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INTRODUCTION TO PEOPLE’S POLAND, 1944-48

These notes are an attempt at a checklist of issues, with more detailed commentary where necessary. First comes a chronological framework for the two document seminars, to give you an overview of the main events you will be encountering in the reading and which you can flesh out as you progress. The overall theme for this block of seminars on Poland, 1944-47 is whether the events of war, occupation and liberation have created a situation for a new Poand moving on from the interwar sanacja model. For communists or others on the socialist left the question was whether a revolutionary situation which could be the basis for building a new, ‘People’s Poland’. For people of ‘centre-left’ persuasion, that is the democratic opposition to the old sanacja regime, it was whether it was now possible to establish a Polish democracy of western type. This involved the further question as to whetherm in the geopolitical circumstances,they thought they could accommodate themselves to People’s Poland or whether the priority had to be to fight against the communist-led regime, if necessary in association with resistance elements which stood in the nationalist and/or sanacja tradition.

First docs seminar

- July 1944: establishment of PKWN (Lublin committee/govt), with moderate programme

- October 1944: October turn > PKWN moves to the left

- May 1945: May turn: PKWN relaxes October turn

Second docs seminar

- From Mikołajczyk’s return (end of June 1945) till the June 1946 referendum

- build-up of PSL

- question of participation of PSL in common electoral list of the ‘democratic bloc’

- May 1946 Polish delegation to Stalin and June 1946 referendum

- From the June referendum to the elections of January 1947:

- Polish delegation to Stalin, August 1946 and consolidation of PPR/PPS alliance

- final clamp down on PSL and faked elections

A. POLISH POLITICAL PARTIES

Polish political parties were very splintered in our period as the Second World War drew to a close. The key to reading the Polonsky and Drukier documents is to see how the Polish communists, a relatively tiny group of thousands rather than tens of thousands of members, were hoping in some way to draw many of these political splinters into their orbit, so as to establish an overall hegemony. An analogy might be the way in which a financier might have a 51% holding in a company, which in turn has a 51% holding in a larger company and so on, till the original financier has ultimate control of vast resources, though his own original stake might amount to no more than 10% of the whole. Another comparison might be with the technique, say, of extreme Trotskyite groups which hoped in the 1980s (maybe hope still) to increase their influence by controlling behind the scenes the Anti-Nazi League and other anti-racist organisations, whose cause was more popular than their own. So one of the concepts we are dealing with in the topic is that of the `front organisation’ which a group (in this case political) uses in order to broaden its power base and spread its appeal among social groups not directly interested in its narrower ideology. Of course, such an operation required a degree of tact and flexibility; hence the criticisms of `sectarianism’, seen as a narrow emphasis of communist ideologocial purity, liable to put off potential sympathy. The communists were not the only political group which was trying to hegemonise the others, of course. I set out below a table of the main Polish political parties (written hand-out, course pouch), and the associations linked with them, whether their military wing and their front organisation (if any). You will see that the Polish communists were organised also in the Soviet Union and that the Lublin committee/government set up in July 1944 was a combination of members of the communist front organisations in Poland and the Soviet Union.

A word first about Polish political parties. Whereas two of the three main British political parties go back to the late seventeenth century, the oldest Polish parties went back to the same 1890s period as our Labour party and had the same roots in an industrialising process and consequent working class. However, Polish circumstances split the Polish working class movement into two camps, one which linked its socialism with support for the cause of Polish independence (Piłsudski’s PPS) and one which opposed independence as a bourgeois irrelevence for true internationalists (Rosa Luxemberg’s Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania/SDKPiL, operating in the Polish parts of the Tsarist empire). At roughly the same time, the SN (National Party; `S’ stands for stranka = party), otherwise known as the National Democrats or Endeks, the party of Dmowski, grouped together the nationalist middle classes. Like the PPS, the SN was represented in the exiled wartime London Polish government. As a party it had become somewhat split between ther wars between those who took their nationalism into fascism and anti-semitism and those who remained true to bourgeois liberal parliamentarism. It was therefore a somewhat controversial party.

Between the wars were formed, through merger of other groups, the final two of the four main parties of the London government: the SL (Peasant, literally People’s Party) of Witos and Mikołajczyk (1931) and the smaller Labour Party of centre-left Catholics, the SP (1937). The only other non-communist party we may note is the small SD (Democratic Party) of progressive intellectuals. A fundamental division in the London government camp was between former supporters and opponents of Piłsudski’s so-called sanacja (clean-up) regime.

During the war, some of these parties developed military wings or operated in undergroundPoland under different labels eg WRN for the socialist PPS. The PPS also split into right and left groups and the left group split further on the issue of whether or not to cooperate with the communists. Osóbka-Morawski’s RPPS (Polish Socialist Workers’ Party) was the pro-communist branch of this second split; this indicates how narrow the band of support was that the communists could look to outside their own ranks. However, elements in all the other parties could be sympathetic to ideas of a common struggle against the Germans which recognised the growing Soviet influence and were prepared to work with its front organisation, the KRN (National Council of the Homeland). The Lublin government thus contained representatives of the other parties, like SL (Witos), PPS (Drobner), and some parts of the P & D docs that might seem obscure eg bottom of p. 5 on the right on the peasant question become less so if one realises that communists who want to use land reform just as a means of maximising support are arguing with SL members who want to create viable farm units.

