REGIMENTAL SUPPORT SQUADRON
11th ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
OPERATIONS SECURITY PLAN
NOVEMBER 2005
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies only. This document contains operational and security planning information.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE
Destroy by shredding.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
COMMANDER’S LETTER 3
SECTION I: GENERAL INFORMATION 4
SECTION II: THE SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE COMMAND
AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION7
SECTION III: DESCRIPTION OF THE THREAT11
SECTION IV: RSS, 11th ACR OPSEC VULNERABILITIES 14
SECTION V: RSS, 11th ACR OPSEC MEASURES16
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, REGIMENTAL SUPPORT SQUADRON
11TH ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
FORT IRWIN, CALIFORNIA 92310-5073
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF
AFZJ-ACS-CO 20 October 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR Regimental Support Squadron, 11th ACR
SUBJECT: Operations Security
1. Operations Security is a necessary element in our daily operations to maintain our resources and capabilities. Our Army is faced with an adversary that we cannot see, an adversary that is intent on frustrating our ability to perform our mission. It is the responsibility of every Soldier to follow operations security measures in order to prevent the adversary from meeting that goal.
2. The RSS, 11th ACR Operations Security Plan outlines steps we must take as a unit to protect our critical information. This is information that, if compromised, could be used against our Soldiers, our families, or our mission. Every Soldier in the unit must understand what information he or she is responsible for protecting, and what steps to take if they make contact with someone trying to gain that information. The Essential Elements of Friendly Information will be disseminated to the lowest level to ensure this understanding.
3. The Operations Security program is designed to protect our unit from threats we may not see or predict. Following the guidance in this plan is paramount to the success of our mission.
4. The point of contact for this plan is the RSS S2 at x7029.
JOE L. DOE
LTC, TC
Commanding
SECTION I
GENERAL INFORMATION
1. PURPOSE. The purpose of this plan is to provide policy and guidance for Operations Security (OPSEC) within the RSS. OPSEC is an integral part of all activities, tests, exercises and rotations at the NTC and FortIrwin and is necessary to protect our critical interests and maintain mission integrity.
2. MISSION. The mission of the RSS, 11th ACR is to provide combat support/combat service support to the 11th ACR and NTC Opposing Force and conduct deployment, survivability, and MOS sustainment training in order to ensure success of the Regiment, OPFOR, and Squadron.
3. DEFINITION OF OPSEC. OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions to:
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversarial intelligence systems.
b. Determine indicators adversarial intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.
c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversarial exploitation.
4. OPSEC CONCEPT.
a. Many activities incident to normal daily functioning will convey information and indicators to adversaries in spite of routine security measures to protect classified information. Information available from detectable friendly activities, when combined with other information held by an adversary, will shape the adversary's perceptions of friendly intentions, military capabilities, actions, and possible weaknesses, all of which will provide answers to adversarial intelligence questions.
b. An OPSEC vulnerability exists when OPSEC indicators of critical information are collectable by adversarial collection systems, the collected information can be processed, and the adversary has time to react in a way harmful to the United States. Capabilities used to obtain information from accessible activities generally depend on target cooperation. For example, passive sensors depend on our emitting signals; observation depends on our observable and discernible actions; the detection of predictable actions depends on our acting in stereotypical ways; and open source material depends on information appearing or being released into the public media.
c. The key aim of OPSEC is to ensure mission effectiveness. Actions that may be implemented include the use of jamming, obscurant weather, camouflage, environmental conditions, covers, or military deception to influence adversarial perceptions and conclusions (e.g., cover operations to explain observable activities, diversions to draw collection and analytical interest elsewhere, conditions causing activities to be ignored, multiple impressions to confuse interpretation of information). Countering adversarial C2 and protecting friendly C2 are functions of OPSEC.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES.
a. The Commanding General of the NationalTrainingCenter is responsible for the OPSEC of the installation. In implementing OPSEC at the NTC, the Installation Force Protection/Antiterrorism Officer is designated as the Installation OPSEC Officer. The Installation OPSEC Officer has the responsibility for developing and implementing the Installation OPSEC Program.
b. The RSS OPSEC Officer will ensure that:
(1) An OPSEC Officer is designated in writing to direct and implement the OPSEC Program. The OPSEC Officer may be a Commissioned Officer (CPT or above), a Warrant Officer (CW2 or above), a Noncommissioned Officer (SFC or above), or a civilian (GS-9 or above).
(2) They are scheduled for attendance at RSS training events.
(3) They establish an internal document review policy for the organization to ensure distribution statements and FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY handling markings are applied IAW command policy.
(4) All assigned personnel are aware of the NTC and RSS Essential Elements of Friendly Information.
c. All personnel in the RSS) are responsible for complying with established OPSEC and security practices for protecting classified, unclassified, and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) which she/he has been exposed to. All personnel should:
(1) Be aware of the intelligence collection threat.
(2) Know command EEFIs.
(3) Ensure co-workers are aware of the intelligence collection threats and EEFIs.
(4) Know where to obtain OPSEC guidance.
(5) Be aware that OPSEC training is mandatory and will be initiated upon an individual's entry into government service/ employment by the supervisor, and be continuous and progressive throughout his/her career.
