the Soviet Union. Similarly if Source E is really an extract from the private phone conversation between Nasser and Hussein, then it too suggests not only that the US and Britain were militarily involved in this conflict (though it does not suggest they have caused it), but this was important enough for them to announce it to the international public and to get Syria to do the same.