R.S. Peters and His Reason Based Conception of Morality

R.S. Peters and his Reason based conception of Morality

Presented at the annual European Conference on Educational Research (ECER2004) held at the Rethymnon Campus, University of Crete from 22-25 September2004.

Masoud Safaei Moghaddam, Ph.D

Shahid Chamran University of Ahwaz, Iran.

Abstract

One of the reasons why philosophers disagree about morals is that they have different theories about those concepts and features of the world that play essential roles in morality. I discuss the case of R. S. Peters, the linguistic analysis philosopher, his conception of reason leads him, as I argue, to provide his moral theory, meta-ethics and moral psychology.

Peters is committed to reason and insists that he is giving a rational account of morals. His theory leads him to see morality and moral judgments as products of reason. Believing that the social dimension of reason is dominant, he argues that it is public and co-operative. This led him to claim that a rational moral theory must not be ego centrist. He rejects the view that goodness is a personal matter, since morality emerges from reason, and objectivity and universality are requirements of reason. His theory of reason is responsible for his view that moral judgments are autonomous, objective, and practical. Since his moral theory is determined by his theory of reason it can be seen as a rational theory.

Peters'view on Reason

Philosophers have disagreed about the nature of moral problems. MacIntyre argues that the most striking feature of moral debates is their interminable character, -- that there apparently is no terminus for the moral debates. He says, "There seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our culture." (1981, p. 6). Leaving aside the question of whether agreement about moral problems is possible, it can be asked why moralists come to different conclusions about morality, or why there are different theories about ethics, not only about substantive ethics but also about meta-ethics.

MacIntyre (1981, pp. 6-21) argues that a reason for this is that in making moral judgments, philosophers usually concentrate on different normative or evaluative moral concepts, such as justice, rights, equality, and liberty, each originally at home in some quite different historical context. I would add that even those who use the same concepts have not necessarily the same conception of them, and this may lead them to provide different theories about morality. This point is made in another work by MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 1980, pp. 1-4, where he takes moral concepts to be changing and criticises those philosophers who try to discover 'the timeless language of morals'.

In this work the concept with which I will be concerned is reason, -- what is the place and the weight of reason in one's moral theory? The relationship between the views held about reason and morality, or the influence of one's theory of reason on one's theory about morality is the principal focus in this work in which I study Peters, who tries to give a rational theory on morality and moral education,

Most of Peters’ views on Reason can be found in his books, Reason and Compassion, 1973, Reason, Morality and Religion, 1972, Ethics and Education, 1966, and his articles; 'Subjectivity and Standards', 1975, 'Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism', 1971, 'Reason and Passion', 1972a, 'The Development of Reason', 1976, 'Was Plato Nearly Right about Education?', 1975a, 'Reason and Habit', 1974b. I will categorize my study of Peters' views on reason into two parts, A-the nature or character and B-the functions of reason.

A- The Origin and the Nature of Reason:

What factors are responsible in establishing reason in the individual and its development? To what extent, if at all, do social factors have a role to play in establishing reason and also in its development? To what extent is reason in its creation and in its development basically private and individual?

Peters sees a pre-existing origin for reason (that is, preceding the emergence of reason in each human) which makes its individual aspect. Sometimes he refers to this origin of reason as 'the primitive tendency manifest in intelligence',[7] and sometimes as 'a (simple) consciousness'. To explain this, I should say that Peters views 'mind' and its development in a way that differs from that of British Empiricists like Hume, Berkeley and Locke, who represent a kind of botanical picture of mind, and consider it as a 'empty cabinet', or as Locke put it, 'white paper, void of all characters'. By contrast, Peters thinks there is a pre-existing origin for mind and says,

"A child is born with a consciousness [which for Peters, and also for classical empiricists, is the hall-mark of mind], not as yet differentiated into beliefs, purposes, and feelings. Indeed it is many months before consciousness of his mother as an entity distinct from himself develops." (1966, p. 49).

