16December2011
ProductivityCommission
LB2CollinsStreetEast
MelbourneVic8003
Re:BarrierstoEffectiveClimateChangeAdaptation-Publicinquiry
TotheCommissioners,
Wethankyoufortheopportunitytomakeasubmissiontothe Productivity Commission Public Inquiryintothebarrierstoeffectiveclimatechangeadaptation.
Thissubmission,preparedbythecoordinatorsoftheWaterGovernanceResearchInitiative – anactivityoftheNationalClimateChangeAdaptationResearchFacility(NCCARF)WaterNetwork – outlinesopportunitiesforembeddingasystemicandadaptivegovernanceregimetomoreeffectively overcome barriers to climate change adaptation.TheobjectivesoftheWaterGovernanceResearchInitiativearetocreateacommunityofconversationaboutwatergovernanceinAustralia,buildcollaborativeresearchlinks,createopportunitiesforco-researchingandinformationsharing,andprovideopportunitiesforearly-careerresearcherstoparticipateinanationalnetworkofresearchersandresearch-users(
This submission focuses on water governance. We attach three Policy Briefings prepared by our Network, and emphasise four key messages in the text below.
Pleasefeelfreetocontactusforanyfurtherinformationorclarificationregardingoursubmission.
Yourssincerely
TheNCCARFWaterGovernanceResearchInitiative
Professor LeeGodden
Professor Ray Ison
Dr Philip Wallis
Ms Naomi Rubenstein
with assistance from Mr Anthony Kung
Introduction
Climatechangeadaptationhastobegroundedinspecificdomainssuchaswater, bushfire, transport orenergy.Oursubmissionconcernswateranditsgovernanceinaclimate-changeworld.Weacknowledgethatmarketshavebeenimportantingrantingflexibilitytoindividualsandbusinesses, however,weemphasisethatmarkets,andmarket-basedmechanisms,arebythemselvesinsufficient.Arangeofapproachesisrequired.Inparticular,adaptingtoclimatechangewillrequireabroaderstrategywithinwhichmarketmechanismsoperateasoutlinedinFigure1.
Figure1. Governancemechanismsbasedondifferentepistemologicalassumptionsforsituationslikeclimatechangeadaptation(Source:Isonetal2007)[1].
Itisgovernmentthatsetstherangeofstrategiesunderwhichmarketsoperate.WeurgetheCommissiontoacknowledgethatgovernmenthasasignificantleadershiprolethatextendsbeyondcorrectingmarketfailures. AsevidenceforthisassertionwereferyoutothesetofpaperspublishedasaspecialissueofthejournalWaterResourcesManagementwhichwehaveco-edited(seeAnnex1).
(1)The ‘problem-situation’ mustbereframed – marketbarriersarenottheonlybarrierstoadaptation
Theissuespaperofthisinquiryevidencesaproblem-framingdeficiency.Page8suggeststhatgovernmentinterventioncouldaddresssomebarrierstoadaptation,butlargelyinsofarassuchinterventionaddressesmarketfailures,ormarginalbehaviouralconsiderations.
Werecognisethatmanybarrierstoadaptationcanbeassessedusingamarket-basedanalysis.Forexample,buildingleveebankstoprotectpropertyincreasesfloodintensitydownstream.Thisisanegativeexternalitythatcanbeaddressedbyadjustingbuildingstandardsandinsurancestructures.
However,framingadaptationasprimarilyanissueofmarketefficiencyorofriskcanforecloseimportantdiscussion.Climatechangeisa ‘wicked’ problem,characterisedbycomplexity,connectedness,conflictandmultipleperspectives.[2]
Weencourageashiftfromimpact-basedpoliciestovulnerability-basedpoliciesthatbuildadaptivecapacity.[3]Impact-basedpoliciesseektobetterpredictthefutureandreduceuncertainty.Theseincludeattemptstodistributeloss,changelanduse,oravoidtheeffectsofclimatechange.Marketanalysestendtowardsimpact-basedpolicies.
