Russia’sInternational Assertiveness:What Does It Mean for the West?
By Andrei P. Tsygankov
In: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 55, No. 1, March-April, 2008, pp. 38-55.
Abstract
Although many have interpreted the Kremlin’s international assertiveness as an indicator of Russia’s departure from the West, Russia’s foreign policy has not become confrontational. Domestically, Putin is opposed by anti-Western Eurasianists, who seek to push the Kremlin away from the West and toward Asia and the Muslim world. At this point, Putin is winning this debate by a wide margin, and the general public is firmly behind his international strategy. The new consensus implies the need to work with the Kremlin in order to address challenges of the post-Cold War world and prevent the rise of the Eurasianist coalition.
Word count: around 7,500
1. Introduction
Soon after the colored revolutions in the former Soviet region, Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy obtained a new dimension – assertiveness. Russia’s international behavior has not become confrontational, nor has it returned to the era of Primakov’s balancing the United States’ power in the world. Instead, Russia has signaled that it seeks greater stakes in the international system and would no longer accept the status of a West’s junior partner it was during the 1990s. In addition to its desire to capitalize on its energy competitiveness and break into Western economic markets, Russia no longer views the old methods of preserving stability and security as sufficient. While maintaining an essentially defensive security posture, it believes that a more assertive strategy provides a better defense of national interests.Putin’s speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy became a high point in Russia’s new assertiveness and was extremely critical of U.S. “unilateralism.” Russia’s president then accused the United States of "disdain for the basic principles of international law" and having "overstepped its national borders in . . . the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations."[1]
Many have interpreted the Kremlin’s international assertiveness as an indicator of Russia’s departure from the West and a vindication of their old fears about Russia.[2]Such a view disregards that Russia had to swallow the war in the Balkans, two rounds of NATO expansion, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, U.S. military presence in Central Asia, the invasion of Iraq and, now, plans to deploy elements of nuclear missile defense in Eastern Europe, along with the recent media war implicating Russia as a potential enemy.[3] In the light of these developments, seeing Putin as an anti-Western nationalist seems quite a stretch. To move beyond simplistic dichotomies, it is essential to understand that Russia’s political scene is not - and never has been - a struggle between liberal pro-Western reformers on the one hand, and anti-Western hard-liners, now led by Putin, on the other. The so-called pro-Western liberals are a tiny minority that is widely associated with Yeltsin’s era of poverty and state disintegration, and gets virtually no support in Russian society. The real debate is between Great Power Normalizers and Eurasianists. Normalizers, like Putin, want Russia to regain its great power status, but to do so within acceptable international parameters and be accepted by Western nations.[4] Eurasianists, on the other hand, want Putin to turn away from Europe and the West in general and toward Asia and the Muslim world.
As this paper suggests, Putin is winning this debate by a wide margin, and both elites and the general public are firmly behind his international strategy. The paper describes a meaning of Russia’s assertiveness, a new elite coalition and new conditions which favor the new course. It then traces attitudes among the political class – from advocates of the new vision to its liberal and hard-line critics. Finally, it analyzes the implications of Russia’s new foreign policy consensus for the United States and other Western nations. My point is not to begin viewing Putin as a pro-Western liberal, as opposed to the increasingly dominant view of him as an anti-Western nationalist, but to dispense with the whole moralistic dichotomy of “good” vs. “bad guys” in favor of a more balanced understanding of America’s national interest. Critical challenges of the post-Cold War world - terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, poverty, and instability - are yet to be adequately addressed, and it is much too early to write Russia off as a true partner. Putin demands attention by being tough on the United States, but his real intention remains to deepen Russia’s interdependence with Western economies and develop a greater level of cooperation with the West. It is essential to work with him if we wish to prevent the rise of the Eurasianist coalition, and the dangerous arms races and politico-economic confrontation that could follow.
2. The Vision of Assertiveness
The Meaning of Assertiveness
The overall objectives of Russia’s foreign policy have stayed the same as they were outlined in Putin’s early programmatic speech “Russia at the Turn of Millenniums” – economic modernization, political stability and enhancement of security.[5] Yet the context in which Russia has had to act has changed considerably, which has modified the methods of pursuing foreign policy objectives.
