Managerial and mobilising internationalism in the British docks and seafaring sector

In September 2010, controversy erupted when a director at Stena Line complained to a Dutch newspaper that British workers in the ferry sector had ‘fat bellies’ and were ‘covered in tattoos’. A few days before the story appeared as front page news in Britain,[1] I was at a meeting of delegates from British, Dutch, Belgian, Irish and French seafaring and port unions, where copies of the original were handed round. The reaction was less outrage than surprise (even amusement) that British workers were attacked so explicitly. The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) has accused Stena of employing Filipino seafarers at £2.20 per hour, which Stena denies, but remarks directed at British seafarers must be understood against this backdrop of competition between North European and non-EU labour.

The maritime sector has been particularly strongly affected by unregulated global marketsand consequently has relatively developed international trade union institutions (Anner et al., 2006; Koch-Baumgarten, 1998; Lillie, 2004). This article, however, compares two processes by which British unions have pursued their own forms of internationalisation, demonstrating how tensions in domestic unionism shape the expectations and strategies applied internationally. Firstly, I examine the case of Nautilus International,whose approach has been strongly partnership-oriented. Then, I consider the International Transport Workers’ Federation’s (ITF) ‘Fair and Safe Ferries for All’ (FASFA) campaign, involving several British unions, which seeks to cultivate bonds of solidarity between North European trade unionists as a means of mobilising opposition against the ‘social dumping’ of low-wage workers.

I focus particularly on the role of officials and leadership, distinguishing between ‘managerial’ and ‘mobilising’ internationalisms. I argue that where international labour market competition is intense, as in the FASFA case, a tension emerges between localised and globalised ways of interpreting interest, and that officials can seek to mobilise by propagating international frames. Where competition is relatively mild, as with Nautilus, the distance between local and global interpretations is less pronounced, affording greater space in which a different kind of internationalism, based on more general political concerns, can flourish. The latter type entails a bureaucratic division of labour, as general concerns filter upwards from membership to be addressed by technical specialists and experienced international officials. In the former case, however, officials often seek to propagate international conceptions of interest which are intended to decentralise of the locus of international activity.

The material and political conditions of internationalism

Recent scholarship on British trade union revitalisation has generally distinguishedbetween the models of organising and partnership,the former emphasising recruitment and collective organisation, and the latter seekingmutual cooperation with employers (Brown, 2000; Heery, 2002; Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2009; Taylor and Ramsey, 1998). The two are not mutually exclusive in practice. Martinez Lucio and Stuart (2009) suggest that partnership strategies could be levers for recruitment activity, and others identify a ‘top-down’ organising model which expands recruitment with little input from membership (Darlington, 2009). A servicing approach can aid recruitment by circumventing employer aversion to collective bargaining (Howell, 1999), entailing a shift towards a ‘managerial unionism’ (Heery and Kelly, 1994) in which the self-representation of the union grassroots is de-emphasised.

Consequently writers have identifiedqualitative elements of ‘organising’that enable a clearer distinction. Organising should imply a member-led trade unionism with the normative objective of increased grassroots activity (Heery and Adler, 2004; Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2009; Simms and Holgate, 2010). Darlington’s (2009) study of RMT’s activity on British railways is illustrative of this. Under Bob Crow’s leadership RMT has pursued a militant strategy, stimulating a ‘devolved activist engagement’, in which activists are encouraged to propagate anti-management frames. Kelly (1998) suggests industrial relations scholars follow mobilisation theory (see McAdam, 1982; Tilly, 1978)inshifting emphasis from institutional factors onto the cognitive process by which oppositional union activity is generated. Hetherefore highlights the importance of leadership and framing processes in establishing collective interest (see also Darlington, 2006). Here,I follow Kelly in examining the role of leadership and framing in shaping internationalism, as well as the material conditions which influence this internal process.

