Preceptors: Brandon Miller De La Cuesta

ThePoliticsofDevelopment[1]

FallTerm2014

Widner

T, Th 9:00-10:00

Preceptors: Brandon Miller de la Cuesta,

Marcus Johnson, Xander Slaski, and Vinay Sitapati

The political philosopher Thomas Hobbes once asked how humanity could escape a world in which life was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”(Leviathan, chapter XIII, 1651). This quest lies at the core of the “political economy of development.”

Institutions have played a pivotal role in shaping human welfare and resolving—or deepening—the dilemma Hobbes identified. Governments can help create a world where people invest because they believe they will see the fruits of their laborand where standards of living rise in consequence. But governments can also become predators or bandits and perpetuate the infamous “war of all against all.” This course asks what shapes institutional effectiveness and accountability—and what leaders can do to help societies out of some of the governance traps that often sabotage development.

The initial lectures, precepts, and assignments consider what we mean by development, entertain several explanations for divergent patterns, and assess the various ways in which context may make the challenges of building effective and accountable government especially difficult. We then ask each of you to put yourself in the place of a leader who wants to improve the provision of public goods and serve an inclusive political community: What can you do to promote institutional change—or does history make a break with the past enormously difficult, as several scholars have recently suggested? The assignments include biography, conceptual and theoretical readings, some classic social science analysis, and practical case studies.

In addition to mastery of assigned reading selections, requirements include three auto-graded exercises (5% each), one 6-page data paper from list A (may be prepared by teams of up to three people, 15%), two 8 to10-page papers, one from list B and one from list C (15% each), a final take-home examination (25%), and class participation (15%). Note: Supplementary reading is completely optional unless you know the assigned selections already.

Introduction: Patterns of Peace & Prosperity (September 11)

Reading

Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “The Economic Lives of the Poor,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 2 (Winter 2007): 141-167.

AmartyaSen (1990).Developmentas Capability Expansion.InHumanDevelopmentandtheInternationalDevelopmentStrategyforthe1990s.K.GriffinandJ.Knight.London,Macmillan:41-58.

Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton University Press, 2013, chapters1 and 2 (pp. 1-56).

FamiliarizeyourselfwiththeMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsat

Explore data sources: World Bank World Development Indicators and UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram,TheHumanDevelopmentReport,2013.Downloadtheentirereportforreference andreadtheOverviewandIntroduction;andthetechnicalnote (200-204)

Supplementary

Hans Rosling TED Talk: Stats That Reshape Your World View, (if you like data visualization, see the Gapminder site with more of the kind of analysis Rosling offers: )

Cass Sunstein, “It Captures Your Mind,” review of Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, Scarcity, September 26, 2013.

Precept: Please sign up for a precept if you have not done so

Explaining the Patterns (September 16)

Why Institutions Matter (September 18)

(Paper options A1 and A2 available, due by September 22 at 5:00 p.m.)

Reading:

Debate: Jeff Sachs, “Making the Investments Needed to End Poverty, chapter 13 in The End of Poverty, Penguin Books 2005 and William Easterly. “Solow’s Surprise,” chapter 3 in The Elusive Quest for Growth, MIT Press, 2002.

Douglass North, “Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1991): 97-112 only 97-102 required). (optional)

Mancur Olson. “The Logic of Power,” from Power and Prosperity, New York: Basic Books, 2000 and“Iraq Insurgents Reaping Wealth as They Advance,” The New York Times,

Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 1-32 and 59-71.

Supplementary:

Conflict, Security, & Development, 2011 World Development Report, chapter 1, pp. 51-68.

Precept: Conceptualizing and measuring development

Part I: Predicaments

The Politician’s Dilemma/The Reformer’s Calculus (September 23)

Historical Legacies (September 25)

Reading

AcemogluRobinson, Why Nations Fail, chapters 1through 4 and 9.

Atul Kohli,"Wheredohighgrowthpoliticaleconomiescomefrom?The JapaneseLineageofKorea'sDevelopmentalState."WorldDevelopment22(9):1269-93.

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg. “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood,” World Politics, 35, 1 (October 1982).

