Privileging Biological Or Social Relationships: Family Policy on Obligations to Children

*Conference draft: Please do not cite*

Privileging Biological or Residential Relationships: Family Policy on Obligations to Children in 12 Countries

Daniel R. Meyer

University of Wisconsin–Madison

School of Social Work

Institute for Research on Poverty

Christine Skinner

University of York

Department of Social Policy and Social Work

Jacqueline Davidson

University of York

Social Policy Research Unit

DRAFT August 2012

We thank Deborah Johnson for assistance with the manuscript and Emily Warren and Vanessa Rios Salas for research assistance.

ABSTRACT

Children’s domestic living arrangements have become increasingly complex over the last several decades in developed countries, with increasing numbers of children born to parents who do not live together, and, even among those born to parents who do live together, increasing numbers are experiencing their parents separating and one or both re-partnering. Children may live with a variety of adults including biological parents, married step-parents, cohabiting step-parents, and, perhaps, other adults who have no biological relationship to the child but do take on aspects of the parental role. In countries with generous and well-developed welfare states, these demographic changes may have few consequences for the economic well-being of children. But in other countries, these demographic changes raise complex questions about who has financial responsibility for the children. In this paper, we identify six common family transitions that children may experience and conceptualize how different potential child support (child maintenance) schemes might deal with these transitions. We then investigate how the child support policies in place in the mid-2000s in several countries handle these family transitions, and use the results of this analysis to categorize countries into the five potential child support schemes. Finally, we compare the categorization of child support schemes with the level of family complexity in each country to see if countries with the highest levels of complexity tend to organize responsibility differently.

To examine these trends and document the differences between countries, Andersson (2002) attempts to provide comparable and systematic data across a range of sixteen developed countries.[1] Andersson (2002) found substantial variation in the proportion of children born outside of residential unions (that is, whose parents were not cohabiting or married). It varied from 3% of births or less in five of the countries he studied, including Finland, to more than 17-18% in the United States (17%) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR; because he is tracking children’s lives over time, he uses data prior to German reunification). Of these children born outside of unions, it is relatively common for them to experience their mother beginning a new residential partnership (either cohabitation or marriage), often fairly quickly. In seven of nine countries for which there is data, more than half of these children experienced their mother partnering (which may be re-partnering) by the time they were nine years of age (Andersson 2002). But even though this is a common experience, there is substantial variation in proportions, from 32% in Poland to 87% in the GDR.

Family instability and complexity is not just an issue for children born outside of unions. For those born in an unmarried cohabiting relationship, by the time they were nine, one-quarter or more had experienced the dissolution of their parents’ relationship in twelve of fourteen countries, and, among these countries, Hungary (48%), Latvia (58%), and the United States (64%) have very high rates. In contrast, rates of dissolution in Italy are estimated to be quite low (7%). While the rate of dissolution is lower for children born in marriage, more than one in ten marital children has experienced dissolution by age nine in twelve of the sixteen countries with data (Andersson 2002). The high rates of dissolution are followed in many countries by high rates of re-partnering; within three years of parental separation (either marital or nonmarital) more than one-third of children experienced their residential parent being in a union again in Norway, United States, Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovenia.

The conclusions from these data are clear: first, the degree of family instability varies substantially across countries. This has also been documented in other studies, examining different countries and different indicators of children’s experiences (e.g., Chapple 2009; Iacovou & Skew 2010; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2011). Second, regardless of the circumstances of a child’s birth, a large proportion of children will experience some time living apart from one of their biological parents, and many of these will experience time living with one of their parent’s new partners.

Family instability raises questions about who has financial responsibility for children. When children live with their biological parents, it is clear that both parents have financial responsibility for the children. When children live with only one biological parent, countries have developed a variety of child support (child maintenance) policies that outline whether the resident parent, the nonresident parent, some other adult, or some combination has financial responsibility for them (Corden 1999; Meyer, Skinner & Davidson 2011; Skinner & Davidson 2009). However, as can be seen in the data on family complexity, children may go on to live with a variety of adults including biological parents, married step-parents, cohabiting step-parents, and, perhaps, other adults who have no biological relationship to the child but do take on aspects of the parental role. These family transitions raise complex questions about who has financial responsibility for the children.

In this paper, we identify six common family transitions that children may experience and conceptualize how different potential child support schemes might deal with these transitions. We then investigate how the child support policies in place in the mid-2000s in several countries handle these family transitions, and use the results of this analysis to categorize countries into the five potential child support schemes. Finally, we compare the categorization of child support schemes with the level of family complexity in each country to see if countries with the highest levels of complexity tend to organize responsibility differently.

I. Conceptual Overview of Biological and Residential Responsibility Schemes

An important distinction in classifying family policy across countries is whether financial responsibility for children resides primarily in private relationships or in the state, and a substantial amount has been written on this topic (e.g., Cunningham-Burley & Jamieson 2003; Eekelaar 1991; Esping-Anderson 2009). One key distinction is between residual welfare states (in which individual families have primary financial responsibility, with the state playing a role only when parents are not able to provide) and those countries in which financial provision for children is seen more as society’s responsibility as a whole. Another broad distinction is whether policy allows for defamilialization, that is, the extent to which the state provides social rights to a minimum income standard that means individuals do not need to rely on the family (Hantrais 2004). The literature on the role of parents versus the state and the family versus the state is fairly well developed, but it is not our focus here. Instead, we are interested in the private sphere, in identifying which adults are responsible, given family changes.

