The Evolution of Technicity
Mike Doyle
Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the British Educational Research Association, University of Exeter, England, 12-14 September 2002
Abstract
The last two decades of the twentieth century saw the birth of evolutionary psychology and the establishment of ICT in the classroom. Whilst the former has, fairly firmly, established the status of human language as a biological adaptation, demonstrated that descriptive and discursive language is probably not unique to our species, and teased out the prime role (gossip) and unstable nature of speech; provided a Pleistocene adaptation explanation of both our social structures, and liking for junk food, which provides a framework for discussions of citizenship and religion; it is silent on the origins of the adaptations that led to our curricular core of literacy and numeracy and the wider curriculum flowing therefrom. Furthermore, the field is innocent of hypotheses about technology – and thereby ICT – as an adaptation, except to infer that it is post-Pleistocene. The exponential growth of technology, and its scientific foundation, over the past two centuries has characteristics in common with a speciation event. In an education system that focuses on language, the question of wherein lies the intellect of technology remains unaddressed. Given that graphic symbolic representation does appear to be unique to us, as a species, it is suggested that an examination of the relationship between graphics and our capacity to adapt, rather than adapt to, the environment may prove a fruitful point of departure.
Question
In the year eighteen hundred and two, two centuries before this text was keyed, William Paley opened his Natural Theology with the following passage, quoted by Richard Dawkins (1988) in The Blind Watchmaker:
In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there; I might possibly answer that, for anything I knew to the contrary, it had lain there forever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to show the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch on the ground, and should it be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place; I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that for anything I knew, the watch had always been there.
Paley’s argument in support of a necessary divine designer to create the heavens, earth, and all the life forms therein, a notion documented some five millennia previously in Sumer (Kramer 1972), has succumbed to Darwin, Mendel, and Crick & Watson. We have now the capacity to engineer new species by DNA manipulation and can plot the processes whereby single cells grow into individuals capable of researching their own genesis. In this respect, we have done much in two centuries. Yet, Paley’s watch retains its enigma.
How did the watch come about?
Technicity
The word ‘technicity’ is unofficial. There exist several, linked, senses of the word, of which two are institutional: firstly, in the context of EU software patent law (FFII Software Patent Workgroup 2002) there is a test of technicity (German: Technizität) or technical character:
… technicity, novelty, non-obviousness and industrial applicability …
implying that patentable software must be more than a computer program (algorithm); secondly, in the context of the philosophy of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, where the Encyclopaedia Britannica (2000) entry includes the following:
… "technicity," the attempt of modern man to dominate the earth by controlling beings that are considered as objects.
This sense was possibly introduced by Dreyfus (2002). The original source is Heidegger’s, 1953, “Die Frage nach der Technik”, initially translated (Langan, 1959 Ch XI) as “The Inquiry into Technique,” the title is more commonly rendered “The Question concerning Technology” (Krell, 1993 Ch VII). (Although Mackenzie (2001) ascribes the term to Simondon; who wrote “technicité”, which (below) connotes meanings beyond those in Heidegger.)
A third, vernacular, sense is to be found in European, where the usage is similar to ‘hi tec’; although the use of ‘technicity’ in English versions of French websites (technicité in French, Technizität in German in ones) to describe walking boots, golf courses, musicians, media, and industrial equipment connotes technicality and professional expertise and hence an intellectual content absent in the Anglo-American term.
Heidegger related Technik to the Greek ‘techne’, that essentially human capacity to ‘let be’ the sculpture immanent within a block of marble. In common with Marx (McLellan 1999), Heidegger saw modern industrial technology as discontinuous with craftwork. He asserted that technicity, the essence of technology, was a framework that led to a constrained view of the world, where both people and the environment, with its resources, flora and fauna, are a ‘standing reserve’ ready for exploitation. He compared the farmer tending a field and letting his crops ‘be’ with the miner who ‘challenged forth’ the underground coal as energy. He also used a silversmith ‘revealing’ a chalice as a pre-technological example.
