Liem 1

Contents

I. Introduction……………..………………………………………………………………………2

II. Methodology………..……...…………………………………………………………………..3

III. COP Operations: The Current and FutureNeed………..…………………..…………………4

COP Construction…………………...…………………………………………………….4

Wanat: A Painful COP Building Experience……...………………………………………6

IV. The Collapsible Fighting Position Design…………..………………………………………...8

Current Alternatives………..………………………………………………………..…….9

How the Collapsible Fighting Position Works…………..………………………………10

V. Testing Criteria: Measuring Success………………………………………………………….13

Ballistic Protection………………………………………………………………………13

Stability…………………………………………………………………………………..14

Fast and Easy Assembly………………………………………………………………….15

Ergonomics……………………………………………………………………………....16

VI. Conceptual Counterarguments…………...…..………………………………………………17

Does It Endanger the Rifleman?...... ……………………………………….17

Is It Detrimental to Counterinsurgency Strategy?……….………………………………19

Is the Potential Benefit Worth the Logistical Strain?...... 21

VII. Implications…………………………………………………………………………………23

VIII. Conclusion……………………...………………………………………………………….25

IX. Bibliography……………………………...………………………………………………….27

I. Introduction

One of the major ground-level components of current U.S. Army counterinsurgency strategy is the establishment of combat outposts (COPs) in contested regions. COPs are essentially independent bases inside insurgent-influenced territory that are run on the small unit level, generally by platoons or companies.[1]Such bases allow U.S. forces many tactical and strategic benefits, from providing a secure location for soldiers to refit between missions to serving as points of contact between the Army and civilian populations in contested areas.

Although COPs are run by small units, they possess sophisticated fortifications and operational capabilities. In addition to extensive perimeter defenses, fully-functioning COPs may contain severalbuildings to house tactical operations centers, dining facilities, latrines, and barracks. The downside of extensive COP infrastructure is that it cannot emerge overnight. Since COPs must instead be developed gradually, enemy forces know where they are being built long before the COPs’ final defenses are complete.[2]Consequently, the first 48-72 hours of establishing defensive structures at COPs can be very dangerous for soldiers on the ground, as the soldiers may be required to build fighting positions by hand in areas where natural cover is sparse, terrain prevents the use of heavy vehicles, and enemy forces are prepared to attack throughout the construction process.[3]

One proposed method to increase soldier survivability during COP setup is to provide protective ballistic barriers that can be quickly assembled and emplaced between soldiers and likely enemy avenues of approach. This project seeks to answer the question of whether it is possible to create such a transportable, collapsible fighting position that successfully protects soldiers from small arms fire during COP setup operations in Afghanistan. This is an important question because COP construction may occur in austere environments well into the future, forcing soldiers to defend themselves with hasty fighting positions for days at a time. Current defensive measures such as digging into the ground and filling sandbags not only leave soldiers exposed to enemy fire but also divert time and manpower away from defending the COP.

The collapsible fighting position is still very much a work in progress. The prototype has not been completed, and no physical tests have been performed. As such, it is impossible to be certain whether the design will ultimately meet its intended goals. However, current information suggests that the collapsible fighting position could provide soldiers with transportable, quickly-assembled protection from small arms fire that would allow greater safety and more flexible posturing of forces during COP setup operations in Afghanistan.

II. Methodology

The purpose of this paper is not to prove that the collapsible fighting position is structurally sound or unsound, as pending real-world tests will be required to determine how well it actually works. Rather, this paper addresses the criteria that the design must meet in order to be useful for the Army. The criteria are:

  1. Ballistic protection: Does the material stop small arms fire?
  2. Stability: Will the design stand upright on uneven terrain when impacted?
  3. Fast and easy assembly: Is the design faster and easier to emplace than current barriers?
  4. Ergonomics: Can soldiers effectively engage targets from behind the barrier?

This paper first introduces the challenges, necessity, and prospective future of COP operations in order to establish the potential need of a collapsible fighting position (section III). It further illustrates the challenges by examining a case study from the 2008 Battle of Wanat, Afghanistan. This battle highlights current vulnerabilities in COP setup missions. In section IV, the paper addresses the currently-available, prefabricated fighting position designs and explains how the collapsible fighting position is potentially better designed to counter threats in Afghanistan.

The paper then details the most important aspect of the project in section V: the design criteria that must be metin order for the collapsible fighting position to be useful. It explains why ballistic protection, stability, fast and easy assembly, and ergonomics are vital metrics. It also proposes tests for each criterion that should provide reliable insights as to whether the collapsible fighting position works according to its design.In section VI,the paper explains valid concerns voiced by Army professionals about the feasibility of the project and examines whether these issues render the collapsible fighting position unfit for duty. Lastly, section VIIfocuses on the project’s implications and briefly examines how testing needs to progress from this point forward in order to accurately gauge the collapsible fighting position’s effectiveness.

