Summary of Experiences with Remote Programming in Somalia

UNICEF and Remote Programming:

Somalia case study [1]

Introduction

Humanitarian response in Somalia is unlike in most other humanitarian responses.Somalia’s humanitarian needs are protracted, with annual drought-flood cycles with few coping mechanisms still intact. Natural disasters are compounded by chronic armed conflict.

Somali potential, however, is also unlike most others. The thriving private sector in the country remains very important. The private sector fuels and benefits from the conflict. Nevertheless, and with appropriate controls, the beneficial use of this enterprising culture has great potential for Somalia.

A country like Somalia must be understood properly to design and implement a programme that suits what the people want. Restrictions of recruitment of Somali nationals at Nairobi level has been a hindrance, but has also been sporadically overcome through other contractual modalities. More access to political and socioeconomic analysis is crucial to avoid programming and operational mistakes that will put the organization at financial and security risk.

Management Arrangement

UNICEF has done well in staying on the ground and close to the people. Benefits have been derived from decentralizing decision making to field offices, together with the means to run the necessary processes. By providing zonal offices with access to all communication and management systems, today stronger and better prepared capacity exists in the field, which in turn helps expedite programme implementation.

Integrated Approach

Learning from countries such as Afghanistan, in 2008 UNICEF partnered with WHO in an effort to accelerate young child survival and development throughout Somalia through the Child Health days initiative. By reaching out in campaigns that cover virtually the whole country, the programme was able to change the way in which UNICEF delivers and reaches the population. The major shift from facility based services to community based campaigns has taken health services directly to the people and already reached substantially more children than in any year since the collapse of the Somali state.

The benefits are numerous. The approach adds credibility to UNICEF, and allows the programme to reach people even in some of the most remote locations. Furthermore, it is a good example of programme integration and cross-monitoring (with the close involvement of Nutrition, Water, Sanitation & Hygiene, and Supply section), and it has also taken UN partnerships to a new level with the close collaboration with WHO.

The integration of services is clearly a way forward. UNICEF Somalia knows that it is not performing as well in programme integration in other areas. There is some experience with area-based (geographically defined) programming, but it has not been implemented at scale. Large proportions of the UNICEF programme are still delivered through programme silos. This is partly due to a global structure that encourages sectoral thinking, but also rooted in a deep feeling of ownership and protectiveness in staff towards their own sector.

Restrictions of the current Aid Architecture

UNICEF should be ideally placed to address the most basic needs that the Somali people experience in this environment and capitalize on its potential. This unfortunately is not always the case. The UNICEF global strategy of responding to emergencies, a formula mainly created for distinct rapid onset emergencies, is unsuitable for Somalia. The UNICEF tendency is to pigeonhole emergencies into categories and yet none of these apply singularly to Somalia. At the same time, emergency response has become the main UNICEF business in the country. Eighty percent of the program is funded through the Consolidated Appeal Process, a one-year funding cycle for strictly humanitarian needs. Consequently, the country office is in a perpetual emergency mode which has led to a virtual regularization of this response. This causes problems In a country where action needs to be taken immediately just like in a rapid onset emergency, only constantly, the regularity and size of the humanitarian operation has created heavy work processes and a poor decision making culture.

The consequences are delays in support to partners, implementation of actions, the hiring of surge capacity, and the release of emergency supplies to name a few. The office has become very inward-focused and staff speaks of being bogged down by processes rather than being in the field providing technical oversight, support and monitoring whenever possible.A rigid but ineffective security system and political exposure through the association with the UN- driven peace process worsens this lack of responsiveness and puts staff at risk.

Collaboration with International and National Partners

State and Non-State Entities

In a country where for most of the population the government and the opposition regularly change shape and orientation the access to humanitarian space inevitably requires negotiations with Non-State entities. A political UN framework is increasingly becoming an obstacle to such negotiations, as are member states’ concerns about some of these actors. This has let UNICEF and the UN as a whole to lose major opportunities and at the same time lost time and money in a rigid drive to engage with the Transitional Federal Government. This risks UNICEF’s reputation with its partners and beneficiaries, with a loss of perception of impartiality as a humanitarian actor. Consequently staff are put at risk. Missing the opportunity to engage with the Islamic Courts Union after their establishment in Mogadishu in 2006 may have been the biggest mistake the UN has made in Somalia since the failed UNOSOM mission. Main causes were a bad relationship between the SRSG and the RC, a weak UN leadership overall, and the interference by member states. This has alienated moderate leaders and ultimately radicalized the opposition.

Local Partners

UNICEF as a respected partner for communities and wider civil society is a clear success story in Somalia. The long-standing presence of the organization in Somalia, with a record of having never left the country throughout the 18 years of turmoil has given UNICEF a respect and trust that is unparalleled. The mandate is conducive for this, and the demonstrated capability, despite all shortcomings, of delivering on commitments. This relationship has over the years given UNICEF better security for staff and has enabled the office to manage temporary threats and political shifts better than other agencies in the country. Strong partnerships with local NGOs and the inclusion of the northern government entities in planning processes has further strengthened UNICEF’s standing in Somalia and allows it to maintain good delivery in a situation of reduced access.

UN Partners

Programmatically, UNICEF in addition to its humanitarian operation is part of the UN Transition Plan for Somalia. While this makes sense in the stable areas where government partners sustain their presence, it increasingly is a burden for the office in the areas were humanitarian response dominates the program. The rigidity of the framework, to an extent due to its role as a programmatic counterweight and support to the political engagement of the UN, costs the office in terms of staff time. The expectations the plan had raised with the Somalia people to a large extent could not be met.

