The Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy

Introduction

In terms of economic power the EU is already a heavyweight international actor, but EU member states have great difficulty in evolving common positions on foreign policy and defence issues, let alone imposing them. The EU is often described as a ‘civilian’ rather than a military power. The aim here is to provide a description of the slow historical evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and a short evaluation of their achievements and prospects.[1]

Defence and foreign policy in the early years of the Community

As explained in Chapter 2 of the textbook, the proposal to create a European Defence Community was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. There was no mention of foreign or defence policies in the Treaty of Rome and only limited competences were envisaged for external relations (Articles 113-116 of the Treaty of Rome).

Despite the decision of the founding fathers of the Community not to pursue a co-ordinated foreign policy, from the 1960s it was becoming increasingly evident that there was scope for co-operation and concerted action on the part of the member states.

At the Hague Summit of 1969 the foreign ministers of the Community were requested to consider methods to increase co-operation between the member states in foreign policy. This led in 1970 to European Political Co-operation (EPC) that was based on intergovernmental co-operation, or consensus between the governments of the member states, and operated outside the framework of the Community institutions. There was no voting, decisions were not binding and military aspects of security were excluded from EPC. The first recognition of EPC in the Treaties was in the Single European Act of 1987, which stated that the member states would jointly attempt to formulate and implement a common foreign policy, though still on the basis of intergovernmental co-operation.

Box 1: Important steps in the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy

1970 European Political Co-operation is set up.

1993 The Maastricht Treaty created the CFSP based on the instruments of common positions and joint actions.

1999 The Amsterdam Treaty created the post of High Representative for the CFSP, envisaged the progressive framing of a common defence policy and added the instrument of common strategies to the CFSP. Enhanced co-operation on CFSP issues without defence implications was allowed.

2003 The Nice Treaty allowed for wider possibility of using the qualified majority vote and a greater role for the EU in crisis management.

2009 The Lisbon Treaty established a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; set up the European External Action Service (EEAS); extended the areas in which qualified majority voting and enhanced co-operation could be used; and widened the tasks of the CFSP.

As explained in Chapter 2, the framework for European co-operation on defence issues for many years was the Western European Union (WEU). This was created by the original EC(6) plus Britain in 1955, but remained relatively inactive for a long time. Following Reagan’s decision to launch the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI or ‘Star Wars’) in 1983 without consulting the Europeans, a meeting of the WEU in Rome in 1984 decided to revive the organisation as a forum for the discussion of European security questions. At The Hague in 1987 a Platform on European Security Interests was adopted with the aim of developing a ‘more cohesive European defence identity’. In 1990 the WEU was responsible for the co-ordination of the military response of the Western European countries to the Gulf crisis.

Box 2: Main events leading to the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy

1955 Creation of the WEU.

1992 Definition of the Petersberg tasks.

1998 Anglo-French declaration at St. Malo.

1999 Helsinki European Council renders the European Security and Defence Policy operational and decides on the Headline Goal of creating an EU Rapid Reaction Force.

2001 The member states made additional pledges to the Helsinki Headline Goal and launched a European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) to boost the development of EU crisis-management capability.

2002 Berlin-plus agreement allowing EU missions possible use of NATO assets.

2003 Iraq War reveals wide differences in the positions of EU countries.

2003 First Joint EU Security Strategy and first ESDP missions.

2004 The European Defence Agency was established.

2009 The Lisbon Treaty renamed the European Security and Defence Policy as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which is responsible for tasks relating to peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and international security. The Treaty envisages an extension of the role of the CSDP through a mutual defence commitment and a ‘solidarity clause’, though both are subject to provisos. Permanent Structured Co-operation (PermStrucCoop) with a group of member states taking on more binding commitments is possible under certain conditions.

The debate about common defence and foreign policy initiatives after the collapse of the Eastern bloc

Given the changed international environment following the collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989, German unification, and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the attitude of the member states to international security issues changed. There was a new willingness to embark on a more active policy, but common positions among member states with regard to international security questions were slow to emerge.

