The dockers of the Seaport of St. Petersburg in 2004 and 2005: an observation on union’s mobilisation for strike actions

Shih-Hao Kang

Abstract

Since the new Labour Code came into effect in 2002, many analysts, as well as Russian union leaders, had argued that under the new policy, union’s right of strike were greatly restricted. The required procedures before the claim of taking legal strike make any active trade union in Russia to consider their mobilisation capacity among the members. Most alternative / non-FNPR trade unions own very tiny minority of membership in comparison with their FNPR counterparts, the impact of the new Labour Code almost has deprived the legitimacy of actions of these active but minor unions. In face of such difficulties in practice, the RPD port organisation of St. Petersburg Seaport took several tactic moves in order to increase the workers’ pay and install an efficient mechanism for inflation compensation to wages. When the collective bargaining failed to meet their demands in 2004, instead of mobilising their members to take place strike, the dockers’ organisations firstly conducted ‘Italian strike’ which is a method to slow down the handling volume of cargoes by workers to reject overtime work and strictly follow the instruction of safety regulation. The union knew they need more work to convince members for a real strike; even the organisational works have be through, the scheduled strike in 2005 was assigned deliberately – firstly to carry out ‘Italian strike’, then ‘warning strike’, and finally ‘indefinite strike’. The study focus on the arrangements of these step-by-step decision to reveal the union’s tactic ability, as well as to review the role of coordination works. The conclusion present a review to analyse the case when a union organisation own better representation approach in the workplace, providing chance to recruit a handful union activists, so that the union was able to employ strategy to defend the its own status.

The case study focuses on the 2004-2005 strike at the Saint Petersburg Seaport. The research is based on close observation and interviews with dockers, as well as documentary analysis of the union’s newspapers and official documents produced by the union and the employers. The analysis focuses on the role of employees and the trade union, rather than that of management, in part because of the difficulties of access to employer representatives and their documentation.[1]

‘All of us know, that Piter dockers present as pioneer of free trade union movement, and for today they are example of active, determined trade unions, not only for other workers but also for employers.’

The director of Legal Consultation Centre of Labour Affairs ‘EGIDA’

Brief review of the 2004-2005 strike

Despite the fact that the last collective agreement was signed in 2002, dockers at the Saint Petersburg Seaport started to complain that their real wages did not grow but even lowered than the standard in 2000. The port union organisations believed that was because the inflation compensation for their wages was not sufficient to cover the gap. The grievances among the workers grew stronger when they compared the wage level to the port performance since the growth of the cargo handling had increased and that meant that more intensive work had been carried out. According to the RPD port committee, the rate of their working norm was not calculated corresponding to their higher productive performance. In April 2004, the collective agreement for 2005-2008 was due to begin the official negotiation round. The main demands from workers’ side were to raise their wages by 40%, and this demand was expected to be added into several tariff-mechanism articles in the new collective agreement. It is important to note that the leaders of the port committee suggested that since the new Russian Labour Code had come into effect, the strength of union organisation had been weakened and for the best protection for workers’ labour conditions they would now have to mainly rely on the content of the collective agreement. The dockers supported the port committee of RPD and believed it was the right time to make serious progress for better conditions for their duties. From the employer’s side, dockers at Saint Petersburg Seaport had received very good payment and there was no reason to introduce an extra pay rise. The trade union committees of the four stevedore companies all met difficulties during the period of collective bargaining, workers’ demands were immediately rejected by the administrations of the stevedore companies. At the end, in four of the five main stevedore service companies, the RPD union committees and the companies failed to reach an agreement in the first instance. As a consequence of the failed negotiation, collective labour disputes started to arise. The first action from the dockers’ side was taken from June to September 2004. The labour dispute and the ‘strike’ action lasted for almost two months more. The administration then agreed to reopen talks. Finally, a temporary compromise for both sides was reached. The compromise, however, only provided minor satisfaction to the dockers’ original demands. The main concern about the indexation of their wages was held over until a new negotiation to take place the next year.

In June 2005, a labour dispute, following similar demands to the 2004 dispute, once again occurred at the port after the failure of a new-round of negotiations started from April. The disagreement between the two sides was still over the mechanism of wage indexation, but the union organisation’s status also came to be a new factor in the struggle between the two sides. Despite the confrontation and settlement the previous year, the dispute developed into a fiercer state. Both sides revealed tougher attitudes and preparations toward the solution of the critical conflict. The new port management, handling labour relations with the dockers for the first time, decided to go through the conflict with an uncompromising position. The general director of JSC Seaport of St. Petersburg then made efforts to remove the leadership function of the RPD port committee. As a consequence, the dockers had for the first time to undertake a real indefinite strike at the port in the battle for a progressive collective agreement and union rights. More importantly, this was also the first time they had called an official strike since the new Russian Labour Code had come into force. In addition, local labour activists were stirred by the strike event, since such an event has not often been seen in the region. The local press also described the situation that had developed as the very first time the dockers were not only using strike threats but were also determined to carry out strike action to reach their demands. Following several dramatic events during the dispute period, the dispute officially ended with a guarantee to reach a comprise agreement.

