Page 1
Page 1
407 U.S. 225, *; 92 S. Ct. 2151, **;
32 L. Ed. 2d 705, ***; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 104
LEXSEE 407 US 225
Questioned
As of: Dec 18, 2009
MITCHUM, DBA BOOK MART v. FOSTER ET AL.
No. 70-27
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
407 U.S. 225; 92 S. Ct. 2151; 32 L. Ed. 2d 705; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 104
December 13, 1971, Argued
June 19, 1972, Decided
Page 1
407 U.S. 225, *; 92 S. Ct. 2151, **;
32 L. Ed. 2d 705, ***; 1972 U.S. LEXIS 104
PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.
DISPOSITION: 315 F.Supp. 1387, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee prosecuting attorney brought suit against appellant bookstore owner to close down his bookstore. The bookstore owner sought to restrain the state court proceedings, and the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida refused to do so on the grounds that the injunctive relief sought did not come within the exceptions of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.S. ß 2283. The bookstore owner challenged this judgment.
OVERVIEW: The prosecuting attorney sought to close down the bookstore as a public nuisance. The bookstore owner alleged that the state officers were depriving him of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He sought injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983 on the ground that the state court was unconstitutionally applying Florida laws so as to cause him great and irreparable harm. The district court refused to enjoin the state court proceeding because the relief sought did not come under any of the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C.S. ß 2283. On appeal, the court held that federal injunctive relief was appropriate only where the irreparable injury was both great and immediate, the state law was flagrantly unconstitutional, or there was a showing of bad faith that would call for equitable relief. The court added that to qualify under one of those expressly authorized exceptions, the federal law did not have to expressly reference ß 2283. The test was whether an act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state proceeding. The court held that 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983 fell within the exception.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the district court's order denying injunctive relief and remanded the case for further proceedings because the statute under which the bookstore owner sought relief was an authorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
CORE TERMS: anti-injunction, injunction, expressly authorized, enjoin, Act of Congress, civil rights, federalism, immunities secured, companion cases, redress, color, state law, federal government, federal right, injunctive relief, statutory exceptions, criminal prosecutions, deprivation, predecessor, qualify, comity, Judiciary Act, federal laws, interpleader, relitigation, irreparable, effectuate, restrain, evident, corpus
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > Anti-Injunction Act
[HN1] See 28 U.S.C.S. ß 2283.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > Anti-Injunction Act
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
[HN2] An Act of Congress, 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983, expressly authorizes a "suit in equity" to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Scope
[HN3] See 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > Anti-Injunction Act
[HN4] On its face the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.S. ß 2283, is an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions. Any injunction against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory exceptions to ß 2283 if it is to be upheld.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > General Overview
[HN5] Even the possible unconstitutionality of a state statute "on its face" does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it. However, the United States Supreme Court has clearly left room for federal injunctive intervention in a pending state court prosecution in certain exceptional circumstances: where irreparable injury is both great and immediate, where the state law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, or where there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances that would call for equitable relief. Only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > Anti-Injunction Act
Governments > Federal Government > U.S. Congress
[HN6] In order to qualify under the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not contain an express reference to that statute. No prescribed formula is required; an authorization need not expressly refer to 28 U.S.C.S. ß 2283. Secondly, a federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception. Thirdly, in order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute, an act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding. The test is whether an act of Congress, clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity, could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Anti-Injunction Acts > Anti-Injunction Act
Civil Rights Law > Section 1983 Actions > Elements > Color of State Law > General Overview
[HN7] 42 U.S.C.S. ß 1983 is a product of a vast transformation from the concepts of federalism that had prevailed in the late 18th century when the anti-injunction statute was enacted. The very purpose of ß 1983 is to interpose the federal courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights: to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial. In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in ß 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a "suit in equity" as one of the means of redress. Federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights. For these reasons, under the criteria established in previous decisions construing the anti-injunction statute, ß 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the "expressly authorized" exception of that law.
SUMMARY:
After a Florida county prosecutor had instituted state court proceedings to close down the appellant's bookstore as a public nuisance, and after the state court had issued an order prohibiting continued operation of the bookstore, the appellant, suing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, sought injunctive relief against the state court proceedings, on the ground that Florida laws were being unconstitutionally applied by the state court so as to cause him great and irreparable harm. The appellant relied on a federal civil rights statute (42 USCS 1983) authorizing suits in equity to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of federal constitutional rights. A three-judge District Court was convened and held that injunctive relief was precluded by the anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions staying state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress" (315 F Supp 1387).
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. In an opinion by Stewart, J., expressing the unanimous view of the court, it was held that 1983 constituted an "expressly authorized" exception to 2283, and that 2283 thus did not preclude injunctive relief in the present case.
Burger, Ch. J., joined by White and Blackmun, JJ., concurred in the court's opinion and noted that although 2283 did not bar an injunction, the District Court should, on remand, consider whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism precluded the issuance of an injunction against state court proceedings.
Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., did not participate.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
[***LEdHN1]
COURTS ß700.5
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[1A][1B]
The federal civil rights statute (42 USCS 1983) authorizing a suit in equity to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of federal constitutional rights, constitutes an "expressly authorized" exception to the federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions staying state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," and a Federal District Court errs in holding that, because of the anti-injunction statute, it is without power in a 1983 action to enjoin a proceeding pending in a state court under any circumstances whatsoever.
[***LEdHN2]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[2]
The federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) providing, subject to specified exceptions, that federal courts may not grant injunctions staying state court proceedings, does not merely state a flexible doctrine of comity, but imposes an absolute ban upon the issuance of a federal injunction against a pending state court proceeding, in the absence of one of the recognized exceptions, regardless of whether a pending state court proceeding is civil or criminal, and regardless of how extraordinary the particular circumstances may be.