The communists, like the socialist PPS, went through permutations. The KPP (Polish Communist Party), heir of Rosa Luxemburg’s internationalist SDKPiL after the first world war, was abolished by Stalin and replaced by the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) founded in Poland by underground communists at the turn of 1941-42. The PPR

was simply the communist party under a new label, itself reflecting communists’ awareness of the unpopularity of their cause. They were to an extent divided on their attitude to the Soviet Union, with Gomułka being associated with a patriotic wing and Ochab. Bierut and Berman with the Soviet Union. Note, however, that all the latter three also at times stuck up for Polish interests or were critical of individual Soviet policies, while Gomułka, accused by Berman of being out of touch with the realities of international power (TORANSKA, p. 5, upper left) in fact did discuss international aspects in detail (P & D, pp. 9-11, 15-16). Note the difference of emphasis in Gomułka’s stress on the internal factor on p. 11 top right and of the external on p. 16 top left. Can these two positions be reconciled?

Note, too, Gomułka’s view of French democracy (P & D, p. 13) and the tactics involved in his account of relations with other left-wing groups he wanted to hegemonise, particularly the RPPS: P & D, p. 1 right. This passage shows that he may have been less of a hard-line Stalinist than Bierut, but he was hardly liberal in a western sense. For the record, Gomułka was forced out of his office of General Secretary in 1948 and narrowly escaped being purged before returning to power triumphantly in October 1956, with the image of a communist, yes, but a patriot too, whom the Polish people could see as a bulwark against Stalinist colonisation. In the event, he proved too much of a communist for most Poles’ taste and fell from power after demonstrations in 1970.

  1. POLISH PERSPECTIVES DURING WORLD WAR TWO

a)Centre-left reformist-democratic, (e.g. land reform). Major element of London govt, particularly its PPS and SL members but:

b)problem of sanacja presence in London government and more conservative line of SN nationalists. SN line on eastern frontier shared, however, by centre-left parties.

c)Catholic orientation, in form of clerical-national organisation Union, linked to SP; and national-clerical Confederation of the Nation (PIASECKI), with programme of Polandas a Slavic Great Power. Note that fascisizing Piasecki was won over by communists after the war to lead.a pro-communist, government backed Catholic organisation, Pax.

d)Revolutionary socialist/Communist.

Note:

a) Tensions between the London parties and activists in the Homeland

-PPS tradition represented in Poland by moderate WRN and more radical Polish Socialists

-SL’s more radical organisations in Poland: B. Chop. (Peasant Battalions)

b) Tensions in the Polish underground between AK on one hand and B. Chop and PPS

elements on the other. Note also NSZ, strongly nationalist inderground organisation

with links to SN and on-off relationship with AK. Murdered all communists and also

targeted PPS/WRN . AK only killed communist ‘brigands’.

  1. FACTORS IN THE POSTWAR SITUATION cf. guidance notes

-Demographic shift: Polesrepatriated from territories ceded to USSR (c. 1.6 m) and from West, altogether c. 3. Germans (3.6m. fled before Soviets, 3m. expelled), Jews (3.2m > 100/200,000), Ukrainians (half a million repatriated to Ukraine from 1944, c. ¼ m. remain

-Border issues. Western Neisse finalised at Potsdam

-Mood. Problem of a proud people not in control of their own fate. The old -v- the new Poland/People’s Poland. Theme of ANDRZEJEWSKI’s novel Ashes and Diamonds. Involves:

-security issues. Elements of civil war between government and anti-communist Underground. Dissolution of AK, January 1945 accompanied by creation of successive legatee bodies (most important Nie and later WiN (Freedom and Independence). Hence; a dual strategy of ostensible accommodation and contined resistance, e.g. strategy of infiltrating PKWN structures

-problems in constructing new security forces. Large role of Soviet citizens in Army offcer ranks, cf. predominance of youth,usually with low educational qualifications

- predominant role of NKVD. Due also to inability of Polish organs to cope e.g.

infiltration of militia (cf. contemporary Iraq)

-Reconstruction (e.g. rebuilding of cities, resettlement of western territoriestaken from Germany. Land reform (September 1946)

-International situation

-Insecurity > Massive development of membership of parties/socio-political organisations

  1. POLICIES

1. Nature of PPR strategy. Relationship of `People’s Democracy’ to Soviet

communism:

-Politics: concept of hegemony. Definition of democracy, at odds with Western

concepts of ‘procedural democracy’ or civil rights, rule of law issues. Stress of

‘real’ democratic guarantees, e.g. the people’s control of army and security services.

