Link Cost-Benefit Analysis

Heidegger

ENDI Lab CGLT

HEIDEGGER

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Heidegger 1NC

***Links***

Link – Agriculture

Link – Alternative Energy

Link – Coal

Link – Cost-Benefit Analysis

Link – Economy

Link – Environment/Warming

Link – ET Observation

Link – Guilt/Morality

Link – Hegemony

Link – Hydropower

Link – Mining

Link – Surveillence

Link – Scientific Research

Link – Security

Link – Space

Link – Terrorism

***Impacts***

Internal Link – Loss of Being

Impact – Environment

Impact – Laundry List

Impact – Being

Impact – Genocide

***Alternatives***

Alternative – Meditative Thought

Alternative – Solidarity With Nature

Alternative – Critical Intellectuals Solve

***Answers And Misc***

AT: Cede The Political

AT: Heidegger Was A Nazi

AT: Evolutionary Realism

AT: Permutation

AT: Ontology Is Infinitely Regressive

AT: Inaction

Ontology First

Reps Matter

***Aff Answers***

Aff – Cede The Political

Aff – Evolutionary Realism

Aff – Perm

Aff – Inequality

Aff – Nazism

Aff – Inaction

Aff – Nihilism

Aff – Value To Life

Aff – Reason/Rationality Good

Brought to you by Brendan, Bryant, Chris, Jason, Leah, Leena, Parth, and Sham-wow.

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Heidegger 1NC

The exploration, exploitation, and colonization of space engages in a process of Enframing that reduces the world to standing reserve and destroys humanity’s connection with Being

Jerkins, 09(Jae from Florida State University, Professor of religion, writes for Florida Philosophical review. Heidegger’s Bridge: The Social and Phenomenological Construction of Mars. Technology as Revealer—the problem of enframing