Noteworthily, the labour disputes in 2004 and 2005 should be seen from a general perspective. The entire development of the 2004 dispute can firstly be seen as a test for both sides. Neither the employers nor the RPD union took crucial moves over the event which might provoke further conflict. Nonetheless, their restraint and the 2004 settlement only postponed the dispute, and the port committee had realised that they would be unlikely to avoid more serious industrial actions. Under the mild dispute atmosphere, the actions taken by both sides actually became the basis of the necessary understanding for their later action in the next year. The RPD activists also realised that any industrial action would be a decisive test of their practical coordination of union organisation-brigade relations. That was the main reason why more serious confrontation as well as more organised forms within the dockers’ industrial action came up. The analysis in this chapter is therefore to focus on the forms of RPD organisation and the participation among their members following the development of the strike events in 2005.

Labour dispute in 2004: a prelude

On 29 January 2004, at the 22nd Conference of RPD Saint Petersburg Seaport organisation, workers brought up concrete complaints that their real wages were actually below the wage standard of 2000. The conference then set up several aims for the progress of the upcoming collective bargaining. In addition, the port committee presented a joint draft collective agreement which was drawn up according to their earlier consensus with the JSC Seaport of Saint Petersburg. The joint draft was assigned to cover port workers of all the stevedore companies, to be applied in the PSK, VSK, ChSK Stevedore Companies and PKT (the situation in Neva-Metall was different because the employers and union committee agreed simply to extend their previous collective agreement). At the conference, the union leaders were quite optimistic about reaching these goals together. In April 2004, the collective agreement for 2005-2008 was due to enter into the official negotiation stage. The main demand from the workers’ side was for a 40% pay increase to cover the indexing of their wages, and this demand was expected to be added into several tariff-mechanism articles in the new collective agreement. The trade union committees of the four stevedore companies all met difficulties in convincing their management to adopt their demands. More difficulties occurred later which gave the period of negotiation a more uncertain atmosphere. The ownership of the port companies was changing. At the end of June 2004, a Danish-registered company, Jysk Staalindustri, which is a subsidiary of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical Combine, bought 51% of the shares of Joint-stock Company Saint Petersburg Seaport from the original shareholder, Nasdor Anstaldt, a Lichtenstein-registered company. The new owner-oriented company also took over 81% of the First, the Second and the Fourth Stevedore Companies. The rest of the shares were in the hands of Saint Petersburg city government and also the Russian federal government (28.8% of the stock in the hand of the Committee for City Properties (KUGI) of Saint Petersburg and 20.2% of the stock in the hands of the Russian federal government.

The process of collective bargaining was soon halted due to an internal struggle of the port management. An acting general director, Sergei Vishnyakov, had been named but the real executive team was not fully authorised by the Board of Directors of JSC Seaport of Saint Petersburg, and the dockers were confused about whom the demands should appeal to. In the end, these four companies all faced the development towards the stage of a collective labour dispute. Despite also standing on the edge of a collective labour dispute, the trade union committee of PKT, however, reached a deal separately with their administration (subordinated to another ownership, different from that of the other three stevedore companies) later on, and finally concluded an agreement by the end of 2004. Receiving an unfamiliar expectation to meet and negotiate with the new owner, the port committee addressed their demands for the content of the new collective agreement 2005-2008. The port committee and the primary organisations of the companies PSK, VSK and ChSK proposed their demands focusing on raising workers’ real wages and the installation of an indexing mechanism.

According to the port committee of RPD, the workers at the port raised two demands for the new collective agreement: making a compensatory rise in the nominal list of tariff rates and pay for all employees; and drawing-up a common mechanism of introducing indexation of wages corresponding to inflation for all employees. Firstly, the local union organisation stressed that over the past three years, while the inflation had kept going on, the employees had seen little increase in their wages, and therefore their real income had actually fallen. Having onsidered all reasonable factors, the union organisation suggested that compensation should be paid for wages amounting to 40 %. The dockers believed that they deserved a real wage rise as well as better working conditions. These demands were proposed by representatives of each union committee to their own companies under the joint draft proposed by the port committee. The new administrative team, however, rejected all the main demands of the dockers’ union. The entangled gap between the two sides was clear. The management did not welcome the port committee’s idea of compensating workers’ wages by a more expensive mechanism of accounting for inflation; they insisted that their own mechanism of accounting for wages was enough. The representatives of the administration asserted that the port committee’s demand for increased wages was 6 times higher than the companies could offer.

According to Boris Oslan, the general director of the First Stevedore Company, ‘Workers of the Joint Stock Company Saint Petersburg Seaport and its stevedore companies are satisfied with their working conditions. Therefore there is no reason for a strike to take place.’[2] With their more specific argument, the administration showed that they believed the wages for most dockers were good enough and that their pay had risen. At a press conference, the head of the press department of JSC Saint Petersburg (Irina Krinkun) argued, ‘…the average wage of the docker-operators of the companies in July 2004 was 23,611 roubles, that was 20% higher than the average wage of 19,652 in July 2003…for some dockers, their wages have even been up to 35,000 roubles. Only the port committee of the Russian Trade Union of Dockers can give the answer to the question why the dockers refused to do extra work.’[3] Actually, the administration of the three companies claimed that the nature of this conflict was only a conflict with a ‘union boss’.

The port committee, on the contrary, explained that their wages had lagged behind inflation. The average amount of lag between the increase of tariff rates and consumer price was 32.1% (compare to January 2001). The lag in the index between the increase of wages and consumer prices in the First Stevedore Company was 23.9%, 25% in the Second and 16% in the Fourth.