MASTER AND MASTER PLAN: THE DEVELOPMENT AND EFFECT OF

HUGH DOWDINGS LEADERSHIP ON THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

BY

MAJOR JOSEPH S. GRANDUCCI III

16 DECEMBER 2000

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

  1. INTRODUCTION 1
  1. THE MAN2
  1. WORLD WAR I4
  1. BETWEEN THE WARS7
  1. ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II10
  1. ORGANIZATION OF FIGHTER COMMAND14
  1. CONDUCT OF THE BATTLE17
  1. CONCLUSION25

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY27

APPENDECIES

  1. APPENDIX 129
  1. APPENDIX 230

ii

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1940 one of the most significant battles of World War II raged in the skies above southeast England. The Battle of Britain was England’s desperate fight for survival. Hitler’s war machine appeared unstoppable, few believed Britain could prevail, and even the American ambassador believed she would surely lose the war. “In the glow of victory, the Germans concluded that anything was possible for Hitler’s Third Reich”.[1] After defeating the French in little less than a month the Nazi war machine faced a single yet defiant England. Had she lost the battle for mastery of her skies, continued British resistance to Hitler’s domination of Europe may well have crumbled.

There are many personalities who provided leadership influencing the outcome, both positive and negative, of the battle. These personalities laid many important plans and made hundreds of decisions, great and small. Truly, in some cases it was a failure to make plans and or decisions that helped determined the outcome.[2] A large majority of the blame for Germany’s loss rests on the shoulders of Hitler. Additionally the German senior military leadership was also at fault for poor long range strategic planning. However, Britain’s preparation and conduct of the battle cannot be ignored. On the other side of the channel, Germany’s foe was more prepared, at least in planning if not in materiel. It was her leadership that turned the tide, and that was due to one remarkable airman and patriot. His name was Sir Hugh C.T. Dowding, Air Vice Marshall (AVM) and leader of the royal Air Force’s (RAF) Fighter Command.

Lord Dowding provided the leadership and vision, which made the RAF’s victory possible. He made many of the key decisions, both before and during the battle proper, which contributed significantly to England surviving to fight on. In 1942, a mere two years after the battle, the British Ministry of Information produced a booklet on the Battle of Britain that did not even mention Dowding. Sir Winston Churchill rejected it with the comment “Would you tell the story of Trafalgar without mentioning Nelson?”[3] Indeed, Dowding's effect on the battles outcome was in a word, pivotal.

“The battle of Britain was Dowding’s battle. Fighter pilots, anti-aircraft gunners, radar operators, aircraft manufacturers and countless others made their contributions, great and small, to the enemy’s discomfiture. But the architect of victory, the presiding genius, was Dowding.”[4]

The development and employment of Dowding’s leadership and airpower expertise led to Britain’s victory, or at least to her non-defeat during the battle began in the mud of France during WW I. After the war to end all wars he continued to develop his technical prowess, airpower theories and leadership style. During the pre-war years of the late 1930’s Dowding began to play a prominent, if not preeminent role in Britain’s air defense plans. By the time World War II came he was positioned to apply his knowledge and leadership to the defense of his homeland. He had spent a lifetime preparing for a few short months of battle that would save Britain and perhaps the world from the boot of Fascism.

THE MAN

Hugh Dowding was born at Moffat, Scotland in 1882, and that coupled with his sometimes-standoffish personality led him to be called a ‘dour Scot’. He was known as an un-emotional character and sometimes familiarly known as “Stuffy”. He had a solid reputation for austerity and was reportedly severe towards his subordinates; he was known to be merciless to himself. Basil Collier, author of “Leader of the Few” summed Dowding’s personality up well.

The legend of Dowding’s personality was a contrast to the stero-typical fighter pilot of the day, often a light hearted creature on the surface, cheerful and even frivolous in manner and given to minor extravagances of dress and diction. Dowding seemed an incongruous figure, sober in speech and bearing, clearly averse from all forms of extravagance. His kindliness and generosity, his rather impish sense of humor were not apparent to those who did not know him. It is a contrast of styles that this leader of Fighter Command took his responsibility gravely and seemed to carry the baggage of generations of stiff lipped British officers. The contrast to the former fighter pilot Goering is striking, Goering who was frivolous, given to extravagances and on the surface cheerful. Dowding’s integrity and sense of dedication were obvious enough. But the very intensity with which he cherished these virtues suggested to those who did not look below the surface a disposition more admirable than engaging, while Goering might be said to have a disposition that was more engaging than admirable.[5]

Dowding was a masterly organizer, and had the resolution and confidence to resist powerful political pressures. Additionally, due to his development as one of the pioneers of military aviation theory he had the technical skills and comprehension that was required. He had a single-minded determination to do all that was required for the RAF to defeat the German Air Force if need be, and he believed it would be required. Always a believer of right and wrong it could be that he saw the battle as a struggle between good and evil. The philosophies of his later years would indicate that he saw his countries position as being in the right, without qualifications. Conversely his enemy’s position was in the wrong, without doubt. He recognized no gray areas in his view of the world; his only desire was to defend his homeland. Collier again provides excellent insight into the man Dowding was.