Heidegger’s claim that the ‘technic’ worldview originated in post-Socratic Greece and degenerated thereafter into the excesses of modern industry (Zimmerman 1990) is negated by knowledge both of Greece and Sumer. Greek silver involved ‘challenging forth’ of the metal from ore, which, in turn, had been challenged forth from the earth by enslaved miners who had the status of a standing reserve. The irrigation-based agriculture of Sumer (van de Mieroop, 1999) was highly technical, in the modern sense, and involved challenging forth produce from a resource depleted terrain. Here people, specifically as potential slaves, were also viewed as a standing reserve.
Extending further back, evidence in the Palaeolithic suggests (McBrearty & Brooks 2000) that the complex of behaviours that marks out behaviourally modern humans encompasses a conceptual framework that takes nature as a collection of resources for exploitation. Indeed, reflection suggests that all living organisms operate in their environment as if it is a standing reserve.
Technicity, the essence of technology, is here understood as that specific, behaviourally modern human, capacity to go beyond the biologically given – the capability to become a watchmaker.
Evolution
Relative to other matters discussed here, the modern notion of evolution is recent, Darwin’s “The Origin of Species” was published in 1859 and the modern synthesis, with genetics, is a product of the last century. Similarly, science in its present sense originates with the shift from the ‘cookery’ of alchemy to atomic physics, triggered by the electrolytic dissociation of water a fortnight after Volta demonstrated his ‘pile’ in 1800 (Asimov 1990).
Darwin cites the dictum: “Natura non fecit saltum” (Burrow 1985 p 223) as a caution against falling into the discontinuity trap. Phase transition, however is a fundamental natural phenomenon: for millennia the separate natures of earth, water, and air have been recognised; and we ascribe to the Greeks the system that included ‘fire’ as the fourth element in a conceptual framework that endured for over two millennia, and was unquestioned by Newton.
The final foundation materiel is the property of matter termed entropy. Originating in Carnot’s theoretical work on steam engines, published in 1824, the entropy principle was first stated by Clausius in 1850 as the second ‘law’ of themodynamics:
Heat cannot of itself pass from a colder to a hotter body.
which rules out perpetual motion machines. A function of temperature and thereby particular motion, statistical methods were required to describe the behaviour of collections of molecules, even in an ideal gas. The statistical expression for entropy is (Stonier, 1990):
entropy = k log D
where k is Boltzmann’s constant (3.2983 x 10-24 cal/deg), and
D is a “quantitative measure of the atomistic disorder of the body in question”.
Hence, given that ‘atomistic disorder’ (number of possible microstates) includes the number of different molecules in a system, entropy is also an indicator of complexity. That heat is given up when substances change phase, e.g. the latent heat of fusion of ice, shows that entropy is also an indicator of structure. (The example given by Stonier (1990, p 48) is the denaturation of trypsin (loss of three dimensional structure), which increases entropy by 213 cal/deg/mole.) Schrödinger (1945) suggested that entropy taken in the negative sense might be considered a measure of order; and coined the phrase “Life feeds on negative entropy.” Attracted by isomorphism between the entropy formula and the measure of information developed by Shannon:
H = - i Pi log Pi
where P is the number of possible symbol combinations,
Brillouin (1962) suggested that information be considered the converse of entropy. This notion was explored further by Stonier (1990, 1997) who equated information with ‘pattern’ seen in the universe. Whilst the value of his hypothesis is uncertain, it does direct attention to the question of the entropy ‘climate’ that pertains in a given region, and to phase transitions (Jou & Pavis, 1989). The value of such considerations is illustrated by work on black holes (Hawking, 1988, p 103); a reminder that our species understands its environment not by the information available to our senses but through instruments that transduce patterns carried by the four natural forces into a sensible form. From these patterns comes information. Historically, ‘modern’ science began when electromagnetism displaced heat: heat, random motion, is incapable of conveying information; whereas the electromagnetic spectrum may be modulated to carry patterns, with messages.
