1
MA Seminar 3301-IfS MIOD 03 (Ewa Mioduszewska)
Face to face and Internet communication. Analogies and differences (semantics and pragmatics)
Four term MA seminar, the aim of which is for the Students to prepare their MA theses and pass the MA exam.
Seminar title: Face to face and Internet communication. Analogies and differences.
The aim of the seminar is a comparison of CMC (computer mediated communication) and face to face communication at different levels, with special focus on the role of conversation in both types of communication. The common theoretical background - P. Grice's theory of conversation, its development in Relevance Theory, theory of analogy, selected literature on CMC.
Field: CMC, semantics and pragmatics.
Topics: (a) social media - description, comparison, the role of conversation; (b) types of CMC (email, chat groups, virtual worlds, Web 2.0, instant messaging, blogging, vlogging, Youtube) and their correlates in face-to-face communication.
Selected references (to be supplemented by references of individual theses)
1.Clark, B. Relevance theory, 2013.
2.Crystal, D. Language And The Internet, 2014.
3.Crystal, D. Internet Linguistics. A student guide, 2011.
4.Grice, P. Study in the way of words, 1989.
5.Frobenius, Maximiliane. Audience Design In Monologues: How Vloggers Involve Their Viewers. Journal of Pragmatics 72 (2014): 59-72.
6.Herring, J:
7.Hofstadter, D., E. Sander. Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking, 2013.
8.Hurford, J. and B. Heasley. Semantics, 1983, 2015
9.Johnson, G. M. (2006). Synchronous and Asynchronous Text-based CMC in Educational Contexts: A review of recent research. TechTrends, 50 (4), 46–53
10.Johnstone, B. Discourse Analysis, 2006.
11.Quan-Haase, A., and A. L. Young. Uses And Gratifications Of Social Media: A Comparison Of Facebook And Instant Messaging. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 30.5 (2010): 350-361.
12.Sykes, J. (2005). Synchronous CMC and Pragmatic Development: Effects of oral and written chat. The CALICO Journal, 22(3), 399–431.
13.Tagg, C. Exploring Digital Communication, 2015.
14.Thomas, J. Meaning in Interaction, 2015.
15.Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. Meaning and Relevance, 2012.
16.Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. Relevance Theory. In Horn, L.R. and Ward, G. (eds.) 2004 TheHandbook of Pragmatics, 607-632.
17.Yule, P. Pragmatics, 1997.
Samples of defended MA thesis topics:
1. Vlog as a comedic sketch: A case study of a successful British youtuber
2. English borrowings in Polish corporation communication (with special focus on e-mails): a case study.
3. Compliments in YouTube comments. In search for verbal and non-verbal clues. A study of selected examples from Zoella YouTube channel.
Methods and requirements.
Term 1: part 1 (lecture – inferential model of communication, analogy theory); part 2 (students' presentations - selected forms of CMC); aim: determining the MA topic, presenting the list of references and collecting data.
Term 2: presenting the first chapter.
Term 3: individual consultations – writing the thesis.
Term 4: MA edition, presentations of the theses (general summary by the lecturer).
Part I: Ostensive inferential communication (lecture)
Topic 1. Ostensive inferential communication: Introduction
- Ostension
-manifestness. A fact is manifest to a person if it is perceivable (by sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste), it can be represented mentally and the representation may be accepted as true by this person.
- Ostensive stimulus
-intentional behaviour (and/or its result), intentionally directed to the addressee.
- Principles of relevance
-relevance of a fact: balance between costs of processing and its positive cognitive effects. Cognitive principle of relevance: our cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.
-Optimal relevance: every ostensive stimulus comes with a guarantee of its own optimal relevance – Communicative principle of relevance. Ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant if it is worth processing and it is the best stimulus chosen by its producer according to his abilities and preferences.
- Processing a stimulus
-decoding: systematic, code-related, recovery of meaning/structure
-disambiguation
-referents’ assignment
-enrichment, constructing ad hoc concepts
-explicature (result of inference in activated mental context)
-implicatures: explicature + contextual premises + inference rules = implicatures.
-Result: recovering intended meaning communicated by the person producing the ostensive stimulus.
