State Mobilized Contention in China
Research Memo
Jingkai He
Theoretical Approach
China's turbulent history in the 20th century provides ample cases to study state mobilized contention. While many cases have already been studied intensively by scholars of different disciplines, few researches have tried to theorize state-led mobilizations or look at cases from that particular perspective. In terms of existing literature on state-led mobilization in China, Feng (2011), Cai (2012), Zhou (2011, 2012) and Lian (2014) contributed to an academic debate over how to conceptualize the Chinese state's governance model. Feng (2011) argues that mobilization was an essential part of the Chinese state's governance model. Limited in infrastructure state capacity, the state often choose to concentrate its limited resources and power to focus on particular goals and hence mobilize national movements to serve that end. Zhou (2011, 2012) argues that mobilization was an important governing technique that complements normal bureaucratic governance. When the bureaucratic governance and norms break down, a mobilizational state would emerge in extraordinary times.Cai (2012) provides an additional angle on regime legitimacy, he argues that authoritarian regimes would gradually lose charismatic legitimacy and therefore need to mobilize movements to build new legitimacy. As the marginal benefits of movement-based legitimacy declines, the state would find it more difficult to return to normal bureaucratic rule.Lian (2014) focuses on struggles as a particular mode of mobilization and argues that the struggle mobilization model, though highly powerful, is not sustainable. Frequent invoking this mobilization model would only drain the mobilization resources and force the state return to normal bureaucratic rule.
Zha (2015) proposes a theoretical framework to explain the outcome of state-mobilized nationalist movement. She argues that when there is high level of foreign threat perception in the public and the state establishes pro-majority institutions that guarantees the interests of the majority of the society, state-led nationalist mobilization is most likely to succeed; when the foreign threat perception is low and the state establishes pro-minority institutions that only benefit privileged groups, state-led nationalist mobilization is least likely to succeed.
This research memo assembles multiple cases across time to highlight three sets of theoretical issues in the presentation of multiple cases. The first issue is the mobilization actor. As the cases would show, the state would often not act as a unitary actor. Organizations that mobilizes popular contention could be a part of the state or an agent of the state, which brings about principle-agent problems. The conflicts between the mobilizing actor and the state would often shape the movements in a particular manner. The second issue is the motivation and goals of mobilization, with the focus on unintended consequences of state mobilization. It turns out that the state may not be able to retain control of the movement they seek to mobilize, or the mobilization structure and outcomes of the movement would later divert original state goals. The third issue is the strategies the state adopt to mobilize, the Chinese state in this memo's cases adopted strategies of incorporation, initiation, control and forbearance to deal with movement mobilization. As it turns out, the state often have limited choices in what strategies they could adopt and that choices certainly always had an impact on the outcome of the mobilized movements.
The Boxer Rebellion
Late Imperial China had experienced almost endless flow of popular uprisings. These rebellions generally targeted local governments and sought to build local bases for sustained struggles. Some of the most prominent uprisings, such as the Taiping Rebellion and the Nien Rebellion, almost took down the imperial rule. Scholars have argued that rural rebels were motivated by religious beliefs and ties(Naquin 1976), pressure to prey or guard resources (Perry 1980), or class consciousness (Marks 1984). Unlike most rebellions that primarily fought against the state, the Boxer Rebels had received state supports and had been mobilized by various levels of local authorities for a significant amount of time, making it an unusual case for popular uprisings in that period of time, but also possibly one of the earliest cases of state mobilized contention in modern China.
