Katalin Farkas
CEU 2004 Fal
Wednesday and Thursday, 11 – 12.40
handouts
Outline
The course offers a survey of some important themes in contemporary epistemology. After two introductory sessions about some traditional sceptical problems and scepticism about the external world in particular, the first part of the course will be dedicated to the Gettier problem and the analysis of knowledge. A set of questions connected to these issues will be handed out, and students will be asked to write a short (1500 – 2000 word) essay which answers these questions. The first part concludes with an in-class written examination on the analysis of knowledge, and with another occasion where students are asked to present and discuss some of the results of the first written essay (the details depend on the number of course participants).
In the second part of the course, we will discuss contemporary theories of justification: foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and consider arguments for and against these theories. Again, students will be asked to answer a set of questions in a short essay, and the section concludes with a written exam and the presentation and discussion of the essays.
In the remaining, somewhat more advanced part of the course, we will bring the notion of epistemic internalism and epistemic obligation into a sharper focus. (There is no essay and no exam at the end of the third part.)
The core readings for the course are all in the reader. Further readings will be suggested during the course.
Course requirements:
· Regular attendance, conscientious reading of all the papers, and participation in the seminar discussions throughout the term
· Two short written essays (1500-2000 word each) answering the first and the second set of questions (questions are handed out in due time during the course).
The deadline for the 1st essay is October 18. Questions for the first essay
The deadline for the 2nd essay is November 22. Questions for the second essay
Late essays may be penalized.
· Satisfactory results in the two written exams.
The 1st written exam is October 21.
The 2nd written exam is November 24.
Grading:
Each of the two essays and the two exams will be graded according to the usual CEU grading system, from A to F. Students who fail either of the four grades cannot pass the course. The grades will then be converted to points according to the grading system, and the average of the points will be converted back to a grade. (For example: the four marks for the essays and the exams is A, B+, B+, B. This corresponds to 4.00, 3.33, 3.33, 3.00 points. The average is 3.415, and this corresponds to a B+.) In borderline cases the seminar activity may be considered as an extra factor.
Planned schedule:
(there may be slight changes depending on our progress)
1. Theories of knowledge, the varieties of scepticism (Sept. 29)
2. Skepticism about the external world, the Dream Argument. (Sept. 30)
Reading: David Blumenfeld and Jean Beer Blumenfeld: "Can I know that I am not dreaming?" in Hooker 1978 (ed.) Descartes: critical and interpretive Essays. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press 234-55
3. The analysis of knowledge (Oct.6)
4. The Gettier problem. (Oct. 7)
Readings: Gettier, Edmund 1963: „Is justified true belief knowledge?" Analysis 23/6, 121-3. also in Sosa –Kim: 58-59
Richard Feldman 1974 "An alleged defect in Gettier counter-examples" The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1974) 68-69:, Paul Moser and Arnold vander Nat, eds., Human Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. 1995, 274-275
Nozick, Robert: "Knowledge" (selection) in Philosophical Explanations Oxford: Clarendon Press: 172-178
5. The Gettier problem and the analysis of knowledge, continued. (Oct. 13)
Reading: Zagzebski, Linda 1999 "What is knowledge?" In John Greco – Ernest Sosa (eds.) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 92-116
6. Williamson’s theory of knowledge. (Oct. 14)
Reading: Williamson, Timothy 1995: "Is knowing a state of mind?" Mind 104: 533-65
OCTOBER 18. Deadline for submitting the 1st essay
7. Williamson’s theory of knowledge, continued. (Oct. 20)
Reading:Williamson, Timothy 1995: "Is knowing a state of mind?" Mind 104: 533-65
Harman, Gilbert 2003: "Reflections on Knowledge and its Limits" http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Williamson.pdf
8. 1st written test: the analysis of knowledge. (Oct.21)
9. Applications: theories of knowledge and scepticism (Oct. 27)
10. Introductory lecture: theories of justification (Oct. 28)
11. Classical foundationalism (Nov.3)
Reading: Chisholm, Roderick M. "The Myth of the Given" in Sosa-Kim 107-119
12. Foundationalism and coherentism. (Nov.4)
Reading: Van Cleeve, James 1979: "Foundationalism, Epistemic Principles and the Cartesian Circle" The Philosophical Review 88: 55-91 also in Sosa – Kim:242-261