Precept: Social science reasoning and the logics of state formation/state capacity

5-question auto-graded Exercise 1, self-scheduled

Global Orders (September 30)

Geography (October 2)

Reading:

Valenzuela and Valenzuela. "Modernization and dependency: Alternative perspectives in the study of Latin American underdevelopment." Comparative Politics 10.4 (1978). Read pp.543-550 (skim 535-543,550-556.)

Jeff Herbst,StatesandPowerinAfrica:ComparativeLessonsin AuthorityandControl.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,chapter5.

Jeff Sachs,A.D.Mellinger,andJ.L.Gallup.2001."Thegeographyofpoverty andwealth."ScientificAmerican284(3):70-5.

Jared Diamond,Guns,germs,andsteel:thefatesofhumansocieties.NewYork:W.W.NortonCo,chapter4.

Supplementary:

Seealso,exchangewithWilliamMcNeill:

YoumightalsoreadtheexchangebetweenDiamondandAcemogluand RobinsonintheNewYorkReview ofBooks:

Precept: Testing theories about geography: hypotheses, correlations/associations

Ethnic diversity (October 7)

Thresholds (October 9)

Reading:

Edward Miguel,"TribeorNation?NationBuildingandPublicGoodsin KenyaversusTanzania."WorldPolitics56(3):327-62.

Ashutosh Varshney, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond”, World Politics, April 2001.

Michael Kremer, “Making Vaccines Pay,” pp. 417-429 in William Easterly, ed. Reinventing Foreign Aid, MIT Press, 2008 or/and Michael Kremer, “Pharmaceuticals and the Developing World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16, 4 (fall 2002): 67-90.

Precept: Causal mechanisms: cultural diversity & public goods provision

Part 2: Generating political will

Why Political Leaders Don’t Always Seem to Care(Oct. 14)

Competition and Counter-pressures (October 16)

Reading:

Robert Bates, Markets & States in Tropical Africa (a very short book, which we treat as a case and discuss in class)[2]

Supplementary (if you have read the Bates book, focus on these instead)

Anne Krueger, "Government Failures in Development,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 3 (1990): 9-23.

Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann, “Seize the State, Seize the Day,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 4 (2003).

Dani Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform, Journal of Economic Literature, XLIV(December 2006): 973-987.

Precept: Markets v administered systems, the pros and cons

Auto-graded Exercise 2, self-scheduled.

Elections, Incentives, & Performance (October 21)

Civic Engagement, Social Capital, and Development Outcomes (October 23)

(Paper options A3 and C1 available, due October 22 by midnight)

Reading

Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work[3]

Supplementary (read these if you have already read Making Democracy Work):

Adsera,A.,C.Boix,andM.Payne.2003."Areyoubeingserved?Political accountabilityandqualityofgovernment."JournalofLaw,Economics,and Organization19(2):445.

Paul Collier, “Votes and Violence,” chapter 1 from Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, Harper Collins, 2009.

Precept: parsing the argument in Making Democracy Work

Fall Break (October 25-November 2)

Part 3: Making Government Work: A “Science of Delivery?”

(Paper Option C2 available, due November 5 by midnight)

The Reformer’s Dilemma (November 4)

Cardoso in Brazil (November 6)

Reading:

AcemogluRobinson, Why Nations Fail,11(justpp332-4), 13,14 (justpp

404-414), 15.

Innovations for Successful Societies video: Reformers speak (about 6 minutes; accessible through Blackboard)

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, The Accidental President of Brazil, A Memoir

Supplementary

Audio Segment, Intro and “The Lie That Saved Brazil” From This American Life.

Helpful for understanding one part of the Cardoso story.

Interview with Cardoso:

ISS Case Study, “Strengthening Public Administration in Brazil, 1995-1998.”

Precept: path dependency and its sources, pressures for innovation

Creating single-agency turnarounds or pockets of effectiveness (November 11)

Short-route accountability (November 13)

(Paper Option B1 available, due November 10 by midnight; paper option B2 due November 12 by midnight)

Reading:

John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser. “Principals and Agents: An Overview,” pp. 1-22 (not the whole chapter), in Principals and Agents. Harvard Business School Press, 1991.

“Empowering Operational Staff: Land Registration in Sarawak, Malaysia, 2006-2009,” ISS Case Study.