Martin Heidegger also claims that people in the 20th century falsely view technology as a Kantian “means to an end”—when in reality, Heidegger maintains, technology is not a means but rather “a mode,” or “a way of revealing.”42 This revealing that modern technology is responsible for is a challenge, a “demand” to nature “that it supplies energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”43Heidegger uses the river Rhine as an example of the demands of modern technology. The Rhine has been dammed up in order to provide hydraulic pressure for a hydroelectric power plant. This use oftechnology changes our phenomenological perception of the Rhine. A vast ecological system, the ancient source of legends and songs, the home of lush forests and breathtaking castles, has been relegated to a “water power supplier.”44This modern ability to take nature out of its original context of being and reassign it within ause-value technological context is known as enframing. In the modern age, we have begun to reorganize everything around us into technological frames of reference and usage; Heidegger warns that the river Rhine is now a power source, the once mystical German soil is now a mineral deposit,and the refreshing mountain air is simply a supply of nitrogen.45 The objects that make up our world have become resources—subjects for us to master, purchase, and own. We have alienated ourselves from all things and placed them into a standing reserve, a standbymode in which “whatever stands by…no longer stands over us as object.”46 Our general disregard for the meaningfulness of the world is precisely what causes objects to lose any coherent status for us. Heidegger finds that the consequence of enframing, whereby the entire natural world inevitably becomes “orderable as standing reserve,” is that “man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve… [who inevitably] comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.”47 We may shape the world, but the world inevitably shapes us. This is a central point of concern I have over the issue of colonization. When Modernity’s gaze upon the world calls forth the project of colonization, this causes the process of enframing to begin, whereupon we mark the world for our own usage until the day comes when humanity itself may be commodified as a standing-reserve. Heidegger explains, “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such.”48 As objects in nature are relegated to standing-reserve, Heidegger explains, “everything man encounters exists only insofar as it has his construct.”49 Since nothing exists outside of humanity’s construction, we end up only ever encountering ourselves. Yet because we do not realize that the phenomena before us are of our own construction, a distortion caused by enframing, Heidegger contends that we fail to grasp an important existential truth—we can never truly encounter ourselves, our world, or Mars for that matter.50 When humanity gazes out at the world, “he fails to see himself as the one spoken to.”51The dizzying rise in modern technology has precipitated a fundamental change in our perception of objects and, inevitably, in ourselves. By turning the world into technology, human kind turns itself into the world’s technicians. We reassemble and reconfigure the natural world for ourown use, playing the part of the self-made, frontier-forging individual—the modern man. Technology unlocks the energy in nature, transforming the rushing water of the Rhine into energy, storing up that energy, distributing it to German power outlets, and thus revealing the concealed power in nature. This challenge to nature, to stop being and to become a resource/commodity for modern human beings, is how modern technology serves as revealer. For Mars, the prospect of enframing is extremely problematic, given its phenomenological nature. As interpretive discourse directs the narratives of Mars (scientific and otherwise), enframing comes rather easily and often appears as a benign force in the media and public discourse, asking, “What can Mars do for us?” Because the interpretation of Mars precedes any objective knowledge, as illustrated by Lowell’s once popular canal theories, we must proceed in the awareness that Mars is, in the public mind, what is said of it. Heidegger warns, “The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing,” adding his somewhat romantic call to modernity, “and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.”52Heidegger’s point is well-taken—what is damaging to our participation in the world is the exclusivity technology brings to bear as a form of modern revelation. Heidegger explains that when technological enframing takes place, “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.”53 When technological ordering comes to be the only way we perceive the