Summary of Key Constitutional Cases

JTIP Handout: Lesson 14 – Pretrial Discovery Practice

Summary of Key Constitutional Cases

The Brady Doctrine

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999)

The petitioner was charged with capital murder and related crimes. The Commonwealth of Virginia’s open file policy gave the petitioner access to all of the evidence in the prosecutor’s files – therefore, the petitioner’s counsel did not file a pre-trial motion for discovery of all possible exculpatory evidence. At trial, it was revealed that the prosecutor did not disclose exculpatory materials in the police files that casted doubt on portions of the detective’s testimony. The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to death. The petitioner later filed a federal habeas petition, granting access to the exculpatory materials. The District Court vacated the murder convictions and sentence for failure to disclose. The Fourth Circuit reversed stating that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his Brady claim by not raising it at his trial or in the state collateral proceedings. The U.S. Supreme Court held that although petitioner has demonstrated cause for failing to raise a Brady claim, Virginia did not violate Brady and its progeny by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the petitioner. In this case the petitioner did not establish the requisite prejudice that he received an unfair trial to claim a Brady violation. Meaning, the petitioner could not prove the outcome of his trial would be significantly different had the exculpatory materials been disclosed, despite their significance.

Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, it was revealed that the prosecution did not disclose favorable evidence to the petitioner (eyewitness statements; informant statements that did not testify; license numbers of suspected cars that did not include petitioner’s car). The State Supreme Court denied the petitioner relief. He filed a federal habeas petition claiming that his conviction was obtained in violation of Brady. The Federal District Court denied relief, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court held that United States v. Bagley requires a cumulative materiality evaluation rather than a series of independent materiality evaluations. It is questionable whether that the court evaluated the significance of the undisclosed evidence in this case under the correct standard. Because the net effect of the state-suppressed evidence favoring the petitioner raised a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have produced a different result at trial, the conviction could not stand, and the petitioner was entitled to a new trial.

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)

The respondent was charged with violating federal narcotics and firearms statutes. Before trial, he filed a discovery motion requesting,inter alia,“any deals, promises or inducements made to [prosecution] witnesses in exchange for their testimony.” The prosecution did not disclose that they had made any “deals, promises or inducements” to its two principal witnesses. Both witnesses testified about the narcotics and firearms charges. The respondent was found guilty on the narcotics charges only. After trial, it was discovered that the two principal prosecution witnesses signed contracts with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) stating that the prosecution would pay money to the witnesses commensurate with the information furnished from their undercover investigation. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s failure in response to the discovery motion to disclose these contracts did not violate the respondent’s right to due process underBrady v. Maryland and that the disclosure would not have affected the outcome because the principal witnesses' testimony was primarily devoted to the firearms charges on which respondent was acquitted, and was exculpatory on the narcotics charges.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)

The defendant and co-defendant were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Before trial, defense counsel requested the prosecution to allow him to examine the co-defendant’s extrajudicial statements. While the prosecution did show defense counsel several statements, one statement in which the co-defendant admitted to the actual killing was withheld and did not come to the defense’s attention until after conviction and sentencing. The U.S. Supreme Court held that withholding evidence favorable to an accused that has requested it violates due process where the evidence is material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective if done in good or bad faith by the prosecution. In this case, restricting the petitioner’s new trial to the question of punishment did not deny the petitioner due process or equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment because the suppressed evidence was only admissible to the issue of punishment.

Right Against Prosecutorial Suppression of Evidence Favorable to the Defense

Wylde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960)

The petitioner alleged by writ of habeas corpus that he “had no counsel present” when he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and that the prosecutor suppressed testimony favorable to petitioner. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a hearing on the petitioner’s allegations.

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleged that the petitioner was imprisoned following conviction through the use of perjured testimony, knowingly by the prosecution, by the prosecuting officers. The writ of habeas corpus was denied without a determination of truth to the allegations. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the denial and the state court was required to review the affirmance of a judgment denying the application for writ of habeas corpus. In light of the petitioner’s inexpert drafting of the writ of habeas corpus, the Court did not foreclose any procedure designed to achieve more particularity in petitioner’s allegations and assertions. If the allegations were true, the petitioner would be entitled to release from custody.

Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)

The petitioners were convicted of assault with intent to murder and the Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed. They argued that (1) the in-court identifications that were made of them were fatally tainted by a prejudicial station house line-up and (2) that Alabama's failure to provide them with appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing, a “critical stage” of the prosecution, unconstitutionally denied them the assistance of counsel. The sole purposes of a preliminary hearing under Alabama law were to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant presenting the case to a grand jury and to fix bail for bailable offenses. The trial court followedPointer v. Texas,380 U.S. 400 (1965), which prohibits the use of testimony given at a pre-trial proceeding where the accused did not have the benefit of cross-examination by and through counsel. However, the U.S. Supreme Court still vacated the convictions and remanded the case to determine whether the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error.

