Intro
In this part we will examine basic views in ethics that reject abstract principles. After briefly reviewing some problems with theories that rely on basic principles, we will cover:
Rule theory
Particularism
Case method
Virtue theory
Feminism
Problems of High-Level Theories
We began this section with briefly examining two very basic theories, utilitarianism and Kantian deontology, each claiming that all moral problems and decisions could be resolved using one or two principles. These principles are very abstract, without much detail, and very general, covering all cases, no matter how complex.
Many philosophers object to such theories because they are too abstract and therefore don’t give us good guidance in difficult cases.
Take utilitarianism, for example.
Aside from leaving us with the overwhelmingly difficult and imprecise task of determining how we can make the greatest number of people happy, utilitarianism demands too much. In theory, every action needs to be guided by the principle of the greatest action for the greatest number. Whether I should go to work this morning, do a diagnostic test, or eat lunch must be evaluated to determine if it contributes the greatest happiness to the greatest number. This seems overbearing, and even morally counterproductive. We almost always, at the moment, can find something better to do, in terms of making more people happy, then what we are doing, even when it is a diagnostic test or care for a child. At times doing something that contributes greater happiness may conflict with other moral obligations. [Think of scenarios where this is so.]
Kantian morality is also problematic.
Unlike utilitarianism, Kantian morality is essentially negative. If we can’t universalize an action, it should not be done. But how can such universalization be used to decide difficult cases, whether to stop a treatment, honor a religious objection to blood transfusion, or enter an incompetent person into a research protocol? While utilitarians, in principle, have an answer to each problem -- do what gives the greatest happiness -- Kantians seem to have little to say about many real moral dilemmas.
Think of this moral problem. Suppose a decision needs to be made about taking a middle-aged person in a persistent vegetative state off a ventilator when that person’s parents object. The case is problematic because an advance directive was discovered after the treatment was begun. That makes it clear that the person did not want to be kept alive under such circumstances. What should be done?
Try applying the utilitarian theory. What would make everyone the happiest? Be sure to include everyone. Isn’t your answer quite speculative? How do we even go about calculating what would make everyone happiest? Now try to universalize. Is it reasonable to have a moral law that we can remove any person from a ventilator with an advance director when his or her parents object? That is hard to figure.
Principlism is intended to solve such problems. But critics say that it doesn’t go far enough. It still offers only a few, usually four, principles, and these are very abstract. And they may conflict in difficult cases, or demand too much, as with the principle of beneficence.
Try using principlism to answer the question about discontinuing treatment when parents object. Again, it is hard to decide.
The answer, to some, is to go to more concrete guidance. Principles are too abstract, “Don’t harm” for example covers every type of harm under every circumstance. But a more particular rule, such as “Don’t lie,” covers a particular kind of activity, convening information. It is much more specific, and so can give clearer guidance. Princplism may offer such rules as ways to explain how principles are to be applied, but critics say that this still leaves vague principles as the main driving force in the theory.
Rule Theory
One answer is to reject principles and get right to moral rules. Moral rules are more precise and deal with the main requirements of morality. They don’t demand too much and, when applicable, give good guidance.
Here is a list of ten moral rules presented by Bernard Gert.
1.Don't kill.
2.Don't cause pain.
3.Don't disable.
4.Don't deprive people of freedom.
5.Don't deprive people of pleasure.
6.Don't deceive.
7.Keep your promises.
8.Don't cheat.
9.Obey the law.
10.Do your duty.
Not a bad list.
Remember some of those shocking news stories about cult leaders, claiming to have great moral wisdom, yet they violated moral rules all the time, even to the point of cheating, deceiving, and frequently depriving followers of pleasure.
Normally, breaking moral rules is wrong.
What happens when moral rules conflict? Suppose keeping a promise ends up deceiving someone. What happens when doing one’s duty causes pain?
Sometimes it seems acceptable to break a promise. For example, a promise to take one’s children to the circus might conflict with an unexpected and unusual opportunity to attend a special, one in a lifetime, much-desired event. This may be a valid exception to the moral rule about promise keeping.
How can justify exceptions to moral rules, and how can we decide which rules to keep when the conflict?
These issues, how to make decisions when obligations conflict or when exceptions, is crucial in bioethics. Tough cases in bioethics are tough, morally speaking, because there are conflicting obligations or exceptional circumstances. So figuring out how we deal with conflicts is crucial in making good decisions.
One answer is to use our moral “intuitions.” In moral theory, intuitions are judgments that are not the product of reasoning. We judge that we like a symphony, but we don’t arrive at that conclusion by offering reasons. Instead we pay careful attention, and judge by what we hear. Similarly, in morality we use our intuitions by paying careful attention to the details of a case, and then simply decide. In this view, we use our moral sense, or our moral intuitions, to determine whether an exception is valid or to decide which rule should be followed when rules conflict.
Another answer is to appeal to what a reasonable person would do, and to seek public approval for our decision. Would a reasonable person take his or her children to the circus when promised? Would other reasonable people approve the decision? [Note: One may actually seek the approval of others, or one may just think about what others would approve of. If one simply thinks about it, then this is a device used to help us make a decision, much like an older person might make decisions by wondering what her or his deceased mother or father would have said. Or we might imagine one of our esteemed colleagues, one whose judgment we respected. What would that person have decided? So the appeal to what other reasonable people would say, may be hypothetical.]
Using intuitions seems too arbitrary, and thinking about what reasonable people would want seems too abstract. So many object to rule theory because it cannot deal effectively with exceptions and conflicts among rules.
How far did we get? Remember the case about the person in PVS whose parents object to being taken off the ventilator. How would a rule theorist respond to this? That is tough to decide.
Maybe tough moral cases make for bad moral thinking.
Moral rules and principles can get us pretty far. We know that it is typically wrong to deceive, to break promises, and to avoid doing our duty. We need to respect autonomy, and avoid doing harm. Thus, moral rules frequently give us good moral guidance. They should be used; we want others to, and we should ourselves. But they are not the whole of morality, as some theorists think.
Tough cases are tough partly because they don’t fit into any neat categories. We need ways to deal with tough cases, but so far we seem only to have the basic ingredients of moral thinking and not enough to make good decisions in difficult cases.