models of democracy.
Christianity. God’s will. ‘The rich man in his castle, the poor man in his field’. Universal rights exist from God. Augustine & God’s intervention. Aquinas & the synthesis of faith & reason.
1 Athens. Direct democracy. Small city states. Free to rule & obliged to be ruled by direct intense participation. ‘Civic virtue’, duty & fulfilment. Plato’s conundrum, ‘Mob rule & emasculation of the wise’. Essential co-operation v individual initiative. Rhetoric, assemblies & short term office. Women & slaves make time available.
Fails, Rome hierarchically efficient. Cannot cope with space (scale) & time (change). ‘the polis’ was exclusive.
2 Republicanism. Protective. Renaissance, humanism & the individual. Self determination & protection from tyranny & oppression. Essential to rule otherwise domination by Popes & Princes. Machiavelli. ‘Eternal vigilance’. A counter to authoritarian power, competitive free speech & association, but iron law.
Fails, property owners, yesterday’s successes, are no better than Princes, others are marginalised.
Developmental. Marsilius breaks the ‘plentitude of power’ of the Pope in Padua. Rousseau (1762). Social contract, reacts to Louis 16th. Freedom from domination requires ‘Justice, liberty & equality’. Executive ‘commissioned’ to enact the ‘common good’ from a separate legislative assembly. Minorities must be equalised & will consent. Citizens are active if ‘happy’ or have a common enemy. Independence (money) & liberty (power) are different.
Fails, no common good, no individual freedom, no minorities, no girls & no industrialisation!
3 Liberal Democracy. Protective. Civil war. Restoration. Requirement for protection from authority & malevolent ‘active citizens’. Sovereignty with the people & their representatives. Hobbes (1651). Nature is strife. Leviathan, a necessary policeman. Locke (1690). Nature is co-operative. Treatises, on natural rights, free speech, association, beliefs & constitutionally constrained state. Paine, the rights of man, & representatives.
Madison, Montesquie (1776). US revolution after a history of oppression in Europe. Checks & balances, separation of powers & competitive political parties.
Fails, distorting effect of economic power.
Developmental. Intense debate & industrial revolution. Educational enhancement, a prerequisite for participation in accountable government. Mill (1859). On liberty. Separation of civil liberties without harm & state political rights with constitutional constraint. Tocqueville, Republican executives have a life of their own. Votes & checks.
Fails, Marx, irreconcilable & Schumpeter, no ‘common good’, necessary decisiveness, voter manipulation.
4 Marxism. (1848). Direct democracy. Pinnacle of the nation state. Freedom requires political & economic equality. Markets & the state are dominated by class capital power. Liberal freedoms are a licence to exploit. Integration of state & society from a workers revolution. Class & conflict disappear. Production abolishes scarcity.
Fails, no explicit protection of individual autonomy & innovative progress. A gigantic gamble.
5 Competitive Elitism. Leadership bureaucracy. REALITY! Efficiency bureaucratic organisation & scientific technology in industry. An instrumental method of selecting favoured skilled leaders & checking power. Weber. Schumpeter. Win the war, win the peace, arrogance. An experts charter? Democracy a luxury? Illiterate voters?
Fails, no intrinsic value, no role for civil society.
6 Classic Pluralism. Interest group competition. FACTIONS! Intermediate groups everywhere. Secures involvement of minorities & curbs majorities. Madison & Schumpeter to Dahl. Empirical democracy. Competitive politics & diversity limits state power & disperses it widely throughout the population. US gridlock.
Fails, undemocratic gridlock & unequal interest groups.
Neo-pluralism. Corporate dominated interest group competition. MNCs domination renders the state enmeshed & impotent, dependent on wealth taxes for spending. Convergence with Marx!
Fails, Marx – state as a capitalist poodle. Social science – state as itself a vested interest.
7 Legal democracy. New Right. Stalin & Hitler. Arbitrary majority rule is not legitimate & must be circumscribed by law. State planning overload. Hayek, Nozick. Issues are handled by consent in markets.
Fails, the distortion of economic power.
8 Participatory democracy. New Left. Not a reaction to the new right but back to Marx. Active participation in political issues to solve collective problems. Participation requires equality, achieved through direct regulation & redistribution of material resources. The state is not representative & illegitimate. Pateman, Macpherson.
Fails, well intentioned actions have unintended consequences, mercantilist fallacy, freedom & command tension.
9 Democratic autonomy. Liberal socialism. Free & equal, without harm. Bill of rights. Deepening democracy by DP, PR, SR, referenda, juries. Extensive market regulation, deepening into economics. Majority justification.
Fails, individual innovation voted away. Reconciling the irreconcilable state & civil society.