-Economics. Three kinds of ownership: state, private, cooperative as opposed toSoviet five year plans and collectivisation

-Society. Concept of the progressive force. Role of land reform and nationalisation

a)Tensions in PPR

-Muscovite wing (e.g.BERMAN, BIERUT, OCHAB). Their calculations based on the new power position of Red Army and Soviet Union, and Stalin’s cautious popular front strategy. > moderate nature of PKWN July 1944 manifesto. Opportunistic (cynical?) nature of this moderation. Berman’s view of electoral democracy and revolutionary vanguard (TORAŃSKA DOC).

-Gomułka’s more nationalist wing. Desire for Polish rather than Soviet power base, in first place in the Polish working class. > divisions between PPR and Moscow Poles, first half of 1944

-Nature of the division, cf. p. 1 of P & D document. Berman not moderate, nor Gomułka liberal

b)PPR electoral strategy: To get the PSL to join the ’Democratic bloc’ single list.or go into opposition where can be tarred with brush of anti-regime underground

Attempt to win over PPS for an anti-PSL line, which will enable communists to supplement their limited resources in overcoming the peasantists’ electoral support, ncreasing repression of PSL activists.

2.Nature of Mikołajczyk’s strategy.

- The `tripod’ on which this rested: his peasant-based constituency in Poland; the West;

and Stalin). Motives for Miko’sreturn to join reorganised Lublin Government

-Formation and growth of PSL. Eclipsing of regime’s peasant wing (SL)

-Question of participation of PSL in ‘democratic bloc’ electoral list, 1946

-Attitude to the June 1946 referendum. Belief that Stalin will recognise Poland cannot be governed without his supporters

-Approaches to the West and Stalin. December 18 protest to the Yalta powers against pre-electoral abuses

.3. Nature of PPS (socialist) strategy:

-Three-fold division (left/right/centre). Fear of provoking communist backlash, civil strife and Soviet intervention. Overtures to bring PSL into democratic bloc as counterweight to communists

-Centrist leader CYRANKIEWICZ accepts merger with PPR, 1948. Motives?

4. Role of the West cf. issue of US aid to People’s Poland. Will aid help Miko through

his association with a benevolent West, or reward a non-democratic regime?

PEOPLE’S POLAND - Some facts

1893 PPS formed (Polish Socialist Party

1894SDKPiL (Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania)

SN formed (National Party) founded by Dmowski

1926Sanacja regime begins.

1931 Polish peasant parties unite to form SL (Peasant Party)

1935Conservative change to 1921 constitution. Death of Piłsudski

1937SP (Labour Party) formed

Peasant mass strikes led by Mikołajczyk

1938Dissolution of KPP (Polish Communist Party)

1942JanPPR (Polish Worker’ Party)

AprAK formed

Nov Murder of General Secretary Nowotko on orders of comrade Molojec

who is executed by a party court

1943AprKatyn affair. ZPP (Union of Polish Patriots) emerges

RPPS (Polish Socialist Workers’ Party)

DecKRN (National Council of the Homeland) – communist front

1944JanRJN (Council of Nation Unity) – AK front

JanCBKP (Central Bureau of Polish Communists)

JulPKWN (Polish Committee of National Liberation/Lublin govt)

AugWarsaw rising begins

Oct‘October turn’ in communist policy

NovMikołajczyk resigns as PM of London government

DecBeneš recognises Lublin government

1945JanAK dissolves itself

FebYalta. Polish protocol

MarSoviets arrest 16 pro-London Polish leaders who emerge from

clandestinity

May`May turn’ in communist policy

JunMikołajczyk in the reconstructed Lublin government

Underground state dissolves itself

AugAK successor body dissolves itself. Succeeded by WiN (Freedom and Independence)

SL splits. Mikołajczyk gets PSL legalised

NovMikołajczyk in the US; aid and trade issues

1946JanNationalisation law

FebMikołajczyk refuses to enter joint electoral bloc

JunReferendum

JulKielce pogrom

AugPPR and PPS leaders consult Stalin in Moscow

SepUS Sec. of State Byrnes’ Stuttgart speech questions Oder-Neisse line

NovPPS-PPR pact > count-down for faked elections

Dec 18 Mikołajczyk appeals to Yalta powers against pre-election malpractices

1947Jan USA communicates protest against malpractices to other Yalta powers

(5 Jan 19). Faked election (19 Jan)

OctMikołajczyk flees Poland. PSL taken over by PSL-Left

1948MarFusion of PPR and PPS begins > Polish United Workers’ Party

SepGomułka forced to resign as general secretary. Bierut exchanges state presidency for party chairmanship

1949Merger of SL and PSL in United Peasant Party (ZSL)

1956Gomułka returns to power as general secretary

1970Gomułka resigns after police shoot dozens dead in worker strike

1989United Peasant Party (ZSL) switches support from PPR to the Solidarity movement, > end of communist rule in Poland