The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?
Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop
Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels
Paper presented at EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference
Austin, Texas, 31 March – 2 April 2005
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Royal Institute for International Relations (IRRI-KIIB)
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On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the European Security Strategy, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, the first ever common strategic vision of the Member States. The first level at which the Strategy as a framework for a comprehensive approach to security, and in fact to EU external action in general, can be put into practice is that of the EU’s neighbourhood. ‘Building security in our neighbourhood’ has in fact been an objective actively pursued by the EU, since the fall of the Berlin Wall as far as the continent of Europe is concerned, and since at least the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) as regards its Southern periphery. It is also the focus of one of the EU’s major new projects: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This paper will assess the potential of the ENP as a framework for the implementation of the comprehensive approach advocated by the Strategy, as well as the challenges to be addressed for the ENP to be successful.
The European Security Strategy: A Choice for Comprehensive Security
The starting point of the Strategy’s comprehensive approach is the recognition of the interdependence between all dimensions of security – political, socio-economic, cultural, ecologic, military – hence the need to formulate integrated policies on all of them (Biscop, 2005). This comprehensive approach is translated into the overall objective of ‘effective multilateralism’, i.e. ‘a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order’. At the global level, the EU seeks to pursue this objective mainly through the UN, which the Strategy sees as the core of the international system, and through the other global and regional partnerships and organizations. With regard to its neighbourhood, the EU will itself assume a leading role in order to ‘promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations’. The same approach is to be followed at both levels: dialogue, cooperation and partnership in all fields of external action, putting to value the whole range of instruments at the disposal of the EU.
De facto, this approach amounts to promoting effective global governance, which can be best understood as a system that at the global level ensures access to the same core public goods which the state provides to its citizens at the national level. These global public goods (GPG) can e.g. be summarized as: international stability and security, an open and inclusive economic system, an enforceable legal order, and global welfare in all its dimensions as an equivalent to national welfare systems. At a certain level of inequality in terms of access to these core GPG, the resulting political instability and extremism, economic unpredictability and massive migration flows risk to become uncontrollable. This gap between haves and have-nots therefore represents the ultimate systemic threat to international security (Coolsaet and Arnould, 2004). GPG are not explicitly mentioned in the Strategy, but: ‘spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order’. So without any doubt, the emphasis in the Strategy is on a long-term policy of stabilisation and conflict prevention through the promotion of global governance.
But of course, dialogue, cooperation and partnership cannot be unconditional. States violating the norms of behaviour vis-à-vis the international community or their own population ‘should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union’. Partnership with the EU can thus be cut back or enhanced according to performance, for: ‘We want international organizations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken’. In certain cases this can include the use of force, but certainly not exclusively – implicitly, the Strategy considers the use of force as an instrument of last resort, in principle to be applied only with a Security Council mandate. The EU aims for ‘early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’, but this applies to ‘the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities’.
On the whole, the Strategy is a positive project, emphasizing positive objectives – ‘effective multilateralism’ or the core GPG. ‘What for’ rather than ‘against whom’ is the question that determines policy. Thus the comprehensive approach avoids the classic security dilemma. The added value of comprehensive security lies in the integration of all fields of external action under this single agenda of ‘effective multilateralism’. ‘Securitization’ of policy fields other than ESDP, i.e. treating issues as politico-military or ‘hard’ security problems and consequently applying politico-military instruments to solve them, is equally avoided however. Under the global heading of promoting ‘effective multilateralism’, the politico-military is just one dimension of external action, at the same level as the other fields. Thus, the implementation of the Strategy should lead to the opposite of ‘securitization’: issues should be dealt with as development, human rights, ecologic problems etc. and should only be put in a politico-military or security perspective when developments threaten to have direct security consequences for the population of the state concerned, for the region or for the EU itself. In fact therefore, the Strategy really is more than a security strategy – it is a strategy for external action.