Cosmopolitan democracy. Extending autonomy in global networks. UN reform & non market solutions.
Fails, voting & economic conundrums remain. Unnecessary, undemocratic & impracticable complex design.
democratisation.
Modernisation. Economic development. + NEW factors – political culture, political institutions, civil society, international pressure.
Lipset (1960), current situation, economic growth, GNP, wealth, rising incomes, agricultural decline, industrial development, urbanisation, social mobility, telephones. Quantitative, universal, linear.
Diamond, ‘well to do people’, vigorous socio economic development, participation, literacy, education & income.
Democratic requisites. The deep process of economic development, the freedom to experiment, innovate & change, are closely associated with liberal democracy. Getting a life.
But why do countries modernise? & correlations are not causes!
But Turkey, India, Germany. The flurry in Africa. EE. Incomplete explanation extended.
Structural. CLASS struggle. + new factors – industrial classes, war, state power, identity, job/vote preference, money. Long term historical unfolding in the structure of class power. Shifts which stop or facilitate alliances.
Barrington Moore (1966), class power groups – landlords, peasants, bourgeoisie v the state. The power of the state is crucial, religious, aristocratic or military. Capitalist induced commercialisation is a counterweight to the state, creating a denser civil society & two structural effects: strengthened bourgeoisie & weakened lords. International success / failure can bring similar pressures.
Class alliances pan out in different ways.
Imbalance of power, the state & the lords = authoritarianism.
No commercialisation, peasants numerous = peasant revolution = socialism.
Commercialisation, industrial investment = aristocratic revolution = feudalism.
Lords weakened by industrialisation = partial democracy.
Landlord / bourgeoisie alliance = fascism. The iron & rye coalition!
Bourgeoisie win, he who pays the piper = bourgeois revolution = innovations = Liberal Democracy!
Thus, democracy (England, France, US) or fascism (Germany, Japan) or socialism (China, Russia)? It all depends.
Rueschemeyer (1992), adds the influence of the industrial classes to the balance of power, a numerous working class & rich middle class capitalists.
1 landlords. 2 peasantry. 3 urban proletariat. 4 urban bourgeoisie. 5 professional middle class.
Therborn (1977), adds defeat in war, mobilisation in the face of threat & internal contradictions.
Mann (1993), adds the increased power of the state, national identity & the economic priorities of the workers.
Giddens (1993), adds the money system is power.
Dependency = neo structuralism.
But tends to ignore; suffrage, nationalism & elite leadership. Incomplete explanation extended.
But the shifts were associated with economic development, a result of ‘know how’, constraining elite choices.
But Africa & EE, class power didn’t develop.
Transition. Elite initiatives. Elites have choices, triggered by initiatives, defeat in war or economic failure or ‘the paradox of success’! Choice through bargaining & negotiation over economic spoils. Elite forums, civic forum, solidarity. Rapid change not structures or cultures.
Rustow (1970), historical sequence - national identity / unity (defence from barbarians), inconclusive political struggle (different beliefs, hot family feuds), decision (emerging compromise), habituation (consolidation). Initiation & consolidation clear distinction.
Coalitions. Hard-liners & soft-liners v. opportunists, moderates & radicals. Negotiation & real sacrifices. Extremes isolated. Past forgotten, future focus. Preservation of the institutions of capitalism. Sunter, Venezuela.
1st transition = Interim governments = opposition led (coup d’etat, revolution), incumbent led (reforms), power sharing (constitutional conferences) or international pressure.
2nd transition = Consolidation = economic development, better than the ‘acien regime’, ideological strength.
Mainwaring (1992), choices & actions of different elites but triggered by economic or war crisis & constrained by structure.
Yes Korea, Taiwan, LA & SA. But there are deeper reasons.
Convergence! Economics breach the structural walls & elites climb through!
## Class structure changes because of modernisation which creates ‘space’ for transition choices by elites.
## Positive economic performance is essential for legitimacy & capitalism requires basic free institutions.
Economic development. Modernisation cause. Structural cause of power shift. Transition trigger. But why?
Trade reduces inequality, induces co-operation & tolerance, moderates extremists, leads to middle class bulges & sovereign consumers / investors & sovereign voters.
Social divisions. Modernisation results in divisions. Structural division the basis for power. Transition trigger.
Social division based on wealth & life chances? Or group division based on culture, gender, ethnicity?
All divisions eventually, inexorably move toward democratisation because co-operation is economically successful.
But different environments & different times.
political institutions & the state. Modernisation stops when the state is powerful, the potential to violently accumulate & crowd out civil society. Structural alliances vary with state power. Transition elites use institutional platforms. Checks & balances on parliament, parties, civil service & military. Intermediate political institutions are vital as state & class are two variables of many.
