Post-Cold War Strategies | 1
Chapter 6Post-Cold War Strategies
International relations theories and America political traditions assumed only a supporting role during the Cold War as containment and deterrence of the Soviet Union dominated strategic thinking and forged a political consensus. Lacking a clear and agreed upon perception of threat, theories and traditions have reasserted themselves in the post-Cold War debate. This chapter begins with the national security strategydebate that followed the end of the Cold War. Nothing has yet to serve as a political rallying point as did the idea of containment. And nothing appears on the horizon.
A strategy of containment held together a political coalition throughout the Cold War. But containment no longer serves, and the subsequent debate has failed to provide a vision for America’s role in the world around which a political consensus can form. Nonetheless, several alternative security strategies have been proposed and debated. They differ as to whether American internationalism is the solution to or the cause of threats to us national security. The alternatives also differ over the ends to which military means are applied. Some advocate the use of force whenever and wherever it might advance American interests, including economic advantage, social values, and the spread of democracy. “Why have a military if you can’t use it?” Others advocate more restraint, using force only to prevent war between great powers or only to defend the homeland.
Alternative post-Cold War strategies are presented in the next section. They are followed by the real strategies of the post-Cold War administrations. The current strategic environment, including Iraq, is given special treatment. The chapter concludes with items for future consideration.
Post-Cold War Strategic Alternatives
Five alternative grand strategies are characterized below in terms of interests and objectives, major underlying premises, and preferred political and military instruments. They differ fundamentally on the reasons for using military force, ranging from the restrictive to the liberal use of force. Post-Cold War strategies examined include primacy, collective security, cooperative security,[1] selective engagement,[2] and homeland defense strategies.[3] These summaries rely heavily on “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy” by Barry Posen and Andrew Ross.[4]
Collective security and cooperative security are more strongly correlated with Wilsonian idealism. True collective security was impossible during the bipolar Cold War due to the veto power in the un Security Council and the ensuing deadlock. But these two strategies were enabled by the end of the Cold War. Selective engagement contains the strains of realism, balance of power, Hamiltonian logic, and Kennan’s containment. Defensive realism and the isolationist thinking of Adams still resonates with many citizens and finds voice in today’s restrictive homeland defense strategy, but it attracted little support from the policy elite until the global economic recession. Global hegemonic primacy is new, enabled by the end of the Cold War and the “unipolar moment” that followed. Offensive realism predicts the progression from isolationism to primacy as the United States grew from weak power to lone superpower. One can see the predilection to global hegemony in its precursor, regional hegemony, in Jackson’s bellicosity and desire to expand American empire further westward, and in the Monroe Doctrine with respect to the Western Hemisphere. And one can see the continuation of Nitze’s preponderance of power.
Hegemonic Primacy Strategy
Advocates of a primacy strategy, or hegemonic primacy strategy, see the rise of a peer competitor as the greatest threat to international order and, therefore, the greatest risk of war involving the United States.[5][6] They seek to preserve the unipolar moment that arrived at the end of the bipolar Cold War era. Furthermore, proponents believe that only a preponderance of American power ensures peace. Adherents of this school often refer to preponderance rather than primacy. The objective, then, is for the United States to act to retain a benign global hegemony and prevent the rise of competing powers. Primacy focuses on inhibiting (containing) Russia and China, but includes inhibition of the European powers of Great Britain, Germany, and France, as well as the Asian powers of Japan and India.
Proponents of the more restrictive strategies subscribe to the theory that states balance against power. If primacy were pursued, then the United States would be the power to balance against. In the long term, the United States may find itself isolated when confronting rising powers. Primacy advocates are more likely to subscribe to the theory that states balance against threat. Proponents of primacy argue that by using force prudently, the United States will be seen at worst as a benign, non-threatening, hegemon and, therefore, states will not balance against it.[7] Others assert that foreign nationalism will brace against even benign American hegemony and cause the problems the strategy is designed to prevent—countervailing alliances and arms races, for example.[8]
The pre-Cold War practice of aggregating power through coalitions and alliances is insufficient. Primacy advocates are skeptical of international institutions, but believe that they and traditional alliances can be used as a strategic asset in the pursuit of American interests.[9] For example, to inhibit Russia, they would expand nato into Central Europe; to counter China, they would perhaps rebuild seato and include Vietnam.
