10/3/2018
Workshop in
Property rights and collective action in natural resourceswith application to Mexico
June4-7, 2007
Casa de California
Mexico City
Taught by Gordon Rausser and Camille Antinori
Course description and objectives:
Control and accessto natural resources is often a product of and a determinant of wealth, income and well-being. Changing ownership and access rights to natural resources can therefore have significant implications for stakeholders. However, the mechanisms through which these processes work are complex and multidimensional. Mexico is an excellent case study of how rights to land resources have played a pivotal role in its history and current economic activities.
An extensive but disjointed literature exists which bears on these issues. The aim of this course is bring together the most relevant of these works to illustrate linkages and the gaps which remain. We focus on natural resource management where property rights and collective action are central aspects. Mexico is one among many examples used to shed light on why ownership and institutions matter in an economic sense. Lectures will cover the political economy of natural resources;commonpropertytheory, various branches of contract theory, empirical challenges, governance and the distribution of wealth; and interdisciplinary work. Our goals are that, at the end of the course, participants will have a clearer appreciation of 1) the role of property and collective decisionmaking in generating economic safety nets, political power and wealth, and 2) strategies for analyzing economic behavior around the allocation of property rights and control.
There will be no written assignment. To gain the full benefit of the course, participants should attend all lectures and read a small set of assigned readings before the lecture to which they apply. Course lectures will be conducted in English. Ample time will be given for discussion.
The course entails two lectures a day. The morning lecture is held 10:00 – 13:00 and the afternoon lecture 16:00 – 18:30.
Lectures cover:
Lecture 1 Introduction to political economy of natural resources (Rausser)
Lecture 2 Theories of collective action, cooperation and common property (Antinori)
Lecture 3 Principal – agent theory and institutional organization (Antinori)
Lecture 4 Incomplete contracts, or why property rights matter (Antinori)
Lecture 5 A political economy model (Rausser)
Lectures 6 Power, influence and the distribution of benefits (Antinori)
Lecture 7 Problems with empirical measurement (Antinori and Garcia-Lopez)
Lecture 8 An interdisciplinary perspective (Antinori)
The course is open to scholars, practitioners and anyone interested in the material, and is free of charge. Background in economics would be extremely helpful but not necessary.
The Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) and the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) are co-organizers of the course. For information on subscribing, please contact:
Dr. Juan Manuel Torres Rojo (CIDE)
juanmanuel.torres at cide.edu
For syllabus and questions about the material covered, please contact:
Dr. Camille Antinori (UCB)
antinori at are.berkeley.edu
Syllabus (subject to marginal changes)
The syllabus below gives the schedule of classes and lectures. Assigned readings are indicated by “Readings”. Background material for the lecture is not assigned reading but is listed for your interest and further study. Lectures will be held at the Casa de California in Mexico City, with one lecture in the morning 10:00 – 13:00and another in the afternoon 16:00 – 18:30for each day of the course.
Lecture 1Introduction to political economy of natural resources (Rausser)
Topics covered:
- Motivation for the course
- The economic lens of resource policy
- The implications of ill-defined property rights
- Case study examples of common pool resources
Readings:
Bruce Gardiner and Gordon Rausser, eds. Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Volume 2B: Agricultural and Food Policy Elsevier: New York, 2002. Chapter 39.
Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (Science, 1968).
Gordon Rausser and Pinhas Zusman, Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, CambridgeUniversity Press: New York, Forthcoming. Chapter 9.
Lecture based on (no readings required):
Gordon Rausser and Pinhas Zusman, Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, CambridgeUniversity Press: New York, Forthcoming.
Lecture 2Theories of collective action, cooperation and common property (Antinori)
Readings:
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press. Chapters 2, 6.
Topics covered:
- The problem of collective action
- Repeated games and multiple equilibrium
- Cross scale linkages among institutions
- Experimental collective action, role of communication and enforcement
- Prescriptions and remedies
- How does Mexican forestry represent a collective action problem?
- Historical motivation and precedence of Mexico’s agrarian system of common property
Lecture also based on (no readings required):
Leticia Merino Perez, Conservacion o Deterio: El Impacto de las Politicas Publicas en las Instituciones Comunitarias y en los Usos de los Bosques en Mexico. INE-SEMANAT: Mexico City. 2004.
Camille Antinori and Rausser, Gordon, "Collective Choice and Community Forestry Management in Mexico: An Empirical Analysis", Journal of Development Studies, 43:3, pp. 512-536, 2007.
Bray, Merino and Barry, 2006. The Community Forests of Mexico: Managing for Sustainable Landscapes. University of Texas Press: Austin.
Antinori et al., “New Interdisciplinary Research on Mexico's Common Property Forests: A National Survey”, Paper presented at Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of the Commons, Oaxaca, Mexico 2004.
Daniel Klooster, “Campesinos and MexicanForest Policy During the 20th Century”,
Latin American Research Review, 38:2, pp. 94-125, 2002.
Lecture 3Principal-agent analysisand institutional organization (Antinori)
Readings:
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1970. Pages 44-54, 76-79, 120-126, 129-131.
Henry Manne, "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control", Journal of Political Economy, 73: 2, 1965.
Eugene Fama and Jensen, Michael, "The Separation of Ownership and Control",
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 26, 1983.
Peter Taylor (2000). "Producing More with Less? Community Forestry in Durango, Mexico in an Era of Trade Liberalization", Rural Sociology 65:2, pp 253-274.
Topics covered:
- Separation of ownership and control
- Bounded rationality and opportunism
- The market for control
- The principal – agent model for contract choice
- Role of information and monitoring
- Application to German and Mexican community forestry
- Role of opportunity costs and opportunities for exit
- Holmstrom-Milgrom’s multi-task model for job design
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Peter Leigh Taylor, 2001. “Community Forestry as Embedded Process: Two Cases from Durango and Quintana Roo, Mexico”, International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 9:1.