Example
John and Mary are a couple. They have an argument over breakfast. John leaves the house, slamming the door and shouting
John: Nice day
Communication between John and Mary, Mary’ comprehension process:
-a fact is manifest to Mary
-the fact is recognized as an ostensive stimulus (2 principles of relevance)
-the stimulus is automatically processed
-decoding x is a day, x is nice
-disambiguation
-reference assignment date, place, speaker, hearer
-enrichment: John states that today on October 4th 2017 in Warsaw the day (concept) is nice (concept)
-inferencing: implicated premises – after an argument the day is not nice, when one slams the door and shouts (suprasegmentals) the day is not nice.
-Further inferencing because relevance was not found: John communicates that the day is terrible (ad hoc concept nice *), John is ironic about the nice day. These are implicated conclusions (speaker’s intended meaning)
Internet vs ftf communication:
-different ostensive stimuli ?
-different implicated premises ?
-different decoding ?
-different positive cognitive effects (i.e. different relevance) ?
Topic 2. P. Grice’ theory of communication ( reading: P. Grice “Logic and Conversation” see reading to # 165)
The Cooperative Principle (CP)
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
The Maxims
Quality:
Try to make your contribution one that is true
(i) do not say what you believe to be false
(ii) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
Quantity
(i) make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange
(ii) do not make your contribution more informative than is required
Relevance
make your contribution relevant
Manner
(i) avoid obscurity
(ii)avoid ambiguity
(iii) be orderly
I. Observing the maxims
A: I’ve just run out of petrol
B1. You can get petrol in a garage around the corner
B2: Oh, there’s a garage just around the corner
II. Flouting (exploiting) the maxims
A. Let’s get the kids something
B. OK but I veto I-C-E-C-R-E-A-M-S
III. Maxim clash (quality versus quantity)
A. Where does John live?
B. In the south of France
IV. Opting out
A. What’s John’s surname?
B. I won’t tell you
V. Violating the maxims
Context: John’s surname is Brown
A. What’s John’s surname?
B. Smith
Standard Implicatures (observingthe maxims)
1. Quality
A. John has two cows
> I believe he has and have adequate evidence that he has
2.Quantity
A. John has 14 children
> John has only 14 children
A. The flag is white
> The flag is all white
3.Relevance
A. Pass the salt
> Pass the salt now
A. Can you tell me the time?
B. Well, the milkman has come
> It’s past 8 o’clock
4. Manner
A. The lone ranger jumped on his horse and rode into the sunset
A. Open the door
A. Walk up to the door, turn the door handle clockwise as far as it will go, and then pull gently towards you.
Non-standard implicatures (flouting the maxims)
1. Quality
A. Queen Victoria is made of iron
A. Teheran is in Turkey, isn’t it Teacher?
B. And London’s in America, I suppose
2. Quantity
War is war
Either John will come or he won’t
If he does it, he does it
3. Relevance
A. I do think Mrs Jenkins is an awful bore, don’t you?
B. Huh, lovely weather for March, isn’t it?
4. Manner
Mrs. Singer produced a series of sounds corresponding closely to the score of an aria from Tosca
Conversational implicatures:
a) Definition
S’s saying that p conversationally implicates q iff:
(i) S is presumed to be observing the maxims, or at least the CP (in the case of maxim exploitation)
(ii) in order to maintain this assumption it must be supposed that S thinks that q
(iii) S thinks that both S and H mutually know that H can work out that to preserve the assumption in (i) q is in fact required.
b) Conditions on calculating the implicatures
For H to be able to calculate the implicature q, H must know or believe that he knows
(i) the conventional content of the sentence p uttered
(ii) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims (tacit knowledge)
(iii) the context of p
(iv) certain bits of background information (e.g. that p is obviously false)
(v) (i)-(v) are mutual knowledge shared by S and H
c) General pattern for working out implicatures
(i) S has said that p
(ii) there is no reason to think that S is not observing the maxims, or at least the CP
(iii) in order for S to say that p and be indeed observing the CP, S must think that q
(iv) S must know that it is mutual knowledge that q must be supposed if S is to be taken to be cooperating
(v) S has done nothing to stop H thinking that q
(vi) therefore S intends me to think that q and in saying that p he has implicated that q
Examples
1. A. Where’s Bill?
B. There’s a yellow VW outside Sue’s house
2. John: Hello Sally, let’s play marbles
Mother: How’s your homework getting along Johnny?
