THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

Violence and insurgency movements confronted Indiaalmost immediately after its independence in 1947 and the Partition of British India into East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan as a homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. The ensuing communal and religious violence took the lives of over 500,000 Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs and sowed the seeds of future conflict.The enduring legacy of Partition is the root cause of the festering hostility between India and Pakistan and one of the main causes of insurgency and unrest in India’s Northeast Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir (shortened to Kashmir throughout).

India’s experience in fighting terrorism and insurgency extends to the following major areas:

  1. In the Northeastern States since 1956.
  2. In PunjabState from 1981-1992.
  3. In Sri Lanka from 1987-1990.
  4. In Jammu and Kashmir since 1947 against Pakistani irregulars supported by the regular Army. From 1989, this struggle has acquired a distinct Islamist flavor of a proxy war.
  5. Indian is also battling with domestic terrorism and violence by Naxalites - mainly by militant peasants against rich landowners. The movement is based on the Maoist-Leninist ideology has links with criminal gangs and the Maoists of Nepal. The spread of this movement within India and escalating civilian casualties is considered to be one of the gravest internal security threats to India today.

Terrorism and insurgency-related violence in various parts of India have taken a large toll of human life and property. Since the last two decades, the casualties of violence in India are highlighted as follows:

  1. Over 65,000-75,000 killed.
  2. Over 760,000 persons displaced from their homes.
  3. Over 10,000 security personnel killed.
  4. Assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 by her Sikh bodyguards.
  5. The blowing up of Air India passenger aircraft Kanishka by Canada-based Sikh extremists killing all 329 persons on aboard in 1985.
  6. Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Primer Minister of India by a Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) female suicide bomber in May 1991.
  7. The hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft with over 180 persons on board by Pakistani terrorists from Katmandu to Taliban-held Kandahar in December 1999 and the subsequent release of hardcore Pakistani terrorists held in Indian jails.
  8. A suicide attack on India’s Parliament to kill or hold hostage over 200 parliamentarians who were in session inside the building in December 2001.
  9. A suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature building (Srinagar) in October 2001 killing over 45.
  10. Multiple bomb attacks on economic and soft targets in Bombay in March 1993 killing 257 and injuring over 1,700; in August 2003killing 52; and on commuter trains in July 2006 killing 209 and injuring hundreds more.
  11. Multiple bombings in October 2005 two days before the Hindu festival of Diwali and the Muslim festival of Eid in Delhi killing 61 and injuring over 200.
  12. Bombings on the Delhi-Lahore Samjhauta Express (India-Pakistan Peace train) in February 2007 killing over 68. Several other unexploded bombs were located on the train and defused by the authorities.
  13. Twin bombings in market places in August 2007 killing over 42 in the South Indian city of Hyderabad. 19 other bombs were set to go off across the city but were detected and defused by the police well in time.
  14. Various attacks on civilians in market places, towns and villages, places of Hindu worship, and pilgrims killing hundreds all over India as a fallout of the simmering unrest in Jammu and Kashmir and the ongoing insurgency in some of India’s Northeastern States.

In addition to fighting insurgency and terrorism, India has also fought short conventional wars after it became independent; with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. The 1971 war led to the dismemberment of East Pakistan, and emergence of Bangladesh as new state.

In 1999, Pakistani intruders secretly occupied the strategic heightsalong a broad fronton the Indian side of the Line of Control in Kargil from where they were able to interdict the strategic Srinagar-Leh road. India had to launch a costly military operation to dislodge the well entrenched mujahidin from the icy heights of Kargil.[1]

In October 1962, India fought an unsuccessful short war to repulse Chinese aggression in Aksai Chin in Ladakh and along the disputed McMahon line in Northeastern India. While China vacated its gains in the Northeast, it still occupies Aksai Chin.[2]

The Indian Army is in the forefront of India’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and has strength of about 1.1 million.[3]The Indian Armed Forces are very professional all-volunteer force and have remained totally apolitical. They are by far the largest and strongestin the region. In 1998 India acquired nuclear weapons capability (as did Pakistan). The Indian Army has always been a volunteer force, and distinguished itself in both World Wars in every theater of operations. Indian medical units also took part in the Korean War.[4]

The primary role of the Armed Forces is to defend India against external threats and aggression and to aid the civilian Government whenever required. Recently the Indian Army has been deployed more and more to fight insurgency and terrorism and is currently engaged in greater numbers in COIN operations in Kashmir.