To those who worked with him in an official capacity he seemed a stern commander, ever zealous on behalf of the organization under his control, quick to resent any move that seemed likely to weaken it or make it less effective, Dowding had the reputation of a hard man, stubborn, self opinionated, contemptuous of the views of others and merciless in pouncing on any weakness in an opponents argument. The reality of Dowding's private personality, “the truth” and his public personality, or as it was perceived by his subordinates, peers, commanders and the enemy, is that his very stubbornness, his very zeal for the defense of his homeland, his very strict and tight control of his organization is what served as the strong foundation of the RAF. There was no room in 1940, in Britain, for a leader such as Goering.[6]

The English were in a desperate situation and Dowding knew it. How did he become the leader that the British needed for victory? The answers begin to take shape in WW I.

WORLD WAR I

Directly before and during WWI Dowding’s experiences would begin to shape the leader that he became in WWII. During his stint at Staff College in 1912 he began to suspect, while the rest of the army continued on in dogged tradition that the ‘aeroplane’ could, and would, do more than was currently asked or even imagined of it. As a consequence he began his string of run-ins with established military practices. An incident during a training exercise serves to illustrate. Contrary to the instructor’s guidance Dowding used the aircraft under his command in a novel manner that was not “the book answer.” And though he was successful, even commendably so, he received a bit of a reprimand. After this demonstration of British Army doctrinal inflexibility he concluded “The army might as well have some staff officers who knew something about flying”[7] and that he would like to be one of them. He decided that the best, indeed the only, way of getting the required knowledge was by learning to fly.

Dowding secured a billet in the newly formed RAF as a pilot and was sent to France initially as an observer. Eventually he would work his way to pilot as the need for qualified personnel rose. In the mud of France began the embryonic theories that would save Britain in 1940. Until this point he had been an artillery officer, though he was certainly not ever comfortable with that or the army in general. He said himself, “Soldiers with a capital ‘S”, he felt, were on one side of an intangible barrier; “ I was on the other.”[8] With intangible feelings of not fitting in, of not buying into the inflexible and regimented tactics of the British army he began to form his technical, tactical and strategic air theories.

Strategically, he knew the aircraft was capable of many more things than it was asked, even if he was not sure himself what they all were. Tactically, he was frustrated by orders to observe point A, bomb point B and take a picture of point C, and all in the same mission. Dowding knew that specialization would be inherently better, yet could not convince his superiors, something they would come to realize much later. An example of his technical ability can be found in his work on an early form of wireless communication for airplanes, an item of great import as seen from today, but of doubtful use to most leadership then. Dowding could sense the promise of it, though he was as yet unsure of its exact uses. He created a lighter, longer range set and ground antenna, and asked for a competition with the existing set. After his creation was proven superior, it was still rejected and many more of the larger, shorter-range versions were ordered. “In thought he condemned his fellow-soldiers for ‘the mental laziness which always made it easier to say No than to say Yes, because if you say Yes you will have to think, and you may make a mistake”.[9] It was this type of thinking that he would continue to face and overcome in later years.

Command of scout squadron, No.16, would further mold his leadership. It was there, at age 33 that his reputation began to spread from his unit to the outside world. Severe and at times awkward, he was also known as dogged in his concern for his men. Even here, a relatively young man, his aloofness was evident as well as his commitment to honor and duty. The ‘younger’ men of 23 stood in a kind of awe of Dowding. It was not his physical presence, though his height was imposing, but of his sense of duty that awed them. An incident with the Germans serves to illustrate this point. A German Aircraft was brought down by his squadron, and in contradiction to established custom, the pilot and observer were shot as they got out of their craft. Dowding dropped their personal effects along with a note behind enemy lines stating where they were buried. His name became something of a legend with the German aircrews. According to some Germans, if you had problems with treatment of your prisoners, Major Dowding could secure prompt attention. Concern for his men and his sense of duty and fair play are evident in this situation. This is not to say that it was all smooth sailing for the young Lord.

