Russian-American Relations in the Strategic Area (Analytical Report)

Russian-American relations in the strategic area
(Analytical report)

In the Russian-US relations we can observe an interesting pattern that repeats itself from time to time. Every five or six years the leaders of both powers declare solemnly “the overcoming the Cold-War legacies”; and then Moscow and Washington enter a new political-military crisis again. The Presidents - Dmitry Medvedev and Barak Obama – are not an exception and they followed the common practice of “pressing reset button” while meeting on bilateral relations at Moscow (July 2009) and Prague’s (April 2010) summits. The question is: could the "Reset policy" repeat the previous attempts to improve the Russian-American relations? (if not, what should the Russian and US government do in order to bring some changes into the negative scenario?)

Delayed Confrontation

Following such a pattern is not accidental. The material and technical basis for the Russian-US relations has not changed since the “Cold War” period. The Russian - US relations are traditionally based on the mutual nuclear deterrence and on creating the mutual assured destruction. The development of economic relations remains blocked by the "Jackson-Vannik amendment" (1974). These various factors inevitably reproduce the system of Russia and US political confrontation.

The parameters of the contemporary Russian - US foundation relations were laid in the early 1990s. In February 1992 the presidents Boris Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush in the meeting at Camp Daviddeclared the transition to the "strategic partnership". In June 1992 at a summit in Washington these presidents declared the creation of a common security system "from Vancouver to Vladivostok." However, the idea that lies behind this partnership hasn’t remained clear. Until the fall of 1993 the Russian and US leaders had been talking about the partnership based on common democratic values. But since 1994 the Bill Clinton’s administration was inclined to consider the “democratic transition "in Russia as a failure. Both powers chose the maintaining of mutual nuclear deterrence system.

In the early 1990's some American analytics believed that the Cold War ended for America not very successful. Soviet military (especially - nuclear) potential wasn’t destructed as in Germany and Japan after World War II. “US National Security Strategy" (1991; 1994) recorded that Russia inherited a Soviet military-industrial complex and the Soviet strategic nuclear forces (SNF). Both argued that in contemporary world only Russia is capable of (1) causing unacceptable threat to the United States and (2) leading the hypothetical conflict with USA by the comparable weapons. The decrease of these capacities was defined as a necessary precondition for the future Russian-American partnership.

Russia did not intend to reduce radically its SNF because the future relations with the USA were not clear enough. The B.Yeltsin’s government wanted (1) to legalize the results of the collapse of the USSR, (2) to remove the nuclear weapons from the former Soviet republics, and (3) to obtain international recognition in the internal conflict with the Supreme Council. The USA helped Moscow to resolve these issues. But then Yeltsin’s administration didn’t plan the unilateral disarmament. The “Main conditions of the Russian military doctrine” (November 1993) proposed that Russian SNF had to prevent the large-scale foreign aggression with nuclear and conventional aggression. Thus, the main opposition, by definition, could only be the USA.

In such a situation Russia and the United States restarted the material and the technical basis for their relationship. "The US Nuclear Posture Review" (1994) affirmed that the Russia’s SNF was the greatest potential danger for the national security. For the US’ SNF there remained the main task to have the deterrence of Russia. In case of a problem, the US could turn to various potential counterforce strikes. On 3 January 1995 the US Defense Secretary William Perry declared the "mutually assured safety" doctrine. The United States began creating the “potential of reconstruction”: the warheads, which was de-alerted, but not destructed, and formed the breakout potential. According to the START-I (1991), the US will keep the nuclear warheads if the democratic reforms in Russia have failed. Under conditions of a prolonged economic depression the USA could quickly return 6000 warheads and have more than 12 000 warheads whereas Russia could only have 6500 warheads according to START-I limits.

Moscow would like protect the mutually assured destruction system, too. Against the military conflict in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999) Russia began to regard the SNF as the guaranty of its sovereignty. Russian Ministry of Defense worried about the growth of NATO’s predominance in conventional military forces and considered the nuclear weapons as a compensating backlog. The “Main conditions of the Russian military doctrine” (1993) did not have the Soviet commitment not to use the nuclear weapons first. It was the first time when in «Russia’s National Security Strategy» (1997 - 2000) there was set a task for the Russian Federation to use the nuclear weapons in order to deter the potential aggressors (according to the Soviet official terminology the term “nuclear deterrence” was not in use). “In the Military Strategy of Russia” (2000) there was allowed to use the nuclear weapons for stopping aggression with the help of nuclear or conventional forces. These points repeated the key arguments of US flexible response strategy (1960s).

The problem of arms control became central for the US-Russian relations again. Moscow accepted the US assistance for the START-I realization (entered into force on 5 December 1994). But the conditions of START-II (1993) created the imbalances for the United States. They were:

- de-alerting principle, according to which Washington could create the potential of reconstruction;

- reducing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently reentry vehicles (MIRV) as arms control priorities.