world, then the world becomes revealed to us only through the banal act of securing natural resources, no longer allowing what Heidegger calls the “fundamental characteristics” of our resources to appear to us.54 The Earth becomes minerals, the sky becomes gases, and the Martian surface becomes whatever those with means will it to be. When we gaze at Mars with an eye toward technologically enframing it, we deny ourselves the possibility of other forms of revelation which, given the great passage of time, may come to make our generation appear quite near-sided and audacious—or worse, cause permanent damage to a planet we are far from grasping in its sublime entirety. Heidegger describes the enframing of a tract of earth as “a coal–mining district”; can the enframing of Mars as a natural resource be far from Heideggerian thought?55 To appreciate fully the meaning in this world and of the “red planet,” we must come to terms with our modern predilection for technological enframing and be accepting of other, more long-term, open-minded and inclusive perspectives of place-making.

Loss of Being outweighs nuclear war – the enslavement of humans to technological thought destroys human dignity and freedom

Rojcewicz, 06(Richard- [Prof of philosophy at Pont Park University, translator of 3 Heidegger books], The Gods and Technology; A Reading of Heidegger p.141-142)

Heidegger now launches an extended discussion of the danger inherent in modern technology. It needs to be underlined that for Heidegger the threat is not simply to human existence. The prime danger is not that high-tech devices might get out of hand and wreck havoc on their creators by way of a radioactive spill or an all-encompassing nuclear holocaust. The danger is not that by disposing of so many disposables we will defile the planet and make it uninhabitable. For Heidegger the danger—the prime danger—does not lie in technological things but in the essence of technology. Technological things are indeed dangerous; the rampant exploitation of natural resources is deplorable; the contamination of the environment is tragic. We need to conserve and to keep high-tech things from disposing of us. Yet, for Heidegger, conservation, by itself, is not the answer. Conservation alone is not radical enough. Conservation is aimed at things, technological things and natural things, but it does not touch the outlook or basic attitude that is the essence of modern technology, and it is there that the danger lies.It may well be that conservation will succeed and that technology will solve its own problems by producing things that are safe and nonpolluting; nevertheless, the prime danger, which lies deeper down, will remain. For the danger is not primarily to the existence of humans but to their essence: “The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal effects of the machines and devices of technology. The genuine threat has already affected humans—in their essence” (FT, 29/28). In a sense, the threat inherent in modern technology has already been made good. Though we have thus far averted a nuclear disaster, that does not mean the genuine threat has been obviated. Humans still exist; they are not yet on the endangered species list. It would of course be tragic if humans made that list. Yet, for Heidegger, there could be somethingmore tragic, namely for humans to go on living but to lose their human dignity, which stems from their essence. Here lies the prime danger, the one posed not by technological things but by the disclosive looking that constitutes the essence of modern technology. The prime danger is that humans could become (and in fact are already becoming) enslaved to this way of disclosive looking. Thus what is primarily in danger is human freedom; if humans went on living but allowed themselves to be turned into slaves—that would be the genuine tragedy.The danger in modern technology is that humans may fail to see themselves as free followers, fail to see the challenges directed at their freedom by the current guise of Being, and fail to see the genuine possibilities open to them to work out their destiny. Then, not seeing their freedom, humans will not protect it. They will let it slip away and will become mere followers, passively imposed on by modern technology, i.e., slaves to it, mere cogs in the machine.For Heidegger, there is an essential connection between seeing and freedom. The way out of slavery begins with seeing, insight. But it is the right thing that must be seen, namely, one’s own condition. The danger is that humans may perfect their powers of scientific seeing and yet be blind to that wherein their dignity and freedom lie, namely the entire domain of disclosedness and their role in it. Humans would then pose as “masters of the earth,” and yet their self-blindness would make them slaves.

