KANT
The Good Will and Duty In the search for intrinsic ‘good’, Kant did not believe that any outcome was inherently good. Pleasure or happiness could result out of the most evil acts. He also did not believe in ‘good’ character traits, as ingenuity, intelligence, courage etc. could all be used for evil. In fact, he used the term good to describe the ‘good will’, by which he meant the resolve to act purely in accordance with one’s duty. He believed that, using reason, an individual could work out what one’s duty was.
Free Will, God and Immortality If our actions are pre-determined and we merely bounce around like snooker-balls, we cannot be described as free and morality doesn’t apply to us. Kant could not prove that we are free – rather, he presumed that we could act morally, and for this to be the case we must be free. He also thought that it followed that there must be a God and life after death, otherwise morality would make no sense.
Synthetic A Priori We do not follow predetermined laws. However, we must act according to some laws, otherwise our actions are random and without purpose. As a result, rational beings must determine for themselves a set of laws by which they will act.
These laws are not analytic (true by virtue of their meaning), but they cannot be determined through experience (a posteriori). The rational being has to determine the synthetic a priori – the substantive rules that can be applied prior to experience.
Kant believed human experience could be divided between two realms, the realm of ideas and the realm of experience, and that morality came from the realm of ideas.
Kant thought that God, angels and human beings shared in the realm of ideas or the noumenalworld which was there to bediscovered by our reason. The way we look at morality is structured by the human mind, which is able to understand some things a priori, before any use of our five senses, using practical reason. Much of Mathematics, for example, is understood this way, and when Einstein came up with his theory of relativity this too was an a priori concept. He never did the experiments to prove it was true: he left that to the Cambridge scientists.
The second realm is the realm of the observable and of experience, which Kant calls thephenomenal realm. This part of human experience can be felt, touched, seen, smelt, heard. It includes our emotions, too, which Kant continually contrasts with our reason.
Humans access both realms: the noumenal and the phenomenal. But morality takes its absolute authority from the noumenal world, and is derived a priori. It is then proved to be true or false by being applied to the world of experience the synthetic. For example, it only makes sense to say “lying is wrong” when confronted with a situation where I am tempted to lie. I must always follow this rule, however, and so, in a sense, conquer my feelings with the supreme good of duty to follow the moralfrom the pure motive ofthe good will. This is what is meant by the synthetic a priori.Autonomy (self-rule through reason) uses a priori (abstract, ideas) reason applied synthetically to the real world.
To sum up:
The phenomenal world is subject to pure reason imposing order and patterns on what we observea posteriori.
The noumenal world is subject to practical reason imposing order and patterns on what we deduce by a priori abstraction (removing our emotions or desires from the process).
Kant believes in categories in the realm of ideas (noumenal realm) which arrange/filter experience so the category of moral thinking generates categorical imperatives (absolute/unconditional, no “ifs”) not hypothetical imperatives which contain an “if” eg If you have to save your friend, then you should lie. Kant argued you should never lie under any circumstances – hypotheticals depend on circumstances/feelings, whereas Kant wants to rely on our shared a priori reason alone. The categorical generates two types of wrong act: a contradiction in nature (eg suicide, which can’t be universalised as we will be wiped out) or a contradiction in will (something you could never want such as a world where everyone is unkind).
The Categorical Imperative – Universalisability
An imperative is a statement of what should be done. In other words, experience can only give us hypothetical imperatives (If you want to be healthy, then you should exercise and watch what you eat). A description of the way the world is cannot tell us the way we should act.
A Categorical Imperative is a should statement, but it is not based on experience, and doesn’t rely on a particular outcome. Rather, it logically precedes experience, or helps us make sense of experience.
It is like that with the categorical imperative: certain actions are logically inconsistent and would make no sense as universal laws, such as lying. As a result, ‘Do not lie’ is a categorical imperative. This understanding that our mind plays an active role in ordering and shaping our experience was revolutionary, and is Kant’s greatest achievement.
Kant states the categorical imperative as follows: I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
The Categorical Imperative – Law of Nature
Kant also states the categorical imperative as follows: Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.
It is difficult to see how these two statements are different, and many texts treat them as though they say the same thing. However, I think they give a real insight into how Kant perceived the Categorical Imperative. Have a look at how the categorical imperative can be applied to euthanasia.