The benefits of One UN in Somalia are not obvious. Where strength lies in collaboration such as for monitoring, common services, and common facilities, it is underutilized and suffers from inward-facing agency behavior. Below the UN Country Team and UN Transition Plan level, however, collaboration has been beneficial for UNICEF. Teaming up with WFP on missions and access negotiations has significantly increased the opportunities for UNICEF staff to be in the field. The collaboration with WHO on the Child Health Days has made them possible. Taking a clear stand on this reality would require UNICEF to divert from the UN ‘party line’, but such action may be required to allow humanitarian operations in central and southern Somalia to be as effective as they can be. The same holds for security management – a UNICEF system that works closely with that of the other humanitarian agencies maybe more beneficial for an effective response and good staff security than being locked into the UNDSS structures.

Remote Programming Mechanisms

Management

The heavy procedural load experienced by a ‘regular’ emergency programme has made the UNICEF Somalia office very focused on itself. A large Nairobi-based Support Centre, mostly occupied with managing itself, has grown in the last two years, and has limited interactions with field offices. This has led to a culture of indecisiveness, where processes often dominate over results and diverts resources from the field offices. Not helping is a UNICEF control environment that may be suitable for most country offices, but is not for Somalia. A habit of avoiding risks rather than managing them has manifested itself. Taken together this has prevented the Somalia office from seizing access opportunities through swiftly moving staff and offices to new locations or even through new implementation modalities such as cash relief and social marketing. Stuck in the same cause – effect relationship is behavior change communication. While ideally highly suitable for a remote programming environment such as Somalia, it is underutilized and the media are not used to their full potential for such messages.

Country Specific Knowledge

Not well enough understanding the aspirations of the Somalia people and the context in which they evolve is another shortcoming that UNICEF experiences. Instead of ‘riding the wave’ and following the often rapid shifts of needs in the country UNICEF gets stuck in its sector approach. Not helping are rigid political and programmatic frameworks that increasingly do not make sense. Together, this creates an environment that does not allow for time to analyze what would work better and to design and risk new program strategies. The result is little or no evidence-based programming and less strategic fundraising than could be done. Consequently, long-term funding is limited and the annual schedule of the consolidated humanitarian fundraising limits development initiatives in the North where they are needed. Education is a prime example, where targets have not been achieved due to a lack of strategic fundraising in the past. With more long-term funding secured this will improve, but pertinent issues of salaries in the sector have yet to be addressed strategically.

Monitoring Arrangements

Like design and impact analysis, programme monitoring has not been given an appropriate standing in the programme. While access was good, monitoring was perceived as a side business to technical oversight and not formalized. An opportunity to build up independent monitoring mechanisms through local partners and contractors was never seized when local access would have allowed the necessary negotiations. As a consequence the Somalia programme now has very poor feedback on aid delivery and relies on external partners that still have the access or linkages to set up smaller and weaker monitoring structures on its behalf. This is a risk to the accountability and ultimately the reputation of the organization.

Donor Coordination

With all these shortcomings, UNICEF is respected by the Somalia donors for delivering results in a difficult environment. This is based on a strong donor relations function that is honest about problems while underlining results that can be achieved in Somalia. In the current financial situation such relationships are invaluable.

Remote Programming Lessons Learned

Key lessons learned from UNICEF Afghanistan’s use of remote programming modality in Somalia can be summarized as:

  • Critical to be operationally and physical present in Somalia. Listen to the aspirations of the people, understand what they need and want in any particular situation, and respond. This ensures appropriate response but requires decisiveness and flexibility. Build trust with communities, they are the only sustainable social structures in a crisis and will provide security for staff and operations even in the worst times.
  • Be knowledgeable about the situation and the needs on the ground. Get the local expertise that is needed where it is needed for decision making. Most International Staff have a limited understanding of the country and the people and are therefore not always making the best program decisions.
  • Ensure to prioritize and stay focusedin the selected programme interventions. Do what you do best, and what is best in a given situation. Don’t try to do everything at once as it spreads resources and delays response. Use a campaign approach to reach the numbers, this will overcome a lot of problems of access and avoid lengthy exposure to fluid situations on the ground.
  • Be decisive and utilize strategic opportunities when they are present. Seize opportunities of access, don’t wait until everybody else agrees but capitalize on the moment to do what the people need. The campaign approach is very suitable for seizing such opportunities. Capitalize on new delivery mechanisms, as they may allow you to access parts of the population that cannot be reached conventionally. Be bold and try out new delivery mechanisms through the private sector, often the only functional mechanism in crisis situations.
  • Be united and take an integrated programmatic approach. Work as UNICEF and not in sectors, overcome the silos of technical areas and delivery what people need “as one” in each place where it is needed. Be part of one UN, but beware of politicized frameworks. Together we can be stronger, but pick your partnerships strategically. Our benefit to women and children is threatened by alliances that make us look partial to a political cause. However, while we must communicate the impartiality of our program better, we must also be honest about being part of the UN, as transparency will take us further than hiding what is common knowledge.
  • Sell yourself and ensure a regular and honest dialogue with development partners. Be honest and transparent with your donors and keep telling them that results are possible. Being honest about problems and constraints will build trust with them, which will result in better and more funding.

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[1] Due to the ongoing Level 3 humanitarian emergency in Horn of Africa, no UNICEF staff were available for an interview for the present background note. The note is fully based on the UNICEF lessons learned document: “UNICEF operating in Somalia. Lessons Learned from a unique situation” from June 2009