Politics and Human Rights in Kurdistan

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Politics and Human Rights in Kurdistan

Bryan C. Curran

Supervised by:

Professor of Law Henry H. Perritt, Jr.

October 3, 2009

Background.

Numbering over 20 million, the Kurds inhabit the mountainous regions of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Years of cultural, economic, and political oppression within these countries has resulted in increasing Kurdish efforts towards autonomy and international support. In the 7th century the Kurds were conquered by the Arabs, ultimately leading to the Kurdish adoption of Sunni Islam. In the decades following, the Kurds found themselves under the rule of various different regimes, including the Seljuk Turks, the Mongols and finally the Ottoman Empire.

The Ottoman Empire’s rule extended across three continents, having significant influence in Southeastern Europe, Western Asia and North Africa. Lasting from 1299-1922, the Ottoman Empire ruled over the Kurdish people until it was succeeded by the Republic of Turkey in 1922. Following the defeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the Kurds aimed to establish a homeland, but were not provided the land necessary to achieve such a goal. Instead, the Turkish government divided up area controlled by the Ottoman Empire and left the Kurds to disperse throughout Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. The increasing populations of Kurds in these countries has not been met with support by the national governments, and the Kurdish lifestyle has come to be characterized as that of unwelcome foreigners. Often being deprived of many basic human rights, the Kurds continue to live under oppressive rule throughout the Middle East and have begun to flee into various countries in Europe.

The increasing developments and human rights movements in Iraqi Kurdistan have provided some hope for the Kurds throughout Turkey, Iran and Syria. This relative prosperity in Iraq has come from decades of internal political conflict and has effectively established a growing sense of Kurdish identity. The question thus remains as to what pathway towards autonomy is most effective for the Kurds. Although international support has come sporadically, a lack of consistent aid has ultimately left the Kurds overmatched in their struggles against the national governments of Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. With minimal chance of victory in formal militarized conflict, the Kurds have few options and have resorted to several attempts at large-scale guerilla uprising. These guerilla organizations have been deemed terrorist organization by many countries, including the United States, thus making hope for increased international aid unlikely.

Section I. Political Division and Civil War in Iraqi Kurdistan

The quest for statehood by the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq has been a pathway not of unity and democracy but rather of political turmoil and civil war. The political tension and violence has divided the region of modern-day Kurdistan and stems from a decade long feud between two leaders within a dual-party system. Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), exist within a power struggle, which consistently drives political division within the Kurdistan population. In order to comprehend the division between these two spheres of influence in its entirety, an examination of the differences in both the leaders and their party platforms is crucial. The question remains whether the foundation of the civil unrest is a product of century old sociological differences, or if the division is in fact a product of 20th century political opportunism. Through evaluating the extensive history of conflict between the two parties, clear sociological and ideological disparities are identifiable; however, these aspects are not the main source of contention that has evoked civil war upon the region. The foundation of the division in Iraqi Kurdistan, the division that has brought neighbors within the region to violent conflict, appears to be a product of the political and monetary opportunism of Talabani and Barzani.

Kurdish guerilla commander, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, founded the Kurdistan Democratic Party in August 1946, aspiring to gain recognition of Iraqi Kurdistan by creating a Kurdish national army, later to be referred to as the pesh merga. The region claimed as the territory of the KDP, known today as Iraqi Kurdistan, was throughout WWII divided amongst Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Immediately upon establishing the KDP, Mustafa Barzani, commonly referred to as “the Kurds’ first modern revolutionary”, became a strong adversary of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, orchestrating various rebellions against the Iraqi government.[1] In the early 1930s, prior to the creation of the KDP, Saddam exiled Mustafa Barzani for a large-scale rebellion against the Iraqi government. He returned from exile in 1943 to discover his fellow Kurds starving and living without aid from the government of Baghdad. The state of the neglected Kurdish citizens fueled Mustafa Barzani to create the KDP, demanding that Baghdad create an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Included under this movement were the demands to recognize Kurdish as an official language within Iraq and to grant Kurds seats within the cabinet in Baghdad.

The Ba’athist coup, a branch of the Arab nationalist movement under Saddam Hussein, took control of Baghdad in 1968 and remained in power until it was dismantled in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam. The Ba’athist party offered to cooperate with the KDP upon its first institution as the Iraqi power. The agreements promised Kurds an official language, guaranteed places in government, land distribution and the return of any Kurds that had been displaced during the rebellions. The arrangements would have served as a means to avoid future conflict in Kurdistan, but the superficiality of Saddam’s promises were soon made clear and as a result, the agreements never materialized. Shortly after, Saddam’s troops defeated Mustafa Barzani, causing him to seek aid from the United States. The United States declined and Mustafa relinquished control of the KDP to his son Masoud Barzani due to health issues that inhibited him from continuing to lead the party. Masoud Barzani wasleft with not only his father’s legacy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, but also with his father’s newest enemy and the beginnings of the political turmoil that would divide Kurdistan for decades.

