Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

SEA VIEW RETREAT, INC.

v.

Thomas DePIPPO.FN1

FN1. Individually and as guardian of Tena DePippo.

No. 11–P–1336.

July 25, 2012.

By the Court (CYPHER, GRASSO & SIKORA, JJ.).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

*1 Sea View Retreat, Inc. (Sea View), a nursing home, seeks to recover from the defendant, Thomas DePippo, individually, for charges incurred for the care of his mother, Tena DePippo (Tena). Sea View filed a three-count complaint alleging that the defendant was liable, both as his mother's court-appointed guardian and individually, under theories of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit. Prior to trial, the defendant stipulated to liability in his capacity as guardian. A jury found in the defendant's favor on the claims against him in his individual capacity. On appeal, Sea View argues that the judge erroneously allowed a motion in limine excluding evidence that Sea View contends was relevant to the defendant's individual liability. We affirm.

It is undisputed that when Tena entered Sea View, the defendant signed a document entitled “Guest Agreement for Nursing Home Care.” The signature line states “Guest or Guest's voluntary or legal representative” and further provides below that “[i]f you are signing as an agent for a GUEST, understand that by signing this document, you are not providing a Third Party guarantee. (See Mass. Regulations Sub Part B, Tag # F212).” There was ample evidence, therefore, to support the jury's finding that the defendant did not contract, individually, to be financially responsible for Sea View's care of Tena.

Sea View claims that the judge erred in allowing the defendant's motion in limine barring introduction of the Medicaid Board of Hearings (board) Decision No. 0508138 and subsequent decision on appeal to the Superior Court which affirmed the board's determination that Tena was ineligible for Medicaid benefits. The board and the Superior Court judge in that matter reasoned that, although transfer of certain funds to family members had been approved as an estate planning tool by a judge of the Probate and Family Court, the funds had remained in accounts in Tena's name or in the defendant's name for the benefit of Tena and, therefore, Tena had “access” to them. As a result, she did not qualify for Medicaid benefits and the transfer of funds to reflect the intended estate planning distributions resulted in a penalty period of ineligibility, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the funds were transferred exclusively for a purpose other than to qualify for MassHealth. Sea View insists that this evidence was relevant to its claim against the defendant, individually, and that it proves that the defendant committed wrongdoing in his capacity as guardian such that he should be held personally liable for Tena's debts pursuant to G.L.c. 201, § 37.FN2

FN2. Chapter 201 was repealed subsequent to the initiation of this case. Guardians and conservators are now governed by the Uniform Probate Code, G.L. c. 190B.

We will not disturb a judge's decision to exclude evidence unless the judge committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003). So far as the complaint revealed at the time of the motion in limine, Sea View was pursuing claims of breach of contract based on the written agreement, promissory estoppel based on the defendant's alleged misrepresentation regarding payment for services provided to Tena, and quantum meruit, claiming services were accepted by and benefited the defendant. While there was a factual allegation that the defendant was hiding Tena's assets and using funds for his own personal benefit, none of the claims against him alleged liability on the basis of misconduct as guardian. Given the defendant's stipulation of liability in his capacity as guardian, the judge, in denying the motion in limine, determined that the “[s]ole issue for trial is whether defendant is personally liable on contract for his mother's care.” The judge's conclusion follows logically from the complaint. We cannot say, therefore, that the judge abused her discretion in allowing the motion in limine.

*2 Moreover, Sea View overstates the holdings in the decisions of the board and the Superior Court judge. The issue before the board and the Superior Court in that instance was whether Tena had access to certain funds at certain times. The decisions do not address the ultimate disposition of those funds. In addition, there is no showing in the record that Sea View sought to develop this argument at trial such that the board decision or the related Superior Court decision were shown to take on relevance that may not have been apparent to the judge in the present matter at the pretrial stage. Sea View has failed to provide us with a transcript, and, without it, we cannot say that any error in excluding the evidence was harmful. For the same reasons, there was no error in denying the motion to amend the judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

Order denying motion to amend judgment affirmed.