Right to Fair Notice of Charges

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)

The United States Supreme Court held that a youth has the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses and the privilege against self-incrimination. The petition to the Supreme Court sought the release of Gerald Francis Gault, the appellants’ 15-year-old son, who had been committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School by the Juvenile Court of Gila County, Arizona. The Supreme Court stated, “the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court,” and reversed the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)

The petitioners were tried and convicted in a state court under an information charging them only with a violation of § 2 of a state statute making it an offense to promote an unlawful assemblage. They appealed to the State Supreme Court, contending,inter alia,that § 2 was contrary to the Federal Constitution. Without passing on that question, the State Supreme Court sustained their convictions based on the information charged and the evidence showing that petitioners had violated § 1 of the same statute, which describes the distinct offense of using force and violence. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioners were denied due process of law and the judgment was reversed and remanded to the State Supreme Court for further proceedings. It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following a conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made. To conform to due process of law, petitioners were entitled to have the validity of their convictions appraised on consideration of the case as it was tried and as the issues were determined in the trial court.

Right to Present Defense Evidence

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)

The respondent was charged with various sexual offenses against his minor daughter. During pre-trial discovery, the respondent served child protective services with a subpoena, seeking access to files that may contain the names of favorable witnesses, as well as other unspecified exculpatory evidence. The agency refused to comply with the subpoena, claiming that the records were privileged. In trial court, the judge refused disclosure during an in-chambers hearing, and the respondent was convicted. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case. On the State’s appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court, further concluding that defense counsel was entitled to review the entire file for any useful evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the respondent was entitled to have the file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial; however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred in holding that defense counsel must be allowed to examine the confidential information. Both respondent’s and the State’s interests in ensuring a fair trial could be protected fully by requiring that the files be submitted only to the trial court forin camerareview. The judgment was therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972)

Holding that the trial court’s extended admonition to petitioner’s only witness to refrain from lying, coupled with threats of dire consequences if the witness did lie, effectively discouraged the witness from testifying at all and deprived the petitioner of due process of law by denying him the opportunity to present witnesses in his own defense.

Indigent Youth’s Right to Basic Tools of a Defense

Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)

The petitioner was convicted of murder a month after his previous trial ended with a hung jury. Both trials took place in a small town before the same judge and with the same counsel and court reporter, who (as was conceded) was well known to defense counsel and other local lawyers and would have read back his notes to defense counsel before the second trial had he been asked to do so. Between the two trials the petitioner, alleging indigency, filed a motion for a free transcript, which the trial court denied. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that an adequate alternative to the transcript was available. The U.S. Supreme Court held, in the narrow circumstances of this case, a transcript was not needed for the petitioner’s defense. A defendant who claims the right to a free transcript does not bear the burden of proving that alternatives suggested by the State or conjured up by a court were inadequate in hindsight. However, in this case the petitioner conceded that he had available an informal alternative (having the reporter read back to counsel his notes of the mistrial, well in advance of the second trial, if counsel had simply made an informal request) which appears to be substantially equivalent to a transcript.

Informant’s Privilege

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)

The petitioner was convicted of knowingly possessing and transporting heroin imported unlawfully. The petitioner repeatedly demanded that the prosecution disclose the identity of an undercover informer who had taken a material part in bringing about petitioner’s possession of the drugs, had been present with petitioner at the occurrence of the alleged crime and might have been a material witness as to whether the petitioner knowingly transported the drugs as charged. The trial court sustained the prosecution’s refusal to disclose. The U.S. Supreme Court held that in the circumstances of this case, failure of the court to require disclosure of the identity of the informer was reversible error. “Where disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair trial, the Government’s privilege to withhold disclosure of the informer's identity must give way.” 353 U. S. 53 at 60-62.

Responding to Prosecutorial Barriers to Discovery

Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976)

During the petitioner’s trial, the chief prosecution witness indicated on cross-examination that he was interviewed by the prosecution who took notes relating to his testimony. The petitioner moved for production of the notes pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, providing that in a federal criminal prosecution after a witness called by the Government has testified on direct examination, the court, on the defendant's motion, shall order the Government to produce any “statement” in its possession that relates to the subject matter of the witness’ testimony. The trial judge denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that the material was “the work product of counsel.” Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the notes were not statements of the witness within the meaning of the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court held that any writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the testimony of a Government witness that has been “signed or otherwise adopted or approved” by that witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and the writing is not rendered non-producible because a Government lawyer interviewed the witness and wrote the statement. See also Campbell v. United States,373 U. S. 487,373 U. S. 493(Campbell II) (1963). The decision was vacated, and the case was remanded.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)