Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
In Partnership with United States Joint Forces Command
Transformation of Military Operations on the Cusp
14-15 March 2005
Co-chairs
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold
Orville E. ‘Bud’ Hay
Panellists
Dr Hans Binnendijk
Professor Christopher Coker
Brigadier General Anthony Cucolo
Brigadier James Ellery
Dame Glynne Evans
Dr Jonathan Eyal
Brigadier General David Fastabend
Admiral Sir Ian Forbes
Major General Jon A. Gallinetti
Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani
Nik Gowing
Major General Andrew Graham
David Handley
Clare Harkin
Admiral Gregory ‘Grog’ Johnson
Graham Jordan
Geoff Loane
Dr John Mackinlay
Rear Admiral Michael K. Mahon
Rear Admiral Chris Parry
Major General Bill Robins
John Schmidt
Dr Peter Starkey
Dr Harlan K Ullman
Major General John R. Wood
Rapporteur
Mark Joyce
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
Transformation of Military Operations on the Cusp
On 14-15 March 2005, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, in partnership with United States Joint Forces Command, held a conference in Norfolk, Virginia entitled ‘Transformation of Military Operations on the Cusp’.
Panellists and delegates were drawn from the military, diplomatic, development and intelligence agencies, NGOs, as well as the media and the academic communities. The conference started from a shared recognition that, with a continued strategy of projecting stability and promoting democracy in parts of the world, US and allied armed forces increasingly will have to operate outside the established, traditional boundaries of military and non-military activities. The conference agreed on the need to createurgently a roadmap towards a coherent, integrated reform ofmilitary, inter-agency and inter-allied capabilities for these new ‘cusp’ challenges.
This paper takes the first step towards framing such a roadmap, by defining the concept of operations on the cusp and elaborating the key challenges arising from these operations. It is a supporting document, to be read alongside the conference papers that we have, which can be found online at
The primary emphasis of the conference was on the United States, Joint Forces Command and associated inter-agency organisations. We also tried to incorporate the perspectives of other commands, allies and international organisations, with some reference toUK views. The conference was conceived as partly a brain-storming exercise and partly a working group; it sought to provide a conceptual framework within which to improve policy, doctrine, training and technology for the conduct of future cusp operations. The conference should provide a platform from which to engage a wider audience in follow-up work.
Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold
Director
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies
The Cusp
“A point of transition between different states”
Oxford English Dictionary
1.US and allied armed forces increasingly have to operate on a series of cusps. Dominant in conventional warfare as never before, these armed forces have nevertheless struggled to manage the transitions to and between post-combat security, transition and reconstruction operations. Confronted with disparately structured and motivated groups of insurgents, terrorists, criminals and warring factions, commanders have found existingmilitary capabilities, and the analytical structures which underpinned their use and deployment, to be insufficiently flexible and adaptable.
2.‘The cusp’ describes the points of transition between crisis and major combat operations, and between major combat operations and the various categories of post-combat security, transition and reconstruction operations. It is not a synonym for counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism or peace-enforcement. Neither is it intended as a new doctrinal category in its own right. Revision and innovation in all of these areas remain essential. However, the isolated initiatives of individual armed services, government departments and nations along rigidly defined conceptual and institutional stovepipes will not provide compelling solutions to the challenges faced by Coalition forces in Iraq andAfghanistan, and to be faced in future complex operations.
3.Operations on the cusps demand that broad campaign effects are defined and planned in advance of warfighting, with the objectives of all relevant military, non-military and non-governmental agencies coherently integrated. This requires a more flexible and less military-centric interpretation of Effects Based Operations and Network Centric Warfare. It also requires doctrinal innovation, national and international institutional reform, and a thorough overhaul of military and inter-agency training and education programmes.
Transformation of Capabilities for Operations on the Cusps
4.Since 11 September 2001, the US and its coalition partners have shifted towards a more proactive international intervention strategy. This strategy has required them to conduct substantial military campaigns after the initial intervention phases, in order to facilitate stabilisation and reconstruction, and to support the transition of power into the hands of new governments.
5.Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have seen US-led coalitions achieve faster and more decisive victories in conventional combat than ever before. Effects Based Planning, underpinned by networked C4ISTAR, have so far provided only glimpses of a ‘transformed’ military campaign, where decision superiority and overmatching power enable the rapid achievement of campaign ‘effects’ with minimal attrition and relatively low levels of damage to physical infrastructures.
6.Whilst OEF and OIF provided evidence of the achievements and huge potential of force transformation, they have also acted as case-studies in its shortcomings in achieving campaign effects. Coalition forces have been required to apply military utility across a much wider spectrum of activity than previously anticipated. Pursuit of the desired strategic and political objectives has required military forces to engage in nation building as well as war, and they often have been ill-prepared for the demands of conducting post-combat stabilisation and reconstruction operations in the midst of insurgency, terrorism, criminality and civil war.
7.The technological advantages in speed, precision and decision-superiority that proved so decisive in conventional, high-intensity combat have been of more limited utility in the transition to and between post-combat security, transition and reconstruction operations. Obtaining coherency of effort among military, political, intelligence and development agencies, as well as a plethora of non-governmental organisations, has made it difficult to define, plan for and achieve desired effects. Differences in equipment, resources, languages and culture have also made networking more complex.