Incontrast,vulnerability-basedpoliciesacceptfutureuncertainty,andseektolearnfromthepast.Suchpoliciesaimtobuildadaptivecapacityandsociallearning,whichmeanstheeaseatwhichinstitutions(andindividuals)canadapttonewconditions.Marketanalysestendtoignorethistypeofreform,yetbotharenecessary.[4]TherecentpaperbyWallisandIson(2011)[5]outlineshowinstitutionalcomplexity,includinghistoryandinitialstartingconditionsgivesrisetopathwaydependenciesandtechnologicallock-inthatcanleadtothefailureofnewinstitutions,includingmarketmechanisms.
Inshort,asignificantbarriertoadaptationiscontinuingtoseetheroleofgovernmentasprimarilytoservicethemarket(p.11,IssuesPaper).Theclassificationofbarriers(p.7,IssuesPaper)isinappropriatebecauseitwhollyignorestheneedtobuildadaptivecapacityandappreciateinstitutionalcomplexity.
WerecommendthattheCommissionreframetheinquirytorecognisethatharnessingmarketforcesisonlyoneofmanyapproachesrequiredtoadapttoclimatechange. Adaptation should also be reframed to present positive opportunities, such as a move to a low carbon, less 'impact', form of economy and society.
(2)Adaptivewatergovernanceneedslong-termplanning;governmentsneedtotakealeadrole
Webelievethatmarketmechanismsareimportant,buttheymustbeusedwithinbroaderstrategiesandinstitutionalplanningledbygovernment.
AstheattachedWaterPolicyBriefingNo.1notes,watergovernanceinAustraliaistrendingtowardstightercentralcontrol.WeendorsetherecentNationalWaterCommissionassessmentofAustralia’swaterresources.TheNWCreportsthatthewaterplanningcyclecantakeupto15years,andthatstronggovernanceandinstitutionalarrangementsarenecessarytoensurethatthebenefitsofimprovedpracticeflowacrossallregionsandplans.[6] OurNetworkmembersalsosupportthecontinuationoftheNWCinanexpandedandmoreindependentroleasakeymeanstogeneratelong-termsystemicandadaptivegovernance,whichisneededasaresponsetotheuncertaintiesofclimatechange.
WepointoutthatnewinstitutionalformsliketheCommonwealthEnvironmentWaterHolder(CEWH)areproductsofinstitutionalplanning.TheCEWHoperatesasamarketactor,butitwouldnothavebeenestablishedifthesoleroleofgovernmentweretofacilitateprivatemarketresponses.Thisisanexampleofmarketmechanismsoperatingwithinbroaderstrategicandinstitutionalplanningledbygovernment.Similarly,theproposedMurray–DarlingBasinPlan[7]demonstrateslong-termresourceplanningunderwhichwatertradingfunctions.
Wedonotmeanthatadaptivemeasuresshouldbecentralised,however.Onthecontrary,large-scale,centralisedinfrastructurecreatespathwaydependencies,whichlockusintocertainapproaches.[8]Forexample,buildingadesalinationplanttoadapttowaterscarcityreducestheincentiveandcapacityofcitycouncilstofindmorelocalisedsolutions.
Rather,weadvocateintegratedplanninginwhichsociallearningprinciplesareusedtoco-ordinatethemulti-levelinstitutionsthatgovernAustralia’swaterresources.Governmentsshouldsteer,notrow.[9]Failuretoco-ordinateadaptiveresponsesmayleadtooverallmaladaptation – promotingdomesticrainwatertankswithoutconcomitantdevelopmentsinpublichealthsurveillancemayincreasetheincidenceofvector-bornediseases,forexample.[10]
Wesuggestthatabarriertoadaptationisthelackoflong-term,government-ledplanningthatincreasesadaptivecapacitythroughsociallearningaswellasgovernanceresearchwhichbetterinformsthedesignandimplementationofinstitutionsandtherolesforagencies highlightedbytheVFRandComriereports.
(3)Wemustconsiderwholesystemsthinkingforwatergovernance
Forthepastdecadeormore,ruralwaterscarcityhasdominatedwaterdebates.Floodrisk,forexample,hasbeenlargelyneglected.[11]Astheattachedpolicybriefingsdiscuss,sotoohavewaterquality,surfacewater/groundwaterinteractions,urbanwatermanagement,andtheeffectoflanduseonwateryields.Yetclimatechangeislikelytoaffectallofthese.Untilthereisstrategicplanningforthewholewatersystem,adaptationwillnotbeeffective.