Modern cosmology is evolutionary in the Darwinian sense. That is, the universe has evolved without discontinuity by slow, steady processes. Within this continuity occur changes of phase. The characteristic of a phase change is that entities and behaviours exist after the phase change that did not exist before it took place and the properties of which cannot be predicted from within the prior phase. In outline, it is currently held that the following cosmological phase transitions occurred (Kaufman 1993, Longair 1996)):
New property
/ Time after Big Bang / TemperatureGravity / 10-41 sec / 1032 K
Strong atomic force / 10-35 sec / 1027 K
Weak atomic and electromagnetic forces / 10-12 sec / 1015 K
Protons and neutrons
Universe now matter dominant / 10-6 sec / 1013 K
Primordial helium
(+ some lithium & deuterium) / 3 min / 109 K
Photons & hydrogen / 1M yrs / 3,000 K
Galaxies & Quasars
(heavier elements) / ongoing
Planetary accretion
(Earth and solar system) / 4,600M yrs / 2.7 K
Entropy increased at every phase-change, accompanied by the potential for greater complexity, i.e. an increasing probability that highly improbable entities, like the Earth, could exist. The complex chemical composition of interstellar space (Irvine & Knacke 1989) includes many components required for replicating organic organisms. Smith and Szathmáry (1995) cite 1988 work by Wächlerhäuser, which suggests that life needs an ‘earth’ because entropy considerations favour surface bonding for the polyanionic organic compounds which might have begun the process; with liquid water as a prerequisite (Katasuki 1988; Ball 1999). Once begun, Smith and Szathmáry (1995) suggest the following phase transitions occur:
Replicating molecules / / Populations of molecules in compartmentsIndependent replicators / / Chromosomes
RNA as gene and enzyme / / DNA + protein (genetic code)
Prokaryotes / / Eukaryotes
Asexual clones / / Sexual populations
Protists / / Animals, plants, fungi
(cell differentiation)
Solitary individuals / / Colonies
(non-reproductive castes)
Primate societies / / Human societies (language)
The following expansion is proposed for the last phase transition:
Primate societies / / Homo societies (language)Homo societies (language) / / Human societies (technicity)
The coarse evolutionary sequence within the Homo phase (Leakey 1994; Lewin 1998, Smith & Szathmáry 1995 p277) is as follows:
Species / Time before present / Encephalisation cm3Australopithecenes / 4.5 Ma to 2.5 ma / 400
Early Homo / 2.5 Ma to 1.8 Ma / 650 - 800
Paranthropines / 2.2 Ma to 1.1 Ma / (cf apes)
Later Homo / 2.4 Ma to present / 800 - 1450
The Later Homo category has the following suggested subdivisions (Lewin, 1998 p 339):
Species / Time before present / Encephalization cm3H habilis
H rudolfensis / 2.5 Ma to 1.8 Ma
2.2 Ma / 650 to 800
H ergaster
H erectus / 2.0 Ma
1.9 ma to 300Ka / 850 to >1000
Archaic H sapiens / 1Ma to 250Ka / 1100 to >1400
(H neanderthalensis / 500Ka to 30Ka / 1450)
Modern Humans / 250Ka to present / 1300
Any evidence in support of a phase transition between anatomically modern and behaviourally modern H sapiens is in the existence of entities that did not exist prior to the transition and that could not be predicted from within it.
Evidence from the Levant of some 100Ka (Niteki & Niteki 1994) suggests that Anatomically Modern Humans alternated with the cold-adapted Neanderthals according to climatic conditions. However, there is no evidence of difference in behaviour or tool assemblages. Indeed, the tool assemblages of both Earlier and Later Homo show remarkable stability over time. For example, the bifacial ‘hand-axe’ of H erectus remained structurally unaltered for over a million years. Similarly, the assemblage associated with H neanderthalensis remained stable until cohabitation with behaviourally modern humans occurred some 40Ka ago. The stability of the tool assemblage suggests that the modern concept of ‘tool’ may be misleading prior to the emergence of modern human behaviour. Dawkins (1992) notion of the extended phenotype might be more useful. This would suggest the hypothesis that increased encephalization provided the capacity to hold a greater number of templates for constructing complex artefacts: a parallel with, say, birds’ nests.
In a recent survey, McBrearty and Brooks (2000) have suggested that the ‘human revolution’ evidenced in Europe some 40Ka has foundations in Africa some 250Ka earlier, based on the appearance of decoration and the use, and storage, of ochre. Deacon (1998) proposed co-evolution with language.
Language and Homo
There is a presumption that language is the highest cognitive capability of our species (Swann, 2001).