“Promoting Accountability, Monitoring Services: Textbook Procurement and Delivery in the Philippines, 2002-2005,” ISS Case Study

“Services for the People, by the People: Indonesia’s Program for Community Empowerment, 2007-2012,” ISS Case Study

Ben Olken. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,” Journal of Political Economy, 2007, v. 115, 2.

Supplementary:

Archon Fung, “Infotopia: Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency,” Politics & Society, 14, 2 (June 2013) and Archon Fung with David Weil and Mary Graham, “Targeting Transparency,” Science 6139 (June 2013).

Precept: Randomized controlled trials as a way to assess the effects of a policy intervention (focuses on the Olken piece, which pertains to the ISS case on Indonesia)

Capability traps (November 18)

Norm coordination (November 20)

(Paper options B3 available, due November 17 by midnight)

Reading:

Bo Rothstein, “Reflections After a Long Day in Moscow,” Social Traps and the Problem of Trust, Cambridge University Press, 2005.

“Conjuring and Consolidating a Turnaround: Government in Bogota, 1992-2003” ISS Case Study And “From Fear to Hope in Colombia: Sergio Fajardo and Medellin, 2004-2007,” ISS Case Study.

Sebastian Mallaby, “The Politically Incorrect Guide to Ending Poverty,” The Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2010 and/or Paul Romer TED talks: “Why the World Needs Charter Cities” and “The World’s First Charter City?”

Supplementary:

On Mockus reforms: and (optional)

Sendhil Mullainathan, “Solving Social Problems With A Nudge,” TED Talk

Precept: Social norms v. opinions and how to modify social norms

Institutional traps & the high politics of reform (November 25)

Reading:

Robert Wade. “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is Not Better at Development,” World Development, 13, 4 (1985): 467-497.

“Inviting a Tiger into Your Home: Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission Cuts Its Teeth” and “Holding the High Ground with Public Support: Indonesia’s Anti-Corruption Commission Digs In,” ISS Case Studies

or

“Saving a Sinking Agency: The National Port Authority of Liberia, 2006-2010,” ISS Case Study.

Supplementary:

Joel Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-Communist Transitions,” World Politics, 50, 2 (1998)

Saumitra Jha on financial innovation as a way to create positive self-reinforcing incentives on WWS YouTube

Precept: none this week (Thanksgiving break)

Auto-graded Exercise 3, self-scheduled

The resource curse (December 2)

Preserving forests (December 4)

(Paper Option C3 available, due December 3 by midnight)

Reading:

Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz, “What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?” from Escaping the Resource Curse, chapter 1.

Paul Collier. The Plundered Planet: Why We Must—and How We Can—Manage Nature for Global Prosperity. Oxford University Press, 2010. Selections TBA

“Controlling Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,” ISS case study

Supplementary:

You may wish to visit the web pages for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Revenue Watch, and the Kimberly Process.

Precept: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is a possible solution to a global public goods problem. To work, it requires some muscle. What muscle does the system employ? Are there other ways to induce compliance that are compatible with democratic norms?

Learning & adaptation (December 9)

Institutional transformation & development (December 11)

(Paper Option C4 available. Due by December 18 at 5:00)

Reading:

Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story (memoire).Times Editions/Marshall Cavendish International (Asia) Pte Ltd, 2004, pp. 13-24, 315-327, 343-347, 556-569 and timeline 664-667. Also see Charlie Rose Interview with Lee Kuan Yew:

Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, chapters 1 and 2 (pp. 13-44)

Geoff Mulgan, “Positive Risks: Taking Innovation in the Public Sector Seriously,” chapter 8 in The Art of Public Strategy, Oxford University Press, 2009.

Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor, pp. vii-ix, 45-58, 61-83, 219-231

Supplementary:

Jonathan Morduch, “The Knowledge Bank,” chapter 13 in William Easterly, Ed., Reinventing Foreign Aid. MIT Press, 2008.

“Dubai, Once a Humble Refueling Stop, Is Crossroad to the Globe,” The New York Times

Precept: Where is institutional transformation most likely to occur? In-class data exercise that pushes us to think about the conditions, circumstances, timing, and human elements behind the rise of common interest states.

Course Goals:

This course tries to develop a basic vocabulary of concepts and theories, build knowledge of a few iconic country cases and scholarly classics, provide some practical orientation for those who may someday work in the field of development, and introduce some current debates. Inevitably, there is an enormous amount of material left on the cutting room floor. In assembling the syllabus, I have tried to limit duplication with other courses and fill gaps I see in the offerings available at the university. Apologies in advance where I have misjudged! Those who have already taken African Politics with me may see some conceptual overlap but with a different mix of reading material and some new theories.