Outline Organization to Fight Terrorism and Insurgency inIndia

India has a Federal system of government. Powers are divided between the Central and State Governments.[5] Internal security and counterinsurgency/terrorism is the prime responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairsin conjunction with the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs to a large extent.

Law and order is mainly a ‘State’ subject. Each State has its own police force and intelligence set-up.This force can deal adequately with crime and minor incidents of terrorism, but cannot tackle an armed insurgency without substantial assistance from the Central Government. The Central Government has a number of paramilitary forces under its control.[6] These are basically armed police forces such as the Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). Specially raised counter-terrorism forces such as the National Security Guard (NSG), the Rashtriya Rifles (RR), and the Special Group supplement the Central Police organisations and the Army.

The Indian experience in COIN has shown that the Police do not have the training or the leadership to combat terrorism and insurgency without help from the Army. The nature of the proxy war in Kashmir, and the sophisticated arms and equipment held by the insurgentshas forced India to employ its military in greater numbers in the early stages of an insurgency.

The Armed Forces are under the strict control of the Centre (federal government). They are by far the most efficient, disciplined and organised force in the country. The Army is in the forefront of India’s counterinsurgency effort, especially in Kashmir and the Northeast.

The paramilitary forces come under the command of the Army during counter-terrorism operations. The Police retain control of the police forces and supports the Army when the Army is playing a lead role as in Kashmir. A Unified HQ under the Chief Minister has been established both in Kashmir and the Northeast to coordinate all activities of the army and the police including the intelligence.A senior retired military officer is usually appointed as the Security Advisor to the government.

If the state government cannot function normally because of wide spread violence and insurgency, the Indian Constitution has a provision to bring the state under direct control of the Central government (this is referred to as President’s Rule). In such situations, the State Legislature is dissolved and constitutional poweris then vested in the Governor.

The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates security affairs with the assistance of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). A newly formed Defence Intelligence Agency coordinates intelligence inputs from the Army, Navy and the Air force. It interacts with all the important ministries dealing with national security, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) on domestic intelligence, and with the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), India’s external intelligence agency. [7]

Background to Insurgencies in India

The Northeast

One of the earliest insurgencies to take root in India was in the Northeast. This region presently shares a common border with Bhutan,China, Myanmar, and Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) and covers over 98,000 square miles. The region has large resources of oil, natural gas, teak wood forests and tea plantations.

Under the British rule the whole region was called AssamProvinceand accorded a special status. Special ‘Inner and Outer Line’ permits were needed to enter the region. The creation of East Pakistan during Partition cut off direct road and rail connections between India and deprived India’s Northeast of its only port at Chittagong (making the area landlocked). The Northeast is now connected to the rest of India by a narrow strip of land barely 15 miles wide called the Siliguri Corridor, squeezed between Bangladesh in the South and Nepal in the north. Despite its rich natural resources, thisregion remained relatively under developed and isolated from the rest of India. Most of the people are of Mongoloid stock and are culturally different from the rest of India. In some states Christianity is the predominant religion. There are no less than 160 different tribal groups and over 400 sub-tribes all vying for political power.

Soon after Independence, the ethnic minorities did not easily merge with the newly formed Indian Union and resorted to insurgency, terrorism, and political violence voicing various demands including autonomy, secession and outright independence.The tribal groups fiercely resisted any migration from other parts of Indiaand looked upon them as ‘foreigners’. During Partition (and later after the 1971 India-Pakistan war), millionsof illegal migrants crossed over into the Northeast from East Pakistan. This upset the demographic pattern, ethnic composition and economic opportunities of the Northeast.Recognizing the different ethnic character of the area, Assam was sub-divided gradually over the years to form six smaller states based on tribal and ethnic lines.[8]Despite this accommodation by the Center, the unrest did not die down and insurgency was fuelled by weapons, funding, and training fromChina and East Pakistan. In addition, the secessionist groups also took safe haven in the thick forested regions of Burma and East Pakistan.[9]

Insurgency first erupted in 1956 in Nagaland demanding independence. In 1966 the insurgency in Mizoram took root. In the late 1970s the insurgency spread to rest of the Northeast. Many of these insurgent groups (especially in Nagaland) had fought with the British-Indian Army against the Japanese and were battle hardened. Soon the insurgency spread to the towns and cities and took on the color of urban terrorism with bombings, political assassinations, kidnappings, subversion and a general breakdown of law and order. In 1988, disgruntled groups in Assamresorted to terrorism and insurgency and established bases and safe havens in Bhutan.