13. Externalism and Internalism (Nov.10.)
14. Classical reliabilism (Nov. 11)
Reading:Goldman, Alvin A. 1971: „What is justified belief?" in G. Pappas (ed) Justification and Knowledge Dordrecht, Reidel also in Sosa-Kim 343-5
15. Criticism of reliabilism (Nov. 17)
Reading: Lehrer, Keith: "Externalism and epistemology naturalized" excerpt from Keith Lehrer Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO, Westview Press 1990) in Sosa-Kim 387-400
No class on 18 November
16. The generality problem (Nov. 24)
Reading: Conee, Earl and Richard Feldman, "The Generality Problem" Philosophical Studies 89/1 (1998) in Sosa-Kim 372-386
17. 2nd written test: theories of justification (Nov. 25)
NOVEMBER 29: Deadline for the 2nd essay
18. Applications. (Dec. 1.)
19. Internalism again (Dec. 2.)
Reading:McDowell, John "Knowledge and the internal" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): 877-893 in Sosa-Kim 413-23
20. Epistemic obligation (Dec. 8.)
Readings: Alston, William P, "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Jusitification" Philosophical Perspectives 2, Epistemology, 257-99
Feldman, Richard "Epistemic Obligation" Philosophical Perspectives 2, Epistemology
21. Epistemic obligation, continued. (Dec. 9.)
22. Virtue epistemology (Dec. 15)
Reading:Greco, John 1993 "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology" excerpt, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23/3 (1993) in Sosa-Kim 468-75
23. Summary (Dec. 16)
Sosa, Ernest – Jaegwon Kim (eds.) 2000: Epistemology: an Anthology Blackwell Publishers
Questions for the first essay
Write a short (1500-2000 word) essay about one of the topics below.
1. The Deductive Closure Principle and the sceptical argument.
Explain briefly the role the Principle of Deductive Closure plays in the sceptical argument, and how Nozick’s theory of knowledge results in the denial of the Principle. Do you think this – i.e. the denial of closure – is a successful answer to the sceptical argument? Do you think this is the best way to answer the sceptic, or are there preferable alternatives? Do you think the Principle is essential for the sceptical argument?
2. Anti-realism as an answer to the sceptical argument
The anti-realist answer to the sceptical argument is based on the idea that truth cannot be wholly evidence-transcendent. So if being a brain-in-a-vat can never make any difference to the evidence available to us, then we can rule it out. What extent is realism an essential assumption of the sceptical argument? Couldn’t the sceptic answer with modifying the sceptical hypothesis as follows: imagine that we are brains-in-vats, but it’s possible to get outside the vat and learn about the deception (like in the Matrix). This happens very rarely though. Could we construct an effective sceptical argument using this hypothesis, which is immune to the anti-realist objection?
The deadline for the 1st essay is October 18.
Questions for the second essay
Write a short (1500-2000 word) essay about one of the topics below.
1. One option for foundationalism is to claim that some beliefs are basic in virtue of being justified by something else – for example, a sensation or an observation or ‘the given’ – which is itself not a belief (this was option (i) on the handout introducing foundationalism, and option (a) in the 7. section of Chisholm’s paper). Since something which itself is not a belief does not require justification in the way beliefs do, here we could have a stopping point in the regress of justification. This view, however, has been criticised on the grounds that only beliefs can justify beliefs. (See for example Davidson’s (1983) “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge” reprinted in Kim-Sosa; and with an “Afterthought” in Davidson’s Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective) Reconstruct and evaluate an argument to support this objection (you can use Davidson as a starting point.). You can also indicate what this means for the foundationalist program.
2. Here is a problem for foundationalism. Maybe it is plausible to say that appearance statements are self-justifying; but what is exactly the content of such an appearance statement? If the content is say, “This appears white”, that is, I include the present appearance in some conceptual classification, it seems that I implicitly compare the present appearance to other appearances; and such a comparison is not obviously self-justifying. Alternatively, we may claim that the content is just ‘This appears like this”, with no comparison involved; but in this case, how can I use this statement to arrive at knowledge which does involve conceptual classification? (The problem is discussed, though in a slightly different form, in section 10 of Chisholm'’ paper.) Is there any way out of this dilemma?
3. Van Cleeve’s answer to the coherentist criticism of foundationalism is briefly this: coherentists claim that in order to have knowledge, we need to know the epistemic principles which license the justification of certain beliefs. This is, however, mistaken: at the beginning of the epistemic enterprise, it is not required that a subject should know an epistemic principle; it is sufficient if some of the subject’s beliefs are simply in accordance with the epistemic principle. At a later stage, the subject can try to discern these principles. Van Cleve thinks that this view is foundationalist. But couldn’t one say that in fact, Van Cleve smuggles a certain externalist element into foundationalism? Isn’t the theory based on the idea that at the first level, things simply work, even if the subject is not aware of why they work? (This question is merely about the issue of whether van Cleve’s theory can be regarded as an internalist theory; it does not concern the question of whether the theory is right or wrong.)
4. If you have any thoughts concerning the matter, why not have a go at the Generality Problem.
The deadline for the 2nd essay is NOVEMBER 29