The public nature of reason

Peters perceives in this simple consciousness a foundation for rationality. For this simple consciousness to be differentiated into beliefs, purposes and feelings it needs to be confronted with real objects, with a public world which is enshrined in language. He believes that the human mental structure develops out of being initiated in the public world and confronting external objects. Indeed, not only rational potentiality but all potentialities of the individual 'can only be developed within the framework of some socially structured pursuit into which he has to be initiated', Peters says, (1966, p. 56). It is most implausible, he (1972a) says, to suggest that reason and critical procedures develop naturally in children's minds as they grow up. Referring to Plato's belief in a connection between individual development and social life, and being in strong agreement with him, Peters says,

"What we understand by reason is not just a kind of gadget that we switch on in our heads, it consists in representing, as it were, on the private screen of our own minds, a public performance in which we have taken part. It is an internalization of a form of social life ...e.g. the development of reason seems to be much affected by methods of child-rearing. If there are arbitrary methods of child-rearing, without explanation, without pointing out the consequences of action, there tends to be a stunting of the development of reason." (1981, p. 11). (My emphasis).

Again, elsewhere, in this connection he says,

"Reasoning in general ...does not represent the flowering of an inner potentiality in the individual that is simply encouraged by child-growers. It is basically a public inheritance ...it should not be regarded as a tool of individual assertion or group domination. It is public not just in the sense that its vehicle is language ...but in the further sense that, even when it takes place in the individual's head, it is an internalization of public procedures." (1975, p. 101), and (1974, pp. 423-24). (My emphasis).

One of the implications of these remarks is that, in addition to the individual or personal nature, reason has also an important public nature. The public nature of reason is formed when its individual origin comes into the social environment. As it appears here, Peters' emphasis on the sociality of mind or reason is related to the mechanism of its development. In connection with this matter, in his Ethics and Education, Peters criticizes Kant and Piaget because according to him, they didn’t speculate about the extent to which the development of mind is the product of initiation into public traditions enshrined in a public language. On the other hand, he appreciates Hegel and Marx for their awareness of the importance of the social dimension of mind.[8]

Accordingly, although Peters (1976, p. 304) admits a sense in which reason, as a mode of consciousness, is private to the individual, reason’s content and its procedures of operation are public possessions, for him. This is because the concepts fundamental to its operation are shared concepts. Children from the very beginning are initiated into language and 'rules of syntax' which are essential for operating reason. Furthermore, there can be different types of reasoning in different societies and different cultures. The developed kind of reason which is manifested in its being “critical” does appear in a certain kind of culture, and can be understood as the reflection in the individual’s conception of social situations in which criticism is a characteristic of society.

Despite what he says on the existence of both the individual and the public aspects of reason, his emphasis on the public nature of reason is such that reason seems to be merely a social production for him. The individual reason is a specific instance of the public mind, or put in Hegel's term, 'public reason'. In this connection, Peters (1974, pp. 417-18) puts a question-mark against extreme forms of individualism which emphasise the individual against what he calls 'the givenness of social life'; against the kind of individualism that emphasises 'doing it your own way', which takes too little account of the givenness of social life. Being amazed at those modern subjectivists who adopt such an extreme individualism, Peters asks, whether we just make ourselves by our private decisions. It is often said that individuals have to 'choose' their own principles, Peters says. But are we hesitant in adopting principles such as fairness, avoiding suffering and telling the truth? Indeed, the demands of reason and the logical principles such as non-contradiction and universalisability are necessary if we are to talk to each other, if we are to be social animals, as Peters does consider humans to be. Thinking in this way, Peters (1972a) and (1974, p. 154) maintains that 'the irreconcilability of the use of reason with egocentricity and arbitrariness is a reflection of its essentially public character'.[9]

Ultimately, the importance of the public nature of reason in Peters' writings appears in his view that determination of human nature regardless of the particular society in which people live, represents a purely formal account of human nature. As reason, for Peters, occupies the fundamental place in human nature (as what makes the human different from animals, and worthy of respect), the public nature of reason occupies an essential place in defining human nature as well. In The Concept of Motivation, Peters explains that human beings are rule-following animals but in aiming at ends, they consider social rules and codes. For Peters, the human being by nature is a rule-following animal, and rules are dominated by the social situation. The human is not a creature that blindly adopts a means to reach the end, regardless of limitations which society has made (which are manifested as social rules). This belief leads Peters to consider sociology and anthropology as the basis for explaining human behaviour. Based on this view about human nature, Peters holds that the theory that disregards the situation in which human behaviour takes place is false. It seems that he, like Popper, who (1990, p. 14) stressed the importance of the situational aspect of his propensity theory, holds that the situation is a part of reality and to be a realist one must draw attention to the situation from which the agent is influenced. Based on this view he thinks that considering the social situation in which the individual thinks and acts is essential for understanding what and how the individual reasons, thinks and acts.