Expectations:

At the end of each week I will post some guidance for the next. These reading notes provide a quick orientation so that you can focus your work more effectively. Generally we ask that you complete assigned selections before your precept meets. If your precept is early in the week, you will have to start a little earlier. During the second half of the course we use case studies to evaluate key concepts and theories. The case studies come from a Princeton research program, Innovations for Successful Societies. If you have trouble finding a case or want to view other options on the same topic you may visit the website directly.

Lectures vary in format. Some provide background or extend some of the ideas in the reading. Others engage you in case discussion. Often we will look at data together. Everyone is expected to participate although the instructor will not “cold call” anyone.

The precepts focus attention on a single question or problem raised in the reading or the lectures. They are designed to amplify the lectures and foster creative thinking. All precepts cover the same ground in substantially the same way. All require participation. Each person has two “coast days”—allotted skips to handle illnesses and other complications. Remember that precepts are also an important venue for raising questions.

Assignmentsand Exams

There are three types of assignments in this course, outside of the reading. Auto-graded 5-question exercises are experimental. They help us understand whether the course is communicating key ideas. They help you lock in some of your knowledge as you read and listen. And they are supposed to be fun. They are hard to design, though, and sometimes we fail to write a question in a way that works. We adjust. The key is to remember that these are experiments, they don’t count heavily, and they reward a spirit of adventure.

Each person must submit three papers, one of which you may complete as a 2- to 3-person team project if you wish. There is a choice of topics and submission dates (see below), but everyone must submit one paper from list A, one from list B, and one from list C. The options help you tailor the course to your interests and your schedule. Because we give you this flexibility, we do not accept late submissions. Just move on to the next option in the list if you miss a due date.

Papers should be roughly 8 to 10 pages, with 1.5 line spacing, 12 point type, and 1 inch margins. Please submit papers through the Blackboard site. You may also email a backup copy to your preceptor if you wish. Please review the course guidance on originality and appropriate citation before you begin. For the data paper, please indicate the names of all team members on the paper if you work with others.

The final take-home exam includes paired comparisons, a data question, and two essays. It takes 3 hours. You may choose a 3-hour period between January 13 and January 19 during which you will take the exam. You will check out the exam from Blackboard and return it to Blackboard 3 hours later. We will provide review materials at the end of the lecture period, in December.

Thinking

In this course we ask you to think like a social scientist and to engage a real world problem in the light of reading assigned. Remember that any social science explanation has a couple of standard parts:

• A theory always has a dependent variable (outcome), one or more independent variables (possible causes of variation in the outcome), and a story line that specifies the causal mechanism or shows by what means the dependent and independent variables link to each other. Ask whether the story is plausible.
• The variables are indicators used to “tap” underlying concepts. Ask whether the indicators are valid and reliable.
• A theory helps us frame expectations about the world around us. The observable expectations that flow from a theory are hypotheses. Ask whether the author’s hypotheses really follow from the theory (are they reasonable deductions from the general claim)? Are there other hypotheses or propositions that might flow from the same theory?
• Often the reading or lectures will refer to a test of a theory. We usually want to know whether analysis of the data reveals the correlations or associations the theory leads us to expect, or whether the anticipated correlations are absent (therefore disconfirming the theory). We also want to know whether the proposed causal mechanism is really active (hence case studies). What do the data say? Do you trust the data source or the data collection strategy?

One of the nicer concise guides to common pitfalls recently appeared in a small nutrition newsletter. You can find the neat chart in e-reserves under the title “Non-Trivial Pursuit.” It’s a fun checklist of the ways studies can go wrong.

The course also requires you to think about how to break out of some of the constraints that social scientists identify. You must think creatively as a manager and leader but ground your ideas in ways that make sense to a social scientist.

Grading

The members of the teaching staff meet each week to agree on a plan for the next week’s precept and to check uniformity in grading standards. We spell out the criteria for papers in advance and mark accordingly, though we allow for flashes of brilliance that take off in an unusual but interesting direction. We curve the grades for individual assignments if necessary.