Even though until December 2003 no formal strategic concept existed, a distinctive European approach to security had already been emerging over the last few years. EU policies towards its neighbouring States have been particularly revealing with regard to the EU’s preference for a comprehensive and cooperative approach, aiming at cooperation rather than confrontation. Obviously, there have been exceptions to this line – in the Mediterranean, the conclusion of an Association Agreement with Algeria, quite regardless of ongoing violence in the country, is a case in point – and there will continue to be so. Nevertheless in the Strategy, the concept of comprehensive security has now been rubberstamped as the European approach to security.
Implementing the Strategy at the Regional Level: The European Neighbourhood Policy
‘Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important’, the Strategy rightly points out. It is indeed the case that, while the security issues arising in the vicinity of the EU are global phenomena that are not specific to this region, their potential effects on the EU can still be greater because of geographic proximity. The EU and its neighbourhood, and certainly its neighbours on the European continent, can be considered a ‘security complex’ as defined by Buzan (1991): ‘a group of States whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’. It is but logical therefore that in this area the EU assumes responsibility and directly takes the lead in promoting peace and security, for a stable neighbourhood is a necessity for Europe’s own security.The actual development of the CFSP and ESDP can be seen in the light of Europe’s failure to fulfil exactly this ambition, notably on the Balkans in the early 1990s and, more recently, in Kosovo in 1999. In that sense, the inherent security dimension of the ENP also answers a long-standing call by the US for more burden-sharing, notably with regard to what Washington rightly sees as Europe’s backyard: the Balkans. Promoting stability in Europe’s neighbourhood can even be seen as a responsibility or a duty, since the EU is the only local actor with the means to do so. Through its force of attraction, the EU has succeeded in stabilising the European continent; now it has to replicate that success in a wider neighbourhood. The Strategy offers an ambitious definition of how far this neighbourhood reaches: the Balkans; ‘our neighbours to the East’, i.e. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the three remaining countries between the EU and Russia after the accession of Rumania and Bulgaria in 2007; the Southern Caucasus; and the Mediterranean.
Since 1995 the EU is committed to the comprehensive EMP, now between the 25 and ten Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority; Libya has been invited to join on the condition of accepting the acquis of the partnership. The EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, adopted by the June 2004 European Council, widens the scope of Europe’s ambitions to the ‘Wider Middle East’: the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), i.e. Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, plus Yemen, Iran and Iraq.
The neighbourhood can be seen as the area in which the EU deems it has a specific responsibility for peace and security, and therefore aspires to a directly leading role, as opposed to its general contribution to global stability through the UN as outlined under the objective of ‘effective multilateralism’. The Strategy puts down the general principle of building comprehensive and cooperative relations in the political, economic, cultural and security fields with the States concerned, a ‘ring of friends’, in order to increase security, i.e. an approach that emphasises a structural, long-term policy of stabilisation and prevention. It does not go into detail as to the instruments that the EU can apply to make these relations work, but of course several instruments already exist or are being envisaged. The potentially most effective instrument is the comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy first proposed by the Commission under the heading of ‘Wider Europe’. Somewhat surprisingly, the ENP is not explicitly mentioned in the Strategy, but the title of the second strategic objective has been changed from ‘extending the zone of security around Europe’ to ‘building security in our neighbourhood’. The potential of the ENP, and the challenges that it poses, can be illustrated by the case of the Mediterranean and the ‘Wider Middle East’ (Biscop, 2004).
The Mixed Record of the EMP
The comprehensive approach put forward as a general strategy for EU external action was already underlying the EMP, or Barcelona Process, at the partnership’s founding conference in 1995. This is evident from the composition of its three baskets, which cover the whole range of relations between the EU and its Southern neighbours: a political and security partnership, an economic and financial partnership and a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. The EMP added a politico-military dimension to the traditionally economic focus of Europe’s Mediterranean policies, but firmly embedded it in a broad framework of relations. In this framework, there is a strong emphasis on dialogue and co-ownership. The Strategy has thus confirmed the basic orientation of the EMP.
The ongoing armed conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, which has been clouding the Mediterranean and the ‘Wider Middle East’ for decades, is of course foremost among the region’s security concerns. Although it does not pose a direct security threat to the EU, the conflict has important negative consequences for EU interests: it is an important cause of the stagnation of cooperation in the EMP, in all fields; it serves to radicalize public opinion; and thus creates a breeding ground for extremism. With regard to the Mediterranean, the analysis of the underlying causes of instability, disputes and conflict in terms of access to GPG is particularly revealing. A number of authoritarian regimes lacking legitimacy have to rely on security forces, and the armed forces, to control the opposition and muster popular support. The armed forces are thus primarily an instrument of domestic politics; States have built large military apparatus, absorbing large shares of national revenue and often playing a determining role in politics and society. The lack of legitimacy is a consequence of the inability to provide for the basic public goods to which every human being is entitled and is exacerbated by the repression of political opposition, which from the perspective of the regimes and associated elites is inevitable, for because of their poor performance democratisation would undoubtedly lead to their removal from power and thus the loss of the wealth which they acquire by running the State. The result has been a radicalization of the opposition, leading mostly to the growth of Islamist movements, including extreme factions that support the use of violence. The strength of Islamism is closely linked to a dense network of mosques and associated organizations, which often provide certain social services that the State is unable or unwilling to organize. Several regimes haves thus created their own extremists, which primarily have a domestic agenda: overthrowing the current regime.
In the medium to long term, the huge – and widening – gap between haves and have-nots in terms of access to the basic public goods should be considered the primary security concern in the region. Attempting to maintain the status quo is thus not an option, even though at first glance the present situation might appear quite stable, for it contains the root causes of instability.
In order to divert attention away from domestic problems, regimes often revert to fierce nationalist rhetoric, often of an anti-Israeli nature, a theme which strikes a chord with public opinion. At the same time however regimes thus confirm the views of Islamist factions, to whom this theme comes natural, which also makes it easier for the latter to spread the more general anti-American or anti-Western views that often complement their opposition to the domestic regimes. A number of regimes haves thus engaged in a game that they cannot win: going along with anti-Israeli and anti-American/anti-Western views might temporarily sooth public opinion, but in the end serves only to reinforce the legitimacy of the Islamists, as these regimes can never live up to their rhetoric, being as they are dependent on American and European economic – and often military – support. The invasion of Iraq has certainly reinforced the appeal of extremist Islamist factions.
A side-effect of nationalist foreign policies and competition for scarce resources is the very low level of regional integration among the Southern Mediterranean States. Existing regional organizations, such as the League of Arab States, have very limited impact or have been paralyzed by internal differences, such as the Arab Maghreb Union. In the framework of the EMP, the Southern partners therefore do not act as a group and have shown very little enthusiasm for multilateral programmes and activities. This lack of political integration reflects the limited nature of economic relations between the Southern States: intra-Southern trade accounts for just 10% of their trade, while more than half of their trade is with the EU.
From Affirmation to Implementation
The EMP has not fundamentally altered this situation. Simply reaffirming the ‘spirit of Barcelona’ in the Strategy is therefore insufficient; the partnership is in need of revitalisation. Indeed, the Strategy itself states that the Mediterranean ‘generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union’s interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process’.
The ENP offers an opportunity to achieve this objective. The aim of the Neighbourhood Policy is to achieve ‘an area of shared prosperity and values’ by creating close partnerships with the EU’s neighbouring States, bringing them as close to the EU as possible without being a member, which should lead to in-depth economic integration, close political and cultural relations and a joint responsibility for conflict prevention. The aim of the ENP can also be seen as preventing dilution of the EU by putting a brake on enlargement – a neighbour by definition lives in the house next door, as a diplomat worded it. To that end, the EU is to offer very concrete ‘benefits’, basically a stake in the EU’s internal market, to be accompanied by further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital – ‘the four freedoms’. The Commission proposes inter alia the following incentives: extension of the internal market and regulatory structures; preferential trade relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; integration into transport, energy and telecommunications networks and the European research area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; and support for integration into the global trading system. Through a process of ‘positive conditionality’, these benefits will be linked to political and economic reform. The Neighbourhood Policy thus has a wide stabilizing and preventive scope.