The U.S. Congress ratified the START-II Treaty in 1996. However, the ICBMs with MIRV formed the basis of Russian SNF. The Russian military experts worried that START-II realization could create the USA predominance in SNF. Russia insisted on signing additional protocols in the New York to START-II (1997). These documents introduced delineation between tactical and strategic missile defense interceptors and extended the use of ICBMs with MIRV. The US Congress did not ratify the New-York’s agreements. Russia ratified START-II with the New-York’s protocols (2000). Therefore START-II did not enter into force.

The START-III negotiations were more conflict. At the Moscow Summit (9 - 11 May 1995) the presidents Boris Yeltsin and William Clinton agreed to reduce the SNF from 1500 - 2200 blocks (50% of the START-II) with both states. The Helsinki Declaration (21 March 1997) contained the main parameters of the START-III:

- limitation of deployed SNF up to 2000 - 2500 warheads by the end of 2007;

- introduction of measures for transparency in SNF and fissile materials stock places;
- negotiation on the control over the sea-based and air-launched cruise missiles.

In 1997 - 1999 the START-III negotiations took place in the Group of Strategic Stability and were conducted by Strobe Talbot and Yuri Mamedov. In August 1999 the Assistant Secretary of State John Holum and Head Department of Foreign Affairs for Security Georgiy Berdennikov had the negotiation of the START-III draft. But Russia rejected the US project because of envisaging the reduction in SNF with reducing ICBMs alert. In January 2001 the George W. Bush administration refused from the START-III negotiations. As a result, Helsinki Declaration was not implemented.

Because of that the USA began to change their attitude to the issue of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system. The «Missile Defense Act» (August 1991) shift priorities towards the tactical ABM-systems. But the USA started to develop a THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) system that could hit targets on the border between outer space and air space. On 9 February 1995 the Pentagon created the "3 +3 program": developing THAAD-technologies on the basis for a future limited strategic ABM system. The White House then decided to revise the ABM Treaty after North Korean missile test “Taepodong-2" on 31 August 1998. Since 1999 the USA. began negotiations with Russia about the revision of ABM Treaty (1972). The Clinton’s administration proposed Russia to change this treaty and to build a limited AMD system (150 - 200 interceptors) centered in Alaska and the Aleutian islands.

In this context the "small confrontation" between Russia and the USA in late 1990's was the result of mutual frustration. The United States supported Boris Yeltsin in his confrontation with the Supreme Council (1993) and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (1996). But then Clinton’s administration made sure about the fact that Yeltsin’s government would refuse from the arms reduction. Russia, by contrast, considered the NATO’s enlargement and the NATO’s operation in Balkans region as creation of a new, potentially dangerous, security system. Until 1999 all the powerful Russian politicals considered the US actions as the precedents for the creation of a new global governance system: so that to reduce the role of the UN by rising the importance of the[A1] NATO. Within these processes Russia started to regard the SNF as a guarantee against potentially hostile actions from the side of the United States. (This intention was sounded by Boris Yeltsin at the Beijing Summit on 9 December, 1999).

Is it just the same as before?

In the 2000's Russia and the U.S. reproduced the old model of their relationship. After 11 September 2001 at the meetings in Crawford, Texas (12 - 3 November, 2001) and Moscow (24 May 2002) presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush both declared a turn to a “strategic partnership”. The new grounds for this had to become the “antiterrorist war”. Russia and the United States tried to modernize the system of mutual nuclear deterrence. Moscow agreed with the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (13 June 2002). According to Rome’s declaration (28 May 2002) Russia and NATO started the programs on developing the tactical air defense and ABM systems.

Presidents Georges W. Bush and Vladimir Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Potential (SORP) Treaty and Declaration on strategic partnership (Moscow declaration) on 24 May 2002. The SORP Treaty limited the strategic offensive potentials by 2200 warheads for Russia and USA. But it did not solve the problem of warhead’s de-alerting as there wasn’t imposed the inspection mechanism. (They were executed on the basis of the mechanism of the START-I). Moscow’s declaration between Russia and USA formed the mechanism of consultations with Russia about all steps in ABM problem. But this declaration did not provide any control instruments for ABM systems. The technical mechanism of Russia-USA’s confrontation was not changed.

On 8 January 2002 the George Bush’s administration announced a new "Nuclear posture review”. That document proposed the possibility of joint operations with the nuclear and conventional forces (Joint Nuclear Operations). For this purpose the USA changed the structure of SNF consisting of (1) shock of offensive systems (nuclear and conventional), (2) ABM systems and (3) communication infrastructure. On 22 November 2003 the U.S. Congress repealed the “Furs Spratt resolution” that prohibited the development of small types of nuclear warheads - “bunker busters”. (Though at the congressional hearing on 20 May 2003 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that Washington regarded the “bunker busters” development as a research program only). The "Joint Operations doctrine with the nuclear weapons" (2005) postulated the possibility of preventive use of nuclear weapons in regional conflicts. The Putin’s administration viewed these trends as an attempt of the USA to contain the Russian policy.

