2

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 4-665 / 03-1925

Filed November 15, 2004

JOANN K. SNYDER-MURPHY, Surviving Spouse of DONALD J. MURPHY, Deceased,

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.

CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS (CEDAR RAPIDS WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FACILITY),

Respondent-Appellee.

2

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.

Petitioner appeals the district court decision affirming the workers’ compensation commissioner’s determination that she did not have a common-law marriage with decedent. AFFIRMED.

J. Richard Johnson of White & Johnson, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

James Flitz, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.


HUITINK, P.J.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Donald Murphy died on May 16, 2000, from an injury he received during his employment with the City of Cedar Rapids. At the time of his death, Donald had been cohabiting for nearly four years with Joann Snyder.[1] Joann filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking surviving spouse benefits on the ground that she and Donald had a common-law marriage.

After an administrative hearing, the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found:

[A]lthough it was clearly established that Joann and Donald were a loving couple that closely shared their lives, and their hopes, they consistently viewed themselves as unmarried at the time of his death as evidenced by a vast majority of their employment and property documents offered into evidence. More importantly, although some family and friends may have considered them to be married, neither Donald nor Joann held themselves out as being married to any governmental entity or the public. The first publication that Joann was Donald’s spouse occurred at Donald’s funeral probably out of sympathy for Joann’s bereavement. While many married women today choose to keep their married names for professional reasons, Joann chose to change her name only shortly before initiating her legal claims against the City of Cedar Rapids. While many persons today choose to live and share their lives with another person . . . , just doing so does not create a legal and binding marriage relationship with all of the rights and responsibilities under law that flow from such a relationship. If anything, these cohabiting persons may be choosing by doing so outside of a formal marriage, to avoid such a legal relationship.

The deputy concluded Donald and Joann did not have a common-law marriage and Joann was not entitled to surviving spouse benefits under workers’ compensation law. The deputy’s decision was adopted by the interim workers’ compensation commissioner.

Joann filed a petition for judicial review. The court determined the commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court stated it had “thoroughly reviewed the record, and ha[d] no doubt that Petitioner and Murphy had a solid foundation as a couple and shared an enjoyable life together. However, their commitment does not rise to the level of common-law marriage.” Joann appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s decision on judicial review for correction of errors at law. Heartland Express v. Gardner, 675 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 2003). We apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2001) in our review of workers’ compensation decisions. R.R. Donnelly & Sons v. Barnett, 670 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa 2003). The commissioner’s decision may be reversed if it is unsupported by substantial evidence in the record or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would support contrary inferences. University of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).

III. Common-Law Marriage

Joann claims the commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. She also claims the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Joann contends, “the record clearly contains substantial evidence supporting the finding that Donald and Joann intended to be married.” She points to evidence that members of Donald’s family considered her to be Donald’s spouse, and that Donald would sometimes refer to her as “honey,” “my ball and chain,” or “wife.”

Although a common-law marriage is as valid as a ceremonial marriage in Iowa, there is no public policy favoring common-law marriage. In re Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 2004). “[C]laims of common law marriage are carefully scrutinized and the burden of proof rests with the party asserting the claim.” Id. Where one party is deceased, the party asserting a common-law marriage must provide proof by a preponderance of clear, consistent, and convincing evidence. Conklin v. MacMillan Oil Co., 557 N.W.2d 102, 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

The three elements of a common-law marriage are: (1) the present intent and agreement to be married; (2) continuous cohabitation; and (3) public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. Martin, 681 N.W.2d at 617. The public declaration or holding out to the public is considered to be the acid test of a common-law marriage. In re Marriage of Winegard, 257 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 1977). “In other words, there can be no secret common-law marriage.” In re Estate of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Iowa 1975).

Joann presented evidence that, among his friends, Donald sometimes referred to her as his wife. When the parties bought a house, when they filed their taxes, and for all work-related purposes, however, the parties did not present themselves as a married couple. Also, Joann and Donald had separate finances; there was no commingling of funds. Joann admitted Donald did not present her as his wife to people she did not know. When Joann introduced Donald to people, she introduced him as “Murph,” not as her husband. When Donald was in the hospital, Joann stated she was Donald’s girlfriend or fiancé. Also, in Donald’s obituary, Joann asked to be listed as Donald’s best friend. Looking at the evidence as a whole, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner’s decision determining Joann failed to present clear, consistent, and convincing evidence that there was a common-law marriage.

We note the mere fact that the commissioner could draw inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence does not mean the commissioner’s decision lacks substantial support. Kostelac v. Feldman’s, Inc., 497 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Iowa 1993). The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether it supports the findings the commissioner actually made. Acuity Ins. v. Foreman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 220 (Iowa 2004) (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 420 (Iowa 2001)).

For the same reasons we found the commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we also find the commissioner’s decision was not unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

We affirm the decision of the district court and the workers’ compensation commissioner.

AFFIRMED.

[1] Although Joann brought this suit as Joann K. Snyder-Murphy, she testified she had not legally changed her name from Joann K. Snyder. Joann began calling herself Joann K. Snyder-Murphy after Donald’s death.