III. COP Operations: The Current and Future Need

Understanding the origin, goals, and challenges of the project begins with understanding COPs themselves—and the challenges they pose to the soldiers who build them. This understanding reveals that COP setups can be highly dangerous but are likely to continue into the future. Therefore, an effort to reduce soldier vulnerability during these operations is vital.

COP Construction

Combat outposts were not defined in U.S. Army doctrine prior to the current counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the absence of COP doctrine did not prevent combat outposts from becoming an essential component of current U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. A 2008 article in the Small Wars Journal noted that hundreds of COPs existed at the time despite having no precedent in the Army’s field manuals.[4]Finally, in 2009, COPs received due recognition in Field Manual 3-24.2: Tactics in Counterinsurgency.According to the manual,

[COPs] represent a cornerstone of counterinsurgency operations, in that they are a means to secure the population. Located in strategically important areas, a combat outpost provides security in its immediate area and direct contact with the local populace. These benefits are unavailable from remote bases. Although the strategy carries with it potential downsides in terms of increased protection concerns and limiting flexibility, the bases provide a huge increase in overall security in the area.[5]

Admittedly, the field manual’s definition is somewhat vague about how COPs actually achieve the goal of undermining insurgents. Fortunately, this process is described by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute in one of its recent reports.According to the Combat Studies Institute, COPs near civilian populations threaten insurgents by serving as bases for soldiers to conduct patrols (reducing insurgent freedom of movement), tying the Army to the indigenous community (meaning insurgent attacks against the COP might alienate local support), and providing construction and maintenance employment opportunities for the local population (building local support for the counterinsurgents).[6]

The decision to build COPs cannot be taken lightly. Financially, individual COPs can cost over a million dollars to build; the process requires extensive resourcing and manpower for construction followed by occupation and monthly maintenance fees.[7]As the field manual on Tactics in Counterinsurgency warns, “emplacing a company or platoon combat outpost in sector is a deliberate operation requiring detailed planning and additional logistical support.”[8]Yet these concerns pale in comparison to the security challenges faced by soldiers establishing COPs.

COPs in Afghanistan may be established in urban or rural areas.Rural COPs have unique benefits and downsides. While they tend to possess better natural defenses, the logistical and construction requirements to build and maintain rural COPs are more difficult.[9] Terrain is perhaps the most difficult challenge faced by soldiers setting up COPs in Afghanistan. In the rugged, rural landscapes where elevations are steep and roads are poor, construction materials must often be transported by air or carried by individual soldiers; ground transport in such situations is impossible.[10] Without heavy machinery and large-scale defensive materials, soldiers in these environments have to work with picks and shovels to create their fighting positions.[11]

Since COPs are now a major component of U.S. counterinsurgency operations, they will likely continue to be used for the remainder of the war in Afghanistan. Moreover, the overall success of COP efforts during current conflicts may encourage their use in future operations in other parts of the world. The prospect of future COP setup operations means that the collapsible fighting position project, if successful, could be usefulto the Army for years to come. After all, increasing soldier survivability is a timeless problem that the Army attempts to address every day. Unfortunately, losses suffered in recent COP setup missions highlight just how vulnerable soldiers still are in Afghanistan.

Wanat: A Painful COP Building Experience

The inherent risks of COP building operations are well illustratedby the 2008 Battle of Wanat, a Taliban-led assault which claimed the lives of nine American soldiers and left twenty-seven wounded.[12]The example of Wanatreveals several key issues with current COP building efforts that the collapsible fighting position project hopes to address. Among the many factors which contributed to the battle’s high cost in casualties, inadequate fighting positions left soldiers perilously exposed to enemy fire.

The Battle of Wanat occurred on July 13, 2008 as a platoon of the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team attempted to establish a COP in eastern Afghanistan.[13]The proposed eight-week construction plan involved U.S. soldiers and Afghan workers creating an outpost with exterior and interior defensive walls, guard towers, and other permanent fortifications.[14] This was in keeping with common COP setup procedures and necessitated the use of heavy equipment. For the first days of the operation, however, soldiers were on their own to build what fortifications they could by hand, aided by a single Bobcat front-end loader vehicle.[15]The Bobcat was useful for filling HESCO barriers, defensive structures used extensively to form COP perimeters. HESCO barriers are essentially metal frames containing large cloth sacks that are packed with sand to stop enemy fire.[16] While HESCO barriers provide excellent protection, they are large and take considerable time to fill. Such barriers therefore cannot be used to protect soldiers during the initial hours of COP setup if vehicles such as the Bobcat are not present.