Masoud Barzani’s rival, Jalal Talabani, rose to power out of the shadows of the already prominent KDP. Talabani was raised in Iraqi Kurdistan as an avid enthusiast of General Mustafa Barzani and follower of the KDP. He worked his way through the ranks of the KDP, winning praise from Mustafa Barzani, until his eventual public challenge of Barzani and the KDP in a meeting with Arab nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser. Shortly after the meeting in 1975, Talabani announced his own political campaign under the newly established PUK. Two years later, he declared his party’s guerilla campaign against both Baghdad and the KDP, ultimately setting the stage for the conflict ahead. Despite Talabani’s call for guerilla opposition, the contention between the PUK and KDP remained relatively civil for almost a year and even came close to a resolution. Any signs of cooperation between the two parties quickly diminished and with the first signs of violence in 1978, the division in Iraqi Kurdistan was solidified.

The initial violence between the PUK and KDP that set off the feud between Talabani and Barzani was committed, ironically, by accident during peace negotiations. Jalal Talabani, being a more modern visionary for the Kurdish people, recognized the need to unite the PUK and KDP if they were going to successfully confront Saddam and the growing Iraqi military. In an effort to initiate this union between the two parties, in 1978, Talabani sent two of his commanders to meet with Barzani and begin negotiations for a peace agreement. The two commanders however, were mistakenly ambushed by the KDP pesh merga and publicly executed. This mistake on the part of the KDP troops initiated a chain of violence between the two groups that would not show serious signs of an end until the US invasion of Iraq. The divide between the Kurdish people compounded with the increasing casualties suffered at the hands of fellow Kurds made them vulnerable to attack from outside influences, deeming it next to impossible for either leader to establish any gains for the Kurdish people.[2]

The parties, having already been driven to violent confrontation, needed only to become politically segregated in order for the internal divide in Iraqi Kurdistan to be complete. The political partition in question developed during Kurdistan’s first election in May 1992. The Kurdish region was able to hold elections for a regional government without contention from Saddam under the protection of the US no-fly zone that allowed Kurdistan to function apart from the influence of the Iraqi government. The cause and details of the no-fly zone will be explained shortly. Barzani was considered the clear favorite in the election, as a result of his father’s lingering popularity within Kurdistan. At the time of the election, Barzani also seemed to be dominant in the ongoing violence between the KDP and PUK, making him appear the more logical candidate for peace in the near future. Talabani however, was able to sway a large portion of voters through his charismatic election rallies, speaking aggressively about Kurdish rights. Talabani’s strong conviction about the future of Kurdistan gave him the appearance of a more modern and international leader than the traditional Barzani.[3]It is worth noting that the United States was not in support of the election to promote democracy in Kurdistan at this time due to the Turkish fear of an unstable Iraqi nation.

The election concluded with Barzani receiving 45% of the votes and Talabani finishing with a close 43.6%. Due to the closeness of the results, the KDP and PUK were each granted five of the ten seats in Parliament and a runoff election between Barzani and Talabani was suspended indefinitely in favor of a joint parliament. With each authoritarian figure having a 50% claim to the new Kurdish Parliament, the two spheres of influence became completely divided. Barzani laid claim to the northwest region of Kurdistan, giving the southeast to rival Talabani. Citizens throughout Kurdistan began aligning themselves on either side of the power struggle and the stage for the political division of Kurdistan was set.

Having established the initial causes of the political divide between Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, it is important to examine whether the factors that have continued to fuel the divide for so many years are sociological and ideological or merely the opportunistic nature of both men struggling for sole power of the region. Comparing several sociological aspects of the two leaders and their parties including geography, language and religion, the disparities between the conflicting sides are apparent; however, these differences are not only minor, but have been openly dismissed as core reasons for the Kurdish divide.It has been commonly recorded from outsiders evaluating the political positions of the two leaders that there are very little differences in their ideologies. Looking first at Barzani, it is logical that due to his geographical location in the north, with his capital initially based in Salhuddin and eventually being relocated to the city of Erbil, that the main support for his campaign would come from a coalition of tribes and clans of Kurmanji speakers. Kurmanji is the most commonly spoken version of Kurdish and is considered a ceremonial language of the Kurdish people, spoken by roughly 80% of all Kurds. Barzani’s close connection with the tribal population, combined with the fact that the majority of his government high officials all share his last name, reveals his nature as a more traditional Kurd. In an account of the leader recorded by CIA officials who worked closely with him, his disposition as a rural, traditionalist makes him appear more like a village chief than a regional authority.[4] Barzani and Talabani are also both Sunni Muslims. When looking at the division in Kurdistan, it is important to keep in mind that unlike the rest of Iraq, Sunni and Shi’ite tensions have never played a role in fueling the Kurdish civil war.