Fundamental questions had to be addressed concerning the future role of NATO, the possibility of the EU developing its own defence capacity and the relation of the latter to NATO structures. In the changed international environment a tacit agreement seemed to emerge between the US and the Community that NATO should remain responsible for territorial defence (in this case the defence of Europe against external aggression), but that the EC should play an increasing role in crisis management. Crisis management was interpreted to mean ethnic and regional conflicts in the vicinity of the Community, and also problems relating to nuclear safeguards, organised crime (including drugs and international terrorism), mass migration and environmental disasters.

In 1992 at a meeting in Petersburg near Bonn this new role was defined in what became known as the Petersburg tasks, namely: crisis management, including combat-force tasks; peace-keeping; and humanitarian and rescue missions.[2]

CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty

The Maastricht Treaty refers to ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy’ (Article J.4). However, the Treaty stated that no agreement would be binding on a member state (such as Ireland) that calls into question the requirements of its own constitution.

After 1989 there was debate about whether it was better to create new institutions to cope with the changed international environment, or adjust existing arrangements ad hoc. At least initially the choice seemed to fall on the latter solution, even though this entailed a certain amount of overlap and duplication of tasks between institutions such as NATO and the WEU.

The Maastricht Treaty assumed that the Western European Union would develop into the EU defence arm, and refers to the WEU as ‘an integral part of the development of the European Union’. It was also described as the executive arm of the CFSP, which was to elaborate and implement all decisions taken under the CFSP. The Amsterdam Treaty still envisaged WEU as the framework for common EU defence initiatives and stated that the EU should foster closer institutional links with the WEU with a view to the possible integration of the WEU into the Union, should the Council so decide.

One of the main limitations of the WEU was that its membership coincided neither with that of the EU, nor with that of NATO.[3] This created difficulties both in defining the responsibilities of the WEU and in establishing the division of powers between the three organisations. In view of the shortcomings of the WEU and, in particular, the problem of its membership, at the Cologne and Helsinki Summits of 1999 it was decided to transfer most of the role and operational resources of the WEU to the EU.The Nice Treaty formally ended the crisis-management responsibilities of the WEU and its activities were to be wound up by 2011.

The Maastricht Treaty formally established the CFSP as the second pillar of the EU. The Treaty also required member states to co-ordinate their actions in international organisations, uphold common positions in international forums and support the CFSP. This was to be achieved through the instruments of common positions (which require the member states to implement national policies in line with the position defined by the EU on a particular issue), and joint actions.

In dealing with the CFSP the Maastricht Treaty was mainly concerned with institutional procedures rather than setting out the substance of common policy. Like EPC, the CFSP was still to be based on intergovernmental co-operation. Unlike EPC, there was an increased obligation for the member states to develop joint action and the CFSP was also extended to cover defence issues.

CFSP in the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties

Given the weak formulation of CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty and its evident ineffectiveness, Germany (with some backing from Belgium) was in favour of bringing the CFSP into the Community pillar in the Amsterdam Treaty. However, France, the UK and most of the other member states opposed such a move. In the event the Amsterdam Treaty simply allowed for an increased role of the Commission in drafting CFSP proposals and the possibility of taking certain decisions under qualified majority in the Council, though unanimity was to remain the general rule.[4] Member states could, however, adopt constructive abstention, i.e. abstention that did not block the adoption of a decision. Enhanced co-operation also became possible for the implementation of a joint action or common position on issues without defence or military implications.

The Amsterdam Treaty also established a High Representative, or individual responsible for the Common Foreign and Security policy, for a five-year period, soon to become known as ‘Mr CFSP’, or in the French version, ‘Monsieur PESC’. This was an attempt (at least in this policy area) to meet the famous problem supposedly raised by Kissinger: [5] ‘Who shall I phone if I phone Europe?’ The High Representative assisted the Council by helping to formulate and implement decisions and, where necessary, acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency. Mr CFSP for the 1999-2009 period was the Spaniard, Javier Solana, the former Secretary General of NATO. Although the budget and staff of the High Representative were smaller than those of the Commissioner for External Relations, the representative role of Mr CFSP conferred a certain degree of authority. This was increased by the personal prestige of Solana (also because of his former role in NATO), who soon achieved a high profile.

The Nice Treaty contained new CFSP provisions relating, in particular, to an increase in the areas that fall under the qualified majority vote, and an enhanced role for the EU in crisis management.

The evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) prior to the Lisbon Treaty

Rather surprisingly for Britain, which is not generally known for its propulsive role in the integration process, an important step in the evolution of a common defence policy came from an Anglo-French initiative. The evident ineffectiveness of the EU in the face of successive Balkan wars (see Chapter 18) convinced Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac of the need to strengthen EU defence structures. This led to the St. Malo Declaration of December 1998, which called for the development of a stronger European defence capacity to enable the EU to act without the US, providing this did not jeopardise the transatlantic alliance.

The 1999 Cologne European Council adopted a statement on strengthening the common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The European Council of Helsinki in December 1999 took key decisions on rendering the ESDP operational. The ESDP was to form part of the CFSP, but with responsibilities for: the development of a temporary bureaucratic framework for the ESDP; the creation of an EU capacity to respond independently to crises andprevent conflicts and eventually to run military operations; and the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force.

The new political and military bodies for the day-to-day running of the ESDP became:

  • A Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS after its French acronym) that keeps track of the international situation, defines the CFSP, and, in the event of crisis, is responsible for the political and strategic control of the operation, though subject to control by the Council. This is composed of national representatives of senior ambassadorial level.
  • The EU Military Committee (EUMC) composed of Chiefs of Staff, which is responsible for giving military advice and recommendations to the PSC.
  • The EU Military Staff (EUMS) that provides military expertise and support.

There is also a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capacity, which is the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CFSP operations.

The 1999 European Council also decided on what is known as the Helsinki Headline Goal, which required the member states to develop the capability of deploying a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of up to 60,000 troops within 60 days for at least a year to deal with the Petersburg peacekeeping tasks. For these forces, back-up troops of about 200,000 are required. It was repeatedly stressed that this force did not represent a European army and that the commitment and deployment of troops when the circumstances required was to be based on sovereign decisions by member states.

After the terrorist attack on New York of September 11 2001, the task of building a European defence capability was felt to have become more urgent, but EU member states were slow to increase defence spending in line with the needs of the Rapid Reaction Force. Rendering the RRF operational required additional capabilities with regard to intelligence, logistics, communications and air transport systems.[6] There were arguments over the proposed division of the cost, and though it was agreed that multinational co-production and acquisition would increase effectiveness, there was little progress in this direction. Denmark decided against contributing troops to the Rapid Reaction Force on the basis of its opt-out of EU decisions and actions with defence implications.

In the ‘Berlin plus’ agreement of December 2002 EU countries were granted access to NATO assets and capabilities if the EU carried out missions independently from NATO. The agreement placed EU-NATO relations on a formal basis for the first time and pledged both sides to transparency.[7] Consultation and co-operation between the EU and NATO were to be tightened. It was also decided that non-EU NATO countries and other interested states could also contribute to EU crisis management. The ‘Berlin plus’ agreement was only reached when tensions over the Rapid Reaction Force with Turkey were overcome.[8]

Although the US supported the EU bearing more of the defence burden, it was concerned about the duplication and overlap of efforts and the lack of co-ordination and transparency which might result from EU ‘go it alone’ initiatives.[9]

In 2002/3 the Iraq War underlined the difficulties in developing the CFSP by bringing out differences between the EU member states. Britain was strongly in favour of the US decision to intervene militarily even without a second UN resolution. President Bush’s policy was also supported by Spain, Portugal and Italy, but France and Germany preferred a multilateral solution. In January 2003 eight European countries signed a joint letter calling for Europe to stand behind the policy of Bush, and the following month 10 Central and East European countries went even further in announcing support for US policy.[10] President Chirac of France expressed the view that the new EU member states had missed a good opportunity to remain silent. In a much-publicised comment US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfield, contrasted the ‘new Europe’ or a coalition of the willing that supported US policy with the ‘old Europe’.

In April 2003 there was an initiative by Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Germany to launch a common defence effort with the notable exclusion of Britain. The proposal deepened the divisions caused by the Iraq War and led to US fears that France and Germany were attempting to undermine NATO.

In December 2003, also in an attempt to overcome such differences, the first joint EU Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ was agreed.[11] This was drafted under the responsibility of the High Representative for the CFSP Solana and called for multilateral co-operation both in Europe and abroad to ensure international security. The Strategy defined the threats Europe had to deal with: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, failed states and organised crime.