Promoting Police Professionalism

PROMOTING POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

Guidelines on the role that police oversight agencies can play to promote police integrity through monitoring action taken against police misconduct and corruption

Contact details:

Gareth Newham

Crime and Justice Programme Head

+27 12-346-9500 (tel)

+27 12-346-9570 (fax)

www.issafrica.org

1. Introduction

To be successful in what can be dangerous work, police officials are granted the power to arrest and, when necessary, use force against their fellow citizens. However, everywhere in the world these powers can result in an occupational hazard that is unique to police when compared to other public servants. This hazard is the opportunity to use these powers for reasons other than achieving legal police objectives. When these powers are abused, the result is often police corruption, brutality or misconduct. These behaviours are substantially damaging to the police’s image in the eyes of the public.

To counterbalance this particular problem, democratic states around the world establish civilian police oversight agencies. These agencies are typically tasked with holding police leadership accountable for ensuring that those under their command adhere to the law and their governments’ stated policies.

In South Africa, the task of holding the police accountable is assigned to three important civilian oversight agencies, namely the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police, the National Civilian Secretariat for Police, and the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID). These agencies can play an important role to ensure that the South African Police Service (SAPS) effectively prevents and tackles corruption within its ranks and promotes professional standards. By asking the right questions and monitoring appropriate data, police oversight agencies can identify key challenges facing the police and then use their power to encourage police leadership to take a proactive approach to addressing these challenges.

This booklet is an initiative of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and intends to assist South African civilian oversight agencies to strengthen their ability to enhance police accountability so as to promote professionalism and integrity. In particular, it briefly discusses key challenges facing the SAPS, suggests questions that civilian oversight organisations can ask of police leaders, and provides indicators that can be used to assess police performance.

The different agencies, however, may require different levels of information from the SAPS. For example, the Portfolio Committee on Police may require two annual briefings and request data for a six-month period each time. The Secretariat of Police may require SAPS data on a monthly basis so that it can establish a monthly monitoring and evaluation system regarding tracking police misconduct, criminality and corruption and the response of the SAPS to such incidences. It will also be necessary for oversight agencies to obtain independent information and analysis of police data from sources other than the SAPS, such as, for example, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate, or research organisations.

This booklet is structured to encourage and assist engagement with the following key issues:

·  Promoting the SAPS Code of Conduct & Ethics

·  Complaints management and public trust

·  Police misconduct and discipline

·  Police criminality and corruption

·  Monitoring the implementation of the new SAPS Anti-Corruption Strategy

2. Promoting the Code of Conduct & Ethics

The SAPS has developed both a code of conduct (see annexure A of this document) and a code of ethics (see annexure B). These two codes are very important documents that set out the core values and principles to which each police official is expected to adhere. Each SAPS official is expected to read and sign these codes and then be held accountable to them.

Indeed, the National Development Plan (NPD) adopted by cabinet states that, ‘In the short term, the code of conduct should be included in the disciplinary regulations and the performance appraisal system of the police.’ The plan goes on to state that any breaches of these codes should be dealt with by the disciplinary system as a matter of priority.

Interestingly, the SAPS stopped presenting its SAPS Code of Conduct or Code of Ethics in the 2011/12 Annual Report. These codes used to be a dominant feature of the SAPS Annual Reports, reminding readers of the ethical standards that police officials are expected to uphold. The NPD also states that ‘mandated oversight bodies’ should monitor adherence to these codes. It is therefore recommended that the members of all police oversight agencies and structures become familiar with these codes and use them in their interactions and engagements with the SAPS. This is necessary as it will emphasise the importance of using these codes so as to continually guide police behaviour and decision-making. If this does not happen, it is very likely that once the document is signed, it gets shelved and forgotten about.

It is therefore recommended that civilian oversight agencies regularly ask the following questions of and request the following information from the SAPS:

·  An update with practical examples as to how these codes are integrated into the disciplinary procedures and performance appraisal systems of the SAPS.

·  Explanations about how these codes are integrated into the recruitment and vetting processes of the SAPS.

·  Explanations of how training is provided so that police officials use these codes to guide their decisions and behaviour.

·  Explanations of how SAPS plans and strategies promote the values and principles contained in these codes.

·  Why are these codes no longer being profiled in the SAPS Annual Reports?

3. Complaints management and public trust

Police have a responsibility to make sure South Africans are safe and to enforce the law. They also have a duty to uphold the constitutional rights of citizens. To be successful in these important responsibilities the police must enjoy the trust of the public. Nothing is more detrimental to public trust in the police than instances of police corruption and other abuses of power.

In order for civilian oversight organisations to monitor the extent to which the public trust and are willing to work with the police, they should regularly monitor the number and nature of complaints made by members of the public against police officials. Tracking public complaints against the police over time is important because it reveals practices and behaviours by police officials that undermine public confidence in them. This information can be used to identify where and how police leadership should focus on strengthening internal controls and processes such as training and supervision. Oversight agencies can assess the extent to which police plans and strategies are likely to be effective and track the extent to which they have an impact over time.

Various surveys show that South Africans do not trust the police to the extent that they should. For example, the annual survey undertaken by the Human Sciences Research Council found that well under half (41%) of all citizens trusted the police in 2011.

Focus group research conducted in 2010 by the ISS further found that some South Africans believe it is difficult or dangerous to complain about poor police conduct and that complaints against the police are ignored.