The primacy strategy requires large overseas presence. Stationing military forces in Europe is seen as an effective means of preventing Germany from forming an independent foreign policy. Forces should remain forward deployed in the Middle East and Southwest Asia to safeguard oil reserves and to discourage India from ambitions of regional hegemony.
Primacy advocates are not a homogenous group, but they share preference for the military over other instruments. The more extreme have contempt for the other instruments and consider vindicationism the right and duty of the dominant power. Of the strategic alternatives, primacy poses the greatest demand for force structure. Advocates are unilateralist, thus requiring the force to be sized and shaped without regard for coalition contributions. Some argue for offensive air, land, and sea forces that are superior to the combined forces of the next two, three, or even four major powers.[10] A strong second strike nuclear force would be maintained to deter major aggression, especially aggression with weapons of mass destruction. One can easily see the logic of Nitze’s nsc 68 and preponderance of power.
Primacy advocates assert that the us share of the global economy is sufficient to sustain a strategy of primacy. They argue that American power and influence is far more than that reflected in gdp.[11] Primacy’s detractors believe the strategy is unsustainable in the long run, and will likely result in imperial overstretch, destroying what it intended to protect.[12] And they predict coalition formation and blowback directed against the United States.
Homeland Defense Strategy
The proponents of a homeland defense strategy assert that the United States is an economically powerful nation, with vast protective oceans, and an overwhelming nuclear arsenal. Its security is thus assured from many, but not all, threats. Adherents of this school often use the words restraint, disengagement, or restrictive instead of homeland defense. Hard-line opponents use the term isolationism as a pejorative and dismissive term. While primacy is the most ambitious of America’s strategic choices, homeland defense is the least. It defines national interests so narrowly that internationalism is neither required nor desired. The only vital American interests are the life, liberty, and property of the American people.[13] Adherents are more inclined to see as major threats the flow of illegal immigrants, terrorists, and drugs, and therefore see border control as the priority solution.
The homeland-defense belief system includes the premise that promoting values abroad generates resentment and that American intervention is the cause of trouble for the United States, not a preventative solution. Adherents of this strategy believe in staying out of foreign conflicts and not using military power to impose world order, spread democracy or American values, or advance American economic interests. Promoting economic advancement is best left to the private sector. One can see defensive realism, pre-Eisenhower Republican thinking, and today’s libertarian movements.
Moreover, for political instruments, adherents to homeland defense see very little need for international actions, for international organizations, or for traditional alliances. Alliances like nato obligate the United States in advance to unimagined future crises around the world. Restrictivists recognize the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, just as advocates of other strategies, but they argue that the risk of attack by weapons of mass destruction is proportional to us involvement in foreign conflicts. Therefore, the United States should withdraw from such entangling alliances and reduce foreign engagement to only those conflicts that threaten us vital interests.[14] The force structure required to support this strategy should take less than two percent of gdp, a non-trivial but modest near-term defense savings.
Those favoring this most restrictive strategy suggest the use of force almost exclusively to protect the homeland. They argue, therefore, for significant reduction of conventional military forces. They would retain a small naval expeditionary force to protect our vital interests abroad, modest air and missile defense, and a second strike nuclear capability. In the long run, the country would require a robust mobilization capability rather than a standing military. Mobilization would require a strong strategic intelligence apparatus and a prescient understanding of events that might lead to war. It would also require the ability to mobilize public support so as to wrest resources from the private sector. In the meantime, the low force level would offer reduced options to the president. To the adherents of a restrictive use of force, this is more a blessing than a shortcoming.
In the absence of security provided by the United States or by a us-led coalition, however, other countries might expand their militaries to provide their own security. An expensive and dangerous spiral of militarization could ensue. In the absence of a global leader, regional powers might assume only local resistance to their attempts at regional hegemony. The result could be more war, not less. Some argue that the low military force level would imply low international influence[15] giving short shrift to the potency of other instruments of national power.
Selective Engagement Strategy
The goals of a selective engagement strategy are twofold. The first goal is preventing war between the major powers, including Russia, China, Japan, and the European powers. The second goal is preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to hostile, ambitious powers, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.[16]
The first goal is premised on the belief that any major-power war in Eurasia is a threat to the United States. The industrialized regions of Europe and Northeast Asia and the resource rich and politically volatile region of the Middle East and Southwest Asia are the primary areas where competition will take place. Loss of easy access to Middle East oil will lead to great-power competition. China is currently competing successfully for resources in Africa, Iran, and elsewhere.