In his response to new challengesand security vulnerabilities, Putin sought to re-affirm Russia’s commitment to European values. In his programmatic speech delivered to the Federation Council in March 2005, Putin declared that he saw Russia moving toward the same values that are shared by others in the European continent -- “theideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy.”[6]
“For three centuries, we – together with the other European nations – passed hand in hand through reforms of Enlightenment, the difficulties of emerging parliamentarism, municipal and judiciary branches, and the establishment of similar legal systems. Step by step, we moved together toward recognizing and extending human rights, toward universal and equal suffrage, toward understanding the need to look after the weak and the impoverished, toward women's emancipation, and other social gains.”[7]
In the former Soviet region, this translated into the doctrine of “continuing the civilizational role of the Russian nation in Eurasia.” Responding to charges of “imperialism” toward post-Soviet nations in the wake of the colored revolutions, Putin insisted that Russiaseeks not the post-Soviet states’ territory or natural resources, but the human dignity and the quality of life of its citizens, whom it regards as its own cultural compatriots.[8]
Putin was clear, however, that while moving in the same direction of freedom and democracy with Europeans, Russia does so at its own pace and given its own conditions. In the same speech referring to the Western role in the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, Putin insisted on Russia’s right to “decide for itself the pace, terms and conditions of moving towards democracy", and he warned against attempts to destabilize political system by "any unlawful methods of struggle.”[9] The motive of non-interference in Russia’s domestic developments from outside only became stronger over time, and
in his addresses to the Federation Council in May 2006 and April 2007, Putin put an even greater emphasis on the values of sovereignty and strong national defense.[10]
Putin’s supporters interpreted his vision using concepts of “sovereign democracy” and “sovereign economy,”[11] insisting on the need for Russia to protect its path of development and natural resources. The Kremlin’s leading ideologist Vladislav Surkov justified the concept of sovereign democracy by the need to defend an internally-determined path to political development and protect values of economic prosperity, individual freedomand social justice from potential threats, which he defined as “international terrorism, military conflict, lack of economic competitiveness, and soft takeovers by ‘orange technologies’ in a time of decreased national immunity to foreign influence.”[12] “Sovereign economy” indicates the state’s determination to have an upper hand in deciding conditions on which Western companies participate in Russia’s economic development. In the world of growing energy prices, the emphasis shifted from providing macroeconomic discipline and tough fiscal policies toward desire to capitalize on Russia’s reserves of natural gas and oil. In addition, Russia insisted that a more assertive foreign policy would better protect its national security. Putin’s speech in Munich,[13] with its strong criticism of U.S. “unilateralism” in world politics, was especially noteworthy serving as another reminder that Russia was not about to tolerate policies that it viewed as interfering with its sovereignty and security. Importantly, the speech was delivered to the European audience; Putin’s supporters have long argued that insistence on sovereignty and security was not inconsistent with European values. From their perspective, by upholding values of sovereignty Russia was in fact preserving European values that Europe itself could not always sustain when confronted with political pressures from the United States.[14]
Consistently with the new vision, Russia moved to strengthen its energy position in world markets, and it argued for improving its security posture. Russia’s energy strategy included increasing state share in energy companies often at the expense of Western capital, building pipelines in all geographic directions, raising energy prices for its oil and gas-dependent neighbors, moving to control transportation networks in the former USSR and coordinating its activities with other energy-producers. As the United States built the alternative Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and worked hard to persuade potential investors and Central Asian nations to build the Trans-Caspian route under the Caspian sea, Russia secured a commitment from Kazakhstan, Turmenistan and Uzbekistan to increase exports of Central Asian energy via Russia’s pipelines. In response to Washington’s decision to deploy elements of missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic, President Putin announced his decision to declare a Russian moratorium on implementing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which would allow Russia to freely move its conventional forces within its territory in response to those steps by NATO that the Kremlin may see as potentially harmful.
Overall, a new foreign policy consensus emerged that an assertive style of achieving the objectives of development, stability and security suited Russia well at the moment. The new Foreign Ministry report entitled “A Review of the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy,” commissioned by the Kremlin and released on March 27, 2007 further elaborated on the new face of Russia’s great power pragmatism. It indicated an important change in Russia’s thinking since the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept. The report embraced the notion of multipolarity based on “a more equitable distribution of resources for influence and economic growth,”[15] which it said laid the ground for a more self-confident and assertive Russia. The document presented Russia as ready to actively shape international relations by challenging the actions of others, particularly the United States, if they were “unilateral” and disrespectful of international law. At the same time, the report was not anti-American and did not call for any concerted effort to undermine the U.S. global position. Instead, it defended the notion of collective leadership and multilateral diplomacy as the alternative to unilateralism and hegemony in international relations.[16]
The Coalition of Assertiveness
Persistent security vulnerabilities and improved economic conditions led to changes in Russia’s identity coalitions. Security threats, associated with terrorism and the expansion of Western military infrastructure toward Russian borders, strengthened the position of the security class. As a result, in the formerly strong coalition of oligarchs and siloviks, the latter gained considerable prominence over the former. The security class did not become dominant, as some have suggested,[17] but it was influencing state decisions more than previously, and it gained a greater presence in commercial companies, especially those energy-related. The state was not consolidated enough to isolate powerful security influences, yet it did not become a hostage to those influences. Liberals, such as Aleksei Kudrin, stayed in the government and continued to make a case for more aggressive liberal economic policies. Members of security class were unable to assert greater isolationism in economic matters, by protecting large companies from international competition,[18] or in politics, by forcing Putin to stay for a third presidential term.[19] Increasingly, the state was taking charge in deciding between ideologies of security-driven isolationism and liberal-minded openness.
The state position has been to stake a middle ground between the two approaches by acquiring a greater prominence in economic affairs, yet using it to make Russia more open, not closed, to international competition. Ever since the most powerful oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovski, Vladimir Gusinski and Mikhail Khodorkovski, were stripped of their economic empires, the state has consistently asserted itself in other key areas. It increased its share in leading energy companies, such as Gasprom and Rosneft. It has renegotiated production-sharing agreements with Western companies in some of the most lucrative oil fields in Siberia and the Far East. Foreign energy giants, such as Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum, now had to play by different rules as introduced by the more assertive Russian state. In addition to the energy industry and military-industrial complex, the state announced plans to create “national champions,” or state-supported companies in the banking, aerospace, automobile and heavy machinery sectors. Yet the state also argued that the creation of such companies was necessary to position them for successful international competition.[20] Russian officials also insisted on expediting the country’s entrance to the WTO. Furthermore, Putin’s strategy of a state-dominant capitalism recognized the vital need of foreign investment, particularly from Western nations, for continuing high economic growth.[21]
The state assertiveness in the nation’s political economy reshaped the previously loose coalition of oligarchs and siloviks, creating a more stable alliance that shared Putin’s pragmatic vision of Russia as a “normal great power” – a strong state playing by internationally-accepted rules and norms of behavior.
The Conditions of Assertiveness
Russia’s new assertiveness is partly a response to its staggering economic improvements. During 1999-2006, the economy finally caught up with the level of 1990 and continued to grow at the annual pace of about 7%. The overall size of the economy increased about five times in current dollars – from $200 billion to $1 trillion. Russia's per-capita GDP has quadrupled to nearly $7,000, and about 20 million people have been lifted out of poverty.[22]Russia’s middle class now constituted about 25 percent of the population.[23] Over the 2000-2005, the average Russian saw a 26 percent annual growth in his income, relative to only 10 percent rise in that of the average Chinese.[24] Inflation was well controlled, and direct foreign investments to the Russian economy skyrocketed making it third in the world among developing economies.[25] The economic recovery explains Russia’s greater assertiveness toward Europe, which accounts for 50% of Russia’s foreign trade. By insisting of long-term contracts with Europeans and greater integration with European markets, Russia wanted to avoid repetition of the 1985-1986 scenario when sharp decline in prices had considerably contributed to breakup of the Soviet economy.
However, oil and gas are merely tools of Russia’s new foreign policy. The real motivation behind it is Moscow’s fear of domestic destabilization resulting from the Washington’s strategy of global regime change. For three reasons, Russia views liberalizing and democratizing instincts coming from the United States as directed against the Kremlin’s power and security. First, Moscow is fearful of a revolution inside Russia. Although the public support for a revolution is weak,[26] the Kremlin’s political technologists take the threat seriously knowing that less than 1% of the population was really involved in the recent capitals-centered colored revolutions and that influential elites in the United States maintained contacts with some radical organizations in Russia.[27] Second, the Kremlin feels increasingly encircled by radical pro-American regimes in the former Soviet region. The so-called colored revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan during 2003-2005 failed to bring greater stability and prosperity, but greatly politicized the international environment in the region. Georgia and Ukraine have already expressed their desire to join NATO, which adds to Russia’s sense of strategic insecurity. Policy makers, such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, insisted that the possible entry of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO would bring about a tremendous “geopolitical shift” and require that Russia “revise its policy.”[28]Third, Russia feels vulnerable to radicalization of Islam in response to the U.S. style of fighting a war on terror. Although some of Russia’s problems of Islamic terrorismcan be attributed to its own errors, such as attempts by some of its authorities to close local Mosques, the other part has to do with the U.S. policies that tend to isolate moderate Muslims and give the cards to radicals. In a global world, this translates into a greater support for Islamic radicals inside Russia.