The alternative is meditative thought.

Rejecting the affirmative’s technological thinking in favor of meditative thought allows unconcealment of alternate ways of being

Joseph, 00(Duquesne University, and editor for the Janus Head, Speaking Differently: Deconstruction/Meditative Thinking as the Heart of "the Faculty of Observing"

From a Heideggerian perspective, the phrase, "the faculty of observing" has significant implications for meditative thinking/deconstruction. If as Cicero says, "Eloquence is wisdom spoken wisely," then observation facilitates the rhetor to speak wisely so as to be able to persuade and stir up a disposition amidst the audience. Heidegger (1953/1996) alludes to this in his phenomenal work,Being and Time,when he writes, "Publicness as the kind of being of the they not only has its attunedness, it uses mood and 'makes' it for itself. The speaker speaks to it and from it.He needs the understanding of the possibility of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way" (138-139). Hence, to be persuasive a rhetor needs first of all to observe. It could then be said that "observation" is thecondition upon whichchoosing the appropriate means of persuasion rests.But we may ask, "Is this not common sense?" It reminds us of the English proverb, "Look before you leap." Yet what is to be borne in mind is that because the rational-scientific framework has permeated common sense so much, it cannot be taken for granted that observing or looking is merely a commonsensical activity. The technological and commercialEnframingof this epoch has such a powerful grip over every aspect of human life that common sense has lost its place as conventional wisdom. Besides, in trying to make human life comfortable and highly efficient, technology has succeeded in creating a desensitized human world.Looking or observing loses its passion in such a world that prioritizes distant, dispassionate and objective observation.Hence, from a rationalistic and technological perspective, observation or looking is detached seeing. The goal of detached seeing is to arrive at certain knowledge and truth. The observer through detached seeing abstracts the essential qualities of a thing in the effort to understand and interpret it. This leads to clear and valid knowledge. But from an existential-phenomenological perspective, such an approach is impoverished. First of all, such a disengaged (detached seeing) activity robs a thing of its concreteness and its embodiment. Second, this process of abstraction/detached seeing (however convincing and certain it is) is oblivious to the context which makes the thing what it is. These two aspects make observation as detached seeing, in the rational-scientific system, a barren and passionless activity. But observation in a radical sense isrespectfor the phenomena. In his essay, "The Thing,"Heidegger (1971b) points to this radical sense of observation which can be characterized as the "essence" of meditative thinking. He writes, "If we let the thing be present in this thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing" (p. 181). Observation as meditative thinking is radical because the rhetor lets the thing be thing in the way it shows itself -- in its concreteness ("thinging") and its situatedness ("worlding world"). But for the rhetor who affiliates with the rational-scientific tradition, an abstract, passionless and decontextualized observation has its payoffs. The persuasion that arises out of such an affiliation is commercially viable given the profit-oriented and competitive socio-cultural arena that every discipline (arts and sciences) has unwittingly bought into. Within such a structure, the skilful and persuasive speaker is one who possesses the skill to convince the listeners to concede to truth irrespective of its concreteness and situatedness. The monopoly over truth at which this approach arrives is gained through a process of elimination and exclusion such that the listeners are precluded from its multiple and genuine alternatives and possibilities. Through such exclusionary means the speaker and all those who subscribe to such a prescriptive approach to truth thereby become the sole owners of the truth by means of expropriation and exploitation. On the other hand, a rhetor (the one who observes with a passion) enables/facilitates/shows how we live and move in truth through inclusive and non-reductionistic ways. This is truly pedagogical and educative for it persuades by "bringing forth"; not because the speaker has a monopoly over truth, but because the listeners live and share in it already. The work of the rhetor is to awaken them to what they already know. It is in this context that epideictic rhetoric is important. We have no new information introduced; rather, the quality of the phenomena is amplified. From a Heideggerian perspective, observing takes on a different meaning as it is based on a radically different assumption. As Hoy (1993) writing on the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger points out: Heidegger's strategy is different from the Cartesian strategy, which starts by assuming a basic ontological disconnection (e.g., between mental and physical substance) and then looks for instances of epistemological connection that cannot be doubted (e.g., the knowledge of the existence of a thinking subject). Heidegger's strategy is to see Dasein as already in the world, which suggests that what needs to be explained is not the connection, which is the basis, but the disconnection(p. 176). The disconnection or the disruption is that which is appealing to the eye of the rhetor who observes by participating.Hence, observation as meditative thinking is to pay attention to the "disconnection" that shows itself in the activity of hovering over as long as we can endure it. To take this a step further, we could say that when the rhetor can endure or stay persistent with this unsettling experience, then the circularity of hermeneutics (through a persistent inhabitation of the phenomenon) gives way to an elliptical movement that is in "essence" elusive and indeterminate. Derrida (1973) calls our attention to this radical difference in what can be called a "project" of deconstruction. He makes an appropriate observation in this regard when he writes: There is then, probably no choice to be made between two lines of thought; our task is rather to reflect on the circularity, which makes the one pass into the other indefinitely. And, by strictly repeating thiscirclein its own historical possibility, we allow the production of someellipticalchange of site, within the difference involved in repetition; this displacement is no doubt deficient, but with a deficiency that is not yet, or is already no longer, absence, negativity, nonbeing, lack, silence. Neither matter nor form, it is nothing that any philosopheme, that is, any dialectic, however determinate, can capture. It is an ellipsis of both meaning and form; it is neither plenary speech nor perfectly circular. More and less, neither more nor less -- it is perhaps an entirely different question. (p. 128) On the part of the rhetor who endures, the latter movement allows for a "re-cognition" of this elusive and disruptive/displacing nature of that which shows itself. In this sense, observation as meditative thinking/deconstruction isrespectfor the phenomena. In such a movement, we could contend with John D. Caputo (1987) that the observer-participant rhetor is never in a privileged position or the sole owner in regard to what shows itself in meditative thinking/deconstruction. He observes: In an a-lethic view, whatever shows itself, whatever comes forth, issues from hidden depths. We know we cannot touch bottom here, that we cannot squeeze what stirs here between our conceptual hands, cannot get it within our grip, cannot seize it round about. The mystery is self-withdrawing, self-sheltering. And that is what gives rise to respect. (p. 276)Hence, in Heideggerian terms, observation could be seen as akin to letting go or "letting be," which is radical detachment or detached attachment. The genuine rhetor is one who cultivates a respectful disposition as regards the "faculty of observing" and "the available means of persuasion" vis-à-vis that which needs to be spoken about.

***Links***

Link – Agriculture

Mass annihilation is analogous to modern agriculture—both use technological thought to produce things, either human bodies or food

Athaniasou, 03(Athena-, Technologies of Humanness, Aporias of Biopolitics, and the Cut Body of Humanity, A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 125-162