That prompted Moscow to respond in the same way. In 2003 Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov announced that Russia could apply the pre-emptive strikes for a potential aggressor. In September 2004 (just after the terrorist attack in Beslan) Sergey Ivanov declared that Russia could cause the strikes on the terrorist bases everywhere in the world. (It was emphasized that such attacks would be non-nuclear). In 2005 such a point was fixed in Russian military doctrine. Three years ago Bush’s administration announced the preemptive-strike concept (June 2002). These steps of the Russian side looked like parallel actions that were taken in Washington as well. (In other words if there is something that is allowed for the United States, then it is allowed for the Russian Federation, too). This caused discontent in Washington: Russia reaffirmed their intention to preserve an adequate U.S. nuclear deterrence system.

In 2004 the Russian-American relations were exhausted. The USA withdrew from the Russian-American observation system (RAMOS) of satellite surveillance and refused building a joint center for monitoring the ballistic missiles launches in Moscow. At a meeting in Bratislava (24 February 2005) Vladimir Putin disagreed with the proposal of George W. Bush to include the fissile materials’ issues in the strategic dialogue. These signals indicated that all attempts to modernizing themutual nuclear deterrence system were unsuccessful. These failures have determined a new “small confrontation” between Russia and the USA.

Since the turn of 2006 - 07 years the Russia-USA relations were developing in two parallel ways. Moscow tried to keep the United States in the strategic dialogue. The deployment of the US third positional ABM was regarded by Russia as an attempt to reject Moscow Declaration (2002). On 7 June 2007 at the G 7 summit in Heiligendamm (Germany), president Vladimir Putin suggested George W. Bush sharing a radar station in Gabala (Azerbaijan) and Armavir (Russia) as an alternative of ”third positional area". But the United States did not agree to this proposal. They suggested turning these stations into the fourth ABM positional area. The discussion of this issue (albeit unsuccessful) took place at the Putin-Bush summits in Kennebunkport (1 - 2 July 2007) and Sochi (6 April 2008).

Russia also proposed introducing limits on the ABM “third position area” or allowing the participants of Russian inspectors. These questions became a central theme of the talks during two visits to Moscow of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Oct. 12, 2007 and March 18, 2008. However, these negotiations were unsuccessful. On 26 October 2007 at the Summit EU-Russian in Mafra (Portugal) Vladimir Putin compared the situation with the deployment of U.S. missile defense elements in Europe with the actions of the Soviet Union before the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. In summer 2008 the U.S. signed agreements with Poland and the CzechRepublic to deploy missile defense components on their territory.

In parallel to the Russian-American relations there was escalation in military confrontation. In the Munich speech (10 February, 2007) Vladimir Putin said that Moscow could take some retaliatory military steps if the USA started to deploy the ABM systems in East Europe and continued the NATO’s enlargement to the East. It could be the moratorium on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFET) and withdrawal from the Intermedial-Range Missile Treaty (1987). During the next one and a half year these issues were escalating. On 17 August 2007, again, Russia started regular flights of its strategic aviation. On 12 December 2007 Moscow introduced the moratorium on the CFET. At the Bucharest NATO Summit (April 5, 2008) Russia seemed being opposed to the potential Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membershipin NATO. The “Five-day war” in South Ossetia (August 2008) was the final of "this small "confrontation between Russia and the USA in late 2000s.

"Five-Day War” caused a deep crisis in Russian-US relations. The Bush’s administration has involved into this conflict on order to clarify a few points. First, to find out Russia's willingness to use force outside its borders. Second, to understand the ability of the "Putin-Medvedev" tandem to cooperate in a crisis. Third, to learn about the strength of Russia's position in the Caucasus. Fourth, to understand the vulnerability of the Russian Air Force for the US space information systems (by which, apparently, there had been shot down four Russian aircrafts). Fifth, to establish a precedent for the possibility of changing the legal regime of the Black Sea Straits which were created by Monterey convention 1936. The possibility of limited conflict between Russia and the United States no longer seems as an "unrealistic" scenario. In both countries have appeared returns to the popular interest in the 1970's concepts of "limited nuclear war".

The strategic dimension of "Reset Policy"

In this context the “Reset policy” between Russia and the USA needs to be renewed fundamentallyas well as its foundation for strategic dialogue. (Only if they both really want to get away from confrontation, and not delay it, as it was in the early 1990's). Moscow and Washington cannot stop using the instruments of mutual assured destruction. But it is possible to have (which is more realistic) weaken technical mechanisms of nuclear confrontation. For this purpose, it is important to change the nature of the negotiations on strategic arms control system.