The co-operative nature of reason

Another characteristic of reason that is fundamental in Peters' moral and educational system is what he (1981, p. 13) calls 'the co-operative nature of reason' which is a consequence of its public nature. Popper influenced Peters in different ways about this. For Popper,

"[rationalists] faith in reason is not only a faith in our own reason, but also-- and even more-- in that of others. Thus a rationalist, even if he believes himself to be intellectually superior to others, will reject all claims to authority since he is aware that, if his intelligence is superior to that of others (which is hard for him to judge), it is so only in so far as he is capable of learning from criticism as well as from his own and other people's mistakes, and that one can learn in this sense only if one takes others and their arguments seriously." (1945, p.238).

According to this characteristic, the individual reason will do better in searching for truth if it is in cooperation with others--what can be called 'collective reason', is more effective than 'individual reason'. Following Hegel who believed in 'social reason', Peters thinks of reason as if it consists of some different parts which are manifested in all individual minds, and also its accuracy and its best working depends on the works of all of its parts together, namely the individuals. From this, he comes into the conclusion that the best social order or government is one that provides every individual the opportunity to share in searching for truth.

Peters' epistemology which supports the idea that reason has a 'co-operative nature' is that knowledge is based upon language; and the recognition that you cannot get far in science if you do not accept what other scientists have done as the basis for your own work (1970, pp. 62-66).

The emphasis on the co-operative nature of reason indicates that it is essential to reject certainty and the absolute ideas which by some kinds of rationalism (for instance, the Platonic form of rationalism) are presented. To say that the individual reason in searching for truth needs cooperation is to say that it has some limitations that could only be compensated for by being assisted by others. This leads Peters to consider that humility is necessary for a person to be rational.

The values associated with the nature of reason

Peters holds that the values associated with reason are procedural, but not substantive (1977, pp. 130-1) and (1981, pp. 12-13). The values which are associated with reason are firstly those which are conceptually connected with pursuing the truth, such as impartiality, consistency, accuracy, clarity, and hating irrelevance and arbitrariness, and those which are derivative from the human's social dimension, such as freedom, respect for persons, and considering others' interests or 'the demand that the human condition should be ameliorated in so far as it is possible'. Peters refers to these values sometimes as 'democratic values' (1981, pp. 36-7), and sometimes as 'the ultimate values' which he thinks underpin the system of rational morality because he holds that what he calls 'the fundamental principles of morality' are articulations of these ultimate values (1972, pp. 88-9). He also thinks that the aims of education are articulations of these values (1981, p. 37).

To explain Peters' view that values associated with reason are procedural, I will discuss his account of Plato's conception of reason. According to Peters, except for some shortcomings, Plato's perception of reason is right. Plato regards reason as a mental faculty within us, required to be developed by education. The main shortcoming which Peters sees in Plato’s view is his belief that the development of reason, in the end culminates in certainty of the sort that he found in Geometry. Peters does not believe in such a certainty, not only in moral, but even in mathematical reasoning. In the development of reason, according to Peters, what is important is not attaining a particular conclusion, or achieving some final state of understanding. Instead, the way of understanding is more important than the content of the matter. While Peters thinks that Plato's belief that the values associated with reason are substantive leads him to think that reason leads to a certain content, Peters believes that these values are procedural; they make a framework in which we can think rationally, they do not provide a certain content. From this, he comes to the view that for any moral theory to be rational it must follow those fundamental principles which are articulations of these values, and are procedural in nature as these values are.

In summary, the main characteristics of ancient rationalism were that reason has a certain content, that reason is a source of knowledge which can play the role of criteria and their value and validity is substantive. To the extent that Peters considers reason as necessarily evaluative, he is in the Platonic line, but he separates himself from Platonic thought by holding that those values are procedural.

A summary of Peters' view on the nature of reason

I summarize Peters view on this matter as follows:

1- Peters holds that it is reason which makes humans of value.

2- The origin of reason is a kind of simple consciousness with which child is born. But it is still only a foundation for rationality and to be developed it needs to be in a public world, in a social situation.

3- Peters sees an individual or personal aspect for reason, on the one hand, and a public aspect on the other. That is, reason is a personal and individual entity by means of which each one mirrors the world from a particular point of view, but at the same time it is a specific instance of public mind.

4- While Peters believes in two, individual and social dimensions of mind and reason, the final analysis which he provides says that reason is internalized public procedures, a specific instance of public mind -- that the social dimension of reason is dominant.

5- The Co-operative nature of reason; the fact that reason will find truth better if it is in co-operation with others, emerges from the public nature of reason.