Domestic tensions between partnership, organising and mobilisationhave implicationson an international scale. Partnership seeks to realign the nexus of conflict away from the within-firm employer-employee opposition and towards a between-firm competition (Martinez Lucio and Weston, 1992), and may, therefore, be inherently disruptive of international cooperation between unions. If the European system is characterised by ‘regime competition’, as mobile production inputs discipline national environments (Streeck, 1998), then partnership’s emphasis on competitiveness must prevent unions from transcending the national. Studies such as Hancké’s (2000) examination of European Works Councils (EWCs)suggest that mobile capital engenders a gap between the logic of local competitiveness and international cooperation, and unions involved in EWCs have tended towards the former (see also Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008; Lillie and Martinez Lucio, 2004; Waddington, 2006; Wills, 2000).

International maritime trade unionism illustrates on a broader scale the extent to which international solidarity has been brokenagainstnational (or regional) competitive interests. The ITF’s Flag of Convenience (FOC) campaign, which seeks to impose internationally-established minimum standards on ships flagged to deregulated registries, has been repeatedly beset by tensions between labour and capital supply countries (Koch-Baumgarten, 1998; Lillie, 2004). The latter (typically including the more advanced European economies) may demand higher international standards, whilst the formermay seek lower standards to retain their competitive advantage. Harvey (2006) suggests that capital’s expanding reach often creates the material basis, not for international solidarity, but national or regional antagonism, and despite its achievements the FOC campaign illustrates this (Lillie, 2004; Koch-Baumgarten, 1998).International trade union institutions cannot rely on economic internationalisation as a determinant of international solidarity, but must also construct a ‘political argument’ which builds a normative sense of common interest (Croucher and Cotton, 2009:116). This political argument is often disrupted rather than aided by material factors.

Against this backdrop a literature on New Labour Internationalism has emerged, invoking a political vision of labour’srole in an authentically globalised ‘clash between the free market and society’ (Munck, 2007:ix; see also Ghigliani, 2005; Lambert, 2007; Waterman and Wills, 2001). Johns (1998), distinguishes between ‘accommodationist solidarity’ which seeks to protect local conditions against outside undermining, and ‘transformatory solidarity’ which actively counters the geographical inequalities upon which capitalism thrives. Again, the latter is dependent on a political consciousness which defines international solidarity as mutually beneficial and normatively desirable. Implicit in this idea of labour as an international movement is the notion of ‘bottom-up’ rather than bureaucratic activity (Ashwin, 2000; Moody, 1997; Waterman, 2001). Moody (1997), for example, presents an extreme formulation of the link between official-led partnership and parochialism, arguing that it is only through the militant activism of transnational grassroots networks that a true global solidarity can emerge.

These arguments raise the question of whether and how Kelly’s (1998) discussion of mobilisation applies internationally.Under what conditions is a ‘mobilising internationalism’ possible, and what is the role of leadership and framing agencywithin it?When applying a mobilising model on an international scale, certain problems emerge. Marxist writershave persuasively suggested that union bureaucracy is pressured to assume more conservative orientations by its ongoing functional interaction with capitalist society (e.g. Allen, 1975; Hyman, 1979). However, there are also strong countervailing tendencies, either rooted in bureaucracy’s relative freedom from the need to preserve local workplace prerogatives (Croucher and Cotton, 2009; Zeitlin, 1989), or in the strong ideological commitment of officials to left political norms (Kelly and Heery, 1994; Rollinson, 1991). Nissen’s (2002) study of union education showshow a concerted effort to stimulate attitudinal change (featuring a professional labour educator drawn from outside the union) was a critical component in reorienting towards a more ‘immigrant friendly’ model. Such cases may illustrate, contra Moody (1997), the importance of trade unionism’s official structures in generating the political components of international solidarity.