The Categorical Imperative – Ends and means
A good will is one that acts in accordance with rationally-determined duty. No character trait or consequence is good in itself. However, as good is defined in terms of rationality, Kant argued that all rational beings were ends in themselves and should never be treated purely as a means to an end. He put this two different ways:
So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end in itself, never as means only.
So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends.
These latter statements of the Categorical Imperative are really an extension of the statements regarding universalisability – we hold laws if we would will that all other rational beings would also follow them. As a result, it would be contradictory for any rule to treat a rational being as a means to some greater end: there can be no greater end. Put another way, I cannot prescribe a rule that, if held by someone else, would result in my being treated merely as a means to end.
The categorical Imperative, stated four different ways above, could be seen as a rational justification for following the golden rule that is the cornerstone of Christian morals (as well as most other religions):
Love your neighbour as yourself.
What makes a bad act bad?
Pure reason finds two ways of determining whether an action is bad: a contradiction in will and a contradiction in nature.
Kant analyzes evil as a kind of logical error, or mistake in reasoning. A contradiction is the worst logical error. It would obviously be a contradiction for a rational being to say “Every rational being should do X, except me.” Contradiction of this form is called special pleading. When rational beings will to do bad things, they want a contradiction: they want everybody else to do the right thing, because that’s exactly what makes their wrongdoing possible. For example, the liar wants everyone else to tell the truth; if everyone lied, no one would believe the liar’s lie. So the liar in effect is willing a contradiction: “Every rational being should tell the truth, except me.” This is special pleading: wanting the rule to apply to everyone but not to me. Such a contradiction is a failure of universalisability, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
How does the reasoning work in practice?
Using practical reason, there are two steps to establish a bad act. First, we consider what we are proposing to do and for what reasons (i.e., on which maxim). Second, we consider whether we can will that everyone act on that maxim. If we cannot do so, we ought not to act on it ourselves. We must find some other maxim, one that passes the test.
Kant thinks there are two kinds of case where one could not will that everyone act on one’s maxim.
- Cases in which there simply could not be a world in which everyone acts on the maxim because everyone’s trying would be destructive of everyone’s continuing ability to do so, (he calls this a contradiction in nature):
“Some actions are so constituted that their maxim cannot even be conceived as a universal law of nature without contradiction.” (Kant, Groundwork 424)
- Cases where one can conceive of a world in which everyone acts on the maxim, but where one cannot consistently or rationally will such a world. (He calls this a contradiction in will)In either kind of case, the maxim will fail the CI test. According to Kant, it would be wrong to act on a maxim of either kind.
Kant’s examples of both kinds:
A contradiction in nature
The maxim: “When I believe myself to be in need to money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even though I know that this will never happen.”
A person proposes to make a promise he doesn’t intend to keep to pay back money in order to meet a need of his own. He must consider whether he could will a world in which everyone is motivated in precisely the same way. Kant claims that he cannot since it is only possible for people to promise in the first place if there is sufficient trust for others to believe that the person promising intends to keep his promise. But a world (otherwise like our own) in which everyone acted on this maxim would be a world in which such trust will not exist. Therefore it is impossible even to conceive of a world in which everyone acts on this maxim as though by a law of nature; therefore it is wrong to act on this maxim oneself.
a. How far can this argument be taken? Would no maxim licensing a false promise, in circumstances of extreme need, say, be such that it could be willed to be a universal law?
b. How much of this example depends on the special “institutional” or “practical” features of promising. What if there were an evil practice that would similarly be destroyed by intentional departures from it? Would Kant’s theoryargue against that?
A contradiction in will
The maxim: “let each be as happy as heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; only I do not care to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in need!”
A person proposes not tohelp others because it is not in his own interest to do so. He then asks whether he could will a world in which everyone is similarly motivated.
Clearly he canimagine such a world, so this kind of case is different from the first. But can he rationally will that everyone act on this maxim as though by a law of nature? It seems he cannot, because in willing that he act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest be promoted, but in willing that everyone act on the maxim, he is willing that his own interest not be promoted. Thus his will is in conflict with itself.
“Since many a situation might arise in which the man needed love and sympathy from others, and in which, by such a law of nature sprung from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope of the help he wants for himself.” (Groundwork,423)
For discussion: must we assume here that his interests are likelier to be promoted in a world in which people are motivated to help others in distress than in a world where they are not? Will this always be true? What if, given knowledge of his own relatively secure position, a person could rationally will the latter rather than the former world, but if he were ignorant of his privileged position would rationally prefer the former to the latter? What should we say then?