Too much state = authoritarianism. Too much laissez faire = class exploitation.
Civil society. Modernisation, a propensity to associate. Structural, balances the power of the state. Dense civil society leads to networks of interaction which bring economic development & strength to the masses. Transition elites emerge from vigorous civil society.
Political culture & ideas. Modernisation results from learning cultures, education, co-operation, moderation & tolerance. Values, attitudes & beliefs grounded in cultural institutions, religions & traditions are socially powerful. Jews, Protestants compatible with liberal democracy!? Dictators - Pope, Louis 14th, Colbert, Napoleon, de Gaulle, Confucian bureaucrats, the Koran, Mao, Stalin, Castro incompatible with democracy. Structural suggest ideas result from democracy not vice versa. Chicken & egg? Transition elites ignore.
International competition. Modernisation results from international trade & markets. Global division of labour & the global economy. MNCs. Structure changes with war, hot & cold, works both ways. Interactions go beyond nation state control. UN, World Bank, IMF. US foreign policy. Cuban revolution. Colonial legacies. Transition elites form international coalitions. Red Cross, Amnesty, Greenpeace. Is external pressure democratic?
Modernisation & transition pay more attention to civil society but civil society is the result of the same forces which shape structure.
Parallel manifestations of evolutionary progress against the rigors of the 2nd law. Capitalism underpins all.
Europe. Reaction against command particularly tax, war & grandiose schemes. Class division. Importance of the state & institutions. War defeat/victory. Economic crisis.
Modernisation. Invalidated by Germany in the 30’s. Turkey & EE later.
Structural. Dominates Europe in the long 19th.
Transition. The short 20th century & consolidation impossible without economic growth. Exceptions had remarkable institutions. Elites seem less relevant than the mass pressures of people.
1939-89. Liberal Democracy defeats fascism 1945 & socialism 1989. But the welfare state, nationalisation, comprehensive education, de-colonisation, centralised de Gaulle & US policy resulted in much command!
Portugal & Spain. Transition. Democratic revolution! Authoritarian regimes were neutral during the war & survived, particularly with US support during the cold war. But expensive colonial wars & capitalist development weakened the authoritarian structure enabling negotiated transitions.
USA. No theory, no class structure, no negotiating elites?
No taxation without representation. Liberal culture. Gridlock constitution. Social racial division. Economic growth.
Cynical politics out but democracy in civil society in. Majority voting v consent.
Latin America. Factors play differently ‘cos of colonial legacy.
Modernisation. No, ‘cos democracy in rich & poor. Chile, Argentina, richest & most prone to authoritarianism v Peru.
Structural. Landed elites seized power from colonialists, armies & civil wars, political institutions but landed elites retained power with agriculture & mineral export dependency. 1930’s collapse. Industrialisation & populist opportunities but little democracy & collapse. Landlords powerful in relation to the state but then workers sustained authoritarianism through populism.
Opportunity in the 1960’s was dashed by the Cuban revolution & fear consolidated the military.
Structural constraints emerge then how it pans out depends on transition choices.
Transition. 3rd wave. No clear trend until the 1980’s global reforms, then softliners & moderates marginalising hardliners & radicals, forget the past, negotiate the future, leaving traditional capitalist & military power intact!
Shocks of 1929 & 1959 produced responses which rendered liberal democracy inappropriate but in 1980 conditions globally were propitious. But demilitarisation? Corruption? Political cynicism? Poverty?
India & China. Modernisation. Quantification difficult, economic development & GNP per head, but what of; political culture, civil society, international pressure (colonial legacy) & state institutions (political parties). Modernisation add ons!
Structural. Barrington Moore study. Power relationships between land lords, peasants, bourgeoisie & the state.
In China authoritarian culture & land lords failed to commercialise agriculture & eliminate the peasants. Peasants formed an alliance with the communists.
In India diverse culture & landed class rule in the colonial administration, the bourgeoisie grew strong in opposition. India had a lush civil society which tamed the state & produced the Congress Party.
Transition. No ‘cos long term cultural trends dominate.
Taiwan & Korea. Both authoritarian in the 1980’s.
Modernisation. No, economic development tends to be slow, here it was sudden.
Structural. Economic development (Chaebols part of international capitalism) & international pressure (geo political issues & war) changed class structure (landlords were wiped out) & a legacy of strong state power.
Rueschemeyer = importance of industrial working class & choices for elimination of landlords. But urban working class well organised in Korea but not in Taiwan.
Transition choices given the space by structural change is again the answer.
Indonesia, Malaysia & the Philippines. Selective application of all 3 theories does illuminate.