I don’t know where I can go because they [the police] cover for each other,

so you don’t know where to report. (Cape Town resident)

As most police work takes place without direct supervision it is essential that the public is easily able to report instances of misconduct, corruption and abuse. Ideally, there should be a central public complaints reporting mechanism that is located at the SAPS head office. The steps for laying a complaint should be well publicised and user friendly. All complaints should be recorded by the central complaints mechanism before being processed and referred for further investigation or action. In this way, the SAPS would be in a position to monitor the nature and trends of complaints across the country. This would allow for SAPS Senior Management to identify particular emerging trends, assess the root causes and take appropriate action before too much damage to the police organisation occurs.

Police oversight agencies would also be able to access this information on a regular basis and assess the extent to which police management was effectively managing conduct throughout the organisation. Moreover, oversight agencies could request independent assessments or audits on the effectiveness of the complaints mechanisms and the impact of police management response to the information at their disposal.

In addition to effective complaint management and internal investigative systems, the SAPS should also develop a mechanism through which it can process civilian commendations for excellent service. Ensuring that all South Africans feel that the SAPS is receptive to both positive and negative criticism will help build a police/civilian relationship based on trust. Commendations can also serve as a source of institutional pride for the SAPS and be used by commanders to help identify officials worthy of promotion.

The SAPS Annual Report describes six different ways citizens can make complaints against police officials. However, the SAPS does not report how many complaints are received, the nature of the complaints, or what police management did to address the complaints and prevent them from re-occurring. It therefore appears as though the SAPS system for recording and responding to complaints is weak and under-utilised. This fundamentally undermines efforts to promote professionalism within the organisation.

In addition, without monitoring and analysing the complaints that the SAPS receives, it is impossible for oversight agencies to determine the extent to which police strategies and plans to tackle corruption, misconduct and poor service delivery or promote professionalism are having the desired impact.

The SAPS Annual Reports also provide no information about the systems the organisation uses to receive reports of excellent service from its members. Nor is information provided about how community commendations are used to allocate rewards to police officials.

It is recommended that the civilian oversight agencies request that the following information be regularly provided to them by the SAPS:

·  A clear description of how the complaints system functions, the resources available to run the system, key challenges facing the system and information on how these challenges are being addressed so as to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the system.

·  The complaints against police officials that are received by the SAPS complaint mechanisms each year.

·  A breakdown of the nature of complaints that distinguishes between criminal, misconduct and service delivery-related complaints.

·  The average length of time investigations take until a decision is made to discipline, prosecute or dismiss the complaint.

·  The profile of police officials who receive the most complaints by station, unit, component, rank and time employed in the SAPS.

4. Police misconduct and discipline

When police officials engage in misconduct it undermines public trust and confidence in the police organisation. Once a complaint is received and recorded by the SAPS, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that the allegations contained are quickly and effectively investigated. This will ensure that misconduct is immediately addressed and will send out a strong message that it will not be tolerated by the organisation. Timely and thorough investigations will play a substantial role in building public trust in the police. Just as importantly, those police officials who are wrongfully accused will quickly be cleared and will not be unnecessarily demoralised by having false accusations hanging over their heads for too long. Given the importance of discipline for professional policing, systems for strengthening internal police accountability should be given priority by both police management and external oversight agencies.

There is no information in the SAPS Annual Reports about internal investigations arising as a result of criminal, misconduct or service delivery-related complaints. The only reference to police misconduct in the SAPS Annual Report is a table that presents the outcomes of disciplinary hearings finalised during the reporting period.

For example, the SAPS Annual Reports present the following information:

Misconduct and disciplinary hearings finalised 2007/08 to 2011/12

Outcome / 2007/08 / 2008/09 / 2009/10 / 2010/11 / 2011/12
Correctional counselling / 73 / 126 / 136 / 179 / 136
Verbal warning / 242 / 52 / 67 / 77 / 80
Written warning / 522 / 267 / 401 / 593 / 479
Final written warning / 161 / 191 / 263 / 474 / 337
Fine / 484 / 658 / 917 / 1 160 / 978
Suspended dismissal / 234 / 507 / 670 / 1 034 / 792
Demotion / 6 / 2 / 2 / 0 / 0
Dismissal / 228 / 366 / 506 / 520 / 532
Case withdrawn / 977 / 446 / 869 / 721 / 864
Not guilty / 529 / 849 / 272 / 685 / 1 185
Suspended without payment / 20 / 15 / 33 / 28 / 27
Postponement of sanction / - / - / - / - / 130
Total / 3 476 / 3 479 / 4 136 / 5 471 / 5 540

From the information provided in the SAPS Annual Report the following conclusions can be drawn:

·  The number of finalised disciplinary hearings increased by 2 064 instances or 59% between 2007/08 and 2011/12. During this period, the total number of SAPS employees grew by 15%. This shows that the rate of disciplinary hearings held is increasing at four times the rate of the increase in personnel. This means that there is a substantial increase in disciplinary steps being taken in the SAPS. This is typically a good sign if it means that police management is taking more disciplinary action when cases of misconduct become apparent.

·  However, the number of hearings ending in a dismissal decreased from 12,2% in 2009/10 to 9,6% in 2011/12, while total hearings increased by 59% in the same period. This suggests that hearings are being used to resolve more petty cases of misconduct that should be handled by supervisors. This could reveal that supervisors are taking less direct responsibility for promoting discipline and are referring cases to hearings instead.

·  Over a third (36%) of the disciplinary hearings held end with no sanction. This is because a total of 2 049 cases were withdrawn or ended in a not guilty verdict. Given that holding disciplinary hearings is a very resource intensive exercise, there is a need to identify the reasons why such a large number of cases are registered only to be withdrawn or end in an acquittal.