3. Joe teased Ralph and Ralph hit him
4. Some of the boys went to the soccer match
5. Mary is in the dining room or in the kitchen
6. The tree wept in the wind
7. John is an eel
8. A. What kind of mood did you find the boss in?
B. The lion roared
Communicating the meaning - the system of sentential inferences in Paul Grice`s model of linguistic communication
I. Linguistic communication in P. Grice’s theory
Speaker communicated (the meaning intended by the sender)
Speaker said Speaker implicated
(semantics: explicit meaning (pragmatics: implicit meaning, inferential coding-decoding communication) communication)
entailments implicatures
conventional conversational
(language based) (context based)
generalized particularized
(assumed linguistic context) (assumed extra-linguistic context)
Example:
A. Do you think that Mary loves Bill?
B. Well, his brother often asks her out to the cinema or to the theatre
1. Mary exists; Bill exists; Bill has a brother - entailments
2. „Well” ---- hesitation, doubt - conventional implicature
3. His brother does not always ask her out - < always, often, sometimes> generalized implicature derived by the quantity maxim
4.He does not take her to the cinema and to the theatre at the same timeand, or> - generalized implicature
5. I don`t think Mary loves Bill - particularized implicature
6. I think Mary loves Bill - particularized implicature (in a different context it might change)
Features of various inferences: cancellability, calculability, truth-conditionality, source
1. entailment: non-cancellable, non-calculable, truth-conditional, source: words or sentence structure
e.g. John has 3 cows entails John exists; John has two cows
2. Conventional implicature: hardly cancellable, non-calculable, non-truth-conditional, source: words (sometimes sentence structure)
e.g. John is an Englishman; therefore he is brave implies conventionally His beingbrave follows from the fact that he is an Englishman
items giving rise to conventional implicatures: but, therefore, even, yet, however, moreover, anyway, well, still, furthermore, although, sir
3. Generalized implicatures: cancellable, calculable by the quantity maxim from scales of expressions, non-truth-conditional.
e.g. Some boys went to the party implies Not all boys went to the party
Examples of scales of expressions underlying generalized implicatures
<all, most, many, some>; <succeed in, try to, want to>, <and, or>, <certain, probable>, <love, like>, <must, should , may>, <excellent, good>, <hot, warm>, <always, often, sometimes> , <(p and q), (p or q)>, <(since p, q), (if p ,q)>, <(a knows p), (a believes p)>
4.Particularized implicatures: cancellable, calculable from extra-linguistic context, non-truth-conditional
e.g. A. Is it a nice day today?
B. Take an umbrella implies It`s not a nice day today
A. I`m afraid of dogs
B. Take an umbrella implies Then you don`t have to be afraid
Paul Grice: „Logic and conversation”. In: Grice, P. 1989. Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA.
I. Organization of the paper
1. Differences between logic and natural language;
2. Attitudes to (1): formalists, informalists, H.P. Grice;
3. Saying Conventional meaning of words;
5. The Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
6. What can we do with the CP and its maxims ?
7. Conversational vs conventional implicatures.
8. Examples;
9. Testing for implicature.
Ad.1 Differences between logic and natural language
- Formal devices: ~, ^, v, , (x), (x), ix
- Natural language devices: not, and, or, if, all, some, the
Example: and - He went home and watched TV
He watched TV and went home
or - He likes ice creams or cheese
not - The king of france isn`t bald
Ad. 2. Attitudes to (1)
- Formalists: - interested in patterns of valid inference
- formal devices are „better”: allow for (1) generalizations; (2) deciding about
dubious cases;
- natural languages are imperfect: they escape clear cut definitions and truth
evaluation;
- solution: construct an ideal language to secure the foundations of science.
- Informalists: - scientific inquiry is not that important. We understand language without knowing its analysis
- we should look for the conditions of use of the language;
- solution: construct logic of natural language.
- P.H. Grice: - there are no divergencies between logic and natural language. You see that they don`t exist if you analyze conditions governing conversation.
Ad. 3. Saying and implicating
Example: A. How is C getting on in his job ?
B. Oh, quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues and he hasn`t been to prison yet.
- implicate, implicature, implicatum
- say: conventional meaning of the words used
Example: He is in the grip of a vice
- In between „implicate” and „say” we have:
* referent assignment (he(?))
* time specification
* disambiguation („in the grip of a vice”)
Ad. 4. Conventional meaning of words
- utterances (words) conventionally implicate:
Example: He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave
If conventional implicatures fail, the sentence may still be true. They are non-truth-conditional
Ad. 5. The Cooperative Principle and its maxims
The CP: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
Quantity: (1) Make your contribution as informative as is required;
(2) Do not make it more informative than is required.