We begin our categorization of child support schemes of assigning responsibility for children by outlining common family transitions. Distinctions between schemes are easiest to see when family transitions occur because different types of transitions change responsibilities in some schemes and not others. In the top panel of Table 1 we introduce notation and identify a base case and six transitions. The base case is simple: a focal child lives with one parent (the resident parent, R) and the other parent is living elsewhere (the nonresident parent, N), and neither of these parents is living with a partner or has had children with another partner. There are then six main family transitions of interest that could occur from this base case. The transitions are differentiated by which parent gains a new partner — the nonresident parent gains a new partner (NNP) in T1 and the resident parent gains a new partner (RNP) in T4. The transitions are further separated by whether the new partnership includes an “old” child (the child of the new partner, the stepchild of the focal child’s parent) in T2 and T5 or a “new” child (a biological child of the focal child’s parent and the new partner) in T3 and T6. There are other potential transitions that we could include, including the addition of new children without a new resident partner, or the dissolution of the relationship with a new partner, or combinations of these transitions; we ignore these because the issues are closely related to other cases we cover.

In the base case, and after each of these transitions, children live with one parent (R) and the other parent (N) lives elsewhere; in some of these cases children also live with another adult, their parent’s new partner (RNP). Which of these adults should have financial responsibility for the child? Countries assign responsibilities differently, as seen in their child support schemes. One key division is between biological responsibility and residential responsibility. Under an extreme biological scheme determining parentage is critical. A child’s two biological parents always retain financial responsibility, regardless of their family transitions.[2] Thus, in the base case, the resident parent, R, would have obvious responsibility and the nonresident parent, N, would also be responsible, with the obligations paid as child support under whatever rules or guidelines are in place. If either or both parents re-partner and live with new children (either biological, or the children of the new partner), it would not matter: biological parents have full responsibility. This is the first of our five schemes (A-E) defined in Table 1 as “A: Biology Absolute.” The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that no transition affects N’s obligation to his/her biological child.

In contrast, in an extreme residential scheme, financial responsibility for a child would end if a parent/adult stopped living with a child (or financial responsibility would never start if the parents never lived together following the birth of the child). Because no parent has financial responsibilities for nonresidential children, no child support system is required. Only resident parents would be responsible for the child until/unless the resident parent re-partners, in which case the new partner would also have responsibility for all children and stepchildren with whom he/she lives.[3] No developed country that we are aware of has this type of extreme residential scheme, so we do not consider it here.

We do, however, consider a scheme, “B: Residence Primary,” in which residence is more important than biology in some instances. In this scheme, a country requires a nonresident parent to be financially responsible in the simple base case, consistent with a principle in which two separated biological parents should be financially responsible for any child (as long as they do not have other obligations). But in scheme B, any other residential transition could change who is responsible for a child, with residence being more important than biology. First consider any type of transition that involves the resident parent living with a new partner, whether they have new children or not (T4-T6). In this case, the focal child becomes their joint financial responsibility because of their joint residence and the nonresident parent’s child support responsibility is lessened or ends. Alternatively, consider the division of responsibilities when it is the nonresident parent who re-partners (T1-T3). If the nonresident parent lives with a new partner, he/she has obligations to the new partner, as well as to any children living in their home (whether step or biological children), so the child support obligation to the original focal child is lessened (or perhaps eliminated). In these ways, residence trumps biological responsibilities. Thus the bottom panel shows that the financial obligation of N is lowered under any transition.

Note that in this scheme (and in others described below), we group together the elimination of financial responsibilities with the lowering of financial responsibilities. We do this for both pragmatic and conceptual reasons. Pragmatically, the data we will use to categorize countries are not always clear on whether child support is lowered or eliminated. Moreover, in many cases elimination of responsibility is merely the extreme case of lowering the obligation. For example, often N’s ability to pay support matters; N’s responsibility after a transition might be eliminated if there was deemed to be no ability to pay, a small amount if there was a small ability to pay, etcetera.

The third scheme we consider, “C: Biology Primary,” is similar to scheme A (Biology Absolute) in that biological relationships primarily define responsibilities. However, in this scheme more recognition is given to financial responsibility for residential biological children than biological children who lived elsewhere. In this scheme, if the nonresident parent re-partners but no children are involved (T1), or if the nonresident parent re-partners and has only stepchildren (T2), this does not affect the responsibility for the focal child, since biological relationships are primary. However, if the nonresident parent has a new biological child with whom he/she lives (T3), this would lessen the responsibility to a previous biological child (the focal child), since biology and residence together trump a child who has only biology. Because biology is primary in this scheme, N’s responsibilities to biological children are unaffected by R’s transitions (T4-T6).

In an adaptation of this scheme, “D: Biology Modified,” responsibility for biological children is still quite important, but responsibility for adult partners as well as for children is incorporated. The key difference between schemes C and D occurs when the nonresident parent takes a new partner, but no children are involved (T1). If a country wants to ensure that a nonresident parent fulfills obligations to a new partner, it could lower (or eliminate) the responsibility for the focal child whenever there is a new residential partner. In this scheme, though, there is no new responsibility for resident stepchildren (T2); they remain the responsibility of their biological parents. Nor does N have a change in responsibility for R’s transitions, since, for example, there is no responsibility for stepchildren (N’s biological child is RNP’s stepchild, and biological ties remain).