404-727-1935
office hours: Tuesday 1:30-3:30PM
336 Tarbutton / Amy Liu
404-727-4973
office hours: Monday 2:00-4:00 PM
111 Tarbutton
POLS 490: Dictatorship and Development
Spring 2007
Description
This course is a senior seminar on economic development in post-World War II democracies and dictatorships. The first two parts of the course introduces students to conceptual issues in the study of political regimes and economic development. The third section examines whether democracy or dictatorship is better at facilitating growth, investigating different proposed causal mechanisms and the evidence for them.
Requirements
1) Readings
Students are expected to read the assigned readings before class and may want to reread the material after it was discussed in class. All readings are available through Reserves Direct.
2) Class participation (15%)
The class has lecture and discussion components. Students are expected to actively participate during discussion. Attendance is required. Students are allowed three excused or unexcused absences after which any further absences will result in penalties for their participation grade.
3) Short writing assignments (30%)
At three points in the course, students will be asked to write a 3-5-page memo answering a given question. (Topics and due dates are indicated in the syllabus.) The questions require students to apply concepts from class and the readings. Each memo is worth 10% of the final grade. Late memos will not be accepted.
4) Midterm – in class exam on Thursday, March 8. (20%)
5) Final – take home exam. Due date to be announced. (35%)
Honor Code
Students are expected to familiarize themselves with the Honor Code of Emory College Honor Code ( paying special attention to Article 4 and its definition of academic misconduct. Honor Code violations including, but not limited to, plagiarism and the use of unauthorized information during examinations will be reported to the Honor Council.
Part I: The state
Why a state?
Functions of the state. Monopoly of violence. Other roles of the state? State failure.
Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. “The Imperatives of State-Building.” Journal of Democracy 15, 2: 17-31.
What kind of state?
Defining political regime. Democracy and dictatorship. Minimalist versus maximalist conceptions. Negative and positive definitions. Conceptualizing versus operationalizing. Purpose of definitions.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76, 6: 22-43.
Types of dictatorships – military
Military coups. Why does the military intervene? Is the military more likely to stage a coup during economic crisis? Structure of military regimes. Are military leaders good economic managers? Do they face particular problems because they are military? State autonomy arguments. Role of ideology.
Biglaiser, Glen. 2002. Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press. Chapters 1-3 (pp.1-90)
Movie: “Condor: The First War on Terror”
Writing assignment: U.S. support of military dictatorships. Due in class Thursday, February 15.
Types of dictatorships – monarchy
Is the need for revenue what drives the emergence of political representation? Do natural resources help monarchs survive? Dynastic monarchies. Do natural resources help countries develop in general?
Crystal, Jill. 1989. “Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar.” Comparative Politics 21, 4: 427-443.
Friedman, Thomas. 2006. “The First Law of Petropolitics.” Foreign Policy (May/June): 28-36.
Types of dictatorships – hegemonic party
What is a hegemonic party? Hegemonic party systems and single-party systems. Existence and survival of hegemonic parties. Elections. Opposition parties. When are hegemonic parties good for economic growth?
Langston, Joy. 2002. “Breaking Out Is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party Hegemonic Regime.” Latin American Politics and Society 44(3): 61-88.
Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2001. “Wither the Kuomintang?” The China Quarterly 168 (December 2001): 930-943.
“The Koizumi Restoration” and “The Man Who Remade Japan.” The Economist (September 14, 2006).
Types of dictatorships – personalist
Defining “personalism,” “neo-patrimonialism.” How do these regimes survive? What are their effects on development?
Gourevitch, Philip. “Letter from Korea: Alone in the Dark.” The New Yorker (September 8, 2003).
Movie: “A State of Mind”
Writing assignment: Containment of North Korea. Due in class Tuesday, March 20.
Part II: The market
What is development?
Defining development. The focus on income: pros and cons. Measuring income. Other criteria for evaluating human well-being.
Sen, Amartya. 1993. “The Economics of Life and Death.” Scientific American (May): 40-47.
Patterns of development
Cross-national and historical trends in development. Sources of inequalities: factor endowments, geography, historical legacy, luck. Is there a role for politics?
Jones, Charles. 1998. Introduction to Economic Growth. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. pp.3-12.
“Winner takes (almost) all.” The Economist (December 7, 2006).
What is needed for growth?
What is needed to make income grow? Inputs for growth: labor, physical and human capital, technology. Can the inputs of growth be provided by the “free” market? The role of government. Why is state intervention tricky?
Ray, Debraj. 1998. Development Economics. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press. pp.51-53.
Part III: Effect of regimes on growth
Inputs for growth: human capital
What is human capital? Importance of human capital. How do we measure human capital? Public and private goods. Human capital as a public good. Incentives of different regimes to provide it.
Brown, David S., 1999. "Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy's Impact on Primary School Enrollment," Political Research Quarterly 52, :681-707.
Birdsall, Nancy, David Ross, and Richard Sabot. 1997. “Education, Growth, and Inequality,” in Nancy Birdsall and Fredrick Jaspersen, eds. Pathways to Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America. Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversity Press.
Writing assignment: Language of instruction in new educational system. Due in class on Tuesday, April 10.
N.B. Class cancelled on Thursday, April 12.
Inputs for growth: property rights
What are property rights? Why are they important for growth? What type of regime best protects property rights? Why? The importance of electoral constraints and time horizons. The problem of measuring rights.
Root, Hilton. 1989. “Tying the King’s Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime.” Rationality and Society 1, 2: 240-258.
Inputs for growth: freedom, efficiency, and allocation
Is freedom important? Its importance in promoting better performance and preventing disasters. Freedom of organization. Labor under dictatorship. Law and order. Is there a trade-off between democracy and growth?
Zakaria, Fareed. 1994. “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Affairs 73, 2: 109-126.
Kim Dae Jung. 1994. “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values.” Foreign Affairs73, 6 (November/December): 189-194.
Sen, Amartya. 1994. “Freedoms and Needs.” The New Republic (January 10-17): 31-38.
State autonomy
Are electoral constraints always good for development? What are the incentives for political leaders and policy-makers? When should they be autonomous? Embedded autonomy. Developmental and predatory states.
Evans, Peter. 1989. “Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third WorldState.” Sociological Forum 4, 4: 561-587.
Regime dynamics and its effects on development
Democratization. The effects of transitions on the economy. Are simultaneous political and economic transitions possible? Does democracy hinder growth and recovery? J-curve. Economic inequality and its effect on politics.
Hellman, Joel. 1999. “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform.” World Politics 50, 2: 203-234.
1