Originated from various local secret sects and societies in Shangdong province (Esherick 1986), the Boxer Movement started out by targeting local Christian communities and foreign missionaries and quickly grew to a regional movement in 1898. Prior to the rise of the Boxer Rebels, there had already been a steady flow of popular uprisings against Christian missionaries and communities, resulting in multiple "missionary incidents" (Jiaoan). The Qing government, under foreign pressure, would often repress the anti-Christian activists and cover the damages for missionaries. State strategies toward such uprisings often oscillated between "Jiao" (suppression) and "Fu" (pacification) (Liao 1982), but always aimed at neutralizing the movement. State responses as such only stoked anti-imperialism and nationalism sentiments (Sato 2007). Under the slogan of "FuqingMieyang" (support the Qing, annihilate the West), the Boxer Movement soon drew wide support from local societies and earned sympathies from local governments. In Shandong, Governor Yuxian reported to the imperial court that "Christian persecution of ordinary villagers had forced the latter to study boxing in self-defense" (Esherick 1986: 199). Yuxianeventually became one of the most prominent supporter of the Boxer Rebels in the Imperial Court, his tenure in Shandong and later in Shanxi provinces had witnessed the most rapid and violent growth of the movement (Li 1980). In 1900, he along with conservative factions of the imperial court advocated for tough stances against foreign power and tried to recruit and mobilize the boxers as a potent military force to fend off foreign aggression. In January 1900, the imperial court issued an edict pronouncingthe Boxers as not "outlaw associations" but "law-biding citizens" (Esherick 1986: 272), marking the first official recognition of the movement from the central government. As the Boxers quickly spread to Beijing's suburban area, they became an immediate threat to the foreign diplomatic missions. Meanwhile, exaggerated reports on the Boxers' mysterious superior powerwere sent back to the Empress Dowager Cixi, the de facto ruler of the court, to embolden her determination to fight against the foreign power. By June 1900, the government military force, along with the Boxers, engaged in the siege of the International Legations and triggered the Boxer war. Facing imminent foreign military retaliation, the imperial court ordered local governments to organize and mobilize the Boxers to defend Beijing(Xiang 2003: 224-229).The Boxers' slogan was then changed to "FengzhiMieyang" (annihilate the west on imperial edicts) to honor the support and recognition they received from the state (Sun 1981). The Boxers were then resoundingly defeated by foreign forces and the imperial court was forced to evacuate and flee from Beijing. The imperial court then changed its tone and ordered the Boxers be completely suppressed in Spetember 1900 and brought the Boxer Rebellions to its end.
A much debated theme in the study of the Boxer Rebels is its relationship with the Qing government. Early studies in China have maintained that the imperial court was never active in mobilizing the Boxers and the later development of the movement was only recognized when the imperial court was militarily unable to repress it. They argued that the Qing government was sufficiently weakened after several losses in previous wars and opened a vacuum for the Boxer Rebels to quickly spread (Lin 1981). Later studies have highlighted the role of internal politics in the imperial court and argued that the power struggle between the conservative faction and the reform faction shaped the government's changing attitudes toward the Boxer Rebellion. The conservative faction seemed to genuinely believe in the magic power of the Boxers and dreamed about relying on its military force to boost . When foreign power intervened in the imperial court's decision over succession and jeopardized the conservative faction's standing, the conservative faction swayed the imperial court and mobilized the Boxers (Liao 1980: 1985). It should be noted that the imperial court, in particular Empress Dowager Cixi, had taken a very ambivalent view toward the Boxer Movement. The Empress Dowager initially ordered local governments to incorporate the Boxers into local military forces, then informally asked local governors to repress the movement as they see fit, and later decided to fully mobilize the Boxers, before she finally turned against the movement. Local governments also showed varying attitudes toward the movement. In Shandong province, despite his sympathy toward the nationalism sentiment of the movement, governor Yuxian still organized several military campaigns to capture movement leaders deemed as bandits (Li 1980, Lin 1989, 2002). Nonetheless, the Boxers still considered Yuxian a patron; some Boxers accepted fiscal support from the governor and agreed to change its official banner with his titles (Qi 2000). When Yuxian was transferred to Shanxi for his lenient attitude toward the Boxers, the new governor Yuan Shikai took a more hard-line approach toward the movement. Under Yuan's rule, the government's military force vehemently battled the Boxers and neutralized the movement's prominent leaders. In other provinces such as Zhili, local authorities also oscillated between suppression and mobilization. It was not until mid 1900 when the imperial court issued supportive edicts that most North China local governments became supportive of the Boxers.