[***LEdHN3]
INJUNCTION ß80
enforcement of statute --
Headnote:[3]
Even the possible unconstitutionality of a statute on its face does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it.
[***LEdHN4]
COURTS ß698
federal injunction -- pending state criminal proceedings --
Headnote:[4]
Federal injunctive intervention in a pending state court prosecution may be proper in certain exceptional circumstances, such as where irreparable injury is both great and immediate, or where the state law is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, or where there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or other unsual circumstances that would call for equitable relief.
[***LEdHN5]
COURTS ß698
federal injunction -- pending state criminal proceedings --
Headnote:[5]
Only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction, and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown, is federal injunctive relief against pending state prosecutions appropriate.
[***LEdHN6]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[6]
The basic purpose of the federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) providing, subject to specified exceptions, that federal courts may not grant injunctions staying state court proceedings, is to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts.
[***LEdHN7]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[7]
In order to qualify under the "expressly authorized" exception to the federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions staying state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," a federal law need not contain an express reference to the anti-injunction statute.
[***LEdHN8]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[8]
A federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding in order to qualify as an exception to the federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions staying state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress."
[***LEdHN9]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction -- stay of state court proceedings --
Headnote:[9]
In order to qualify as an "expressly authorized" exception to the federal anti-injunction statute (28 USCS 2283) prohibiting federal courts from granting injunctions staying state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress," an Act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, which could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding; however, in order to come within this exception, an Act of Congress need not, on its face and in every one of its provisions, be totally incompatible with the prohibition of the anti- injunction statute; the test, rather, is whether an Act of Congress clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court of equity could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.
[***LEdHN10]
RIGHTS ß12.5
remedy for deprivation --
Headnote:[10]
The purpose of the federal civil rights statute (42 USCS 1983) authorizing an action at law, a suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress of a deprivation, under color of state law, of rights secured by the Federal Constitution and federal laws, is to interpose the federal courts between the states and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights, and thus to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial; in carrying out this purpose, Congress, by expressly authorizing a suit in equity as one of the means of redress, has plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in 1983 actions.
[***LEdHN11]
COURTS ß691
federal injunction --
Headnote:[11]
Federal injunctive relief against a state court proceeding can in some circumstances be essential to prevent great, immediate, and irreparable loss of a person's constitutional rights.
SYLLABUS
Title 42 U. S. C. ß 1983, which authorizes a suit in equity to redress the deprivation under color of state law "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . ," is within that exception of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U. S. C. ß 2283, that provides that a federal court may not enjoin state court proceedings "except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress." And in this ß 1983 action, though the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding (cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, and companion cases) are not questioned, the District Court is held to have erred in holding that the anti-injunction statute absolutely barred its enjoining a pending state court proceeding under any circumstances whatsoever. Pp. 228-243.
COUNSEL: Robert Eugene Smith argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Paul Shimek, Jr.
Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert L. Shevin, Attorney General, and George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General.
George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, and Michael R. Perle and John DeCicco, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of New Jersey as amicus curiae.
JUDGES: Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all members joined except Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Burger, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which White and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 243.
OPINION BY: STEWART
OPINION
[*226] [***708] [**2153] MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
[***LEdHR1A] [1A]The federal anti-injunction statute provides that a federal court [HN1] "may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 1[HN2] An Act of Congress, 42 U. S. C. ß 1983, expressly authorizes a "suit in equity" to redress "the deprivation," under color of state law, "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . ." 2 The question before us [**2154] is whether this "Act of Congress" comes within the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute so as to permit a federal court in a ß 1983 suit to grant an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court. This question, which has divided the federal courts, 3 has lurked in the background of many of our recent cases, but we have not until today explicitly decided it. 4
1 28 U. S. C. ß 2283.
2 The statute provides in full: [HN3] "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
3 Compare Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (CA3) (ß 1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception), with Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (CA4) (ß 1983 is not an "expressly authorized" exception).
4 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n. 2; Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 613 n. 3; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54. See also Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 556; Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15.
In Younger, supra, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS was the only member of the Court who took a position on the question now before us. He expressed the view that ß 1983 is included in the "expressly authorized exception to ß 2283 . . . ." 401 U.S., at 62. Cf. id., at 54 (STEWART, J., joined by Harlan, J., concurring); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 120 n. 14 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J., joined by WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ.).
[*227] I
The prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, brought a proceeding in a Florida court to close down the appellant's bookstore as a public nuisance under the claimed authority of Florida law. The state court [***709] entered a preliminary order prohibiting continued operation of the bookstore. After further inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, the appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, alleging that the actions of the state judicial and law enforcement officials were depriving him of rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying upon 42 U. S. C. ß 1983, 5 he asked for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings, on the ground that Florida laws were being unconstitutionally applied by the state court so as to cause him great and irreparable harm. A single federal district judge issued temporary restraining orders, and a three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U. S. C. ßß 2281 and 2284. After a hearing, the three-judge court dissolved the temporary restraining orders and refused to enjoin the state court proceeding, holding that the "injunctive relief sought here [*228] as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not come under any of the exceptions set forth in Section 2283. It is not expressly authorized by Act of Congress, it is not necessary in the aid of this court's jurisdiction, and it is not sought in order to protect or effectuate any judgment of this court." 315 F.Supp. 1387, 1389. An appeal was brought directly here under 28 U. S. C. ß 1253, 6 and we noted probable jurisdiction. 402 U.S. 941.