Antinori, Camille and Bray, David, “CommunityForest Enterprises as Entrepreneurial Firms: Economic and Institutional Perspectives from Mexico”, World Development, September 2005.
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design,” JLEO 7.
David Kang and Aage Sorensen 1999. “Ownership Organization and Firm Performance”, Annual Review of Sociology, 25, pp 121-144.
Lecture 4Incomplete contracts, or why property rights matter(Antinori)
Readings:
Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure,1995. Chapter 2
Antinori and Rausser, 2007. “Ownership and Control in Mexico’s Community Forestry Sector.” Working paper.
Topics covered:
- Asset inequality and poverty / Asset-based wealth
- Property rights theory and incomplete contracting
- Basic model for incomplete contracting
- Applications in Mexican forestry
- Criticisms of incomplete contracting
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Camille Antinori, 2000. Vertical Integration in Mexican Common PropertyForests,
Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro, Black Wealth/White Wealth: A New Perspective on Racial Inequality, Routledge 2006.
Maskin and Tirole, 1999. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts / Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature”, Review of Economic Studies 66.
Christopher Woodruff, “Noncontractible investments and vertical integration in the Mexican Footwear Industry,” IJIO, V20, 2002.
Gordon Hanson, “Incomplete Contracts, Risk and Ownership,” IER, 1995.
Lecture 5A political economy model (Rausser)
Readings:
Gordon Rausser and Pinhas Zusman, Political Power and Endogenous Policy Formation, CambridgeUniversity Press: New York, Forthcoming. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6.
Topics covered:
- Overview of models of Nash bargaining
- Results when Nash-Harsanyi axioms do not hold
- Need for alternative bargain framework
- Distribution of power and welfare under a multiple stakeholder model with multiple goods
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Simon, Goodhue, Rausser et al “Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy”. 2006.
Zusman, Pinhas, 1992. “Constitutional Selection of Collective Choice Rules in a Cooperative Enterprise,” JEBO 17.
Lectures 6Power, influence and the distribution of benefits (Antinori)
Readings:
Anne Larson and Jesse Ribot, 2004. “DemocraticDecentralizationthrough a Natural Resources Lens: An Introduction”, European Journal of Development Research, 16:1, pp1-25.
Peter Wilshusen, 2007. “Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico”. Conference paper, 2007 Annual Meeting of Association of American Geographers, San Francisco.
Topics covered:
- Critiques of decentralization and devolution
- Equity and efficiency
- Distribution of benefits under different governance structures
- Endogenous bargaining power
- Comparison of common property management regimes with agricultural and industrial cooperatives
- Incorporating technical uncertainty and local knowledge into adaptive ecosystem management
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Anja Nygren, 2005. “Community-Based Forest Management Within the Context of Institutional Decentralization in Honduras”, World Development 33:4, pp. 639-655.
Shirli Kopelman, J. Mark Weber, David M. Messick, 2002. “Factors Influencing Cooperation in Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research.” In The Drama of the Commons, NationalAcademy Press: Washington, D.C.
Lecture 7Problems with empiricalmeasurement (Antinori and Garcia-Lopez)
Readings:
Dani Rodrik, “Getting Institutions Right”, manuscript, 2004.
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996-2005”. See World Bank website:
Topics covered:
- Developing indicators for a political economy
- The endogeneity issue
- Social capital indicators: what are they and how to use them
- Performance measures
- Survey methodology
Guest lecture: Gustavo Garcia Lopez, PhD candidate, IndianaUniversity; field investigator on National Community Forests of Mexico Project. Speaking on field experiences, challenges, lessons learned.
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Joel Sobel, “Can We Trust Social Capital?” Journal of Economic Literature 2002.
Jefferey M. Sellers and Lidstrom, Anders, “Local Government and the Welfare State”,
Governance, 20:4, Forthcoming, 2007.
Vanessa Perez-Cirera, and Lovett, Jon C., “Power distribution, the external environment and common property forest governance: A local user groups model”, Ecological Economics, pp. 341-352, 59, 2006.
Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mookerjee, 2000. “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels,” American Economic Review, 90:2, pp. 135-139.
Steve Durlauf, 2002. “On the Empirics of Social Capital”, Economic Journal 112, pp. F459-F479.
Lecture 8An interdisciplinary perspective (Antinori)
Readings:
Pranab Bardhan and Isha Ray, “Methodological Approaches to the Question of the Commons” EDCC 2006
David Mosse, “Collective Action, Common Property, and Social Capital in South India: An Anthropological Commentary,” EDCC 2006
Topics covered:
- What do other disciplines offer to analysis of the commons and collective action?
- Market exchange v. gift exchange
- Anthropological v. economic interpretation of a common problem: South India
- How combine case study and empirical analysis
- Can we bridge interdisciplinary gaps?
Lecture also based on (no reading required):
Laura Nader, Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a ZapotecMountainVillage, StanfordUniversity Press, Stanford, Calif., 1990.
Jesse Ribot, 1998. “Theorizing Access: Forest Profits along Senegal’s Charcoal Commodity Chain”, Development and Change 29, pp. 307-341.
Bronislaw Malinowski 1961. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. Plume.
Jean Ensminger, 1997. “Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Formal and Informal Rights to Land in Africa." In The Frontiers of the New Institutional Economics, John N. Drobak and John V.C. Nye, eds. Pp. 165-198. New York, New York: Academic Press.
Alejandro Velazquez, Alejandro Torres, and Gerardo Bocco, editors. 2003. Las Ensenanzas de San Juan: Investigacion Participative para el Manejo integral de recursos naturals. SEMARNAT/INE/State government of Michoacan.
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