In terms of state support, the imperial court did not stop at issuing edicts. After the Qing government declared war against foreign powers and recruited the Boxers to fight, thegovernment provided100,000 taels of silver and 200 piculs of rice to Boxers flooding into Beijing (Yihetuan, 1951 a: 42). Prince Zhuang, the commander in charge of Beijing's defense, established a boxer branch in his own residence and used government funding to register and train the Boxer Rebels (Yihetuan, 1951 b:487). He also mobilized several thousands of Boxers from nearby regions to join the Beijing defense force and provided them with equipments (Yihetuan, 1951 a: 414). Local authorities in Zhili, Shanxi and Shandong also provided logistic supports for the Rebels (Yihetuan, 1951 b: 191). Moreover, the state recognition provided legitimacy for the Boxer Movement, as the new slogan "FengzhiMieyang" (annihilate the west on imperial edicts) revealed, many more residents in Beijing and suburban area joined the movement after the imperial court openly endorsed it (Sato 2007).
In terms of state strategy toward the movement, despite the ambivalence and local variations, the imperial court did try to incorporate the movement into its own military campaign in 1900. The incorporation process was never complete, as the rebels were never fully integrated with the conventional armed force. The Boxers were indeed mobilized but not fully incorporated by the state, but this strategy was again adopted by local governments in subsequent cases. As Perry's study showed (1980: 224-234), the Red Spears rebels were enlisted in the Communist army and was incorporated and later replaced by new state-initiated movements in 1940s. While the Communists' incorporation of the Red Spears movement demobilized the movement, the Qing government's effort to incorporate the Boxer Rebellion actually intensified the mobilization of the movement.
It should be noted that since the Boxer Movement lacked a centralized national command, the relationship between the Boxers and the state varied in different regions. In some places such as northern Jiangsu, the Boxers were more confrontational toward local authorities and were met with harsher repression. In places like Beijing, the Boxers essentially penetrated into local society and fought along with the government force. And when the conservative faction was in control of the imperial court, the Boxers were mobilized and supported by the state, once the conservation faction was purged amid the defeat of the Boxer War, the Boxers were again heavily repressed. We could characterize the state mobilization and support for the Boxer movement as opportunistic and sporadic, but it still marks an important beginning in that the State made an effort to mobilize popular uprisings for its own goals.
The Constitutional Petition Movement
In early 20 century, as the Qing Empire headed to its finale, the imperial court faced increasing pressure to adopt constitutional rule and evolve into a constitutional monarchy. a constitutional petition movement emerged across China. The imperial court issued an edict promising constitutional rule upon further consultation with the society. Professional groups and business associations immediately started to organize and mobilized to petition to the imperial court for the convention of a parliament and a constitution. Zhang Jian, a prominent businessman in Jiangsu province, initiated the Association for Constitutional Preparations (ACP, YubeiLixianGonghui). From 1906 to 1910, the ACP and its provincial branches organized four national waves of constitutional petition movements. The first two movements rallied thousands of supporters from more than 14 provinces, organizers collected petitioners' signatures and presented them to the imperial court, and was met with tepid official response (Jeans 1997: 14-16; Hou 1993: 268-292). The third wave of petition claimed to have collected more than a million signature and mobilized rallies and demonstrations in multiple localities (Geng 1980, Hou 1993: 297-305). It was also during this time period that the court agreed to establish local assemblies in provinces and provides another avenue for pro-reform activists to coalesce and mobilize for the petition movement (Thompson 1995). The final response from the imperial court was still not enthusiastic, political reform was only partially implemented and was aborted when the 1911 Revolution brought down the imperial rule.