Primate precursors of human social behaviour, including tribalism, leadership, alliances, apprenticeship, warfare, relations with other species, sexual relationships, and communication are well documented (Goodall 1986; Matsuzawa 2001); including demonstrations that Pan, the primate group closes to Homo is evolutionary sequence, has a cognitive capability to use simple semantic and grammatical constructs when presented visually. The field of evolutionary psychology (Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby 1992) focuses on the evolutionary adaptations that saw these behaviours develop into human ones. Of particular importance is the evolutionary advantage of cooperation, and hence larger groups; and the competing fitness needs of the sexes in a species where, compared with apes, neonates are 12 months immature, a consequence of brain size in relation to the birth canal. In this context, Dunbar (1996) proposes that language evolved to service social cohesion and argues that the primary use of language is ‘gossip’, a vocal replacement for primate grooming. Deacon (1998), from a neurological perspective, suggests the co-evolution of brain and language. The papers collected in Harford, Studdert-Kennedy & Knight (1998) are largely supportive of this hypothesis. Stringer (2002) thinks that H ergaster could have had speech. It seems possible that language was characteristic of the whole genus Homo. This early development of speech finds support in Darwinian theory, where complex capabilities do not jump into existence fully formed but rather develop as a sequence of fitness enhancing adaptations. Pinker’s (1994) notion that language is an inbuilt instinct finds support in the human developmental sequence, where language buds and flowers between the ages of two and four following the completion on neurogenesis.
Support for the early evolution of language, possibly including grammar, is also to be found within language itself. Whilst all languages appear to operate according to an underlying universal grammar, the sounds used and surface grammar vary dramatically; yet all languages are equally capable of conveying complex ideas. The papers collected in Lock & Peters (1996) underline these characteristics of language. That language changes very rapidly temporarily and spatially is one of its defining characteristics (Nettle 1999). Each generation defines itself by its vocabulary and accent. Localities, even relatively close ones, have unique words and pronunciations. The definition of a tribe, or culture, embodies the existence of mutually incomprehensible language. An explanation for this apparently maladaptive characteristic of language is its use as a defence against freeriding.
In any cooperative group, where favours are understood to be reciprocated, the most evolutionary successful strategy is to take all and give nowt. However, when members of the group can remember that an individual never contributes, then they can withdraw cooperation. This makes freeriding not longer adaptive. However, in a larger group there is a greater chance that a freerider will avoid detection. Genetic theory (Dawkins 1989) suggests that altruism is adaptive in an evolutionary sense only for close kin. The altruism that oils human groups must, therefore, require protection against freeriding.
The danger, therefore, comes from ‘strangers’ whose reliability cannot be ascertained. In larger human groups, stranger detection strategies beyond personal knowledge are required. A local, group, dialect that gives away a stranger through divergent pronunciation is just such a mechanism. Note: only very young children can learn a second language with phonetic accuracy. This means that the stranger will be treated with caution until their cooperative credentials are assured.
The difficulties experienced by philosophers in expressing their thought in language is well illustrated by Heidegger (Krell 1993), who needed to mine ancient language in order to approach his meaning. Indeed, as Langan (1959 p 3) noted:
Heidegger recreates the German language as he writes. … Translating a philosophy that lives deep in the darkest genius of its language is no easier than translating Hoelderlin …
Hence, language qua language does not seem to have the characteristics necessary to motivate the phase transition hypothesised for behaviourally modern humans.
Drawing
Graphic representation is more sophisticated that language, at least from the freerider perspective. Signs can be both public and secret. Whilst the illustrations on the cave walls at Lascaux (Delluc & Delluc 190) drawn 10Ka ago are immediately recognisable, the signs and symbols have lost meaning. Graphics are also inestimably better for representing spatial information.
Unfortunately, our understanding of drawing is minimal, as is our use of the word. At Leeds University Library on 7 Sept 2002 a keyword search of turned up 24,301 occurrences of ‘language’ against ‘drawing’ at 1,053; the indexes of a dozen introductory psychology texts produced no occurrences of ‘drawing’; and no text on evolutionary psychology considered the subject: fascinating because Evans & Zarate (1999) is cartoon-based. Where drawing is discussed, it is in the context of the development of artistic representation, e.g. Cox (1992). Yet writing, number, and geometry are founded in drawing.