6. TRAINING.
a. Every individual should be able to answer the following questions:
(1) What is OPSEC?
(2) Why is OPSEC important to my organization?
(3) Why is OPSEC important to me?
(4) How can I contribute to the OPSEC program?
b. All personnel will receive orientation training within the first 90 days of arrival to the unit. This training will focus on:
(1) The local intelligence threat.
(2) How adversaries aggressively seek information on military capabilities, intentions, and plans.
(3) How OPSEC complements traditional security programs to maintain essential secrecy of military capabilities, intentions, and plans.
(4) Specific guidance on the EEFI to protect and OPSEC measures to prevent inadvertent disclosure.
c. All personnel will receive annual refresher training in OPSEC measures and EEFI.
d. OPSEC officers will complete the 40-hour OPSEC course provided by DA prior to assuming duties.
SECTION II
THE SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE COMMAND AND
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI)
1. SENSITIVE AREAS. Because of the highly visible mission of the 11th ACR (R) the following facilities/areas are considered or could become sensitive, due to the fact that they could be lucrative sources of information.
a. Headquarters Offices. These areas are considered excellent targets for adversary exploitation because they are centers of information about intentions, current activities, status of capabilities and vulnerabilities.
b. Communications facilities, TOC’s, and CP's during exercises, testing, mobilization, etc.
c. Arms, ammunition, and explosive storage areas.
d. Classified material storage sites.
e. Automated Information Systems (AIS) and word processing activities including computer systems that store or process classified and Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI).
f. Offices, conference and planning rooms where classified and CUI is discussed, generated, displayed and used.
g. Intelligence and security offices.
h. Trash bins and dumpsters.
2. CRITICAL INFORMATION. This information, if disclosed to an adversary, could result in compromise of our personnel or mission.
a. Deployment/redeployment dates and times.
b. NTC rotation schedules, including individual Soldier schedules in the field.
c. Rotational unit arrival and departure times.
d. Holiday, comp days, and max leave dates.
e. Rotational training objectives specific to the rotational unit.
f. Unit strength and composition of any unit.
g. Times and locations of large formations or activities, especially those that include family members.
h. Roles of Soldiers in the field during rotational training; design of training.
i. TTPs/SOPs that outline procedures used in the unit.
j. Access rosters, FRG lists, personnel rosters, and any information about our Soldiers or family members.
2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI).
a. EEFI are "Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness." We must not answer the adversaries' questions as this provides them intelligence indicators that identify friendly intentions, capabilities and activities.
b. For Official Use Only (FOUO) Information. This sensitive unclassified category involves information that must meet the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption criteria as specified in AR 25-55 w/change 1. Assignment of material to this category requires a case-by-case determination at the time of origination. Information that is not classified, but requires or should be withheld from public disclosure IAW AR 25-55 w/Chg 1, is For Official Use Only, and therefore sensitive information and will be handled and marked accordingly. The following are exemptions to the FOIA that must be handled as FOUO. A complete list can be found in AR 25-55 chapter 3.
(1) Documents relating solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the unit (e.g. orders, SOPs, and administrative documents such as sick call hours).
(2) Financial information received in confidence (e.g. bids, contracts, and proposals with non-DoD agencies).
(3) Internal recommendations pertaining to the decision-making process (e.g. AARs, staff evaluations, and budget plans).
(4) Information in personnel and medical files.
c. The command EEFI (Critical Information) listed herein are to be protected by all personnel assigned or working for this command. This does not mean that the EEFI stated here are classified, or that this list is in itself classified. It is the answers to the questions that must be protected in some manner. Prior to public release (this includes disposal as unclassified trash), information that concerns the command EEFI will be reviewed by the designated OPSEC POC.
3. COMMAND EEFI.
a. The RSS EEFI are:
(1) How are units trained during rotations?
(2) What are the specifics of the redeployment of 11th ACR units?
(3) When are Soldiers in the field and for how long?
(4) Where are rosters listing personnel information including family member phone numbers and addresses and personal data kept?
(5) When and where are major functions, including organizational days, formations, and special training?
b. The NTC and Fort Irwin EEFI are:
(1) What are the capabilities or weaknesses of a directorates, units or agencies support to Fort Irwin and what are the capabilities, vulnerabilities or weaknesses of any maneuver unit assigned, attached or on rotation here (e.g. AARs, trends, tactics/techniques and procedures (TTPs), etc)?
(2) What are totals, locations and occupants of sensitive positions?
(3) Is there any derogatory information on people that could be used by a Foreign Intelligence Service?
(4) Are there down range unit locations listed anywhere?
(5) Are there critical personnel shortages or unit strengths listed anywhere?
(6) Are there critical equipment shortages or significant down time listed anywhere?
(7) Where and how are ongoing plans and operations stored and are people briefed about their sensitivity?
(8) Are Automated Information Systems capabilities, vulnerabilities or weaknesses listed anywhere?
(9) Is there special training occurring in your unit or during a rotation (examples are mountain, airborne, linguistic, or other unique or unusual training)?
(10) Who handles and how is information disseminated about VIP or Distinguished visit or identities or itineraries?
(11) How is information about New Equipment receipt, capabilities, vulnerabilities or weaknesses handled and Weapons and systems capabilities, vulnerabilities or weaknesses?
(12) How is information about Security measures used by the installation at the different Force Protection Condition Levels handled and disseminated?
(13) How are recall rosters of directorates, units, staffs and agencies handled and disseminated?
(14) How are maps showing sensitive locations (i.e. HQs, HRTs, MEVA’s etc.) handled and disseminated?
SECTION III
DESCRIPTION OF THE THREAT
1. COLLECTION THREAT. It has been determined that the collection capabilities facing the U.S. Army and the NationalTrainingCenter and FortIrwin are multi-disciplined and pervasive. The adversary is often portrayed as a sinister individual secretly photographing classified documents taken from a safe at night. This type of activity constitutes a mere fraction of the current foreign multidiscipline approach to intelligence collection. Foreign intelligence services’ collection efforts may apply only one method of collection or any combination of methods. Generally, multidiscipline collection capability is divided into the four categories listed.
2. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT) THREAT. As its name implies, the source of HUMINT is people. HUMINT is the collection of information for intelligence purposes through the use of and by human sources. It is commonly gathered either covertly by espionage agents with placement and access, or overtly through information readily available to the general public. Intelligence services assign a high priority to the acquisition of scientific, technical, economic and military systems information, research and development of DOD military technology, and industrial techniques and processes as they relate to military and strategic capabilities. HUMINT is also used to verify and expand on intelligence gathered through other sources. HUMINT threats against the RSS include:
a. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. Intelligence agents are assigned to illegally collect information, either through personal infiltration into an organization or through a knowledgeable or unwitting intermediary with access to the desired information. The unwitting intermediary could be anyone who becomes careless in protecting classified or sensitive unclassified information, or who forgets the vital nature of routine data as a result of continuous exposure to classified and sensitive unclassified information.
b. OPEN SOURCE. Intelligence collection services satisfy the majority of their intelligence collection requirements through the systematic analysis of open source literature. Here at FortIrwin these sources could include The High Desert Warrior and PAO news releases. Individual Soldiers may also contribute to this threat by posting sensitive or CUI on the Internet. It is estimated that over 80 percent of the information desired by foreign intelligence collectors within the United States can be gleaned from open sources.
c. TERRORISM. A terrorist threat assessment of the NTC must consider both domestic and international elements. Subsequently, the potential collection threat to the command is significantly increased by virtue of the continuous media interest in training at the NTC. No known terrorist threat has been identified which specifically targets the NTC, personnel or tenant units. However, there have been identified threat groups operating in Southern California. See G2 and/or CID personnel for the most recent information on such groups.
d. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Technology with military application has been identified as a high-priority target for all foreign intelligence collection organizations. In their efforts to satisfy their collection requirements, foreign intelligence agents target U.S. Government and military organizations, the Defense Contracting industry, and the academic community to gain information about military technological capability.
3. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) THREAT. SIGINT is collected by intercepting electronic signals emanating from telecommunications facilities or non-communicative devices emitting an electronic signal.
a. COMINT is information derived from the study of intercepted electromagnetic communications. Prime sources of valuable COMINT include clear voice, non-encrypted telephones and radio communications, and web access (including email traffic). Major Foreign Intelligence Services (FIS), using various intercept platforms, have a worldwide COMINT capability, which is growing in importance and use.
b. ELINT is technical or intelligence information derived from non-communication electromagnetic radiations, such as those emitted by radars.
c. FISINT is derived from the intercept and analysis of communication between pieces of equipment. An example of FISINT would be information obtained from the intercept of electronic communications between a missile and its ground-based guidance system. SIGINT collectors which pose a threat include fixed ground collection platforms within the Continental U.S. (CONUS); interception of emitters; e.g., telemetry, radar, and other emissions that can be intercepted by satellite, aircraft, or ground-based collectors; interception of site voice communication; interception of microwave transmissions of Defense Switched Network (DSN), local, and long-distance telephone calls, and email traffic on the web.
4. IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT) THREAT. IMINT is a valuable collection means and includes data obtained by photographic, infrared, or radar imagery equipment. IMINT can be collected through cameras mounted on space vehicles, overhead aircraft, or by individuals on land. IMINT provides foreign intelligence agencies an extremely valuable collection tool at the research and development, test ranges, and the exercise and training centers. Targets of IMINT collection include test facilities, training ranges (such as those here at FortIrwin), industrial complexes, personnel and material. This method of collection is valuable because it can inform analysts of areas requiring further examination by more exacting methods of intelligence collection.
5. MEASUREMENTS AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE (MASINT). MASINT is scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from technical sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive features associated with the source, emitter, or sender and to facilitate subsequent identification or measurement. MASINT includes all technical intelligence except SIGINT, and overhead imagery. The eight primary disciplines of MASINT are Infrared, Seismic, Radar, Laser, Effluent, Nuclear, Optical and Unintentional Radiations. MASINT collection may be conducted by HUMINT intelligence assets using portable collection sensors as well as air and space borne collection sensors.