The Indian Response

The Indian approach has been a mix of political accommodation, economic development, and the use of military force to restore normalcy. India initially looked upon the insurgency as a law and order problem led by ‘misguided hostiles’ who had to be weaned away from militancy and brought back to the fold of normalcy. The unrest was thought to be associated with the difficulties of initial state formation. India’s approach was then based on the classic guerrilla warfare theory of Mao Tse-Tung. Additionally, the lessons learnt from the British army’s COIN experience in Malayalike re-grouping of villages, isolation of the population, and area dominationwere applied in Nagaland and in Mizoram with mixed success. The Indian Army’s long experience in jungle warfare and patrolling were put to good use and kept the insurgents on the run. The induction of the Army and the Central Police Forces was looked up on as an occupation force.

The Army was given strict instructions regarding conduct of operations. An Order of the day to the troops being inducted to the Naga Hills read:

You must remember that all the people in which you are operating are fellow-Indians… and the very fact that they are different and yet part of India is a reflection of India’s greatness. Some of these people are misguided and have taken to arms against their own people, and are disrupting the peace in this area. You are to protect the mass of the people from these disruptive elements. You are not there to fight the people in the area, but to protect them. You are fighting only those who threaten the people and who are a danger to the lives and properties of the people. You must therefore, do everything possible to win their confidence and respect and to help them feel that they belong to India.[10]

The Army initially conducted counter insurgency operations like a conventional operation-large operations, aimed at killing insurgents. Intelligence was compromised as the local police had been subverted was almost non functional as was the state government. The Army’s operations to ‘seek and destroy’ the insurgents using large forces was sometimes termed as pointless ‘jungle bashing’. The Assam Rifles a local paramilitary force officered by the Army performedwell in bringing down the level of insurgency overall. Cordon and search operations netted good results but led to accusations of human rights abuses and the use of excessive force.[11]

It must be emphasized that the Army did not use its artillery, tanks, or heavy firepower during counterinsurgency operations and operated under full civilian oversight.Helicopters were used extensively for movement of troops, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance as integral part of counter-insurgency operations, but the offensive use of air power was used only on one of two occasions in Nagaland and Mizoram to extricate an isolated post from being overrun by insurgents. Many posts were also air maintained by airdrops of supplies and ammunition by transport aircraft from forward airfields located in the Northeast.

The Indian government also reached a series of political ceasefire agreements with various tribal groups and political parties to stop the violence and terrorism. In addition, a policy of surrender and rehabilitation was introduced whereby surrendered insurgents were given monetary compensation and included in the political process to bring peace to the troubled region. The Armed forces were given special powers under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act as they were operating in remote areas where the local police was non-functional. The concept of Unified Command was tried successfully in the Northeast for closer cooperation between the Army and the central police forces and included intelligence sharing.

As levels of violence came down, the Central Government made a concerted effort to increaseeconomic aid, development projects and job opportunities. Diplomatic efforts and coercion led to joint counterinsurgency operations between India and Burma. By 1982, China also withdrew its support to the insurgent groups and a major source of arms, training and supplies to the militants eventually dried up. Bhutan was pressured to act against Assamese rebel groups that had entrenched themselves on Bhutanese soil and over 33 camps were destroyed in this operation in 2003.

From 1985 onwards India began to seal off the porous 2,500 miles long border with Bangladesh by constructing a fence along its entire length which has now been completed to a large extent. The movement of militant groups and illegal migrants into northeastern India from safe havens in Bangladesh is expected to reduce because of more stringent border controls. However, Pakistan continues to increase it influence and support to groups inimical to India. It has established operating centers in Nepal and Bangladesh and the Inter Services Directorate continues to fund and arm some groups directly.

The Present Situation and Overall Approach.

The Indian approach to COIN operations has yielded positive results. The insurgent movements in the Northeast have gradually lost momentum and given up their demand for independence.Many of themhave begun to turn to criminal activities to intimidate, kidnap and coerce the local population to extort money for personal monetary gain. Factional infighting between the insurgent groups themselves reduced has their effectiveness and unity.The Indian governmenthas been able to strike deals with separate groups on various issues and involve them in the peace process. On some occasions insurgent groups even surrendered en masse.