I argue that the material conditions enabling a mobilising internationalism to emerge simultaneously limit its progression into a ‘transformatory solidarity’ as defined by Johns (1998). The precondition for the expansion of solidarity between British and other European workers, which is discussed below, was the need to protect conditions within the regionalised European ‘social infrastructure’ (Harvey, 2006:398) from its undermining by non-EU workers. Fetzer’s (2008) study of EWCs illustrates how international economic integration can prove a basis for international solidarity, within critical limits. Where companies ‘share the pain’ across Europe, they create the basis for ‘risk communities’ in which genuine cooperative relationships can emerge. But these communities cannot simply be defined by this within-Europe process. They also require an external driver, in the form of a ‘shared European vulnerability’ (Fetzer, 2008:295; see also Ghighliani, 2005).

Critical geography literaturesuggests that such communities,which simultaneously generate and seal off solidarities,area consequence of the spatial flexibility of capital. Its search for more profitable configurationscauses place-specific devaluations which engender national or regional conflict between groups of workers (Harvey, 2006; Herod, 2002; Rainnie et al., 2007). Following this, I argue that the material determinant of internationalisation types is the relative flexibility of labour markets. A mobilising internationalism is more likely to emerge where international integration is high, but theseconditions also defineits spatial limits. Moreover, there may also be temporal limits to international mobilisation. Hyman’s (2005) identification of an ‘agitator’ tradition within international trade unionismsuggests that mobilisation tend to be reactive, responding to specific grievances against employers, rather than proactive and ongoing. I therefore contrast ‘mobililsing internationalism’with a more detailed examination of the ‘managerialism internationalism’ that Martinez Lucio (2010) points towards, considering the interaction between organisational form, frames, and material conditions, and its implications for our understanding of these constraints on trade union internationalism.

Nautilus International

The first case study, Nautilus International, is a specialist union for maritime professionals representing about 24,000 members. Information is based on semi-structured interviews with leading officials, interviews with lay representatives, observation of training events, and document research. Data was gathered between September 2009 and November 2010.

As implied by its name, Nautilus has a distinctively international structure, prioritising international affiliations above domestic ones to the extent that in 2009 it joined with Dutch counterparts in a transnational merger. This is a reflection of the unique employment conditions of its membership, which is spread globally across ships in small groups amongst increasingly multinational workforces.[2] This means that it does not have a typical branch and steward structure, instead having only British and Dutch ‘branches’. Nautilus is in a relatively strong labour market position compared to other seafaring unions. There is a global shortage of seafaring officers,and there is also a prestige associated with British officers which is partly historical and partly related to the levels of training and support available. A far greater challenge to Nautilus’s membership base has been demographic attrition. Reduced training commitments, as well as the declining attractiveness of the seafaring profession due to criminalisation and reduced shore leave (see Nautilus, 2010) has meant that the ageing membership is not being replaced by new cadets at a sufficient rate. Gradually diminishing resources, combined with the challenges that membership dispersal demands of the union’s traditional servicing role, define the problems globalisation presents for Nautilus.[3]

The personalisation of Nautilus’s service provision in recent years is in part attributable to a more general ‘decollectivisation’ of industrial relations (see Howell, 2005:131). Education for Nautilus representatives, for example, focuses on the increasingly individualised ‘locus of conflict’ at work and the practicalities of representation at employment tribunals. But this is exacerbated by the increasing dispersal of Nautilus membership,and itsgrowing heterogeneity. Nautilus’s newspaper, the Telegraph, is read all over the world and contains a membership application. It is common for seafarers of other nationalities to join in this manner and there are very few restrictions.[4]Given these increasingly diverse constituencies, Nautilus may in future consider variable membership packages, with some receiving only services such as the Telegraph and legal support as opposed to coverage in collective bargaining (which is logistically impossible on some ships anyway).[5]

Nautilus sees itself as an all-round organisation for seafarers rather than just a means of workplace bargaining, and it thrives on a sense of close community that such specialist work entails.[6]Therefore dispersal and multinationalisation present particular problems. Aside from the safety issues caused by language barriers, Nautilus’sown research suggests that multinationalisation has led to on-board isolation and cultural segregation (Nautilus, 2010:22). Whilst members themselves have been relatively sheltered from the international integration of labour markets, the internationalisation of other strata (typically lower status brackets) has diminished workplace collectivism. Thus Nautilus’s internationalisation process has sought to enhance its flexibility as a servicing union, and the increasing need for the resources to do so has necessitated expanding its membership base.[7]If there is a tension, however, between Nautilus’s membership community and this expansion, it seems to have been negotiated relatively smoothly. Nautilus has expanded strategically, carefully avoiding being reduced to ‘Unite-brackets-maritime-sector’ as one official puts it. Most notably, it conducted an international merger with the Dutch FWZ in 2009, to form Nautilus International.