Note that Kant’s first example above also illustrates the idea of a contradiction in will. The person (in the example) who makes a lying promise uses the trust of others and the practice of promising for his own ends. But would these ends by promoted or harmed by everyone’s making such promises? If the latter, then he cannot rationally will that world and also will that his own ends be promoted by his making the lying promise. Therefore, it is wrong for him to make a lying promise to advantage himself.Conclusion:a bad act is one that creates a contradiction in nature or will.
Quotes
“Ought implies can”.
“Two things fill me with wonder – the starry sky above and the moral law within”.
“The only good thing is the good will”.
“So act that the maxim of your action can be willed as a universal law”.
Examples
1. If I help and old lady across the road because I enjoy it this has no moral worth. It only has moral worth if I do it because it’s my duty as it is a universal principle of reason to help people in need.
2. If a crazy knifeman (Kant’s own example) comes up to me when my mate is hiding in the house and asks “is your mate in there?” I am supposed to say “yes!” Why? Because the rightness of telling the truth has absolutely nothing to do with circumstances or consequences (Kant was opposed to utilitarian ethics).
3. Duty can seem dry and passionless. So in the final scene of the film The Queen Her Majesty explains to Blair why she felt she was doing the right thing keeping her mouth closed and staying in Balmoral when Diana died – she was “doing her duty” which is difficult- her duty to protect her grandchildren. Her popularity plummeted and she was pressurised to come to London.
Issues with Kant
1. Kant puts forward the primacy of reason above all other virtues. What is rational is moral and what is irrational is immoral. Reason gives us dignity, binds us to each other and the moral commands generated are universal. He divides emotions off from reason. Is this valid? Or was Hume right – the feeling of sympathy is the grounds of morality, not reason?
But Kant assumes that human beings are rational. Hume had suggested that our desires are primary and moral judgment is not grounded in reason but in our feelings. Reason is used to discover truth and falsehood, not to guide action. Supposing we don’t have reason. Kant says himself that ought means can.If we cant then morality should be about something else. But Hume goes further and says that there is not necessarily any contradiction to guide you when you universalise actions eg. It is not against reason to prefer the destruction of the world to the scratching of my finger.
Is this a good criticism? Are emotions and inclinations enough? Does it justify us using them to be moral? (SEE UTILITARIANISM – Hedonic Calculus presupposes use of reason.
2. What about the other virtues – kindliness, compassion, selflessness, humility etc.? Surely we can achieve happiness by cultivating these qualities? Reason can play its part but these are important too. Anyway, surely its very cold to call an action immoral because its irrational rather than to say it hurts another’s feelings?In addition our motives are not always pure and people seldom act from purely practical reason; we more often help others because we like them or feel sorry for them. Putting duty above everything seems cold and inhuman and Kant’s theory with its belief in duty severs morality from everyday life.
3What about the man with no reason? Is he less moral than the person with more?What about animals? Do we think they reason? If not, then are they not to be valued or protected? (what would the animal rights’ brigade have to say?)
4Kant said we could judge actions as moral by the use of the Categorical Imperative (CI) First formulation – Universalise
Some of the rules generated by CI could be at best be morally insignificant eg. When you buy a book put your name inside. Nothing contradictory, nothing against the will but clearly shows that just because you universalise the rule, it doesn’t become moral. You could just as easily universalise the opposite. Do not put your name inside when you buy a book
Kant’s theory is abstract and not always easily applied to moral situations – it tells you what types of actions are good but it does not tell you what is the right thing to do in particular situations. Alasdair MacIntyre points out that you can use the universability principle to justify practically anything.
4aKant said that actions could be contradictory to the will and this would make an action immoral. Can we criticise this?
Kant assumes too much when he says that we will reject those rules that when universalised, we as rational beings would find unacceptable. We might be all rational but we are all different and what one finds acceptable another might find intolerable.eg. A Sadist – Could wish for sadism to be universalised. It involves a risk that he might become a victim but theres a good chance that he will also be able to practise his sadism. However the sadist would be using someone as a means to an end so he would be breaking the second formulation of the CI