ThereisalsoadangerthattheresponsebyGovernmentstoreportssuchastheVFRandComriereport(seebelow)willreflect “siloed” thinking anddecision-makingratherthanwholeofgovernmentresponses. Inthisregardclimatechangeadaptationtobeeffectivehastobeawholeofgovernmentapproachthatisembeddedthroughouttheplanningandregulatorysystem.
(4)Decision-makersneedtoengagecommunity
WecommendtheCommissionforinquiringintobehaviouralandculturalbarrierstoadaptation.However,theIssuesPaper(p.10)remainsfocusedonsuchbarriersastheyrelatetomarkets.Wewouldgofurther.AsdiscussedinWaterPolicyBriefingNo.2,thereisa ‘paucityofeffectiveintegrationofcommunityvaluesandbest-practicecommunityengagementinwatergovernance’.Communityengagementleadstoappropriategoalsandsolutions,andhelpsminimiseconflict.NeighbourhoodEnvironmentImprovementPlansaregoodexamplesofhowcommunitiescaneffectadaptation.[12]However,thecommunityismorethanacollectionofrationaleconomicactors.Consequently,effectiveadaptationrequiresthatgovernmentsunderstand,considerandengagecommunities.
InthisregardwedrawattentionintorecommendationcontainedintworecentmajorinquiriesinVictoria,namely(i)TheVictorianFireRoyalCommission(VFR)recommendation(No.93)thatthestatecomprehensivelypursuetheobjectiveofachieving(wherepossible)thepriorityoutcomesoftheNationalStrategyforDisasterResilienceandtheimperativeofsharedresponsibility,inparticularby:
• requiringthatlocalknowledgeisconsideredasacriticalcomponentofallphasesofemergencymanagement
• involvinglocalcommunitiesinthedevelopmentandownershipofcommunityresilienceplansbasedonan ‘allhazards’ approachandtailoredforthespecificneedsofeachcommunity
• encouraginglocalcommunitiestoformresiliencecommitteestodevelopandadministercommunityresilienceplans
• nominatingVictoriaPoliceastheleadagencyininitiatingthestrategytodevelopcommunityresiliencecommittees;and
• requiringemergencyserviceagenciestoconsultandengagewithlocalcommunityresiliencecommitteesinthepreparation,planning,responseandrecoveryphasesofemergencymanagement,and
(ii)therecommendationintheComrieFloodInquiry[p.220]whichsays: ‘TheVFRisawareofanongoingprojectthatisdesignedtobuildcommunityresilienceandempowercommunitiestopreparefor,respondtoandrecoverfromemergencies.Thisprojectexistsunderthebannerofafirelearningnetworkof ‘strategicconversations’ andisbeingundertakenbytheKnowledgeandLearningUnitoftheOfficeofLandandFireattheDSE.Theconversations “valuelocalknowledgeandexperienceandstrengthentheexistingnetworksthroughwhichpeoplesupporteachother,shareknowledgeandmakesenseofthethingsthatplacestressoncommunitylife.Theyareenablinggovernmenttoparticipatemeaningfullyindialoguewithcommunitiesaboutthingsthatmattertothelocalpeople,andtodeliveritsservicesmoreeffectively”.
Conclusion:Whatconstituteseffectivegovernanceandeffectiveadaptationrequiresresearch
Adapting to climate change is an immensely complex task. No one approach will be sufficient, and failure to recognise the ‘wickedness’ of climate change constitutes perhaps the most significant barrier to adaptation.
This submission, and the accompanying policy briefings, recommends a governance approach that use social learning as a way of increasing adaptive capacity. While market mechanisms play an important role in granting flexibility to individuals, they must exist in broader strategic and planning efforts enabled by government.