The traditional character of Masoud Barzani could not differ more than that of the modern, outgoing Talabani. Based in the south with his capital at the city of Saluymaniya, Talabani’s main support comes from a more urban class of citizens. Most of Talabani’s followers speak Sorani, a Kurdish language spoken by a small minority of Kurds in both Iraq and Iran, where it is recognized as an official language. While Barzani possesses qualities of a small-scale Kurdish leader, Talabani presents himself as a world-class politician. He is able to woe his followers with extravagant speeches of Kurdish rights and a bright future. Other than the fact that the two parties speak different Kurdish languages and are separated geographically, the sociological differences between the two parties are relatively minute. As the division between Talabani and Barzani has become more violent with neither side willing to concede, the separation has become noticeably more geographical with citizens having to choose a side and relocate from their homes. These sociological differences may be enough to distinguish the manner in which each ruler leads his half of the Kurdish region, but they do not appear to be the true catalysts of the violent conflict between the two sides.

With only minor differences between the ideologies of the two parties, they developed very similar political platforms. According to Mahmoud Othman, an independent Kurdish member of the Iraqi Parliament, in the years following the eventual Kurdish cooperation, the platforms of the two parties, removed of their names, were virtually indistinguishable.[5]The two leaders both viewed the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan very favorably, but in the presence of alternative motives, this notion eventually became secondary. Barzani’s desire for autonomy reflected his father’s, Mustafa Barzani, lifelong dream of seeing a Kurdish state stand independently. Masoud Barzani held onto his father’s dream, but as Iraq became more and more of a hostile region, especially after the US invasion, Barzani swayed from the goal of an autonomous Kurdistan in favor of his own prosperity and the prosperity of Kurdistan apart from Iraqi influence. As will be discussed in later sections, it quickly became apparent to Barzani that with the rest of Iraq fighting against itself after the US invasion, it was much easier for Kurdistan to operate under the US protection and prosper, rather than call for its own independence. Talabani was also an avid supporter of the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan, but he often feared that Iraq would be partitioned amongst its ethnic groups and the Iraqi nation would be left in shambles. As the war against Saddam escalated and the United States invaded Iraq, Talabani was quick to recognize and lobby for his role as the future leader of Iraq. With this in mind, his calls for an autonomous Kurdistan quickly became a distant memory.

The views of Barzani and Talabani towards Saddam and their political platforms did have small variations, both of which appeared to be established to solidify their own futures as rulers. These variations however, are primarily products of the Kurdish divide rather than causes. Barzani’s ideology and aspirations as a leader were more near-sighted than that of Talabani, mainly due to the fact that Barzani was lobbying to rule all of Kurdistan, while Talabani was lobbying to one-day rule Iraq. As a result, Barzani spoke of Kurdish prosperity and quality of life, whereas Talabani spoke of human rights, democracy and gender equality in a unified Iraq. These varying political aspirations also influenced the opinion of each leader towards Saddam. Talabani was adamant about the need for Saddam’s removal and used his skill as an international politician to call for outside help, namely from the United States. Barzani’s views towards Saddam, though in agreement with Talabani’s, were also influenced by his alternative motives. Barzani was not against an Iraq without Saddam, but he did not want to stir up trouble with his partner in the oil smuggling business, Saddam. This partnership will soon be explained more thoroughly as a component of political opportunism. As a result of this motive, Barzani was more reluctant to partake in any action against the Iraqi military.[6] Evaluating the ideologies of Barzani and Talabani does reveal numerous differences, but as mentioned previously, many of these ideologies were a product of the divide in Kurdistan and not a cause. It is also important to recognize that while some of these ideologies are not shared by both leaders, they do not outright conflict, which makes them unlikely to fuel any unrest between the leaders. The combination of the sociological and ideological aspects of Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani as leaders does not seem to provide any evidence that these factors are the sources of the political divide in Kurdistan that would eventually lead to civil war. In fact, as will be established through the examination of the long history of violence, the foundation of the division seems to lie in political and monetary opportunism.