His run-ins with the future commander of the RAF, Sir Hugh Trenchard, began in WWI. After a commendable stint commanding his squadron he was promoted to Lt Col and sent back to England to command Southern Training Command. In an incident reminiscent of later events he requested from the air authorities at the War Office a brief respite to restore his depleted units. The fighting in the Somme during 1916 had drawn a large number of his instructors to the front lines as well as all the new recruits. Consequently, his training command had very few instructors. Short term bleeding of his training units to provide an immediate answer to long-term problems did not sit well with Dowding. It was a situation Dowding would face again. In fact, in a move much like his later reaction to squadrons being sent to France he wrote a letter to Trenchard’s senior Personnel Officer about the problem. Trenchard acquiesced, but it was not deemed to be in Dowding’s place to make such a request and it caused a rift between the two that would last most of a decade. This type of exchange between Dowding and his superiors would be a recurring theme and combined with his doggedness may have landed Dowding his job at Fighter Command instead of overall command of the RAF.

BETWEEN THE WARS

If WWI had begun to shape his theories and leadership style, the period between the wars continued to refine them. During this period he would, more than any one man, shape the RAF that would defend Britain during the Battle of Britain. Dowding's direct influence would be the catalyst for the required changes.

“It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that, but for Dowding, there could have been no Hurricane, no Spitfire, no radar chain, no escape for the Royal Air Force from the fate that had overwhelmed its counterparts in European countries, no avoidance of irremediable disaster.”[10]

Immediately after WWI he served well in Palestine and the Middle East with distinction. But the next position he held would be momentous for both him and England and would start to set the pieces on the table for the battle to come. Appointed as Air Member for Supply and Research, Dowding undertook several programs that would ultimately result in important advances. One of his first actions was to champion the removal of wood as a primary building material from aircraft. The corporate inertia of the wood bi-plane as the conventional aircraft would attempt to thwart him. A momentous event that Dowding used to his advantage in this endeavor was England’s victory in the Schneider Trophy race. The trophy was given for seaplane races over a closed circuit at low level. From the winning plane, the Supermarine S.6B, came the eventual design for the Spitfire.[11] But the story does not reach its happy ending without Dowding’s intervention. After Supermarine won the trophy, with money donated by a private individual, it was suggested that Britain’s government continue the contest by sponsoring it in the following years. Dowding felt this would be a bad idea on several accounts. First, further development of seaplanes had obvious limited potential for military applications, as well as the fact that faster and faster aircraft designed primarily for speed on a close track necessitated lighter airframes and larger engines. These two combined made for more dangerous planes, specifically dangerous for the pilot. Secondly, the cost of the Air Ministry supporting the contest for its limited returns seemed a poor investment to Dowding. Instead, he suggested that the Air Ministry use its limited funds to ask for two monoplane aircraft designs providing the best possible performance with conventional configurations and practical landing speeds. Although this program was initially an experiment, Dowdings ability to sense a need or capability, if not its exact purpose, served England well. The proposed designs with an emphasis on the monoplane and metal construction laid the groundwork for the Hurricane and Spitfire.

In 1934 Dowding was relieved of the Supply portion of his job and given the task of research and development. He was now free to concentrate on one area. At the same time the British commenced a large effort to rectify the poor shape England’s peacetime air defenses found themselves in. From 1934 to 1936, Dowding led the early development of the Spitfire, Hurricane, Radar and the formation of his command and control network. Here again Dowding was faced with tradition bound superiors. He believed “the collective official mind had got into a rut.”[12] A case in point is the bi-plane vs. monoplane argument. Up to this time the advocates of the bi-plane still held sway. Tradition, in so much as the fledgling air force could have tradition, and proven technology vs. problematic new technology along with a lack of imagination seemed to doom the monoplane. Fortunately, Dowding knew a winner when he saw one. The monoplane clearly was the aircraft of the future and he promoted it over the biplane.

Dowding was not always correct in his decisions. For example some experts called for the installation of fuel tanks that could stop leaks if pierced by bullets. He did not press ahead on the basis that the test results seemed to show the weight and bulk prohibitive. What he did not know is the numbers were for a heavier crash resistant tank and not merely a self-sealing tank. This problem was fixed much later and done with a hasty program as hostilities broke out. Two other poorly thought out programs backed by Dowding, the Defiant fighter and the Battle light bomber were both failures. The reality of the failings of these two programs may be more politics than poor decisions by Dowding, as he was not completely immune to some amount of political pressure. While he won most of his arguments over research and development he was not perfect. Fortunately his strategic and operational vision for Britain’s defense was nearly so.