Annex1-SpecialIssueonWaterGovernanceinaClimateChangeWorld:AppraisingSystemicandAdaptiveEffectiveness
GuestEditors:LeeGodden,RaymondL.IsonandPhilipJ.Wallis
WaterResourcesManagement
Volume25,Number15/December2011
WaterGovernanceinaClimateChangeWorld:AppraisingSystemicandAdaptiveEffectiveness
LeeGodden,RaymondL.IsonandPhilipJ.Wallis.p.3971-3976
SustainableCatchmentManaginginaClimateChangingWorld:NewIntegrativeModalitiesforConnectingPolicyMakers,ScientistsandOtherStakeholders
RayIson,KevinCollins,JohnColvin,JaniceJigginsandPierPaoloRoggero,etal.p.3977-3992
WaterReformandtheFederalSystemintheMurray-DarlingBasin
DanielConnell.p.3993-4003
DevelopingPurposefulandAdaptiveInstitutionsforEffectiveEnvironmentalWaterGovernance
AnitaFoerster.p.4005-4018
TowardsAdaptiveIntegratedWaterResourcesManagementinSouthernAfrica:TheRoleofSelf-organisationandMulti-scaleFeedbacksforLearningandResponsivenessintheLetabaandCrocodileCatchments
SharonPollardandDerickduToit.p.4019-4035
PoliticalandProfessionalAgencyEntrapment:AnAgendaforUrbanWaterResearch
RebekahBrown,RichardAshleyandMeganFarrelly.p.4037-4050
WaterLawandPlanningFrameworksUnderClimateChangeVariability:SystemicandAdaptiveManagementofFloodRisk
LeeGoddenandAnthonyKung.p.4051-4068
TheImpactofInstitutionalPathDependenceonWaterMarketEfficiencyinVictoria,Australia
EdwynaHarris.p.4069-4080
AppreciatingInstitutionalComplexityinWaterGovernanceDynamics:ACasefromtheMurray-DarlingBasin,Australia
PhilipJ.WallisandRaymondL.Ison.p.4081-4097
[1]Ison,R.L.,Röling,N.Watson,D.(2007)Challengestoscienceandsocietyinthesustainablemanagementanduseofwater:investigatingtheroleofsociallearning.EnvironmentalSciencePolicy10(6)499 – 511.
[2]APSC, 2007 Tackling Wicked Problems: A Public Policy Perspective Australian Public Service Commission, Canberra, 16 December,
[3]JanMcDonald, ‘MappingtheLegalLandscapeofClimateChangeAdaptation’ inTimBonyhady,AndrewMacintoshandJanMcDonald(eds),AdaptationtoClimateChange:LawandPolicy(TheFederationPress,2010),1,10.
[4]DKennedy,LStockerandGBurke(2010)'Australianlocalgovernmentactiononclimatechangeadaptation:somecriticalreflectionstoassistdecision-making',LocalEnvironment15:805–816.
[5]Wallis,P.Ison,R.L.(2011)Appreciatinginstitutionalcomplexityinwatergovernancedynamics:acasefromtheMurray-DarlingBasin,Australia,WaterResourcesManagement25(15)4081.(DOI:1007/s11269-011-9885-z)
[6]NationalWaterCommission,TheNationalWaterInitiative – securingAustralia'swaterfuture:2011assessment(September2011,Canberra).
[7]Murray–DarlingBasinAuthority,ProposedBasinPlan(November2011,Canberra).
[8]RebekahBrown,RichardAshleyMeganFarrelly(2011) ‘PoliticalandProfessionalAgencyEntrapment:AnAgendaforUrbanWaterResearch’,WaterResourcesManagement25(15):4037–4050.SeealsoAnitaFoerster(2011) ‘DevelopingPurposefulandAdaptiveInstitutionsforEffectiveEnvironmentalWaterGovernance’,WaterResourcesManagement25(15):4005–4015.
[9]NeilGunninghamandCameronHolley(2010) ‘Bringingthe'R'wordback:regulation,environmentprotectionandNRM’,OccasionalPaper3/2010,TheAcademyoftheSocialSciencesinAustralia,Canberra.
[10]McDonald,aboven1,26.
[11]LeeGoddenandAnthonyKung, ‘WaterLawandPlanningFrameworksUnderClimateChangeVariability:SystemicandAdaptiveManagementofFloodRisk’,WaterResourcesManagement25(15):4051–4068.
[12]NeilGunningham,CameronHolleyandCliffordShearing(2007) ‘Neighbourhoodenvironmentimprovementplans:Communityempowerment,voluntarycollaborationandlegislativedesign’ EnvironmentalandPlanningLawJournal24:125–151.