Quality: (1) Do not say what you believe to be false
(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence
Relation: Be relevant
Manner: (1) Avoid obscurity of expression;
(2) Avoid ambiguity;
(3) Be brief;
(4) Be orderly
The most important maxim: Quality: only if this is observed, may the others be observed. There may also be other maxims: aesthetic, social, moral (e.g. be polite)
Talking: purposive, rational behaviour - an empirical fact
- common, immediate aim;
- interdependence of exchange;
- assumption of continuation
Assumption: talk exchange is profitable if the participants adhere to the CP and the maxims.
p. 142: „I am fairly sure that I cannot reach this conclusion until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”
Ad. 6. What can we do with the CP and the maxims?
(a) violate;
(2) opt out;
(3) maxim clash;
(4) flout or exploit.
Ad. 7. Conversational vs conventional implicatures
S saying that p has conversationally implicated that q if:
(1) S is presumed to be observing the CP and the maxims;
(2) To accept (1) we must assume that S has implicated that q;
(3) S thinks (and assumes that H thinks) that H may work out that q.
Conversational implicatures have to be worked out. To work them out, H must know:
(1) conventional meaning of p;
(2) referents;
3) CP and the maxims;
(4) context;
(5) background knowledge;
(6) assumption of mutual knowledge of (10-(5).
Ad. 8. Examples
(1) No maxim violated
(a) A. I am out of petrol.
B. There is a garage round the corner.
(b) A. Smith doesn`t seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B. He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
(2) Maxim clash
(a) A. Where does C live ?
B. Somewhere in the south of France.
(3) Maxim exploitation
- Quantity
(a) „Dear Sir, Mr. X`s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.”
(b) Women are women.
(c) War is war.
- Quality
(a) Irony: „X is a fine friend”.
(b) Metaphor: „You are the cream in my coffee”.
(c) Meiosis/understatement: „He was a little intoxicated.
(d) Hyperbole/overstatement: „Every nice girl loves a sailor”.
- Relevance
(a) A. Mrs. X is an old bag.
B. The weather has been quite delightful this summer, hasn`t it?
- Manner
(a) I sought to tell my love, love that never told can be.
(b) I have Sind/sinned.
(c) obscurity in the presence of children.
(d) Miss X produced a series of sounds....
(1-3) - particularized conversational implicatures: saying that p on a particular occasion in virtue of special features of the context.
- generalized implicatures: p normally implicates that q (in the absence of special circumstances): examples - a) X is meeting a woman this evening
b) X went into a house yesterday and found a tortoise inside thefront door
Ad. 9. Testing for conversational implicatures:
(a) cancellability;
(b) non-detachability;
(c) non-conventionality;
(d) non-truth-conditionality;
(e) indeterminacy
Topic 3. Relevance Theory (reading: 16 see reading to # 2657)
Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber 2004. Relevance Theory (G. Ward & L. Horn (eds.) Handbook of Pragmatics. Oxford: Blackwell.)
1. Introduction
Human communication – expression and recognition of intentions (inferential model of communication versus code model)
Inferential pragmatics – how H infers S’s meaning on the basis of the evidence provided.
Assumption: utterances create expectations which guide H – expectation of relevance.
2. Relevance and cognition
What may be relevant? Any external stimulus or internal representation which provides an input to cognitive processes.
The search for relevance is a basic feature of human cognition.
When is an input relevant? When it connects with background information to yield relevant conclusions = positive cognitive effects (e.g. contextual implications, strengthening, weakening, withdrawing assumptions).
Relevance of an input to an individual
- Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects activated by processing the input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
- Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
Example: 1. We are serving meat
2. We are serving chicken
3. Either we are serving chicken or (7x134 – 3) is not 46
Effort and effect are non-representational (non-numerical) dimensions of mental processes. The same is true of relevance.
Our perceptual mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions and process them in the most productive way.
Cognitive Principle of Relevance
(Wilson & Sperber 2003: 7): Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.
3. Relevance and communication
Ostensive-inferential communication
- the informative intention: The intention to inform an audience of something
- The communicative intention: The intention to inform the audience of one’s informative intention.
Ostensive stimulus= behavior designed to attract an audience’s attention and focus it on the communicator’s meaning. It creates a presumption of relevance.
Communicative Principle of Relevance
(Wilson & Sperber 2003: 9): Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.
Optimal Relevance
(Wilson & Sperber 2003: 10): An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff: (a) It is relevant enough to be worth the audience’s processing effort; (b) It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences.