Reaction Paper #1

Reaction Paper #1

598: Emergency Management

Sarah J. Waterman

Do federal policies promote risk?

Since the creation of FEMA, federal disaster policies have unintentionally promoted risk, resulting in an exponential increase in disaster costs over the past two decades. A shift is occurring however, from the traditional response approach to a more proactive, mitigation based approach.

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) of 1968 had a laudable purpose: provide people living in flood plains with insurance and encourage communities to engage in responsible land use and mitigation techniques (Birkland, Burby, Conrad, Cortner and Michener, 2003). NFIP, however, produced an unintended consequence. Mitigation efforts made formerly uninhabitable land “safe” for development and available insurance encouraged people to build. Because many mitigation measures are based on events that are low in probability, people developed a false sense of security. When levees were topped, however, the resultant damage was exacerbated by inappropriate development. Overdevelopment is particularly salient in areas with limited growth boundaries, desperate to maintain economic viability, even at the cost of local ecology. Because of the relatively low financial risk subsidized by NFIP, communities continue to build with today in sight, instead of tomorrow’s potential flood.

An August 2007 GAO report provides a current analysis of the continued national susceptibility to natural hazards. Although the report omits any inference that current federal policies encourage risk, it does acknowledge a considerable boom in population in the nation’s most vulnerable areas and encourages a shift in emphasis to mitigation efforts. As the today’s readings allude, mitigation is clearly the preference of planners, policy makers and environmental scientists. The major problem with mitigation, however, is a political one.

Successful mitigation faces the challenge of intergovernmental cooperation. While federal policies may mandate mitigation, local governments are ultimately responsible for implementation. Local officials, however, are often resentful of federal “intrusion.” In her book on environmental regulation, Denise Scheberle (2004) argues that typologies of relationships between federal and local governments fall into four quadrants. In the case of disaster mitigation, most federal-local relationships would be characterized as “coming apart with avoidance” (22). Characterized by low trust and low involvement, federal and local governments fail to coalesce on objectives and local governments engage in shirking behaviors. For example, while earthquake building codes were mandated, local government chose not to enforce building codes, resulting in devastation after the Northridge earthquake.

The “coming apart with avoidance” behavior is not necessarily malicious, but the result of a salience problem. Local governments are often the most tangible to the general public and thus focus on day to day tasks like on-time garbage collection and pothole free roads. A low probability risk such as a flood is thrust behind tasks deemed more important to daily functions. As remarked in the Haddow, Bullock and Coppola text, failed mitigation attempts are far less visible than a failed response (76).

The GAO report and other readings for today suggest that continued attempts at mitigation are the best approach to disaster and emergency management. The GAO report, for example, suggests that a collaborative approach with FEMA as the head agency will help to resolve currently contentious federal-local relationships. GAO recommends a move from the current approach, where collaboration occurs on a “hazard specific basis,” to a “national comprehensive strategic framework for mitigation” (2). With the belief that mitigation will prevent hazards from becoming disasters and disasters from becoming catastrophes, GAO holds that mitigation is to today as the NFIP and other recovery programs were to the 1970s.

Our first attempts to manage disaster resulted in unintended consequences that subsequently exacerbated the cost of recovery. Our second wave of policy, however, has the potential to reduce cost, preserve environmental features and better protect communities from inevitable natural hazards.

Outside References:

Scheberle, Denise. Federalism and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation, 2nd ed. GeorgetownUniversity Press, 2004.

United States Governmental Accountability Office. Natural Hazard Mitigation: Various Mitigation Efforts Exist, but Federal Efforts Do Not Provide a Comprehensive Strategic Framework. Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, August 2007. (GAO-07-403)