8.The relatively high-intensity and high complexity of these operations has located them largely outside the conceptual boundaries of military peace support, humanitarian intervention and counter-insurgency doctrine. Disparately structured opponents, coupled with the need to integrate a large number of coalition military partners with a wide range of civilian and non-governmental agencies, have forced commanders at the tactical level to become increasingly reactive.
9.Operations on the cusp have, then, resulted in an undesirable paradox: a proactive political strategy underpinned by increasingly reactive military operations.
10.Overcoming this paradox requires urgent action in three principal areas:
A. Creation of new conceptual frameworks for civil-military interaction
A(1)Operations on the cusps cannot always be framed as a linear progression from high-intensity combat to progressively lower-intensity stabilisation tasks. Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have had to operate in ‘polymorphous’ operational environments, where their opponents have forced them into a state of constant transition between familiar military operational, conceptual and doctrinal categories.
A(2)This environment, traditional military-centric approaches to civil-military interaction are problematic. Military forces must be seen as one element in a multi-faceted intervention, stabilisation, transition and reconstruction strategy, embracing a broad spectrum of military and non-military capabilities.
A(3)Such an approach requires civilian actors radically to reform their capabilities and operating procedures. The mounting pace of military transformation makes it vital to address the shortfall in international civilian resources available and suitable for deployment alongside military forces. Some humanitarian organisations will, of necessity, continue to operate in a state of semi-detachment from the military and other government agencies. Mechanisms must, nonetheless, be established for the more efficient exchange of information between civilian and military actors. Neutrality cannot be an excuse for inertia. Regardless of their formal relationship with armed forces, it is incumbent on all civilian agencies to reform their capabilities to reflect the realities of a changing operational environment.
A(4)Technology has a vital role to play. Operational analysis and modelling will have to become increasingly multi-disciplinary, and C4ISTAR technologies will have to be adapted to embrace a much wider network of actors. These reforms must be underpinned by a broad cultural transformation. The demands of operations on the cusps must be incorporated formally into military training and education programmes. These programmes should incorporate non-military institutions and personnel, and should institutionalise the notion of coherent, integrated and mutually supportive civil-military relations.
B. Development of new institutional capabilities for operations on the cusps
B(1)The US and its allies seem certain to continue a strategy of proactive ‘stability projection’. They are also likely, by implication, to become involved in further operational commitments on the cusps. De-confliction, coordination and integration of inter-agency efforts cannot be effectively managed on an ad-hoc, operation-by-operation basis. As well as coordinated training and education programmes, there is a perceived need for new institutional structures through which to construct a coherent approach to these operations over time.
B(2)The US has pursued a significant institutional innovation through the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (OCRS). Based in the State Department, the OCRS draws its staff from across government and is designed to oversee civilian planning effort and coordinate civilian deployments alongside military forces in the field. The UK government has developed a similar model through its Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), an institution populated principally by members of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Ministry of Defence, but which also seeks to coordinate the actions of other departments and relevant non-governmental actors.
B(3)The principal roles of the OCRS and PCRU currently are to manage the capability gaps and minimisefriction between the different governmental departments and non-governmental agencies involved in stabilisation and reconstruction operations. Preparation for operations on the cusps, where civil-military interactions take place within highlycomplex and constantly shifting operational environments, may require governments to develop more robustly equipped and mandated institutions.
C. Development of new international capabilities and institutions for operations on the cusps
C(1)The United States has rarely acted alone in international interventions, and is unlikely to do so often in the future. Inter-operability with allies and international institutions must, therefore, be a key feature of its evolving modus operandi.
C(2)In the first instance, there must be a concerted attempt to develop an international, but lean, network of dedicated security and reconstruction institutions. This network should operate at both the national and multilateral levels. It should also seek to incorporate the range of non-governmental actors alongside whom government agencies will be acting in operations on the cusps.
C(3)Alongside networking, it will also be necessary to consider establishing dedicated institutions at the multilateral level. The EU has developed and is in the process of developing institutions and capabilities – for example the new EUROGENDFOR constabulary force – with clear potential applications for cusp operations. NATO, meanwhile, will soon have a fully operational Response Force, whose principal purpose is high-intensity crisis response, but whose capabilities can be adapted for post-combat security, transition and reconstruction operations. The utility of these institutions must be reviewed and, where appropriate, overhauled better to meet the demands of operations on the cusps.
11.Follow-up work should be shaped by the following priorities:
AInvestigate means of planning flexible, reliable and comprehensive campaign effects in advance of warfighting
BConduct an integrated, international review of doctrine for peace support, humanitarian assistance, counter-insurgency and other military roles in the context of operations on the cusps
CReview the mechanisms of civil-military interaction at the operational and tactical levels, and recommend specific procedural and institutional reforms
DInvestigate models for dedicated national and multilateral institutions, better to promote a systematic civil-military transformation of capabilities for operations on the cusps
11.EReform military and inter-agency training and education programmes to promote de-confliction, coordination and coherent integration
11.FPropose technological, modelling and simulation solutions to enable better planning for civil-military interaction on the cusps