It is a tragic and telling statistic that eight of the nine Americans killed at Wanat died on a ridge that had no HESCOs because it could not be reached by the Bobcat.[17] The soldiers manning this observation post had to reinforce their position entirely by hand.[18] Consequently, when insurgents attacked five days into the COP building operation, the soldiers at the observation post had only sandbags for cover.[19]

Ultimately, U.S. and Afghan forces repelled the insurgent attack. However, the tragic losses suffered at Wanat sparked heated debates that are still ongoing. Looking beyond the controversy, it is possible to learn important lessons about COP operations from Wanat. For instance, it is noteworthy that even though a Bobcat successfully filled several HESCO barriers before the COP was attacked, the vehicle could not be used in more rugged terrain. Since some COPs are established in locations that can only be reached by airor on foot,[20] HESCO barriers can sometimes be filled only by hand and are therefore notideal for protecting the initial soldiers at an emerging COP.Moreover, the terrain at Wanat was difficult to dig into, reducing the effectiveness of hand-dug fortifications and making the process of filling sandbags particularly difficult.[21] Given these conditions, the soldiers could have benefitted from some type of defensive material other than sandbags and shovels. Since it is entirely possible that similar terrain will be encountered in future COP operations, there is a legitimate need for defensive measures that do not require exhaustive digging.

IV. The Collapsible Fighting Position Design

The dangers of current COP setup operations in Afghanistan and the likely prospects of such missions continuing into the future create a need for new risk mitigation measures. Whether the ideal solution is a doctrinal improvement or a tangible, physical design remains to be seen. However, a group of West Point seniors representing the mechanical, systems, and psychological engineering disciplines developed a collapsible fighting position that may offer a viable improvement for the current situation.The collapsible fighting position is designed to be modular, lightweight, and resistant enough to be used as temporary ballistic cover for soldiers at emerging COPs. If it works according to the design, it will be transportable by ground or air and can be assembled in 20 minutes.

Current Alternatives

Figures 1 and 2: Defenshield (left)[22] and Protech (right)[23] armored fighting positions

The collapsible fighting position project is not the first attempt that has been made to design moveable ballistic walls. Companies such as Nationwide Structures, Defenshield, STS Security Products, and Protech all sell modular armored structures for military use. Currently-available designs appear capable of performing their intended duties in Iraq and Afghanistan admirably. Nevertheless, the current options do not meet the COP-focused needs of this project. An evaluation of the various companies’ current designs by the engineer team determined that the commercial models are too large and not sufficiently mobile to serve as protective barriers during the initial phases of COP setups in rugged terrain. They are heavy structures designed to stay in place for extended periods of time at locations such as traffic control points; they are not meant to be set up hastily on COP perimeters and removed after HESCOs and other defenses are in place. Transporting and emplacing them on the mountainous terrain of many parts of rural Afghanistan would likely be impossible.[24]

How the Collapsible Fighting Position Works

Figure 3: Collapsible Fighting Position, front. The most recent design of the collapsible fighting position is three panels high rather than the two panel height pictured.

The collapsible fighting position is a structure consisting of 12 to 15 individual ballistic panels held together by built-in clamps and large enough to accommodate four soldiers at a time. 12 panels are necessary for basic stability and protection while an additional three panels can be added for overhead cover.No external equipment or tools are required for assembly. Each panel is made of bullet-resistant, composite glass that is capable of reliably stopping 7.62 x 39mm ammunition, the standard round fired by an AK-47.While this material does not stop higher-caliber small arms fire and RPGs, the assumption is that this is a worthwhile tradeoff since the glass’s light weight makes it easier to transport and since the fighting position itself is only meant for temporary use, to be removed once harder barriers such as HESCOs are emplaced. Because the engineering team has not yet been able to acquire samples of the composite glass for independent testing, it is not known how heavy each panel will be; currently, estimates suggest that the panels will weigh approximately 40 to 50 pounds each. The panels are designed to fit inside a Joint Modular Intermodal Container (JMIC), a collapsible cargo box that can be loaded into the back of a Chinook helicopter or transported as a sling load by Chinooks and Blackhawks. Each JMIC will hold 24 panels, enough for the construction of two collapsible fighting positions.

The following scenario illustrates how a COP setup involving the collapsible fighting position might occur. At the start of the COP building operation, helicopters or trucks would transport the collapsible fighting position panels alongside other supplies and troops to the construction zone. Once there, soldiers wouldunload the JMIC containing the fighting position panels and work in two-person teams to carry the panels from the crate to key defensive positions on the perimeter of the COP. The soldiers would then clamp the panels together and form the fighting positions to protect themselves. From this point forward, they would take cover and return fire from behind the fighting position as necessary while digging and reinforcing permanent fighting positions around the perimeter. The collapsible fighting position would likely remain in place for at least two to three days during this process. Once the walls and fortifications of the COP were completed, the collapsible fighting position panelswould be broken down, repacked into the JMIC, and transported out for future use if still serviceable.

The technical characteristics of the collapsible fighting position such as weight and bullet resistance must be rigorously evaluated according to specific criteria in order to assess whether it is actually a useful piece of equipment. Since these tests are still pending, it is too soon to tell whether the design is capable of performing the mission proposed above. If it can do so, however, it will be a far superior design to other currently-available models of transportable ballistic protection.