Merger to form Nautilus International

Nautilus’s merger furthers the two objectives of expanding its member base, and projecting a stronger political voice within a globalised regulatory framework (Gekara, 2009). As Gekara (2009) shows, the merger was initially treated with scepticism, as members feared losing support for local priorities and cooperating with potential competitors for jobs. Constitutionally, it would have been possible to conclude the merger without a ballot of membership, but Nautilus worked hard to give the process democratic legitimacy. Meetings were organised to explain the reasoning, presenting the alternatives as either a cut in services or a hike in dues.[8]FWZ faced a near-identical set of demographic problems, suggesting a ‘risk community’ primarily rooted not in the labour market flexibility of capital but in generalised weakening governmental commitments to training provision. Moreover, the merger also depended on close pre-existing personal contacts between the organisations, both at the workplace level (there are several companies in which British and Dutch seafarers staff the same ships), andamong elitesthrough cooperation within the ITF.[9]

These factors apparently proved persuasive, because the ballot in 2008 saw an 80% yes vote on a turnout of 28% (Gekara, 2009). Senior lay representatives seem to accept the merger’s logic and expect officials to work to deepen administrative integration between branches.[10] It could be argued that the merger delays rather than solves the attrition process, but as Gekara (2009) notes, Nautilus believes the heightened political clout of the new organisation can ensure increased training and recruitment commitments from state and industry,reversing decline more durably. In this sense, a further reason for the merger is revealed: it represents an attempt by Nautilus to engage with these international political concerns directly, rather than relying on a secretariat such as the ITF.[11]

Nautilus and internationalisation

Nautilus has the ability to ‘punch above its weight’ in the technocratic environment of international bargaining and regulation. Many official positions require technical knowledge over the general negotiating skills prized in other seafaring unions such as RMT.[12] For example, the Nautilus Telegraph is widely respected not just by members but also by management as a source of industry news, and officials are often approached for technical advice by employers.[13] Current General Secretary Mark Dickinson was previously Assistant General Secretary at the ITF. Dickinson sits on the Fair Practices Committee, a sought after position on a grouping which co-ordinates the FOC campaign, sets minimum international standards, and where representatives from capital-supply and labour-supply countries try to find common ground.The role of official personnel is therefore an important consideration in understanding Nautilus’s internationalisation. If the merger is its most obvious component, it is the culmination of a process which has deeper roots. A key factor was the confluenceof peoplewith extensive international links and experience within the ITF’s officialdom (such as Dickinson and the now-retired General Secretary Brian Orrell) in Nautilus during the late 1990s.[14] The coinciding introduction of New Labour’s tonnage tax[15] led Nautilus to look outwards, seeking supra-national opportunities to influence crewing provisions, anticipating growth in the UK fleet.[16]

Nautilus’s international expansion reflects a renewed emphasis on recruitmentwhich applies to domestic workers in other sectors as well as international workers. One senior lay representative had retained his membership when moving into vessel traffic services, owing largely to the organisational culture of Nautilus (an officers’ union which emphasises ‘fair play’ with management) as opposed to the T&G who organised the majority of dock workers.[17] This is representative of one section of people Nautilus can hope to recruit in future.But the expansion process is most sensitive when it comes to recruiting workers from lower-wage countries. Nautilus officials refer to the union’s ‘core’ membership, indicating that professional British officers remain at the organisation’s heart. This core does not have a specific definition or confer specific advantages, and it may be that it’s normative importance is eroded in the future.