The constitutional petition movement seemed like a classic case of the bourgeois class autonomously organize to push for democracy and more representation. That was only half true. From the beginning of the movement, the state had been involved in various organizations and provided support to the movement. When Zhang Jian and his associates form the ACP, Cen Chunxuan, then governor of Guandong Province, donated 10,000 silver dollars and promised to raise 1,000 dollars annually to cover the association's expenses (Zheng 1988). Other provincial governors, along with some Manchu aristocrats, were also supportive of the ACPand recruited ACP activists to be their staff members or recommend them to Beijing (Li 2014, Zheng 1988). Rui Cheng, then mayor of Shanghai and a Manchu princeling, was even listed as a founding member of the ACP (Rhoads 2000: 127). In the third wave of the petition movement, local governors agreed to present the petitions to the imperial court on behalf of the movement and collectively wrote to the court, urging the Prince Regent to take decisive moves toward constitutionalism (Li 2006, Zhang 1971: 438-440). When the imperial court was determined to stall the political reform process and rebuked local governors, the movement lost its momentum and eventually faded. Moreover, it would also be over-simplifying the case to argue that the local governors were always the supporting force behind the movement, several governors had expressed disapproval of certain actions of local ACPs and assemblies, particularly when their own policy priorities became targets of the movement (Liu 1996). The ACP also had experienced internal splits, with the more moderate factions stayed with the cause of constitutional monarchy, and the more radical factions grew sympathetic to a republican revolution (Hou 1993: 481-484).
The case of the constitutional petition movement brings two points to our attention regarding state mobilized contention. First, state may not act as a unitary actor in cases of mobilization, a mobilized event. In the constitutional petition movement, it was the local state authorities who mobilized the movement against central state authority in order to promote their own political agenda. Second, state mobilized contention may have unintended consequences. Local governors initially mobilized local assemblies to petition for constitutional rule but soon found that local assemblies would also check their own power and interfere with their policy priorities.
Petition movement later become a repertoire of state mobilization, state would often mobilize the public to petition for a particular goal. Unlike the Boxer movement in which state mobilization provided legitimacy to the movement, in cases of state mobilized petition movement, a large scale movement in favor of state goals provided additional legitimacy to state actions. This pattern was quickly followed by Yuan Shikai in his brief restoration campaign in 1915. When Yuan, the newly elected President of Republic of China, wanted to restore the monarchy and became emperor himself, he first plotted to mobilize popular support. In August 1915, Yang Du, a Yuan confidant, initiated a group named "Chouan Hui". Liang Shiyi, another Yuan confidant, formed "National Petition Association" in September 1915. Both organizations branded itself as independent civil society group but was indeed organized, controlled and funded by the Yuan government.Yuan provided 200,000 silver dollars to Chouan Hui as its primary fund source, and Liang was then state tax commissioner and had direct access to state funding (Tang 2002). While Chouan Hui primarily organized a media campaign to recruit intellectuals in support of the restoration campaign, the National Petition Association was more involved in mobilizing popular support of the restoration, as its leaders called upon local branches to hold rallies and collect signatures to be sent to Beijing(Gao et. al. 2015). They infamously enlisted people of different profession to form various professional petition groups in Beijing and organized demonstrations to prove the public's urge to welcome restoration. Groups mobilized even included prostitutes and beggars (Fang 2000). Yang Du was said to be inspired by beggars' quarrels and convened leaders of Beijing's beggar society and offered 1 dollar for each beggar's signature in support of the restoration campaign. About half of Beijing's beggar population then participated with 10,000 signatures collected. Yang further mobilized the beggars to march in Beijing and "plead" Yuan to accept the emperor title (Lu 2005: 39-41). While Yuan's restoration campaign eventually failed in 1916 and the popular support he mobilized was widely laughed off as disingenuous, the casecould still shed light on how the Chinese state tried to mobilize popular movements.