Proponents of selective engagement believe that states balance against power, and if the United States exerts power indiscriminately, countries will balance against the United States. Adhering to the realist school, advocates recognize that resources are scarce and that they must be jealously husbanded. The threat of major-power war and proliferation argue for engagement. Balance of power theory and scarce resources dictate the need for engagement to be selective. One can see this strategy lying between defensive and offensive realism or in Eisenhower’s moderate Republicanism.
Advocates of selective engagement believe the public will not support the global police mission. Forces engaged in peace operations may be difficult to disengage and redeploy and may not be ready to participate in major regional war. Because assuring major-power peace is this strategy’s principal objective, engaging in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations should be decided by domestic politics and only entered into when the prospects for success are good and the risks and costs are low.
According to selective engagement advocates, the United States must be prepared to act unilaterally if great-power peace is threatened. Traditional alliances, such as nato, are viewed as beneficial to the extent that they either prevent or allow the United States to respond to threats to major-power peace. While they may be beneficial, there is little or no need to enlarge nato or the web of alliances.[17]
To support this strategy, the United States needs the military force structure to deter major-power wars in regions of competition and, if necessary, to fight and restore peace. The force structure logic of the Cold War remains; the United States must have the force structure to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional wars. Two, to deal with an opportunist aggressor that might be emboldened by substantial American involvement elsewhere. The United States must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent. In addition to deterring attack on the homeland, America should signal to non-nuclear states that its force stands behind the status quo powers.[18]
While founded in the realist school, critics contend that focusing on Eurasia isn’t selective enough to husband scarce resources and might lead to grand strategy mission creep. Given that engagement in peace operations is left to domestic politics, implementing the strategy might be buffeted by the media and fickle public interest. The resulting employment policy, appearing random and lacking any coherent vision, would likely lose public support over time. A series of uninspiring peace operations could further erode public support.[19]
According to opponents of the selective engagement strategy, engaging selectively means that the United States would lead only when its vital interests are at risk. Its prestige and ability to lead in the international community would likely suffer. The result would be that the United States could not affect others in important matters, thus forcing the United States to act unilaterally when multinational action would have been preferable.
Collective Security Strategy
A collective securitystrategy is based on the premise that a threat to one nation is a threat to all. Peace is indivisible. And American national security is best assured through international institutions. The original idea of collective security applied to the global community of nations principally represented by the un. During the bipolar Cold War, however, the idea degenerated into two distinct and opposed collective security systems represented militarily by nato and the Warsaw Pact. Liberal political factions could see nato as a collective security arrangement, and realist factions could see it as an accumulation of power through a traditional alliance structure. Political consensus was thus possible.
Collective security is implemented through a multinational coalition to deter or defeat an aggressor that has amassed sufficient power to pose a threat to other states. American security, indeed, the security of the free world, was bolstered through the nato alliance, possibly seen as a collective security arrangement. The Persian Gulf War was less ambiguously collective security. One sovereign state invaded another and the international community responded collectively to return to the status quo ante. A collective security arrangement has been in development throughout the twentieth century and had become the accepted norm by the end of the Cold War. One can easily see the aspirational logic of post-wwi Wilsonian idealism, liberalism, and institutionalism in a collective security strategy.
Another premise is that peace is indivisible. Because wars spread, the United States has an overriding interest in preserving global peace. The credible international institutions do not yet exist, and a principal objective of this strategy is to build them over the long term. Without such institutions, small regional powers might calculate that local aggression would be overlooked by major powers because they have no interests at stake. International institutions that respond consistently over time will alter that calculation and deter small aggressions that might grow into larger regional conflicts.
The implications of the collective security strategy for force structure are demanding.[20] The strategy assumes a large American overseas presence. Internationally, it requires some countries to maintain forces sufficient for the defense of their homeland plus a force subordinated to international institutions. The us contribution—the reconnaissance strike complex—would complement other nations’ forces. The complex is essentially the Desert Storm force and its power projection capability, command and control systems, and precision guided munitions. A strong second-strike nuclear capability would be maintained.