Advanced Topics in Metaphysics

Metaphysics, ‘the science of Being’, aims to describe Reality at the highest level of generality. This module asks whether there really exist such common-sense entities as materialbodiesand persons, and raises some sceptical doubts about them. Then we ask aboutfacts and events: do these ‘philosophical’ entities really exist? We proceed by seeking ‘criteria of identity’ for each of these categories:

  • 1) Material Objects. A ‘criterion of identity’ for material objects is a non-trivial necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of the material objects x and y. If x and y occupy the same places at the same times throughout their existence, does it follow that x = y?
  • 2) Personal Identity. In what does the identity of persons consist?
  • 3) Facts and Events. Are there such entities as facts, or such entities as events? If so, what is their criterion of identity? We look at the motivation for facts and events in the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the theory of Causation. Then we study three theories of events, namely Kim’s theory, which treats events as facts; Davidson’s theory, which treats events as spatio-temporal particulars individuated by their causes and effects; and Lewis’s theory, which treats events as regions of spacetime.

Lectures:The lectures for this module will be held in **, on Thursdays from 6-7pm in the Autumn Term. The lecturer is Dr. Keith Hossack ().

Seminars:The seminarsfor this module will be held in **, on Thursdays from 7-8pm in the Autumn Term. They will be led by the lecturer and by **.

Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion. One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not worry if you have not fully understood it in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in the seminar discussion. In addition, there are further readings listed for each essay topic.

Assessment (BA): This module is assessed by a two-hour exam in the Summer Term. You may also write up to two essays during the course, taken from the titles below, and receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can be useful practice for the exam. You should submit the first such essay by the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last seminar of term. [Notes: 1) You are welcome to submit an essay earlier than these dates; 2) the seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay more than once.]

Essay (MA): This module is assessed by two essays of a combined total of around 3,500 words. These must be written in response to two of the set questions listed below, except with permission from the module convenor. For details concerning submission of the essays, including deadlines, see the MA Handbook.

Moodle: Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.

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Seminar Questions and Readings

Week 1.Criteria of Identity

Seminar question: ‘Does every species of object have its own criterion of identity?’

  • Lowe, E 1989. ‘What is a criterion of identity?’ The Philosophical QuarterlyVol. 39, No. 154: 1-21.

Week 2.Identity of material objects

Seminar question: ‘Are there non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of a material object?’

  • Reading. Shoemaker, S 1979. ‘Identity, Properties, and Causality’Midwest Studies In Philosophy Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 321–342.

Week 3. Vague identity

Seminar question: ‘Are there any borderline cases of identity?’

  • Evans G, 1978. ‘Vague Objects’. Analysis1978 p208

Week 4.Contingent identity

Seminar question: ‘Suppose that you and your body are in fact identical. Might you nevertheless have had a different body?’

  • Lewis, D 1971. ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’. Journal of PhilosophyVol. 68, No. 7, Apr. 8, 1971 203-211

Week 5. Personal identity

Seminar question: ‘What is it that matters in survival?’

  • Parfit, D ‘Personal Identity’. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1. (Jan., 1971), pp. 3-27.

Week 6. Truth and fact

Seminar question: ‘If a sentence is true, must there exist a corresponding fact?’

  • Russell, B 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read Chapter XII. (Widely available free online.)

Week 7. Property exemplifications

Seminar question:‘“Events are property exemplifications.” What does this mean? Is it true?’

  • Kim, J., 1976. ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’, in M. Brand and D. Walton (eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 159–77. Reprinted in Kim’s Supervenience and Mind; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.

Week 8. Causation

Seminar question:‘Assess the suggestion that, if e would not have occurred without c, then c is a cause of e.’

  • Lewis, D. K., 1973. ‘Causation’. Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-67.

Week 9. Events as the causal relata

Seminar question: ‘Does Davidson make a convincing case for the existence of events?’

  • Davidson, D., 1967. ‘Causal Relations’. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703.

Week 10. What is an event?

Seminar question: ‘An event is a … class of spatiotemporal regions’. (Lewis) Is it?

  • Lewis, D. K., 1986. ‘Events’, in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. pp. 241–69. (Available on Oxford Scholarship Online.)

Essay Titles and Readings

1)If x and y are material objects which throughout their existence are in exactly the same places at exactly the same times, does it follow that x = y?

  • Gibbard, A., 1975. ‘Contingent identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187 –221.

2)Can a materialist give a satisfactory criterion of personal identity?

  • Shoemaker, S 1984. ‘Personal Identity’in S Shoemaker and R Swinburne, Personal Identity, Oxford; Basil Blackwell.

3)What is an event? What is the criterion of identity for events?

  • Davidson D, 2001. ‘The Individuation of Events’. Chapter 8 of his Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available on Oxford Scholarship Online.

4)What is a ‘criterion of identity’? Does singular reference require a criterion of identity?

  • Lowe, E 1989. ‘What is a criterion of identity?’ The Philosophical QuarterlyVol. 39, No. 154: 1-21.

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